Key messages[1]
- Spanish-German relations have weakened as a result of various shocks within the EU, although the friction stems more from the reduction of the old asymmetry than from substantial divergences. Spain’s rebalancing generates reluctance in Berlin and other capitals, but Europe’s challenges require this bilateral tension to be overcome.
- In such a context, we propose two lines of action: grounding common problems in joint proposals for cooperation in priority areas, such as financing, security and defence and foreign policy, and improving interpersonal ties between the Spanish and German populations.
- On joint financing, the debate should focus on European public goods in order to maximise the potential of common funds, promoting specific alliances in areas such as renewables.
- On security and defence, Germany should include Spain in informal arrangements, move towards a bilateral security treaty and explore a joint naval project.
- On foreign policy the proposal is to align risk perceptions, strengthen European economic deterrence, coordinate approaches to Israel and Palestine through each partner’s privileged channels of dialogue, and bring Germany along into the dialogue with the Global South.
- Finally, regarding interpersonal ties, greater cultural and educational exchanges are needed, in the audiovisual field and through the organisation of forums with young leaders from both countries.
Analysis
Introduction
The relationship between Germany and Spain is undoubtedly under strain. The awkward episode that took place during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to the White House, when Donald Trump scolded Spain in front of the press while Merz remained silent, exposed the lack of harmony between the two countries. The reasons for this asynchrony are partly legitimate. They rest on disagreements over the management of international crises, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the German perception that Spain should ramp up its support for Ukraine, and the many challenges facing the EU at a time characterised by rivalry between the US and China. Added to this is more recent history, which brings back bitter memories in the Spanish imagination of the austerity recipe imposed and promoted by Germany during the Euro Crisis (2010 to 2012), as well as the persistent perception among parts of the German public of Spain as a fiscally irresponsible and undisciplined economy (more than a third of the Germans surveyed in late 2024 found Spain to be a spendthrift country). All this has clouded the relationship between two countries that, in their similarities, may find more common ground than differences.
Spain and Germany face similar challenges, shared by the rest of the Union. Among them, three major blocks stand out: (a) financing needs; (b) defence; and (c) European foreign policy. However, their approach to these challenges and to the measures to address them appears to be very different, giving rise to irritation and obstacles in the relationship’s fluidity. But it is mainly that: appearances. Spain and Germany are not so far apart in most of their positions. What leads to friction is the rebalancing between the countries. After years of behaving as a junior partner, both in the bilateral relationship and within the EU, Spain has gained confidence. Among other aspects, its economic performance and assets stand out in the transition to a decarbonised economy, which have led the current government to turn Spain into an active participant in the European debate, with proposals and objections on the direction of the EU. It is Spain’s more vocal role, which seeks to contribute politically as befits the Union’s fourth-largest economy and the euro area’s growth leader, that generates reluctance. The reduction of asymmetry therefore entails an adjustment in the bilateral relationship.
It is along these lines that an improvement in Spanish-German relations within the EU is proposed. The scale of the challenges makes bilateral cooperation more necessary than ever and requires a variety of perspectives in order to reach common positions that capitalise on the richness of the Union’s strengths. For this reason, improvements are proposed through two channels: first, by grounding the major problems in concrete proposals in priority areas and, secondly, by strengthening interpersonal ties between the two countries.
European public goods and joint financing
In 2020 the EU faced an unprecedented situation in its history: the COVID-19 pandemic. In the face of a crisis that paralysed the global economy, put millions of jobs at risk and generated chain effects that were difficult to predict, the EU chose to issue common debt. The funds from the NextGenerationEU programme have enabled investments in the ecological transition, digitalisation, support for SMEs and other areas, and forced some of its most reluctant Member States to cross the Rubicon of joint debt, with Germany at the forefront.
Six years later, Europe is not facing a single crisis, but a set of overlapping crises of comparable scale. Europe must take responsibility for its own defence and build up the European pillar of NATO, secure its energy supply through decarbonisation, regain economic competitiveness, advance in digitalisation, strengthen its innovation system and adapt to demographic change. All this while 12 of the Union’s 27 Member States have public debt levels above 60% of GDP and 10 have a public deficit of more than 3%.[2] In other words, fiscal space is very limited, which restricts the states’ capacity to allocate public resources to the necessary transformations, either through surpluses or by borrowing sustainably on the market.
This is where one of the key points of friction between Spain and Germany emerges. Spain calls for greater joint European financing to address common challenges. This translates into a much larger EU budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework, or MFF) and progress towards Eurobonds. The First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Spain, Carlos Cuerpo, has been very vocal regarding the issuance of Eurobonds. Spain has supported the proposal by Olivier Blanchard and Ángel Ubide to replace part of the debt already issued by Member States with common debt, thereby creating a European debt market. Figures such as Christine Lagarde and Mario Draghi have also supported the creation of a ‘European safe asset’.
Germany and the other frugal Member States, by contrast, remain firmly opposed. Their objections are usually based on three concerns. The first is shared and refers to moral hazard, meaning that common debt could weaken incentives for fiscal discipline at the national level. The second is specific to the German constitutional and political context: Germany is reluctant to accept open-ended fiscal liabilities without clear limits and effective parliamentary control, not least because of a restrictive ruling by the German Constitutional Court. Such legal limitations apply at the German fiscal level and could be overcome through the collection of European own resources, although original and innovative proposals will be needed in the near future to give new momentum to this idea. The third objection to Eurobonds is linked to financial concerns, since markets could treat them as an additional layer of debt rather than as a genuine replacement for national debt, increasing the perceived exposure in more indebted countries. Germany would also have little direct financial incentive to support such a scheme, given that its own borrowing costs are already very low and could rise under a common issuance model. Additionally, Germany and the ‘frugals’ also oppose a larger European budget, as they made clear in their first reactions to the European Commission’s proposal of €1.8 trillion for the 2028 to 2034 period, and to additional own resources to be collected by the European Commission.
In the face of this clash, the proposal is to redirect and anchor the debate in European public goods (EPGs). These are goods for which market supply is insufficient without public intervention, and that must be produced at the European and not at the national or local levels. Doing so minimises the externalities of producing individually, allows economies of scale to be exploited and takes local preferences into account. Working on the basis of these EPGs to overcome financing constraints makes it possible to identify priorities and common objectives, the capacities needed to achieve them and associated plans.
The Commission’s first proposal for the new MFF has been structured along these lines, and this is how it should be deepened. Common European financing should place a particular emphasis on EPGs, making the most of the potential of the funds and avoiding the Europeanisation of national public goods.
EPGs could structure closer alliances around specific public goods and encourage an exchange of best practices based on each country’s strengths. A clear example of synergy can be found in renewable energy. In the first half of 2025 electricity prices in Germany were 47% higher than in Spain, even though in 2024 Germany had twice Spain’s installed renewable capacity and a renewables share one percentage point higher. Germany has a high industrial demand for electricity and a smaller renewable resource supply, which leads to the inclusion of more fossil fuels in the electricity mix and to higher prices. Spain, in turn, has abundant cheap energy, but lacks the interconnections and storage that would give its grid greater export potential. Germany has an interest in the export of Spanish electricity to the rest of the continent, while Spain has an interest in investment in batteries to balance the grid. A stronger commitment to renewables promoted by both countries could mobilise joint investment and political momentum to advance interconnections, which are blocked in France. This would help achieve a significant European public good: greater decarbonisation of the economy through a cheap and abundant energy resource that would give Europe greater energy independence from unpredictable allies.
Security and defence
Another stumbling block in the Spanish-German bilateral relationship lies in defence. This has not always been the case, since both countries have a history of decades of pacifist tradition. Fifteen years ago, only 50% of Germans and 62% of Spaniards surveyed considered force sometimes necessary to maintain world order, but large majorities said it should first have UN approval: 76% in Germany and 72% in Spain. In addition, the German population consistently showcased a greater approval of the use of civilian means over military means in its foreign and security policy between 2016 and 2023.
Security is the European public good par excellence. Until recently, its provision rested on the US security umbrella, but the war in Ukraine has made Europe realise that it cannot depend solely on US deterrence. The withdrawal of financial and military support for Ukraine by the Trump Administration, as well as the President’s threats to leave NATO and to invade Greenland, have forced Europeans to face reality: from now on, our security is ours alone.
For this to be so, Europe must increase its defence spending and develop its own, joint and coordinated capabilities. All this requires, among other things, funds and time. Traditionally, Spain has been one of the NATO countries that has spent the least on defence relative to GDP. Still, its performance has not been very different from Germany’s in relative terms: both Spain and Germany invested 1.1% in 2016, while in 2025 Spain reached 2.1% and Germany only 0.2 percentage points more.
At the Hague summit in June 2025, Donald Trump asked Europe to commit to defence spending of 5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% for defence and 1.5% for critical infrastructure protection, resilience, industrial base development and so on). Spain, by contrast, stated that its commitment would not exceed 2.1%, which it considered sufficient to meet the agreed-upon NATO target capabilities. This positioned the Spanish government as the counterpoint to the acceptance shown by the rest of Europe and the allies. It also caused misgivings among countries that had indeed increased their defence spending considerably, such as Poland, whose spending accounted for 4.5% of GDP in 2025.
Spanish reluctance to increase defence spending has mainly to do with domestic political considerations and the rationality of spending. It is not necessarily related to a lack of solidarity. This was reflected in the data from June last year, amid the NATO controversy: 42.1% of Spaniards considered the refusal to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP to be correct (almost 12 percentage points more than those who disapproved of the decision), with voters of the current governing coalition showing this attitude more markedly. This contrasts with Spain’s solidarity and commitment to Ukraine. For example, in January 2026, 68.4% of respondents in the barometer of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Spain’s public body in charge of conducting social studies) said that they were very or fairly concerned about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while more than a third supported increasing EU financial support for the country. In turn, in March 2026 Spain was the fourth-largest recipient of Ukrainian refugees in the entire Union, although far behind Poland and Germany, who each hosted almost four and five times more refugees, respectively.
Despite these attitudes, there is scepticism over Spain’s actual commitment to solidarity beyond political declarations. Thus, its low defence spending has kept Spain out of some key groupings. A clear example is the E5 group, composed of Germany, France, Italy, Poland and the UK. This group has emerged as the main coordinator of military support for Ukraine and of the reflection on rearmament and the development of joint European capabilities after the White House withdrew its support for Kyiv. Spain was also absent when European leaders travelled to Washington together with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in August last year following the meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska on the future of the war in Ukraine.
In this context, the proposal to improve Spanish-German relations in defence have several aspects. First, Germany should invite Spain to meetings of the ‘minilateral’ formats that are emerging in defence. Specifically, it should promote an expanded E5 that includes Spain (E5+). After all, Spain’s defence budget is the 15th largest in the world in absolute terms, just behind Poland’s. Spain is therefore a key actor for the discussions taking place within it, particularly on Ukraine. At the same time, Spain must be prepared to participate and fulfil what is expected from its inclusion in terms of political contributions, but also financial and military commitments. A concrete example would be for Spain to deliver full Patriot batteries to Ukraine, instead of only missiles, as it did both in 2024 and 2026.
Secondly, Germany and Spain could work on a bilateral security treaty or agreement. Germany has concluded agreements of this sort in recent months with the UK, Italy and Ukraine, among others. These seek to guarantee cooperation and ‘exchanges in strategic areas of security policy’, as well as the credible and efficient development of coordinated and interoperable defence forces and capabilities. An agreement of this kind would deepen security and defence relations between Spain and Germany.
Third, and in even more concrete terms, cooperation between Spain and Germany is proposed to develop a joint naval project. Germany is already involved in such projects with different European and non-European partners in drones, combat aircraft, land combat systems and helicopters, among others. In the naval field, cross-border cooperation appears to be less intense. This is an opportunity for Spain and Germany, where the former’s naval industrial base could support the latter’s needs, for instance, in seabed surveillance. Such a project could have a very positive impact on Spanish German security and defence relations. In any case, the project should avoid industrial nationalism in defence in order to achieve shared purposes and objectives. Thus, strong cooperation between the two sides should be the basis and precondition of such an endeavour.
Foreign policy
Finally, in foreign policy the last three and a half years have strained Spanish-German bilateral relations for various reasons. This paper addresses two: (a) Europe’s positioning towards the US and China in a context of geopolitical rivalry; and (b) the conflict in the Middle East.
The US was Europe’s almost undisputed ally until Donald Trump arrived at the White House, although previous Administrations had already signalled their strategic shift towards Asia. Even so, the relationship was maintained. Donald Trump’s second term, characterised by greater rhetorical and factual belligerence towards Europe, has included exorbitant tariffs, accusations of a European democratic deficit and a diagnosis of ‘civilisational erasure’, support for far-right parties in national elections, sanctions against former European commissioners and threats to Denmark’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Added to this are the withdrawal of support for Ukraine, the proposal of the Peace Board to replace the UN, and violations of international law in operations in Venezuela and Iran, among other events.
In the face of all this, a consensus on the need for European strategic autonomy, both in defence and in other areas of the economy, has grown. And this autonomy is also with respect to a volatile US. Public perception in Spain and Germany is similar on this point. A recent study by Germany’s Bertelsmann Stiftung reveals that 76% of the German population and 74% of the Spanish population consider that it is time for the EU to follow its own path with respect to the US. Furthermore, 73% of Germans and 59% of Spaniards perceive the US as an unreliable partner. In both cases, Germans have more negative perceptions than Spaniards, but this is not reflected in the positions of their respective governments.
One of the main points of friction between Sánchez and Merz has been the Spanish government’s opposition to Trump’s demands: objecting to defence spending of 5%, to the ‘Riviera of Gaza’, to intervention in Venezuela and preventing the use of US bases in Spain for the Iran war. Germany, for its part, initially opted for ‘appeasement’. This position was shared by other European and global leaders, especially during the first year of Trump’s second term. In recent weeks, however, a slight shift has been observed in the German Chancellor towards a more openly critical position, even speaking of the ‘humiliation’ of the US by Tehran.
The distance between the countries can also be seen in how to deal with China. But on this issue, the differences may be somewhat deeper, since public perceptions in the two states are slightly more divergent. The same Bertelsmann Stiftung study indicates that 74% of the German population views China’s growing influence in the world negatively, while only 51% in Spain responds in the same way. As for whether citizens think their country is dependent on China and are willing to reduce that dependence even if it entails economic costs, the results are closer: 80% of the German population and 72% of the Spanish population respond positively. This may have to do with Germany’s very negative experience in recent years with its dependence on cheap Russian gas. After the recent trauma of extremely high energy prices and the loss of industrial competitiveness, further aggravated by the so called ‘China Shock 2.0’,[3] Germany is wary of replacing one dependence with another, especially in sectors where it has long held a leading position, such as automobiles and machinery.
In contrast, Spain stands out internationally for having raised its profile in its relationship with China, establishing itself as an interlocutor comparable to countries such as France, Germany and Italy. It seeks closer engagement with Beijing insofar as this brings greater investment into the country in strategic sectors for the future competitiveness of Spain and the continent, such as electric vehicles and batteries. Madrid is therefore trying to insert itself into the new global value chains, capitalising on its abundant clean energy, attracting investment that creates local value and modernises the country’s industrial and technological capacity. Politically, a stronger relationship with China is framed within Spain’s strategy of acting as a bridge to the Global South, as will be discussed below.
Both Germany and Spain agree that the tension between the US and China will continue, and that Europe’s interests will always be subordinated to those of the two major superpowers. For this reason, Europe needs greater independence so that it can decide on its own future and not become a bargaining chip or collateral damage in geopolitical competition. That independence must be technological, energy-related, in payment systems, in industrial capacity and so on, but it requires clear and coordinated consensus and strategies. Consequently, greater alignment between the two European countries is needed to strengthen the action of the EU and its position in the world.
Along these lines, two concrete actions are proposed to align risk perceptions and work on a consensus that takes all interests into account. First, exchanges between the National Security Councils of both countries. Spain has had such a body since 2013, while in Germany it is a recent creation (August 2025). Both comprise government ministers relevant to national security and, in the Spanish case, other members of the administration, such as the Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs and the Chief of the Defence Staff. They are responsible for advising the decisions of the Prime Minister or the Chancellor on national security matters, as well as for informing strategies. In this respect, a structured exchange between the two Councils would allow positions to be brought closer together on the basis of a common understanding, the identification of shared and asymmetric risks, sources of vulnerability and strategic interests. Risk perceptions could thus be aligned between the two countries, reaching a more complete understanding of the risks and opportunities represented by actors such as the US, China or Russia.
In addition, a second line of action would consist in promoting the joint design of response packages to external coercion by the great powers. Europe would thus build its own economic deterrence. In a first phase, the exercise would apply both to potential pressures from the US and from China and should be expanded to other jurisdictions in the future. Europe did something similar in the summer of 2025, identifying products for retaliatory tariffs in response to Donald Trump’s threat of 30% tariffs. As a novelty with respect to what was done, the European economic deterrence strategy should take into account cooperation with other middle powers, in line with Mark Carney’s proposal in Davos or by the Geostrategic Europe Taskforce. The aim should be to strengthen deterrence through coordination among a broad group of allied countries that share an interest in greater independence from external pressure.
This exercise must be repeated with different actors in mind. As different authors have argued, Europe must understand what its strengths are, in which aspects of the global economy it is indispensable, and what toolbox it has in order to respond to external coercion.[4] This requires a joint analysis of strengths, interests and available resources to alleviate possible disruptions. In parallel, although with a medium-term horizon, the analysis should extend to the precise identification of the areas in which Europe wants to be independent, moving beyond abstract and undefined debates on sovereignty and grounding them in concrete elements.
Another point of friction in foreign policy is not directly related to the rivalry between the US and China. The situation in the Middle East is an issue where Berlin and Madrid are at odds. It is estimated that Israel’s activity in the region since the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 has caused the violent death of at least 75,200 civilians in Gaza[5] and 1,029 deaths, 2,786 injuries and more than one million displaced people in Lebanon.[6] On this issue, Spain has also opposed the actions of Netanyahu’s government more directly and condemned them publicly. This has included recognition of the State of Palestine, describing Israel’s action in Gaza as ‘genocide’ and promoting the suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, albeit unsuccessfully, among other actions. Germany, for its part, is in a complicated situation because of the weight of history and has been much less direct in its criticism. It has, however, pressed for the entry of humanitarian aid through Rafah, continued to cooperate with UNRWA, halted the export of weapons that could be used in Gaza and voted in favour of sanctions against violent settlers in the EU.
However, there is an opportunity to turn the clash of positions into a strategy. Spain, which supports the Palestinian cause and has the recognition of the Arab world on its side, can exert pressure and act as an interlocutor on one side; Germany, which has better and more fluid relations with Israel, can do the same on the other. Both actors can play their cards and their roles as ‘good cop and bad cop’ on both sides, becoming more directly involved in a stable and lasting resolution of the conflict. This would allow Europe to assert a role in a region where it is largely absent, despite a humanitarian crisis of devastating proportions.
Lastly, one area for additional joint progress is relations with the Global South. Spain has acted as a bridge between Europe and different regions of the world with which it has relatively closer cultural, historical, economic or geographical relations than other European countries. Such is the case of Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, even though its colonial past has generated animosity in some instances. Taking advantage of such context and comparatively better relations, it is time for Madrid to continue playing that role by involving European partners more directly in relations with the Global South and not merely representing Europe. Therefore, just as Germany is asked to raise Spain’s profile in informal security and defence forums, Spain should do the same with Germany in the Global South. A good opportunity to do so would be the next Ibero-American Summit, to be held in Madrid in November this year.
Interpersonal linkages
In addition to all the substantive and positional clashes observed, there is an underlying trend that makes it harder to improve Spanish-German relations: the two societies do not know each other. A 2025 survey by the Elcano Royal Institute shed light on the image of Germany in Spain. Spaniards have a better perception of Germany than of their own country, but 61% of respondents had never visited it and 85% spoke no German at all. For its part, another barometer conducted at the end of 2024 found that 73% of Germans had visited Spain (and almost a third of them more than four times). At the same time, when Germans were asked what first comes to mind when they think of Spain, more than 90% of the associations had to do with holidays, good weather and food. This suggests that, beyond stereotypes related to tourism, holidays or the habits of each country, there is no deep cultural understanding or dense social fabric.
To address this lack of knowledge, cultural and educational exchanges need to be cultivated, connecting schools, secondary schools and universities to strengthen the relationship. Work can also be done in the audiovisual field. Spain and France regularly cooperate on many co-produced works; France and Germany, for their part, have a very institutionalised and dense cooperation that is clearly exemplified by ARTE, a specifically Franco-German television channel. Therefore, there is room to develop joint productions that make it possible to present each country in greater depth.
The organisation of a Spanish-German young leaders’ forum is also needed. This is common among other pairs of countries, but not between Spain and Germany.[7] It would be a programme that brings together 15 young people from each country annually, led and organised by the respective embassies together with cultural institutions, such as the Cervantes and Goethe Institutes. Participants could undertake cultural and institutional visits, meet other young leaders with whom to create a network, and thus foster the gradual rapprochement of both societies without incurring an exorbitant economic cost. This is a concrete measure that can be implemented quickly and whose medium- and long-term impacts could be notable.
Conclusions
In short, Spain and Germany face common challenges from different positions. But, as this paper has sought to show, the distance between them is less serious than it appears. There is room to work on joint positions within the European framework on the financing of European public goods, security and defence, and various aspects of foreign policy. At a cross-cutting and medium- to long- term level, actions must be taken to foster interpersonal linkages and contact between both cultures, to improve the bilateral understanding between the societies and overcome classic stereotypes.
The set of proposals, however, share an important caveat that needs to be highlighted, as anticipated in the introduction. To a large extent, the tension between the two countries has more to do with the recalibration of the relationship than with irreconcilable positions. Spain has become the growth leader of the euro area while Germany is experiencing lacklustre economic performance; Spain has the renewable resources to lead the energy transition while German industry is losing competitiveness.
In many cases, the positions of the two countries are not opposed or very different from what they were years ago. If anything, on some points they have converged. What has changed is that Spain has partly shed its inferiority complex. Economic figures and the absence of other European leaders in the social-democratic field embolden the current Spanish government to abandon its perception of itself as a junior partner in the relationship. And this has not been well received either in Germany or in other capitals. Nor does it help that the Franco-German axis, the driver of major political projects in Europe, is not working. That tandem has been seized up for years and the international context offers no respite for it to be reestablished. The EU and its Member States must therefore have the flexibility and breadth of vision to accept political initiatives and impulses, even when they come from the periphery. After all, the Union’s motto remains ‘united in diversity’.
[1] This analysis is based on the discussions held during the seminar Germany and Spain in 2026: good relations in challenging times? in April 2026, organised by the German Embassy in Spain.
[2] The figures on public debt and deficit come from the latest Eurostat data update available at the time of writing (22 April 2026). In the case of public debt, the data are still provisional and correspond to the last quarter of 2025; the reported public deficit is for the whole of 2025.
[3] This refers to the shock produced in the global economy by China’s excessive supply of green goods, which is eroding the competitiveness of industry in other countries.
[4] Some of the analyses that develop and detail this idea have been published by Ignacio Álvarez Peralta (part of the Geostrategic Europe Taskforce) at the Elcano Royal Institute, André Sapir, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard and Jeromin Zettelmeyer at Bruegel, and Tobias Goehrke at ECFR (on the US, and on China together with Nina Schmelzer).
[5] The data come from an independent population survey published in The Lancet Global Health. The survey observes population changes between 7 October 2023 and 5 January 2025.
[6] The data come from a report by the United Nations Human Rights Office and cover only the first three weeks of escalation between Israel and Hezbollah from 2 March 2026.
[7] Some examples are the meetings of young leaders from Spain and the US, Germany and Italy, France and the US, and Germany and Israel, among others.
