Key messages
- US-Morocco relations have evolved from a largely security-based partnership into a broader strategic relationship encompassing geo-economics, supply chains, energy, technology and engagement in Africa.
- The Western Sahara has now become the main political element in this relationship and the major success of Morocco’s US strategy. Washington now views autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the only viable solution and Rabat seeks to convert this political support into a new diplomatic, economic and strategic reality.
- Economic relations are acquiring a new strategic dimension. Morocco’s free trade agreement with the US, its proximity to Europe and its access to Africa are enhancing its attractiveness as a nearshoring destination.
- Morocco’s growing value to the US derives from its ability to connect disparate strategic arenas. It maintains links with the Gulf State monarchies and, despite Gaza, preserves its strategic relations with Israel. Its attractiveness for Washington resides precisely in this capacity for connecting the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East.
- For Spain, the main risk is not that Morocco might replace it as a privileged US partner, but rather a gradual loss of influence over Washington’s North African agenda. Spain retains significant strategic assets, but it needs to leverage them more effectively to preserve its influence.
Analysis
Ties between the US and Morocco have been historically close, and Rabat is one of Washington’s oldest allies. Morocco was the first country to recognise the independence of the nascent American nation in December 1777, when Sultan Mohammed III issued a decree authorising US ships to enter Moroccan ports and promised them protection. Morocco’s recognition was formalised in 1786 with the signing of a Peace and Friendship Treaty, which is regarded as the oldest US treaty to have remained continuously in force.
Relations between the two countries over the course of the 19th century mainly revolved around trade and maritime security, particularly the protection of vessels against piracy on the so-called Barbary Coast. Unlike much of North Africa, Morocco managed to preserve its independence throughout the 19th century, which enabled it to maintain direct and continuous diplomatic relations with the US. The US presence was consolidated with the opening of consulates in Tangiers and other coastal cities, which fulfilled both diplomatic and commercial functions. The Tangier American Legation, founded in 1821, the first US public institution to operate abroad, acquired special importance, and it remains a key historical symbol of the long-standing relationship between the two countries.
During the first half of the 20th century, with Morocco under French and Spanish protectorates, direct relations with the US were more limited, although consular and trading links continued. The strategic importance of the country increased during the Second World War, however, and in November 1942 Morocco became one of the Allies’ main landing sites in North Africa. Just two months later, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill gathered in Casablanca to coordinate Allied strategy, and the President met Sultan Mohammed V, an encounter which subsequently acquired significant symbolic value both in the relations between the two countries and in the process towards Moroccan independence.
Morocco’s strategic importance continued to grow with the advent of the Cold War. In 1950, when it was still a French protectorate, Washington and Paris struck a deal allowing the US to build and use a network of military installations on Moroccan soil, including the Nouasseur, Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir airbases, as well as the naval and communications installations at Port Lyautey, now known as Kenitra. Operating as part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), these bases enabled the advanced deployment of US strategic bombers and formed part of Washington’s overall strategy for deterring the Soviet Union. In 1952 Harry Truman authorised the storage of non-nuclear components of atomic bombs without informing the French authorities, and two years later complete nuclear weapons were deployed in Morocco with presidential authorisation.
Morocco’s independence in 1956 heralded a new phase in bilateral relations. Washington quickly recognised the new State, and cooperation was broadened in the political, economic and military spheres. Morocco soon consolidated itself as the US’s leading pro-Western partner in North Africa, and as a major recipient of US economic and military aid. However, the presence of the bases installed during the protectorate became increasingly controversial, particularly after a B-47 carrying a nuclear weapon crashed at Sidi Slimane Air Base in January 1958. The accident did not produce a nuclear explosion, but radioactive contamination was detected. Mohammed V called for the removal of the US military presence and struck a deal with Dwight D. Eisenhower when he flew to Rabat after meeting General Franco in Madrid in December 1959 that would lead to the dismantling of the US airbases.
This process culminated in 1963 with the withdrawal of SAC’s three main bases, but it did not put an end to the US military presence in Morocco. When Hassan II (who had succeeded his father in 1961) visited John F. Kennedy in March 1963, the latter agreed that the installations would come under Moroccan sovereignty and control, but Washington would retain the use of some of the key infrastructure it had built, especially the naval telecommunications facilities associated with Kenitra, Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel. Additionally, the US also agreed to continue to provide training and assistance to the Moroccan armed forces. This presence was progressively reduced until the final closure of these facilities in 1978, when satellite communications and alternative facilities elsewhere in the Mediterranean made them redundant. Rather than a conflict between the two countries, the US withdrawal from these bases reflected a transformation of the relationship: it evolved from a US military presence inherited from the protectorate to a model of cooperation on defence matters compatible with Moroccan sovereignty.
The US’s special relationship with Morocco did not pose a major problem for Madrid until a major conflict erupted when Hassan II decided to mobilise some 350,000 unarmed ‘volunteers’ (the so-called ‘Green March’) in October 1975 in order to force Spain to abandon the Western Sahara, a territory it had administered since 1884 (though its presence had only become effective in 1934). During the crisis, Gerald Ford’s Secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, made it clear to all parties involved that he feared an independent Sahara would soon fall under the control of Algeria’s pro-Soviet regime and therefore preferred the territory to come under Moroccan sovereignty once Spain had left. The outcome of this episode illustrated both the importance that the US attached to Morocco as a regional actor and the skill displayed by Rabat’s diplomacy in its management of relations with Washington.[1]
1. The new century
With the advent of the 21st century, the US and Morocco gradually began to develop a broader and more institutionalised relationship, which enjoyed considerable bipartisan support in the US Congress.
The September 11 attacks of 2001 significantly strengthened the security dimension of the relationship. In the wake of the attacks, George W. Bush’s Administration sought to intensify cooperation with moderate Arab governments in the fight against terrorism, and Morocco soon became one of its leading partners in North Africa. This relationship acquired even greater importance after the Casablanca bombings of May 2003, in which Moroccan Islamists murdered 33 people of several nationalities (including four Spaniards), and was extended to include intelligence sharing, border security, training, and the fight against radicalisation and terrorist networks. Morocco consequently emerged as a reliable US counterterrorism partner, with cooperation gradually extending beyond North Africa.
It was also in the post-9/11 context that the Morocco Free Trade Agreement (MAFTA), whose objectives extended well beyond trade, was signed in June 2004, entering into force on 1 January 2006. The Bush Administration saw Morocco as a moderate Arab and Muslim partner whose economic and political reforms merited support; furthermore, this was part of its broader strategy to push for a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA).[2] For Rabat, the agreement offered the possibility of diversifying economic relations that had traditionally focused on Europe and, above all, of deepening its strategic ties with Washington.
MAFTA made Morocco the first –and so far, only– African country to sign a free trade agreement with the US, and the second Arab state to do so after Jordan (which had done so in 2000). MAFTA envisaged the immediate removal of tariffs on approximately 95% of bilateral trade in industrial and consumer goods, and contemplated specific regulations relating to agriculture, services, investment and intellectual property.
Progress on the economic front was matched by a deepening of security relations. In June 2004 the US formally identified Morocco as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), a status that facilitates access to certain forms of US military cooperation, equipment, research and training. The announcement enabled the consolidation of a defence relationship that included joint exercises, the coordinated access of US forces to Moroccan installations and the financing of military training programmes.
Only five years into the new century, the foundations on which bilateral relations would develop over the course of the next two decades were thus established: cooperation against terrorism, military collaboration, economic and security assistance, a privileged trading framework, and close political dialogue.
Barack Obama’s Administration built on the relationship forged with Morocco by his predecessor, though it placed greater emphasis on political reforms, human rights and economic development. The Arab Spring further enhanced Morocco’s value to Washington as a relatively stable partner in an increasingly turbulent region. Washington looked benignly on Mohammed VI’s response to the 2011 protests and the approval of a new constitution, but it continued to press for progress in the realms of democratisation, governance and human rights. The war in Libya, the instability of the Sahel and the spread of Jihadism in Iraq and Syria also strengthened cooperation against terrorism. Morocco took part in the international coalition against Islamic State and developed greater capability in the areas of intelligence, prevention of radicalisation and religious training, although this was not enough to prevent it from being the home to a significant number of foreign fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq.
The main institutional development of this period was the launching of a Strategic Dialogue between the US and Morocco in 2012, the first formal and periodic arrangement aimed at structuring the bilateral relationship. Organised around issues of policy and security, economics and trade, and education and culture, it facilitated the coordination of cooperation, which until then had been somewhat ad hoc. Subsequently, the Millennium Challenge Corporation programme and other initiatives aimed at encouraging investment, employment and training consolidated this trend.
The first Donald Trump Administration further strengthened strategic relations with Morocco, which in turn underpinned the latter’s alignment with some of Washington’s key partners in the Middle East. In 2018 Rabat broke off diplomatic relations with Iran, which it accused of supplying arms and military training to the Polisario Front via Hezbollah and its embassy in Algeria. Teheran and Hezbollah denied these accusations, but the decision strengthened Morocco’s image as a close partner of the US and the Gulf monarchies arrayed against Iranian influence in the region.
In keeping with this, military cooperation continued to make progress. In October 2020 the Defence Department and the Moroccan government signed a cooperation plan for the next decade, aimed at strengthening military coordination, joint exercises, and the fight against terrorism and other regional threats. Morocco was thereby consolidating itself as a territory from which the US could extend cooperation on security matters towards the Sahel and the rest of Africa.
The real breakthrough did not materialise until December 2020, however; this was when, within the framework of the Abraham Accords championed by the Trump Administration, Morocco agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. In parallel, Washington formally recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, becoming the first major Western power to do so, thereby overturning decades of US policy, which had hitherto described Morocco’s goal of granting autonomy to the territory as a ‘serious and credible proposal’, but without recognising Rabat’s sovereignty.
The normalisation of relations with Israel did not come out of the blue. Morocco and Israel had maintained political and security contacts for decades, and had opened liaison offices in 1994, after the Oslo Accords, which Rabat closed in 2000 in the wake of the second Intifada. The strong historical and human links that already existed between Morocco and the large Israeli community of Moroccan origin are also noteworthy: according to a senior Moroccan diplomat in Washington, the Moroccan Jewish diaspora has also played a very significant role in facilitating contacts between Rabat and influential political circles in the US. The 2020 agreement enabled diplomatic contacts to be reestablished, direct flights to be opened, and economic, technological and especially security and defence cooperation to be rapidly broadened. This did not prevent Mohammed VI from maintaining official Moroccan support for the two-state solution, or from continuing to serve as Chairman of the Islamic Cooperation Organisation’s Al-Quds Committee, among whose objectives is the preservation of the Islamic and Arabic character and legal status of Jerusalem.
The US decision on the Sahara represented a remarkable diplomatic success for Rabat, but it also had significant regional repercussions. The Polisario Front rejected it on the grounds that it ran contrary to the doctrine established by the United Nations, while Algeria interpreted growing US support for Morocco as a shift in the regional equilibrium. The EU initially distanced itself from the US recognition and reiterated that the definitive status of the Western Sahara should be resolved within the framework of UN resolutions, but in subsequent years several European States moved closer to the Moroccan position on the territory’s autonomy. In the Arab world, the recognition strengthened a similar tendency already evident among several of Rabat’s partners, especially the Gulf monarchies, some of which opened consular delegations in El Aaiún (the capital of the Western Sahara) and Dakhla (the former Villa Cisneros). Trump’s decision also injected an openly transactional and bilateral logic into an issue that Washington had traditionally handled within the multilateral framework provided by the UN.
Joe Biden’s arrival in the White House in January 2021 initially raised the possibility of reviewing his predecessor’s decision, but his Administration chose not to revoke the US’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, though it also decided against opening a consulate in Dakhla, as his predecessor had promised. Biden also respected the other policies laid down by earlier Administrations: military cooperation, the African Lion military exercises, the fight against terrorism and the Strategic Dialogue all continued, and Washington increasingly referred to Morocco as a partner capable of contributing significantly to regional security. It is worth noting in this regard that in mid-2021 the Biden Administration repatriated the Guantanamo detainee Abdul Latif Nasir, the first transfer of this kind carried out since 2016.
The Biden Administration also advocated the deepening of ties between Morocco and Israel, and actively sought to insert them into a broader regional architecture. However, the invasion of Gaza following the terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023 significantly raised the political cost of normalising relations with Israel for Rabat. With public opinion overwhelmingly in favour of the Palestinian cause, Morocco reduced the visibility of its efforts in this area while simultaneously strengthening its rhetoric in support of the two-state solution. Despite this, bilateral cooperation with Israel continued to take place, especially in the areas of defence, intelligence and technology.
At the same time, the Biden Administration continued to express its misgivings about issues related to human rights and freedom of expression, maintaining a specific dialogue with Rabat on these matters. Nonetheless, the differences surrounding these issues failed to alter the overall trend of the relationship, which continued to be characterised by increasingly close cooperation.
2. The current situation
Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 accelerated the consolidation of an already close strategic partnership. The main development during this period has consisted not so much in a new political rapprochement but rather in a willingness to convert an already very close relationship into tangible results.
As far as the Western Sahara is concerned, Washington has gone one step beyond the position adopted in 2020. In April 2025 the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, described autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as ‘the only viable solution’ and Rabat’s autonomy plan as ‘the only framework’ for talks with the local population and other actors. In August 2026 Trump officially reiterated this stance in a public message to Mohammed VI, while simultaneously rejecting any alternative that would prolong the status quo. The US has thus gone from recognising the Moroccan position to actively promoting Rabat’s autonomy plan as the only solution to the conflict.
What Morocco has pursued since Trump’s return to the White House is the transformation of the political recognition of 2020 into a new diplomatic, economic and strategic reality. This entails attracting US investment to the Sahara, extending the benefits of bilateral cooperation to the territory, and ensuring that other Western countries gradually align themselves with the US position. Rabat also seeks to modify the lens through which the conflict is viewed, portraying it not as a question focused on decolonisation and self-determination but one revolving around sovereignty, regional stability, development and the security of the Sahel. However, although US support may help to transform a situation involving de facto control into an increasingly accepted reality in the international arena, this is not necessarily the same as resolving the conflict.
In this context, the economic dimension acquires growing importance. The coming into force of the free-trade agreement between the US and Morocco was accompanied by a significant expansion of bilateral trade. This has been clearly asymmetrical, however: while US exports have multiplied by a factor of more than 11, Moroccan exports have risen by a factor of four.Apart from the increase in trade, economic relations are acquiring a progressively more strategic character. The traditional sectors –agriculture, phosphates, textiles, machinery and energy products– have now been overtaken by the aerospace sector, car-making, renewable energies and other advanced manufacturing industries. Morocco also offers US corporations an industrial and logistics platform near the European market and with a growing focus on Africa. In this regard, the value of the free-trade agreement transcends strictly bilateral commerce and is increasingly linked to the reorganisation of supply chains and new strategies of nearshoring and productive diversification. Investment flows reflect a similar trend, although their evolution has been less consistent. The US has consolidated itself as one of the most important investors in Morocco and was the largest source of new inflows of foreign investment in 2022, with approximately 34% of the total received that year. The importance of the relationship therefore resides not only in how much the two countries trade with each other but also Morocco’s growing presence in sectors and supply chains of strategic interest to the US.
Rabat’s growing economic ties with Beijing, however, complicate this picture. Morocco is also attracting significant Chinese investment, especially in car-making, batteries and critical minerals. Rabat thus seems reluctant to choose between Washington and Beijing; instead, it hopes to maximise the advantages of its relations with both, while the US seeks to prevent Chinese companies from using Morocco as an indirect point of entry into its market. This Moroccan ability to simultaneously maintain close relations with the US, Europe, China, the Gulf and Africa indicates an increasingly autonomous and diversified foreign policy.
Figure 1. Evolution of US-Morocco economic relations (figures in US$ mn; trade in goods, exports, imports and balance from the US perspective)
| Year | US exports to Morocco | US imports from Morocco | Total trade | US balance | US investment in Morocco | Important sectors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 (pre-MAFTA) | 481 | 446 | 927 | +35 | Still limited amount | Agriculture, phosphates, textiles, machinery |
| 2006 (advent of MAFTA) | 838 | 521 | 1,359 | +317 | Start of a new investment era | Agriculture, machinery, industrial products |
| 2010 | 1,948 | 686 | 2,633 | +1.262 | Growing US business presence | Aviation, energy, agriculture, textiles |
| 2015 | 1,625 | 1,012 | 2,637 | +613 | Stock ≈ 2,670 (1) | Aerospace, car-making, agroindustry, energy |
| 2020 | 2,301 | 1,048 | 3,349 | +1,252 | Stock ≈ 3,000-3,500 (1) | Aerospace, car-making, renewables, manufacturing |
| 2022 | 3,749 | 1,657 | 5,406 | +2,092 | Inflow ≈ 700; US was the largest investor ≈ 34% of the FDI received | Industry, energy, aerospace, car-making |
| 2024 | 5,372 | 1,903 | 7,275 | +3,469 | Inflow ≈ 178 | Energy, aviation, agriculture, car-making, infrastructure |
| 2025 | 5,530 | 1,859 | 7,389 | +3,671 | Consolidation of investment | Energy, aerospace, car-making, renewables, supply chains |
| 2026 (January-June) | 3,383 | 1,050 | 4,433 | +2,332 | Greater interest in new strategic investments | Energy, digital/AI, critical minerals, defence, advanced industries |
The other major goals of Moroccan foreign policy are security and its growing influence in Africa. For over two decades, Morocco has hosted the African Lion, AFRICOM’s largest military exercise held in the continent; it cooperates closely with Washington on intelligence and the fight against terrorism; and participates in the training of the security forces of other African nations. This is in addition to the initiative launched by Mohammed VI to enable the landlocked countries of the Sahel to have access to the Atlantic Ocean. Rabat thereby tries to present the Sahara and its Atlantic coast as elements in a broader strategy of connectivity and stabilisation of the Sahel, at a time when Western influence has been weakened and the presence of Russia and China in the region is growing.
Morocco also occupies a unique position in the Middle East. It maintains its normalisation with Israel despite domestic opposition to the occupation of Gaza, retains close ties with the monarchies of the Gulf, and portrays itself to Washington as a reliable partner amid a possible expansion of Iranian influence in North Africa and the Sahel. Its value to the US therefore stems from its capacity to connect various strategic theatres –the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Sahel, Africa and the Middle East– and not solely its traditional alignment with Washington.
Bilateral relations are thus entering a new phase. Rabat pursues its own agenda and uses its privileged relationship with the US to further its main goals, especially international recognition of its control of the Western Sahara. This autonomy, combined with its stability and growing African presence, has meant an increase in its value to Washington. Under the second Trump Administration, an association built over decades revolving around security and defence is evolving towards a broader relationship, in which security, geopolitics and geo-economics are increasing converging.
3. Spain and the US-Morocco-Israel axis
Over the past decade or so, Rabat has sought to reduce its political dependency on Europe –even though the EU continues to be its main economic partner– by means of a more autonomous, assertive and diversified foreign strategy. The US recognition in 2020 accelerated this trend, and from the Moroccan viewpoint it confirmed the value of linking its main territorial aspiration to other areas of interest to Washington, ranging from security and military cooperation to investments and supply chains.
Trump’s return has accelerated this dynamic while simultaneously strengthening a triangular relationship between the US, Morocco and Israel that transcends the Sahara issue. Normalisation of relations with Israel was closely tied to the 2020 decision by the US, and since then Rabat and Jerusalem have significantly broadened their cooperation on defence, intelligence and technology, notwithstanding the Gaza crisis.
For Spain, this growing convergence between Washington, Rabat and Jerusalem introduces a new element in the strategic balance of the western Mediterranean. Although it does not necessarily entail a weakening of the Spanish position, it does alter the context in which Madrid must manage its relations with Morocco and requires that it pay greater attention to a series of particularly sensitive questions: the future of the Western Sahara, the balance between Morocco and Algeria, the position of Ceuta and Melilla, cooperation on migration and antiterrorism and, more generally, Spain’s strategic value to the US in North Africa.
The main novelty is that Morocco now enjoys a US endorsement of its stance on the Sahara that is much more explicit than at any previous time. For Spain, whose relations with Rabat have long been shaped by the Sahrawi issue, this development reduces its ability to treat the conflict in an exclusively bilateral Hispano-Moroccan context or within the European framework. Washington’s change of policy has turned into a structural variable of the problem and increased Rabat’s ability to internationalise its autonomy proposal.
These developments also underscore the need to address a longstanding ‘cognitive asymmetry’ in Spanish-Moroccan relations. Thanks in part to the fact that many Moroccan police officers, members of the armed forces, judges and even intelligence agents have traditionally been trained in Spain, they have acquired a level of knowledge of the country’s history, politics and society and a degree of access to its establishment that their Spanish counterparts generally lack. Madrid could perhaps respond to this by reviewing its policies on diplomatic training, language skills, institutional expertise and investment in Moroccan studies.
In any event, Morocco’s growing strength does not necessarily have to come at Spain’s expense. The two countries perform different functions for Washington. Spain continues to offer strategic advantages that are difficult to replace: its membership of NATO and the EU, its geographical position at the western gateway to the Mediterranean and, in particular, the bases of Rota and Morón, which are fundamental to the US’s ability to project military power in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Atlantic. For its part, Morocco offers political stability, capacity for dialogue in Africa and the Arab world, cooperation on antiterrorism and an increasing sway over the Sahel. From the US perspective, the two countries may be viewed as complementary allies rather than rival partners.
The risk for Madrid is thus not so much Morocco’s hypothetical replacement of Spain as Washington’s privileged partner, but rather a gradual loss of Spanish centrality in specific North African issues. The greater Rabat’s capacity for directly presenting itself to the US as an indispensable go-between in the Sahel, West Africa, Atlantic security and supply chains, the greater will be its ability to have a say in the strategic framework where Spain needs to defend its own interests.
This evolution also affects the delicate Spanish balance between Morocco and Algeria. Above all, increased US support for Rabat and the intensification of the historic rivalry between Morocco and Algeria may hamper Madrid’s ability to maintain stable relations with both countries even further. Algeria continues to play a fundamental role for Spain, owing to energy, economic and security reasons, whereas Morocco is indispensable in such areas as migration, the fight against terrorism, trade and the management of Ceuta and Melilla’s immediate surroundings. Increased polarisation in the Maghreb would thus have a negative impact on Spain’s ability to protect its interests satisfactorily.
Ceuta and Melilla constitute another element requiring special attention. US support for Morocco over the Western Sahara does not entail endorsement of Moroccan claims to these cities. Admittedly, in March 2026, Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon advisor currently attached to the American Enterprise Institute, publicly stated that Washington should recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. Rubin is not a member of the Trump Administration, however, and his remarks should not be mistaken for White House policy. Far more importantly, a document drawn up by the House of Representatives (House Report 119-631, submitted by the Appropriations Committee to accompany budget project H.R. 8595 for the 2027 fiscal year) recently described Ceuta and Melilla as ‘Spanish-administered’ cities located in ‘Moroccan territory’, and noted that Rabat maintains a longstanding claim to them, adding that the committee supported efforts by the Secretary of State to encourage diplomatic engagement between Morocco and Spain on their ‘future status’. However, these remarks only appeared in the committee’s report, not in the final text of H.R. 8595, which was ultimately approved by the House of Representatives on 15 July 2026; moreover, the chair of the subcommittee responsible for the report, the Republican Mario Díaz-Balart, later explained that these comments did not constitute a recognition of Moroccan sovereignty claims, nor did they represent an official policy shift in Washington. Additionally, prompted by the mass incursion of more than 70,000 Moroccans (and others from sub-Saharan Africa) into Ceuta on 30-31 July 2026, a State Department spokesperson stated that Washington ‘unequivocally supports Spain’s sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla’. Notwithstanding this, Rabat’s enhanced strategic weight in the US indirectly strengthens its diplomatic hand, thereby making it even more urgent for Spain to maintain its own well-established dialogue with Washington on the security of the Strait and the western Mediterranean.
The Israeli dimension adds an additional variable. The increasing cooperation between Rabat and Jerusalem on defence, intelligence, drones, air defence and technology may gradually alter Moroccan military capabilities and, in the process, certain regional balances. The most important issue for Spain, therefore, is not so much the existence of this cooperation, but rather the possibility that it might assist Morocco in increasing its technological advantage over its neighbours. Meanwhile, Israel may become an increasingly important indirect interlocutor in relations between Rabat and Washington.
Conclusions
Spain currently finds itself in a regional environment in which Morocco enjoys greater autonomy, more privileged partners and a growing ability to exert its influence beyond the Maghreb. The Spanish response should consist not solely in reacting to every Moroccan diplomatic success, but rather in strengthening the features that make Spain a hard-to-replace partner for the US: the Rota and Morón bases, its simultaneous membership of the EU and NATO, its geographical position, its ability to act as a mediator in the Maghreb and the Sahel, and its role as a bridge between Europe, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.
The consolidation of the US-Morocco axis therefore represents both a challenge and an incentive for Spain. The challenge lies in ensuring that Rabat’s increasing weight does not impinge on Spain’s ability to influence the US agenda in North Africa. The incentive is the fact that the growing strategic importance of the western Mediterranean, the African Atlantic coast and the Sahel also offers Madrid the opportunity to increase its value as a partner in the eyes of Washington. Spain’s challenge is thus not to delay or prevent Morocco’s strategic ascent –which is beyond its control, in any case– but rather to ensure that this does not translate into a relative loss of Spanish influence in Washington and in its immediate regional surroundings.
[1] See Charles Powell (2011), El amigo americano. España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia, Galaxia Gutenberg, Barcelona, 2011, pp. 243-82. Discussing the Sahara in October 1974 with the President of Algeria, Houari Boumédiène, Kissinger confessed that ‘we have no interest in Spain being there’, because ‘it’s not logical for Spain to be in Africa’. See Myra F. Burton (Ed.) (2014), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, vol. E-9, part 1, United States Government Printing Office, Washington DC, ‘Document 89. Memorandum of Conversation, 14 October 1974’, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p1/d89.
[2] The Middle East Free Trade Area, which was proposed by the US in 2003, failed to become a single unified regional bloc by 2013, as had originally been intended.
