Key messages
- North Korea’s large-scale military support for Russia has transformed what began as a European war into a broader Eurasian security challenge, with direct implications for the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula.
- Pyongyang’s troop deployment and ammunition transfers to Russia mark a decisive shift from diplomatic alignment to direct military collaboration, creating the basis for a deeper Russia-North Korea security relationship.
- Although China, Russia and North Korea are not permanent ideological allies, their shared interest in weakening the US-led international order could sustain pragmatic and interest-based military cooperation.
- The possible institutionalisation of trilateral cooperation could include joint exercises, port access, nuclear signalling, cyber operations, space cooperation and multidomain military coordination.
- Europe and South Korea should respond by strengthening deterrence, interoperability, multinational exercises, defence industrial cooperation, cyber and space capabilities, and resilience in critical infrastructure.
- A credible response requires both stronger defence preparedness and sustained diplomacy aimed at reducing incentives for deeper China-Russia-North Korea military alignment.
Analysis
North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia during the Russia-Ukraine War has been one of the most surprising developments in global affairs. At the outset of the conflict, the Biden Administration, together with its Western allies, formed a value-based alliance and imposed maximum pressure and sweeping sanctions on Russia. Many expected Russia to become internationally isolated and eventually be forced to concede. Backed by indirect military and economic assistance from the West, Ukraine also mounted a strong defence. Against this backdrop, North Korea made a move that few had anticipated. By openly supporting Russia, it provided large-scale shipments of ammunition and deployed thousands of troops. What had initially been regarded as a European conflict gradually evolved into a war with strategic implications across the Eurasian continent.
From North Korea’s perspective, this marked its first large-scale overseas troop deployment since the Korean War and became a turning point in restoring and deepening relations with Russia after the end of the Cold War. As the war progressed, military cooperation between Russia and North Korea continued to expand. Russia also officially invited North Korea to participate in joint military exercises with China. As a result, the world is now approaching a situation in which it may soon witness joint military exercises involving China, Russia and North Korea, an unprecedented development that did not occur even during the Cold War.
The ideological foundation underpinning North Korea is Juche, or self-reliance theory. At its core, Juche emphasises achieving ideological, economic and military independence through self-reliance and autonomous national defence, without depending on external military assistance. Although North Korea survived the Korean War with substantial support from the Soviet Union and China, Kim Il Sung came to believe that the country should become capable of defending itself without relying on either power. This conviction was shaped in part by North Korea’s wartime experience. During the Korean War, the Soviet Union and China exercised significant influence over military operations and the armistice negotiations, often regardless of Pyongyang’s own preferences.
Furthermore, the failed attempt by pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions to remove Kim Il Sung in the late 1950s reinforced his determination to consolidate political independence, ultimately contributing to the withdrawal of Chinese Volunteer Forces that had remained in North Korea after the Korean War. Consequently, North Korean historical narratives emphasised not only resistance against what they describe as US imperialism but also the preservation of national independence from Chinese influence. This dual emphasis has become an integral part of North Korea’s official interpretation of its modern history.
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet support, North Korea’s economy became increasingly dependent on China. From Pyongyang’s perspective, this growing dependence risked expanding China’s political, economic and psychological influence over the country. Kim Jong Il therefore sought to improve relations with the US, Japan and South Korea, while pursuing negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program as a means of reducing China’s leverage. However, with the arrival of the George W. Bush Administration, North Korea became increasingly isolated over its nuclear programme. During the subsequent famine, in which hundreds of thousands to millions of people are estimated to have died, North Korea’s expectations of external support remained largely unmet, further reinforcing its perception of strategic vulnerability.
After assuming power, Kim Jong Un purged prominent figures regarded as having close ties to China, including his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, while initially attempting to improve relations with both the US and South Korea. Following the failure of the Hanoi Summit, however, North Korea fundamentally re-oriented its foreign policy. It abandoned engagement with South Korea by defining inter-Korean relations as relations between two hostile states and shifted its diplomatic priorities towards strengthening ties with China and Russia. North Korea’s large-scale deployment of troops to support Russia represents a decisive turning point. It goes beyond the diplomatic cooperation pursued under Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il by extending the relationship into direct military collaboration. If this trajectory continues, Russia-North Korea military cooperation could gradually evolve into trilateral military cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia. Such cooperation, should it become institutionalised, would have implications extending beyond regional security and could emerge as a matter of global strategic concern.
1. The risk of institutionalised China-Russia-North Korea military cooperation
When China and Russia began conducting combined military exercises in 2018, military experts in Washington DC and London largely dismissed these activities as symbolic demonstrations, assuming that cooperation between two traditional rivals would be short-lived. However, by 2022 China-Russia combined exercises had significantly expanded in scale and complexity. Some even included participation by other countries such as India, reflecting growing discussions on interoperability and operational coordination among participating forces. Although China and Russia remain historical competitors, they appear to share a broader strategic objective of transforming the US-led international order into a more multipolar system.
In this context, the possibility of North Korea joining such exercises should not be excluded and may, in fact, become increasingly plausible over time. While China and Russia may not be permanent allies, they are likely to continue cooperating at least until they achieve meaningful progress in reshaping or undermining the liberal international order. From this perspective, their cooperation may be best understood as strategic and interest-based rather than ideological or permanent in nature. The Trump administration appeared to show greater openness to a multipolar world order, implicitly recognising the influence of five major powers: a ‘Core Five’ comprising China, Russia, the US, India and Japan. Even beyond the Trump presidency, both Democratic and Republican administrations are likely to face structural constraints in maintaining the US’s traditional global policing role, particularly as its relative power declines. As a result, a gradual adjustment toward burden-sharing and selective engagement in global security affairs may become increasingly necessary in US foreign policy, regardless of party leadership.
Recently, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has visited North Korea, emphasising the importance of military cooperation and highlighting the potential for economic cooperation in the Tumen River region. As a commander of the US Forces Korea once described South Korea as an ‘aircraft carrier’ positioned against China, Beijing may view North Korea as a strategic platform for projecting power into the Pacific and as a geopolitical instrument for deterring or exerting pressure on the US and Japan. Over the decades, this did not happen because North Korea did not want to become a platform for foreign troops and foreign power. That may now be changing.
If military cooperation among China, Russia and North Korea continues to deepen, joint military exercises involving Chinese and Russian forces on North Korean territory could become increasingly plausible, similar in concept to the combined military exercises conducted by the US and South Korea. Russian nuclear-powered submarines, Chinese nuclear-powered submarines and even Chinese aircraft carriers could also potentially make extended deployments to North Korean ports such as Wonsan, should future political and military agreements permit such arrangements. Wonsan could become, in effect, China’s equivalent of Pyeongtaek: a forward platform in the Pacific and a strategic position against the US and Japan.
Likewise, similar to the US-South Korea extended deterrence framework, China, Russia and North Korea could expand cooperation in the nuclear domain. Such cooperation might include joint strategic planning or tabletop exercises involving hypothetical nuclear strike scenarios against US and allied military facilities, including Pyeongtaek, Okinawa and Guam. Furthermore, comparable to multinational exercises conducted among European and Indo-Pacific partners, China, Russia and North Korea could potentially conduct integrated joint exercises across the maritime, land, air, cyber and strategic domains, including simulated operations targeting Seoul, Pyeongtaek, Tokyo, Guam and Okinawa.
Should trilateral military cooperation continue to deepen, the US, South Korea and Japan would face increasing challenges in deterring or counterbalancing these developments and might require stronger deterrence capabilities and closer security cooperation. From this perspective, the long-term strategic implications of China-Russia-North Korea military cooperation may pose a greater challenge to the international security environment than North Korean nuclear tests alone. The Russia-Ukraine War demonstrated North Korea’s willingness to provide direct military support to a strategic partner. If military alignment among China, Russia and North Korea continues to expand, future regional crises, including a potential contingency on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait, could involve varying forms of military coordination or mutual support among the three countries. While the specific form and extent of such cooperation remain uncertain, the possibility has become an increasingly important consideration in regional and global security assessments.
2. EU-ROK responses: deterrence, resilience and diplomacy
In response to these developments, Europe and South Korea face significant challenges. Nevertheless, their cooperation can be strengthened along two broad lines of effort. First, Europe and the Indo-Pacific democracies should expand military cooperation to address the growing strategic implications of China-Russia-North Korea security cooperation. Beyond the traditional domains of land, sea and air, closer collaboration should be pursued across emerging domains such as space and cyberspace. Europe, together with South Korea, the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and other like-minded partners, should deepen security and defence cooperation through more frequent multinational exercises, enhanced interoperability, expanded military education and personnel exchanges, and closer defence industrial cooperation. Joint training in both the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific would contribute to greater operational coordination and reinforce the perception of a unified security community.
Recent conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine War, the conflict between Israel and Iran, and the Venezuela crisis, have demonstrated the evolving character of future warfare driven by advanced science and technology. North Korea and Russia are likely to draw important lessons from these experiences and further develop their military capabilities accordingly. At the same time, China continues to accelerate the modernisation of its military by expanding its capabilities in nuclear missiles, cyber operations and space systems through advanced technological innovation. In this context, military cooperation among China, Russia and North Korea extends beyond conventional military domains. It increasingly encompasses cooperation in strategic technologies, including nuclear deterrence, missile systems, cyber operations, space capabilities and cognitive warfare.
As a result, Europe and South Korea face the prospect of being exposed to multidomain security threats on a continuous basis –24-hours a day, seven days a week–. Cyber operations, information warfare and psychological influence campaigns could increasingly penetrate the daily lives of ordinary citizens, extending the battlefield beyond traditional military environments. North Korea, China and Russia have long demonstrated strength in information operations, including the use of social media, disinformation, election interference and other forms of cognitive and psychological warfare. Advances in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies have the potential to further enhance the scale, speed and effectiveness of these activities. Europe and South Korea should therefore strengthen cooperation to develop advanced technological deterrence capabilities capable of countering threats in cyber, space, information and other emerging domains.
Building resilience should constitute another important pillar of cooperation. Modern conflicts have demonstrated that critical infrastructure –including energy systems, communications networks, transportation and digital services– may become a primary target during the opening stages of a crisis or armed conflict. Europe and South Korea should therefore expand cooperation to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure, improve cyber defence and strengthen crisis preparedness. Unlike traditional military threats that primarily target armed forces during wartime, the emerging military challenges posed by China, Russia and North Korea increasingly affect civilian populations during both peacetime and conflict, making comprehensive resilience an essential component of national and allied security.
Defence industrial cooperation also represents a critical pillar of collaboration between Europe and South Korea. The Russia-Ukraine War has prompted European countries to increase defence spending and has reinforced the principle that Europe must assume greater responsibility for its own defence. At the same time, South Korea’s defence industry, which has evolved in response to the persistent military threat from North Korea, has become an increasingly important supplier of advanced defence systems to European countries. Rather than viewing one another as competitors, Europe and South Korea should pursue a strategy of mutual growth through joint research and development, collaborative technological innovation and the expansion of defence markets in response to the evolving security challenges posed by China, Russia and North Korea.
By combining Europe’s long-standing defence industrial expertise and operational experience with South Korea’s advanced manufacturing capabilities and rapid production capacity, both sides can strengthen their defence industrial bases and develop next-generation military capabilities suited to emerging multidomain threats. Such cooperation would not only enhance deterrence but also contribute to more resilient and sustainable defence supply chains, strengthen technological competitiveness and reinforce the long-term security of both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. As security challenges become increasingly interconnected across regions, defence industrial cooperation should be regarded as a strategic investment in the collective defence of democratic partners rather than simply a commercial relationship.
Secondly, diplomatic efforts should be strengthened to prevent the further institutionalisation and expansion of military cooperation between China, Russia and North Korea. Despite the recent growth in security cooperation, each of the three countries also has important economic and political interests beyond military affairs. Kim Jong Un has promoted Wonsan as a major tourism destination, while Vladimir Putin has repeatedly emphasised the economic development of the Russian Far East, including Vladivostok, as a gateway to the Asia-Pacific rather than solely as a military stronghold. Following the eventual conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine War, South Korea and Europe should actively explore diplomatic initiatives that reduce incentives for deeper trilateral military alignment and encourage greater regional stability.
Conclusions
Ultimately, responding to this evolving security environment will require a balanced strategy that combines stronger deterrence with sustained diplomatic engagement. Enhancing military preparedness alone is unlikely to be sufficient, just as diplomacy without credible deterrence may prove inadequate. As the strategic landscape continues to evolve, both approaches will need to be pursued simultaneously to reduce the risks associated with an increasingly interconnected security environment across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
In association with the Korea Foundation
