During Donald Trump’s first term (2017-2021), and even more so in the second, inaugurated in January 2025, American democracy has undergone a significant downturn. According to Freedom House, America slipped from a score of 86 points out of 100 in 2017 to 81 in 2025. The V-Dem Institute’s liberal democracy index also recorded a significant decline, with a fall from 0.75 in 2024 to 0.57 in 2025, dropping from 20th to 51st in the international rankings. Moreover, the Economist Intelligence Unit, which describes the United States as a ‘flawed democracy’, awarded it 7.65 out of 10 points in 2025, as opposed to 8.22 in 2006. Despite their differing methodologies, these studies concur in highlighting problems related to the expansion of presidential power, the dilution of institutional controls, and growing pressures regarding the rule of law and public freedoms.
The American system’s main source of resilience lies in one of the characteristics that often hampers its governability: the extraordinary dispersal of power.
Democratic erosion does not necessarily entail an irreversible drift towards authoritarianism, however. The United States still has a wide variety of institutional, territorial, economic and societal checks and balances that curb the concentration of presidential power. The regular holding of competitive elections, the autonomy of the civil and military administrations, the independence of the judiciary, federalism, the political clout of then larger cities, the diversity of the private sector and the strength of civil society constitute seven reasons for being moderately optimistic about the future of its democracy.
Paradoxically, the American system’s main source of resilience lies in one of the characteristics that often hampers its governability: the extraordinary dispersal of power. This fragmentation can give rise to stalemates and conflicts, but it also hinders a president from forcing the main centres of political, economic and societal decision-making to bend to his will simultaneously. Although some of these checks and balances have undergone significant erosion, their resilience enables the gloomiest forecasts about the future of American democracy to be viewed from a more nuanced perspective.
1. Electoral resilience and the role of legislative checks and balances
The fact that contested elections are held on a regular basis continues to be one of the main mechanisms for curbing presidential power in the United States. The mid-term elections being held on 3 November 2026 offer voters the chance of substantially altering the balance of power in Washington and placing fresh constraints on the Trump administration.
At the time of writing, everything seems to suggest that the elections will take place normally thanks to the existence of numerous institutional, technological and legal mechanisms designed to ensure the trustworthiness of the vote and the verification of the outcome. As the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) recently pointed out, a fundamental characteristic of the American system is that elections are not overseen by a single federal authority, since the task of running them fundamentally rests with state and local authorities. This means that thousands of jurisdictions administer their own electoral processes, and there is no single centralised computer system that manages all the results. According to the latest EAC press release, more than 98% of electoral jurisdictions use systems that generate a paper record of every vote cast. Moreover, the voting equipment, which is stored in secure premises, is subjected to testing prior to the elections. Furthermore, a recent report issued by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), a bipartisan organisation that brings together state legislatures, notes that all 50 states undertake audits once the elections are over. While it is true that the Trump administration has tried to introduce significant restrictions on the distribution of postal ballots, several federal courts have intervened to ensure that such restrictions do not apply to the elections to be held on 3 November.
The importance of these elections lies not only in the fact of their being held but also in the real possibility of new majorities emerging in one or both houses of Congress. Although the electoral process does not in itself provide a guarantee of democratic quality, the enduring existence of real political competition constitutes a necessary condition for curbing any drift towards the concentration of power.
If the Democrats were to regain the House of Representatives, they would acquire a considerable ability to audit the behaviour of the executive branch, instigate enquiries and have a significant say in the adoption of certain legislative and budgetary initiatives. Control of the Senate would significantly increase such powers, especially in terms of confirming nominations. In the event of both houses falling into the hands of the Democrats, Trump would face a scenario of divided government that would significantly hamper the execution of a large part of his legislative programme (or what remains of it) and restrict his room for manoeuvre during the last two years of his term in office.
Despite this, the extent and scope of such checks and balances should not be exaggerated. The president enjoys ample executive powers that can be wielded without passing new laws, and partisan polarisation has considerably reduced the possibility of striking bilateral deals. Moreover, controlling one or both houses does not automatically guarantee the ability to place real restraints on the executive, especially when the latter resorts to expansionist interpretations of presidential powers.
That said, the possibility of legislative elections substantially altering the president’s scope for action remains a fundamental characteristic of the US political system. Changes in the composition of both legislative chambers remain a real possibility, and with it, voters’ ability to modify the institutional balance of power.
2. The autonomy of civil and military bureaucracy
The US federal administration constitutes another major source of resistance to the concentration of political power. Its organisational complexity, the existence of entrenched administrative procedures and the professionalism of a large proportion of its employees obstruct the transformation of the state apparatus into an instrument subject to the president’s personal preferences.
The federal administration has undergone profound restructuring during Trump’s second term, initially instigated by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) under Elon Musk. According to figures provided by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the net reduction in the federal civil service amounted to 264,029 employees between January 2025 and August 2026, accounting for around 12% of the total. This contraction affected federal agencies in a highly uneven fashion: whereas USAID lost approximately 98% of its staff and the Department of Education more than 45%, other organisations, such as the Department of Homeland Security, escaped relatively unscathed.
These cutbacks have laid bare the vulnerability of certain federal institutions, especially those that are most dependent on the spending priorities of the White House. However, they have also revealed the difficulties of carrying out an administrative transformation on such a sweeping scale. The procedures surrounding hiring and firing, the powers assigned to certain agencies by legislation and the possibility of launching legal challenges to government decisions have impeded the implementation of some measures.
The story of DOGE is instructive. Regarding the savings of $215 billion announced by the organisation itself, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported major methodological flaws and problems of transparency that prevented it from confirming a substantial proportion of the amount declared. The report issued by the GAO in 2026 found accounting errors in a number of contracts, savings attributed to operations that had never been put into effect and insufficient information regarding costs linked to some layoffs. When DOGE was wound up in July 2026, without submitting a final report evaluating the results of its efforts, it laid bare the difficulties of translating a political offensive against the federal bureaucracy into coherent and sustainable administrative reform.
Interpreting these events as an unequivocal victory for the civil service would be unjustified, however. The loss of specialist expertise and the undermining of certain agencies may well have lasting consequences. Bureaucratic resilience consists not only of preserving the formal existence of the institutions concerned but also of maintaining their professional and operational capabilities.
A particularly sensitive issue in this debate is the relationship between civilian power and the armed forces. At the behest of Pete Hegseth, the Trump administration has brought about changes in the highest echelons of the military and in the Pentagon’s organisational priorities, accompanied by an attack on certain diversity and inclusion policies. The administration’s initial proposals floated the idea of a substantial reduction in the number of officers and a review of promotion criteria and internal organisation matters, raising concerns regarding the politicisation of the armed forces.
Nevertheless, the US armed forces boast a professional tradition and institutional culture that stand in the way of attempts at partisan instrumentalisation. Military obedience to the legitimately constituted civilian authority is an essential principle of any democracy, but this is not the same as a duty to execute illegal orders or the acceptance of essentially partisan considerations in the discharge of military functions.
The decisive issue therefore is not whether the military hierarchy is capable of resisting the president’s political preferences but whether it manages to preserve its institutional neutrality, its professional procedures and its respect for constitutional legality. Although recent pressures have put these principles to the test, the existence of a well-established command structure and entrenched professional standards continues to represent a bulwark against the unfettered politicisation of the armed forces.
In short, America’s civilian and military bureaucracies have shown themselves to be vulnerable to presidential pressures, but also more resistant to being swiftly and unilaterally transformed than might have initially been supposed.
3. Judicial independence and the defence of the constitution
The judiciary constitutes one of the main checks to the Trump administration’s more arbitrary initiatives. The decentralised structure of federal courts, the formal independence of their judges and the longstanding US tradition of constitutional litigation provide numerous opportinities for challenging the decisions of the executive branch.
The current makeup of the Supreme Court, with a six-to-three majority of conservative judges over their progressive counterparts, adds another layer of complexity. Although three of their number were nominated by Trump himself, their stances on jurisprudence do not necessarily ensure unconditional submission to the will of the White House. Indeed, some of the thorniest controversies arising during his second term have made it clear that the textualist and originalist interpretations advocated by some of the conservative judged may induce them to curb presidential powers.
Thus, in the case of Trump v. Barbara, the Supreme Court rejected the president’s attempt to implement an executive order that would unilaterally suppress the right of citizenship by birth enshrined by the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution. Simillarly, in Learning Resources v. Trump, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that his emergency economic powers enabled the president to impose certain tariffs without legislative approval. Other disputes have revolved around the autonomy of the Federal Reserve and the limitations placed on the president’s ability to deploy the National Guard, as in the case of Trump v. Illinois.
These cases demonstrate the importance of the separation of powers and the continued existence of judicial curbs on presidential action. They particularly illustrate the fact that the conservative majority in the Supreme Court does not necessarily constitute a bloc that will automatically accede to any expansionist interpretation of executive powers.
However, it would be equally mistaken to portray the Supreme Court as a systematic counterweight to the Trump administration. Some of their decisions have favoured broad interpretations of presidential prerogatives, while others have limited the possibility of obtaining broad-ranging judicial redress for the actions of the executive. Recent judicial rulings therefore reveal a finely poised balance, where the judges’ ideological outlook coexists with different notions of the separation of powers.
It is also important to distinguish between the provisional suspension of a measure and its definitive withdrawal. A court ruling can delay the implementation of a policy while failing to prevent the executive from imposing it through other procedures. Moreover, in the final analysis the efficacy of judicial oversight depends on the extent to which its sentences are actually obeyed.
Despite these limitations, the existence of an independent judiciary which the states, local authorities, businesses, universities and other organisations can turn to continues to act as a major restraint on the arbitrary exercise of power. Its importance lies not so much in the administration suffering legal reverses as in the fact that it is obliged to give a legal justification for its decisions and submit them to the scrutiny of institutions that it does not directly control.
4. The federal structure as a safety net
The federal structure of the United States probably constitutes one of the most important obstacles to the concentration of presidential power. The existence of 50 states equipped with their own institutions, constitutionally recognised powers and independent democratic legitimacy significantly hampers any blanket imposition of policy initiatives emanating from Washington.
In the US system, states are not mere administrative offshoots of the federal executive. Their governors, legislatures and judiciaries are accountable to their own electorates and play a significant policy-making role in areas such as education, law and order, healthcare, economic regulation and environmental policy. This territorial distribution of power has taken on special importance during Trump’s second term. Several Democrat-run states have turned to their regulatory powers and the courts to challenge federal decisions in areas such as immigration, environmental protection and the funding of public services.
California represents a particularly significant example. When the Trump administration revoked the special authorisations included in the Clean Air Act enabling states to impose more stringent emissions standards on new vehicles, its attorney general coordinated a legal challenge supported by 26 states, counties and cities. The dispute provided a clear illustration of state governments’ ability to challenge federal decisions when they are deemed to undermine their regulatory powers.
Similarly, a coalition of 21 states and four cities, spearheaded by New York, challenged the decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to postpone certain restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions for coal-fired and gas-powered power stations. Another 15 states went to court to challenge the ‘energy emergency’ measures advocated by the White House, arguing that they would allow it to bypass the environmental assessments required by federal legislation.
State-led resistance is not restricted to the judicial domain. California has advocated the continued existence of its emissions-trading programmes and bolstered its participation in international climate cooperation networks. The fact that it has joined the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as a sub-national member is especially noteworthy. With an economy that accounts for approximately 14% of the US’s GDP, California wields a capacity for international influence that clearly transcends its borders.
Such autonomy is subject to significant limitations, however. The constitution assigns exclusive powers to the federal government in certain areas, and federal legislation can prevail over state regulations when their competences overlap. Moreover, the dependence of certain state programmes on federal funding can significantly restrict their room for manoeuvre.
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that federalism can contribute to both the protection and limitation of certain rights. Some states have used their autonomy to strengthen certain freedoms, while others have passed controversial measures in areas such as reproductive rights, the regulation of elections and immigration.
Federalism cannot therefore be construed as an automatic guarantor of liberal democracy. Its contribution to democratic resilience lies in its multiplication of decision-making centres with their own legitimacy, capable of offering political alternatives, challenging federal decisions and hindering an unjustified geographical concentration of power.
5. Checks and balances at the municipal level
The larger US cities account for an additional dimension of the geographical dispersal of power. Although their legal autonomy depends largely on state legislation, city halls wield significant administrative, budgetary and regulatory powers that can have considerable impact on the implementation of federal policies.
The importance of this counterweight is strengthened by the country’s current political landscape. At the time of writing, 67 of the 100 largest US cities have Democrat mayors, and Democrats run nine out of the ten most populated conurbations. Cities such as New York, Los Angeles and Chicago combine significant economic resources, large populations, sophisticated infrastructure and highly developed administrative capabilities that lend them considerable political influence.
One of the areas in which municipal autonomy has emerged in an especially pronounced way is migration policy. Cities such as Los Angeles and Chicago have passed resolutions that restrict voluntary collaboration between their police forces and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This does not necessarily prevent the federal government from exercising its powers, but it may hinder certain operations and force federal agencies to incur greater administrative and operating costs.
The conflicts provoked by the deployment of the National Guard and the intervention of federal forces in large cities have also highlighted the importance of local governments as political and judicial actors. Local administrations in places such as Portland and Chicago have appealed to the courts to challenge certain initiatives emanating from Washington, invoking constitutional and legal limits to federal involvement in matters of law and order.
Environmental policy offers another striking example. A network of more than 400 mayors has made commitments to cutting emissions in keeping with the Paris Agreement targets, despite the U-turn in federal climate policy. Numerous cities have used public transport electrification programmes, energy efficiency and the decarbonisation of buildings to continue pushing the green transition agenda at the local level. In areas such as housing, planning and social services, local governments can also pursue their own policies, which partly offset the consequences of certain changes in federal funding and regulation.
Local autonomy should not be mistaken for sovereignty, however. State governments can curb the powers of cities by means of specific legislation, and dependence on federal and state funding affects their ability to operate. Moreover, the large urban areas do not represent the entirety of American society, and their political priorities may differ substantially from those of rural areas.
Despite these limitations, local power represents a significant counterweight. Its importance lies not so much in its ability to block presidential decisions as in hindering their uniform implementation, preserving spaces for political experimentation and providing alternative institutional platforms where opposition to the executive branch can operate.
6. The diversity of the private sector and the autonomy of the market economy
The size, complexity, wealth and heterogeneity of the US economy constitute another barrier to the concentration of political power. The existence of giant multinational corporations, small and medium-sized companies, professional associations, financial institutions and capital markets that are deeply integrated with the international economy makes it difficult for economic activity in its entirety to be subordinated to the political preferences of a specific administration.
Although certain business sectors have explicitly backed some of Trump’s initiatives, especially in the areas of deregulation and taxation, others have expressed reservations about policies they regard as prejudicial to their interests. Restrictions on migration, the uncertainty surrounding tariffs and specific government initiatives affecting the way markets operate have created acute tensions between the White House and various economic actors.
Migration policy is especially illuminating. The large tech companies depend very significantly on their ability to attract highly qualified professionals from abroad. This is why corporations such as Apple and Google have devised legal protection mechanisms and carried out internal reorganisations of their workers subject to H-1B visas, while others such as Microsoft and Adobe have lodged legal challenges to certain administrative restrictions that affect the hiring of foreign workers.
The most labour-intensive sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and construction, have also expressed concern about the economic consequences of a tightening of immigration controls. Business associations such as the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) have expressed their reservations about the compulsory application of certain employment verification mechanisms, such as E-Verify, and have advocated solutions which will guarantee the availability of workers for their companies.
Despite this, it is important to differentiate between the defence of economic interests and a commitment to liberal democracy. A company may oppose a migration policy for reasons of profitability without challenging other governmental actions that weaken institutional controls. Similarly, certain business groups may benefit from their proximity to political power and choose to comply with its demands. The relationship between the Trump administration and large US corporations has brought this ambivalence to the fore. While some companies have publicly proclaimed their autonomy or challenged specific policies, others have sought agreements with the White House or adapted their priorities to the executive’s preferences.
The private sector should not therefore be viewed as a homogeneous bloc of democratic resistance. Its contribution to institutional resilience is more indirect and structural: the multiplicity of economic interests, the competition between companies, membership of international markets and the existence of financial resources that are relatively independent of the federal state are obstacles standing tin the way of the concentration of economic power in the hands of the executive.
This autonomy does not guarantee that companies will act in defence of public liberties, but it does limit the president’s ability to impose his political preferences on the entirety of the economy.
7. The strength of civil society
The density, diversity and autonomy of US civil society organisations constitute one of the main sources of resistance to any weakening of democratic institutions. Universities, foundations, organisations devoted to the defence of civil rights, professional associations, the news media and civic movements constitute an extensive network of actors capable of mobilising resources, voicing demands and subjecting government decisions to public scrutiny.
An especially important feature of the US system is the existence of private organisations with sufficient financial and legal resources to embark upon strategic litigation against the federal government. Entities such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have the resources and experience needed to petition the courts, mobilise experts and pursue prolonged legal suits. This capacity is essential to understanding the efficacy of the judiciary as a constitutional counterweight: the independence of the courts would be far less relevant if there were no non-governmental organisations capable of resorting to them.
Universities constitute another important battleground. During Trump’s second term, a number of prominent academic institutions have faced pressures related to federal funding, their internal policies and their handling of politically controversial issues. Some, such as Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania, have chosen to negotiate with the administration, while others have turned to the courts to defend their autonomy.
The case of Harvard is particularly striking. The university won several legal rulings in its favour after appealing against the withdrawal of $2.2 billion in federal research funding, which the courts viewed as unwarranted government interference in its institutional autonomy. These controversies have revealed both the universities’ ability to overturn the decisions of the executive branch and their financial vulnerability in the face of threats to withdraw public funding.
Freedom of information is another highly contested arena. In September 2025, the Pentagon introduced new restrictions for journalists accredited to the Department of War, demanding commitments regarding the obtaining and publishing of non-authorised information, even if it was unclassified. These measures triggered a strong reaction from the news media and professional organisations concerned, which challenged their compatibility with the rights enshrined in the First Amendment. The controversies surrounding the withdrawal of credentials and the restrictions on access to certain federal institutions have also triggered court cases instigated by media outlets and organisations concerned with defending press freedoms. Although the court rulings in question have not always led to definitive victories for the media, they have demonstrated the existence of a means of challenging government pressure.
Organisations devoted to the defence of digital rights have also played an important role. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has questioned the automated surveillance and monitoring programmes that social media companies have applied to foreign residents, obtaining the judicial review of specific security protocols devised by the Department of Homeland Security.
In addition to the activities of these institutional actors, there is a broad and longstanding US tradition of civic mobilisation. Demonstrations, protest campaigns, community initiatives and activist networks provide an outlet for political discontent beyond strictly electoral channels. Their ability to influence government decisions is uneven, but they help to keep public participation alive.
It is of course worth noting, in this regard, that America’s civil society does not constitute a homogeneous ideological bloc. There are organisations advocating liberal pluralism and others that actively endorse expansionist interpretations of presidential power. This is why the organisational strength of civil society does not in and of itself ensure the preservation of democracy. Its fundamental contribution lies in the existence of multiple forums for association, mobilisation and funding that do not depend directly on the federal government. This pluralism hinders the administration’s ability to dominate public debate and allows different forms of political and societal opposition to survive, even when certain state institutions are being subjected to major pressures.
Conclusions: the limits of presidential power and US democratic resilience
This brief analysis of seven clearly differentiated spheres of activity provides grounds to view the most pessimistic diagnoses of the future of US democracy to be viewed in a more nuanced manner. Although Trump’s second term has accelerated certain worrying trends regarding the concentration of presidential power and the undermining of certain institutional controls, the United States continues to have a plurality of relatively autonomous power centres capable of challenging, curbing and, in certain circumstances, overturning the decisions of the executive branch.
The US political system’s main source of resilience lies in an extraordinary dispersal of political, geographical, economic and societal power. The same characteristics that often hinder the country’s governability — its institutional fragmentation, federal structure, the autonomy of local governments and the existence of multiple social actors with the ability to initiate action — also represent a significant hindrance to the political system as a whole being subjugated to the presidential will.
Nevertheless, this capacity for resistance should not be confused with a guarantee of democratic recovery. The periodic holding of elections, the independence of the judiciary, federalism and the strength of civil society create favourable conditions for the survival of political pluralism, but their efficacy depends both on the resources at their disposal and on the will of political actors to respect the constitutional rules of the game.
Nor should it be forgotten that some of these checks and balances have suffered considerable attrition. The cuts to administrative capabilities, the pressures exerted on universities, the polarisation of the judiciary and the hoops that some economic actors have jumped through to meet certain presidential preferences reveal that institutional resilience is uneven and subject to significant vulnerabilities.
This is why it is essential to distinguish between three dimensions of democratic resilience: the ability to challenge the decisions of the executive branch, the likelihood of effectively curbing their application and the possibility of reversing their consequences. The existence of court cases, protests and institutional conflicts shows that pluralism remains alive, but this does not guarantee that existing checks and balances will preserve their powers intact or succeed in reestablishing the rights that have already been eroded.
The future of US democracy will therefore depend to a large extent on three conditions: that the elections — and in particular the mid-term elections of 3 November — continue being genuinely contested and that their results are respected; that judicial decisions are respected and properly implemented by the executive; and that the organisations and institutions capable of performing supervisory duties retain the necessary resources and autonomy to discharge them.
From this perspective, guarded optimism about the future of the United States should not depend on the alleged superiority of its institutions or the assumption that constitutional checks and balances will operate automatically. It should instead be based on the realisation that presidential power continues to face a range of deeply entrenched and relatively autonomous obstacles whose existence hinders any authoritarian transformation of the US political system.
American democracy is not immune from the authoritarian tendencies that are increasingly in evidence elsewhere, but it retains sufficient institutional and societal bulwarks to render its recovery possible. Whether or not this possibility can become a reality will depend on the resilience of its institutions and the ability of American society to defend the traditions and practices that have hitherto underpinned alternation in power, the rule of law and the full exercise of fundamental freedoms.
