This ARI analyses the speech by French President Jacques Chirac on January 19, 2006, at the Île Longue base in Brest, Finisterre, on the subject of France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. The purpose is to determine whether or not the speech contains doctrinal changes and whether it may be interpreted as a veiled threat to Iran.
China is a party involved in the Iranian crisis, both as a leading buyer and investor in the energy sector being developed by Iran and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, which could once again, in the same way as Iraq, find itself left on the sidelines by the players in a deeper conflict. In recent weeks, the crisis has taken a greater hold, while Beijing maintains a conciliatory and pragmatic attitude, which has allowed it to not lose ground in the Persian Gulf, beyond the freezing of a number of contracts. But the region is no longer what it was, and the cautious calls for Chinese diplomacy conceal a concern for the significant interests invested in Iran during the past five years as part of a far-reaching geopolitical strategy
This ARI reviews the measures being taken, in addition to those that ought to be adopted, for Indonesia to develop a satisfactory response to the threat of Islamist terrorism following the bomb attack in Bali on 1 October 2005.
Whether judicial balancing and proportionality analysis are appropriate in cases arising out of the war on terror depends on whether such a war can be conducted under ordinary conditions, or whether it calls for the deployment of emergency powers, or else, whether it calls for the adoption of an intermediate approach consistent with conditions of stress. To strike a proper equilibrium between liberty and security, judicial balancing in the war on terror must be fine-tuned to fit conditions of stress.
International terrorism is not exactly the same thing as transnational terrorism. Neither should international terrorism be confused with Islamist terrorism, even though these terms refer to phenomena that at present largely overlap. This paper explains why this is so, proposes two basic criteria for an analytical definition of international terrorism and applies these definitions to the current reality of globalised violence.
France has managed to fight against terrorism without imposing laws of exception but rather by adapting its institutions to the changes in terrorist practices.
The UK was uniquely prepared for the challenge of an Islamist terrorist attack in having built an impressively integrated intelligence architecture while pursuing a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that hinges on making London and British society resilient and in minimising the risks of terrorism. Despite this preparedness the bombers went unnoticed and got through the security dragnet. The London bombings show that the asymmetric threat of terrorism is not going to go away in the near term –instead it is likely to be enduring in nature and potentially deeply divisive within our democratic societies–.
London and its citizens were expecting a major terrorist attack basically since 11 September 2001. The question was never ‘whether’ such an attack would take place, but rather ‘when’ it would happen. On Thursday, 7 July, it finally did happen. This article will focus on the aftermath of the attacks and the fall-out for London, the UK, and Europe as a whole.
This paper discusses intelligence and domestic counter-terrorism in the UK, post 9/11, with an emphasis on intelligence-led counter-terrorism. It also offers a tentative, initial analysis of the implications of the 7 July London bombings, where there is a presumption of a lack of prior intelligence
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