Spain remains in 13th position in the 2025 Elcano Global Presence Index and among the other EU countries in the Top 20 –Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy and Belgium– is the only one whose score is higher than in 2024, although only marginally (see Figure 1). The UK, which left the EU in 2020, recorded a fall, part of which can be put down to Brexit. The Conservative government’s post-Brexit foreign policy slogan ‘Global Britain’ has been little more than a hollow promise. The Labour government scrapped it in 2024.
Figure 1. Top 20 countries in the 2025 Elcano Global Presence Index and score change since 2024
| Ranking | Score | Change 2024/25 | Ranking | Score | Change 2024/25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. US | 3,323.6 | +32.7 | 11. South Korea | 408.3 | +13.1 |
| 2. China | 1,980.1 | +82.8 | 12. Italy | 381.0 | -3.1 |
| 3. Germany | 904.7 | -23.0 | 13. Spain | 312.1 | +0.5 |
| 4. UK | 824.5 | -44.0 | 14. Australia | 276.3 | -4.4 |
| 5.Japan | 787.9 | -11.9 | 15. Turkey | 261.2 | +2.1 |
| 6. France | 691.7 | -2.0 | 16. Switzerland | 244.1 | -13.9 |
| 7. Russia | 639.5 | +49.7 | 17. Singapore | 239.9 | +3.4 |
| 8. Canada | 501.4 | -54.5 | 18. UAE | 235.2 | +1.1 |
| 9. Netherlands | 450.8 | -28.6 | 19. Belgium | 209.8 | -21.9 |
| 10.India | 381.0 | -10.6 | 20. Saudi Arabia | 207.0 | -3.4 |
The index, first calculated for 1990 and now covering 150 countries, is the result of adding together 17 indicators of external projection which are aggregated according to the criteria of experts in international relations. It measures the ability of countries to project themselves beyond their borders and the extent to which they are participating in and shaping the process of globalisation. Global presence is measured on three dimensions: economic presence, including outward foreign direct investment and other elements such as energy, services and exports; military presence, which is determined by the number of troops deployed abroad and; the equipment available for deployment, and; soft presence, which is based on a wide number of factors including exports of cultural products, tourist arrivals and official development aid.
Spain’s economic presence accounts for 61.8% of its global presence (50% in 1990), soft presence 26.6% (14.4%) and military presence 11.7% (35.6%, see Figure 2). Its score rose slightly in the latest index as it was able to make up for losses in some indicators, such as manufacturing and culture, with increases in tourism, sports and information, among others. As one would expect, the EU and the rest of Europe together account for most of the global presence (around 55%).
Figure 2. Spain’s global presence index: absolute values and % share in the index of the economic, military and soft presence dimensions, 1990-2025
| Variable | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic presence | 77.1 | 102.2 | 153.0 | 207.2 | 246.5 | 195.3 | 191.7 | 192.8 |
| % of global presence | 50.0 | 54.7 | 63.8 | 66.9 | 66.4 | 65.3 | 63.3 | 61.8 |
| Energy | 25.1 | 11.1 | 27.7 | 38.9 | 37.1 | 65.5 | 51.3 | 45.9 |
| Primary goods | 53.6 | 103.3 | 120.0 | 150.1 | 152.4 | 188.1 | 175.5 | 180.6 |
| Manufactures | 303.3 | 417.2 | 487.9 | 572.5 | 498.8 | 510.5 | 480.0 | 448.0 |
| Services | 372.3 | 439.9 | 534.3 | 663.7 | 647.1 | 591.2 | 609.9 | 686.6 |
| Investments | 73.9 | 135.9 | 462.8 | 771.8 | 1248.1 | 737.6 | 728.7 | 693.1 |
| Military presence | 54.9 | 52.8 | 48.1 | 52.9 | 58.4 | 40.2 | 39.0 | 36.4 |
| % of global presence | 35.6 | 28.2 | 20.0 | 17.1 | 15.7 | 13.4 | 12.9 | 11.7 |
| Troops | 1.3 | 28.7 | 47.3 | 46.9 | 42.5 | 16.3 | 31.3 | 47.4 |
| Military equipment | 456.1 | 418.3 | 364.9 | 405.5 | 455.1 | 323.1 | 301.7 | 267.5 |
| Soft presence | 22.2 | 31.9 | 38.8 | 49.4 | 66.4 | 63.8 | 72.4 | 82.9 |
| % of global presence | 14.4 | 17.1 | 16.2 | 16.0 | 17.9 | 21.3 | 23.9 | 26.6 |
| Migrations | 47.1 | 59.3 | 90.1 | 210.0 | 307.2 | 270.9 | 297.5 | 284.2 |
| Tourism | 271.8 | 242.3 | 317.5 | 358.5 | 319.8 | 374.2 | 454.9 | 487.9 |
| Sports | 30.4 | 99.5 | 44.3 | 96.1 | 103.9 | 117.4 | 105.5 | 113.7 |
| Culture | 7.0 | 61.5 | 92.2 | 104.5 | 123.8 | 235.2 | 217.6 | 250.3 |
| Information | 24.5 | 65.9 | 73.0 | 51.5 | 103.8 | 85.7 | 84.4 | 103.0 |
| Technology | 21.1 | 28.3 | 33.0 | 72.0 | 89.7 | 83.3 | 120.7 | 143.0 |
| Science | 44.9 | 76.1 | 109.2 | 141.4 | 194.5 | 241.7 | 275.8 | 282.9 |
| Education | 22.8 | 48.0 | 83.0 | 33.8 | 88.7 | 95.0 | 125.2 | 176.4 |
| Development cooperation | 108.6 | 144.5 | 149.9 | 215.8 | 394.2 | 117.8 | 171.1 | 227.6 |
| Climate | 119.9 | 139.4 | 154.1 | 202.1 | 224.9 | 228.3 | 236.4 | 321.7 |
| Global presence index value | 154.2 | 186.9 | 239.9 | 309.5 | 371.3 | 299.3 | 303.1 | 312.1 |
| Position in the index | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
The Index measures a country’s actual external projection rather than its power, reputation, or image. Because a strong international presence does not automatically translate into global or regional influence, the link between presence and power ultimately depends on the effectiveness of a nation’s foreign policy. Consequently, the Index reveals not just how present a country is on the global stage, but also the specific nature of that presence
The Index gauges the results of internationalisation, not its means. For example, a country may have deployed a significant number of troops abroad with a defence expenditure that is relatively smaller than that of another country with a smaller military presence abroad. Nor does the Index measure the openness of countries, though it may help to analyse it. The Index considers the external projection of countries and not so much the way in which they absorb the external action of other countries in their national territory. That is why the Index considers the exports of manufactured goods but disregards imports.
Spain’s economic presence is characterised by a strong services sector (75.4% of GDP), a relatively low manufacturing sector compared with Germany or even Portugal and a relatively higher weight of agriculture (3%) than France and Italy. Spain’s economic presence is the key factor in its global presence and largely explains the fluctuations in Figure 3. The global presence rose inexorably until the 2008-14 financial crisis and the Great Recession when it plummeted, intensified during COVID, and since 2022 has picked up again but has yet to reach the previous high (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Spain’s global presence, 1990-2025
The increased economic presence since 1990 has been powered by the surge in exports of goods and commercial services, particularly the latter in recent years, and the expansion of Spanish companies and banks abroad. Service exports rose from €77.9 billion in 2020 to €225.3 billion in 2025, a significant success story that is generally not known, while merchandise exports over the same period increased from €266.3 billion to €392.8 billion. Spain’s global share of service exports is 2.5% compared to 1.7% for goods.
Spain has a hard core of multinationals that began to expand abroad in the 1990s. The outward stock of investment rose from US$15.6 billion in 1990 to US$828.9 billion in 2025. In comparison, Italy’s rose from US$60.2 billion to US$702.7 billion and in GDP terms was also lower than Spain’s.
Of the four largest EU economies, Spain’s global presence has increased the most since 1990, albeit from a much lower starting point (see Figure 4). Its score rose 50.6% compared to 29.3% for Germany, 12.2% for France and 4.7% for Italy.
Figure 4. Global presence of Spain, France, Germany and Italy, 1990-2025
Spain’s soft presence has been on an almost constant upward path. One of the key drivers of the soft presence is international tourism, which has recovered since the disastrous COVID year in 2020 when the number of visitors plummeted to 18.9 million from 83.5 million in 2019. In 2021, there were 31.1 million, in 2025 96.8 million and this year at least 100 million, double the population. Other factors are the progress made in renewable energy –in 2025 it generated an historic 55.5% of electricity– and greater publication of scientific material.
Another key element of the soft presence is immigrants. Just over 20% of Spain’s population of some 50 million is foreign-born compared to less than 3% of the 38.8 million population in 1990. But for net migration, Spain’s population would have declined in the past 36 years as the fertility rate (1.1 children today) has been consistently below the replacement rate (2.1) at which existing population levels would be maintained. Roughly half the 10 million foreign-born population is Latin American, more than in the rest of the EU together. In a country with a rapidly ageing population –life expectancy of 84 years is one of the world’s highest– and more deaths than births (since 2015), migrants are supporting key sectors such as tourism, agribusiness, social care and construction.
Lastly, the military presence’s share of the global presence has been steadily declining, but Spain still maintains a significant number of military personnel deployed in international missions and bases abroad. More than 170,000 military and police personnel have been deployed overseas since 1989 (4,000 at present). Although the Index only dates from 1990, it serves as a powerful indicator of Spain’s profound transformation since the isolation of the Franco dictatorship. Entering the multilateral arena later than other major European powers, Spain underwent an intense period of internationalisation that has seen its global footprint expand significantly. The trajectory since 1990 underscores this historical leap: a nation that was once turned inward now enjoys
