Executive summary
The growing presence and proactivity of the Global South involves a structural change in the international system, requiring a strategic overhaul of relations between Spain and the EU and this heterogeneous group of countries. The evidence shows that relations go beyond development aid and are already substantial and growing, not only in trade and direct investments, in scientific and technological cooperation, but also in terms of diplomacy and security. This reconfiguration must therefore be extended to all dimensions, and a more integrated approach is called for. [1]
First, it is essential to jettison reductionist attitudes that conceive the Global South as a homogeneous bloc or that simply address geographical criteria. Instead, a strategy that is sensitive to the political, economic and social characteristics of each country, region and interregional grouping needs to be devised.
Secondly, it is advisable to construct these new relations on the basis of recognising shared interests and values and the strategic potential of such alliances in a more fragmented global landscape. The growing assertiveness of the Global South in international forums and its greater economic and political protagonism underscore the need for a more structured and sustained political dialogue on the part of Spain and the EU.
Lastly, it is crucial to move to a more coherent governance of foreign policy towards the Global South, achieved through greater governmental and multilateral coordination and by abandoning an exclusively donor-recipient mentality. Spain benefits from a unique portfolio of assets –historical, cultural, institutional and economic– that enable it to play a key role in this new scenario.
Introduction
Within a few weeks of taking office, the Trump Administration imposed tariffs on its main trading partners, suspended the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), announced the end of support for Ukraine in its war with Russia and flirted with the idea of leaving both the UN and NATO. These are just some of the measures that, if they were to be implemented in full, would do away with the multilateral system created at the end of the Second World War; a system in which the US, as well as being a cornerstone of the system, constituted a structural ally for Europe.
For at least the last three terms, the US has increasingly become a less multilateral international actor. This came to be more pronounced during the terms of Donald Trump, who has moreover made the country a markedly hostile power, even towards some of its traditional partners.
In parallel, new regional and global powers, largely non-Western and all of them developing countries up until the end of the last century, have been consolidating themselves in recent decades. Obvious cases in point are China, a new world power, and Brazil, a clear regional power. India is another regional power that, after decades of an economic development model focused on its domestic market, is now seeking a greater international role.
Europe, or more specifically the EU, with its traditional liberal and free-market approach, for obvious reasons operates (or operated) more assuredly in a multilateral system of a firmly Western character, which many of its Member States helped to build. Moreover, the current priorities set out by the Union, such as the construction of a more tech-driven productive base, the digital and green transitions, strategic autonomy and protecting its territorial integrity and borders, require, as well as a greater level of integration within the EU, that the Union actively participates in the international system and thereby helps to shape it. Put another way, the EU cannot afford to withdraw. Nor can Spain, which finds itself facing very similar dilemmas to those of the Union, having joined this political and economic project almost 40 years ago.
In the context of (what seems to be) the loss of a strategic ally in the US, still distant relations with India, complex relations with China and overt confrontation with Russia, it is essential, for Europe in general and Spain in particular, to locate strategic allies in the Global South, to which end it is necessary to reconfigure its relations with them. The reconfiguration of Europe and Spain’s relations with the Global South requires, first, a deeper understanding of this complex, diverse and very wide group of countries. The Global South, which may be said to contain 173 territories and countries,[2] with a population of more than 7 billion people (86.6% of the total) and economies that account for more than 40% of the world total,[3] is much more than China, India, Brazil and Russia. They have, moreover, been organising themselves in multilateral configurations, in many of which the countries of the North have not been taking part, at least since 1955 when the Bandung Conference was held. Secondly, there is also a need for a more granular analysis of Spain and Europe’s economic and political relations with the Global South.
Download: Database – Towards a reconfiguration of relations with the Global South.
This Excel file provides a comprehensive overview of the countries of the Global South and their interactions with Europe. It analyses the geopolitical, economic and institutional dynamics of the Global South within the changing international order.
See also:
Roundtable “Rethinking relations between the EU and the Global South”. 28 October 2026.
[1] The authors would like to extend their sincere thanks to Ana Ballesteros, Marta Driessen, Miguel Otero and María Santillán O’Shea, whose comments have resulted in significant improvements to the analysis.
[2] For the purposes of this work the Global South is defined as: (a) all the countries of the Americas, with the exception of Canada and the US; (b) all Asian countries, with the exception of Japan; (c) all the countries of Oceania, barring Australia and New Zealand; (d) all African countries; and (e) in Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, North Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. Although the geographical classification of Turkey may vary depending on the source used, which may place it in Asia or include it in Europe.
[3] Authors’ own calculations based on World Bank data (World Development Indicators); accessed 22/IX/2026.
Image: World map with glowing connecting lines. Photo: Yuichiro Chino / Getty Images.
