Key messages
- The narratives surrounding aid have evolved in tandem with the international development assistance system. Thus, the aid story now being told reflects the crisis incurred by the multilateral system and the context of geopolitical fragmentation.
- The narrative surrounding Spanish aid also reflects the national political situation. In this regard, compared with a similar exercise conducted five years ago, the rhetoric espoused by the main political parties with parliamentary representation (Bildu, ERC, Junts per Catalunya, PNV, PP, PSOE, Sumar and VOX) has evolved in various directions: (a) the notion of aid as a tool for furthering national interests (in addition to solidarity) has spread across the parliamentary spectrum; (b) the goals of peace, security, defence and the promotion of democracy have gained centrality; (c) calls for official development aid to be effective and efficient has increased; and (d) although the traditional priorities of Spanish development aid remain the same (Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Middle East) there is now a greater recognition of the need for flexibility and adaptation to a highly volatile environment, which includes its geographical scope.
- In general terms, Spain’s political parties continue to exhibit a multilateral and pro-European stance. Nonetheless, as in the case of the efficacy of aid, there are clear calls in some quarters for the multilateral system to be reformed and improved, thereby ensuring the existence of a functioning and rules-based international order and, in others, various critical opinions about the European Commission’s role in the international aid system.
Analysis
Introduction
Since the Elcano Royal Institute published its analysis of Spanish political parties’ stances on the subject of international development assistance in 2021, there have been substantial alterations both on the international stage and in the domestic political context. In a matter of just a few years –indeed months– the architecture of international aid, the multilateral system, the development policies pursued by both the EU and Spain as well as the very configuration of the Spanish political spectrum have undergone significant changes. This new scenario demands the updating of the previous analysis to identify the main points of consensus and disagreement surrounding development aid.
The Spanish debate largely mirrors the arguments that are being waged internationally. Growing geopolitical rivalries, the fragmentation of the international order, rows about funding and the questioning of some of the traditional principles underlying aid policy have transformed the parameters of the conversation. There is one major anomaly involving Spain, however: here the debate is unfolding against a backdrop of an increase in the resources earmarked for aid, in contrast to what is happening in the largest donor countries.
The incentives that account for the political parties’ varying levels of participation in this reflection exercise have also changed. Thus, in 2021 the prospect of drafting a new aid law focused the debate on what kind of characteristics this public policy ought to have, whereas today, in a context of greater political polarisation, the debate tends to revolve more around the very legitimacy of international development aid. As a result, the discussion is simultaneously both more complex, since it needs to reflect an increasingly shifting and multidimensional international scene, and more basic, because it reintroduces issues related to the political foundations that underpin this public policy.
This analysis first offers an overview of the international backdrop against which the current debate takes place and sets out the methodology used to analyse the stances of the main political parties with parliamentary representation in Spain. Next, it scrutinises their proposals in terms of the rationales and goals of aid, the means, the geographical and sectoral priorities and the role of the European and multilateral communities. The study concludes with a synthesis of the main areas of consensus and disagreement identified and is completed by an appendix that sets out a detailed account of the positions of each political grouping.
International context
The US withdrawal from multilateral organisations, the freezing of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the major aid cuts implemented by various European countries, which in 2025 represented just over 23% compared with the preceding year, have forced a rethink of the role played by ODA, and the same may be said of how it fits in with other sources of development funding and the coexistence of a range of development actors (the public and private sectors, financial institutions and public/multilateral development banks, and such international forums as the G20 and the Paris Club, among others). Various donors view aid as a device for expressing international solidarity while simultaneously contributing to their own interests, whether these be economic and/or political.
In recent years several groups of developing countries have exerted greater pressure to reform the international architecture so that it offers a more accurate reflection of countries’ relative weight in the world’s economy, power structures and populations. An example of their demands is for more in-depth reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such demands call for a rethink of the relations that traditional donors like Spain maintain with their developing partners. In this context, the international community gave a positive reception to the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Seville –both in terms of participation and the launch of specific initiatives within the framework of the Sevilla Platform for Action–, something that has been interpreted as showing that the vast majority of countries, including Spain, remain committed to development and multilateralism.
All this has its impact on the multilateral institutions, many of which, for political and financial reasons, have embarked upon processes of reform. Of particular relevance to Spain are the DAC Review, in which the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is reassessing the limits of ODA, the processes of graduation and the DAC’s alliances; and the United Nations UN80 initiative, which seeks to improve efficiency and coordination between its various agencies. In addition, there has been a proliferation of multilateral institutions led by countries from the Global South, separate from the traditional forums, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
In the EU the political and economic agenda implicit in strategic autonomy creates tensions between, on one side, the fundamentals of European aid such as the promotion of democratic values and respect for human rights and, on another, the defence of European interests in initiatives such as the Global Gateway. The EU’s sole foreign policy instrument (the Global Europe Fund), set to emerge from the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034, will need the capacity to resolve such tensions, equipping the EU with greater flexibility, nimbleness and adaptability in a changing environment and simultaneously providing an attractive offer to the countries of the Global South, in a context of multiple alignments with various world (eg, the US and China) and regional (eg, Turkey and Brazil) powers.
With the enactment of the Law on Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity, Spain’s aid policy has seen the reform of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), its Cooperative Statute and the strengthening of its financial cooperation. Spain has, moreover, located itself in this international context as a defender of cooperation for development and as a bridge between ‘northern’ and developing countries by being one of the few major European donors not to have cut its ODA budget and having successfully hosted the Seville Conference.
Methodology and national context
In 2021 the Elcano Royal Institute ran a reflection exercise involving the main political parties in Spain’s parliamentary spectrum, held concurrently with the debate in Congress from which Law 1/2023 on Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity emerged. This reflection revolved around what the rationales, goals, priorities –sectoral and geographical– and channels of Spain’s aid programme should be.
Seven political parties took part in the exercise –Cs, ERC, PNV, PP, PSOE, Unidas Podemos and VOX– and a questionnaire was drawn up to canvas the essential elements that this Spanish policy should have in order to become a policy of State.
The many upheavals in the international context, as set out above, and the way the domestic context has evolved –with, for example, changes to the distribution of political forces with representation in Spain’s parliament– justify the need to update this reflection. Thus it was that from 2025 to 2026 the Elcano Royal Institute re-ran the reflection exercise among the main political parties in Spain’s parliamentary spectrum, with the goal of identifying the points of consensus (and disagreement) regarding how Spanish aid policy should position itself in the international development system and how it should contribute to Spain’s influence on the international stage.
To this end, representatives of the eight main political parties in the parliamentary spectrum (Bildu, ERC, Junts per Catalunya, PNV, PP, PSOE, Sumar and VOX) were invited to reflect on the rationales, goals, priorities (both sectoral and geographical), channels (bilateral, European and multilateral), means (technical cooperation, financial), values and interests involved in Spanish aid policy.
The analysis set out in this ARI is the outcome of a three-stage process. In the first stage, the content of the proposals put forward by all the aforementioned political parties is analysed. Specific scrutiny is applied to: (a) the manifestos drawn up for the most recent parliamentary elections, held in 2023;[1] (b) the involvement of the various parties in the Congressional Committee on International Aid for Development and, specifically, during the sessions devoted to setting out and debating the Sixth Executive Plan on Spanish Aid for Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity 2024-2027[2] and the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development,[3] given that these are broad subjects enabling the various parties’ positions to emerge regarding the rationales and goals of aid, their sectoral and geographical priorities, and their stances on financial and technical means, on the EU and on the multilateral system; and (c) documents shared by the political parties, specifically for this exercise. Such documents have proved especially useful in a volatile environment where changes have arisen, with respect to the electoral programmes of 2023, in the hierarchy of priorities for some parties.
In the second stage, during April and May 2026, bilateral meetings and/or written exchanges were conducted with the political groups in order to set out and, where applicable, clarify the results obtained in the content analysis. The exchanges with ERC, Junts per Catalunya, PNV, PP, PSOE, Sumar and VOX enabled the results obtained to be fine-tuned, in some cases with additional information, provided by the political groups in question.[4] This second stage also enabled the inclusion of any changes in stance that had arisen among the political parties since their manifestos had been drafted in 2023, given the speed with which the aid crisis in Europe and the OECD as a whole unfolded. The third and final stage saw the analysis, together with its appendix, being sent to all the groups included in the study, for a final chance to comment.
The methodological differences compared to the 2021 analysis may be explained in part by the way the Spanish context has changed. The involvement of the political parties was greater in the earlier study –they took part in the drafting of a questionnaire that was, moreover, completed by the majority of groups– in a collective exercise where representatives from the parties met on two occasions. Despite efforts being made to apply the same method again, this proved impossible owing, first of all, to the lack of an initial response from the majority of political groups and, secondly, to the difficulty of holding cross-party meetings. The explanation for such changes may be that in 2021 there was an incentive in the drawing up of Law 1/2023. The present authors do not, however, rule out the possibility that the widespread atmosphere of tension and polarisation has had a bearing on parties’ reduced inclination to participate in 2026, compared with 2021.
Aid: why and to what end?
The recent evolution of political narratives surrounding Spanish aid shows a progressive but clear acknowledgement of the multidimensional nature of this public policy. In the exercise conducted five years ago, and indeed prior to this, there was a recognition that aid policy was capable of contributing to a wide variety of rationales and goals, but such a perception has acquired narrative granularity and depth in recent years.
Thus, five years ago, categories of rationale that might be deemed to fall under the heading of ‘in the country’s own interest’ were fundamentally part of the positions of the right/centre-right in the political spectrum (who were already advocating, for example, international cooperation as an instrument for internationalising Spanish companies), whereas this way of justifying cooperation has recently become more widespread. Specifically, the perception of cooperation as an instrument that also contributes towards a donor’s own security and stability has become more widespread across the political spectrum. Moreover, both PP and PSOE, which are the parties that have traditionally been in charge of aid policy when in government, subscribe to the idea that aid contributes to Spain’s leadership, to its influence and image in the world, and that it should therefore be consolidated as a policy of State.
This tendency, which is partly in response to the international geopolitical context and is also to be observed in many other countries, encapsulates a significant change in terms of how Spain’s own interest was perceived in aid policy five years ago. What was then perceived as an incidental outcome, collateral to the fundamental motives of solidarity, is now at the heart of debates regarding the rationale and the amount of aid and indeed the very expedience of aid policy.
These perceptions coexist, however, with the persistent defence of solidarity as the fundamental rationale for aid. Indeed, solidarity is among the rationales shared by most parties both in 2021 and in the current exercise, which analyses documents from 2023-26. Nevertheless, this principle, which was once deemed a cohesive and basic feature of aid policy, has now acquired various caveats: whereas some parties have a hierarchy in which solidarity and global justice outrank the country’s own interests, some put this the other way round, while others maintain that all rationales should be secured simultaneously. Arguments have even recently emerged that make the principle of solidarity conditional on partner countries’ fulfilment of certain targets (for example, in the area of migration). In general, a reasonable degree of political consensus on the idea that aid can and should serve multiple rationales and goals coexists with a significant degree of disagreement regarding the types of rationale that should take priority.
The parties also agree on the multiple and varied nature of the goals of aid. In various cases, the goals attributed to aid are aligned with the global development agenda and consequently with is multidimensional concept of development: the 2030 Agenda, the fight against poverty and inequalities and the fight against climate change. In this connection the goals of peace and security as well as the defence and promotion of democracy have gained centrality in recent years. Some parties, however, place more emphasis on democracy and human rights as intrinsic reasons for aid, whereas others put more stress on their promotion as a goal or as a sectoral priority. In broad terms, the country’s three main political parties –PSOE, PP and VOX– are in general agreement about these goals, albeit with caveats and provisos in the case of VOX.
By what means?
Turning to the means that should be used to implement aid policy, and despite it being questioned in recent international debates, a large majority of parties reiterate their commitment to the goal of earmarking 0.7% of Gross National Income to the ODA budget. Furthermore, there is a clear consensus across the political spectrum on the need to ensure the efficacy and efficiency of aid policy by utilising transparency and the measurement of results and impact. Although this idea was already present in the 2021 exercise, it was then advocated particularly by the centre and right of the political spectrum. Now, however, this concern regarding efficacy and efficiency is gaining support across the entirety of the spectrum. Additionally, various parties are also putting greater emphasis on other components of the aid efficiency agenda, such as ownership by countries from the Global South, advocated by left-wing parties with a nationwide presence, and the idea that cooperation needs to go beyond aid.
Indeed, in terms of combining aid with other financial resources, and the development-funding agenda more broadly, the Fourth United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), held in Seville in 2025, ensured a greater presence for both main parties of government in this agenda, particularly compared with smaller and/or opposition parties. In any event, some of these parties already subscribe to the idea of the need to combine public and private resources. Specifically, there is a shared concern on the left for securing an international development-financing system that is fair, with the fair regulation of markets and taxation that goes with it.
Among the methods for delivering aid, the importance of decentralised cooperation as a hallmark of Spain’s aid policy also stands out; almost the entire political spectrum subscribes to this idea, with the exception of VOX, which advocates the recentralisation of foreign affairs. The widespread advocacy of decentralised aid was already in evidence in 2021, although it has latterly gained support, in parallel to the Autonomous Communities’ increased presence in international political forums (such as the EU and FfD4). Lastly, education in development and global citizenship, as well as the participation of civil society in devising international ODA policy are among the measures prioritised on the left.
Where? Sectors and geographical areas
As was the case in 2021, Spain’s political parties are unanimous in consistently identifying Latin America, Ibero-America or Hispano-America as the most important destination for Spanish aid. To a large extent they also agree in highlighting Africa and the Middle East as important regions, with various political parties also placing emphasis on Palestine, the Western Sahara and the Sahel. Some parties additionally prioritise the Mediterranean, especially the Catalans, regardless of their position on the political spectrum, which may be explained by their geographical location.
Two trends emerge in the geographical assignment of aid compared to 2021. There are growing calls in various parties to maintain a certain degree of flexibility in order to fine-tune more specific geographical priorities, depending on the changing context. Secondly, on the right there has emerged the idea of tying the geographical assignment of aid to the track records of partner countries and, in particular, their fulfilment of any migration deals that have been agreed.
In terms of sectors, humanitarian aid is the subject of greater consensus than any other sector, followed by health. PP and PSOE both advocate the promotion of democracy among their priorities, whereas the left-wing parties operating at a national scale, PSOE and Sumar, both prioritise inequalities and poverty, gender and climate change; the latter is in direct contrast to the calls emanating from VOX to decouple aid from the gender, environmental and 2030 agendas.
Aid policy in its geopolitical context: multilateralism and the EU
Commitment to multilateralism receives almost unanimous support among Spain’s political parties –with the exception of VOX, which generally favours bilateralism– and the same applies to the perception of the United Nations system as a mechanism for maintaining peace, for responding to global problems and for the deployment of efforts around the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Nevertheless, the political commitment to honouring multilateral undertakings, which is perceived in general terms as an important part of fulfilling Spain’s role in the world, coexists with clear calls to reform, bolster and improve the self-same system, such that a rules-based and functional international order may be ensured. The exception in this regard is VOX, which links Spain’s membership of every international body to its ability to safeguard Spain’s national interests and its use of Spanish taxpayers’ money, and also advocates the national government’s full recovery of powers in international relations, currently being partly shared with the EU.
With regard to this European dimension of Spanish aid policy, the parties emphasise both the need to forge European alliances that enable Spain to align itself with its European neighbours and amplify its voice, and a critical perception of the European Commission’s role in issues involving EU relations with partner countries. Indeed, the parties at both ends of the parliamentary political spectrum are induced by the latter consideration to advocate greater distancing on the part of Spain from EU foreign policy, although for very different reasons at the two ends of the spectrum. The regionalist parties, meanwhile, are unanimous in calling for devolved aid policy.
Conclusions
The recent transformations in the international and national contexts have altered the framework in which international development aid is debated in Spain. Against this backdrop, the analysis of the main political parties’ stances shows an increasing acceptance of the multidimensional nature of aid policy. Solidarity continues to be the core element when explaining the rationale of this public policy, but it increasingly coexists with arguments related to security, stability, international influence and the safeguarding of national interests. Similarly, the goals attributed to aid have broadened and diversified, and now more emphatically include such issues as democracy, peace and security, in addition to such traditional issues as the fight against poverty, inequalities and climate change.
Although widespread support for the target of earmarking 0.7% of Gross National Income to ODA remains, concern about efficacy, efficiency and accountability has increased. There is also greater debate surrounding the deployment of private resources and the funding of development in ways that extend beyond aid.
There is a wide consensus regarding the geographical priority in Latin America, along with Africa and the Middle East, while humanitarian aid and health stand out among the sectors that attract most agreement. Lastly, the commitment to multilateralism and the idea of the EU as a key political forum for Spanish aid are also widely shared. There are, however, calls for reform, as well as competing perceptions of the degree of alignment that Spanish aid ought to have with the European and international institutions.
The main areas of consensus between the parties involve the perception of aid as an instrument with multiple goals, adherence to the 0.7% commitment, the importance of the efficacy of aid, the priority of Latin America, the value of humanitarian aid and general support for multilateralism. The main disagreements emerge in the ranking of rationales, between solidarity and national interest, in the tying of aid to security and migration goals, in the relevance of the gender, climate change and 2030 agendas, in the criteria governing geographical assignment and in the role that the EU and the multilateral institutions ought to play in Spain’s foreign policy.
Appendix: Proposals made by Spain’s main political parties on the subject of international development aid.
[1] See the proposals made by Bildu, ERC, Junts per Catalunya, PNV, PP, PSOE, Sumar and VOX.
[2] Specifically, the interventions made during the sessions on 11 and 18 June 2024 are analysed.
[3] Sessions held on 18 March, 9 June, 20 October and 18 November 2025.
[4] In this regard, the regional parties’ manifestos for elections in the autonomous communities, where the majority of their proposals on the subject of international cooperation are to be found, proved especially useful.
