Executive summary
The intensifying rivalry between the US and China has reshaped Europe’s strategic calculations. Building on the 2020 European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC) report, which assessed Europe’s positioning in this context, this edition re-examines the geopolitical landscape in light of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to the White House. This report features 22 national chapters and one dedicated to the EU, analysing the evolution of Europe’s relations with Washington and Beijing, the range of approaches to dealing the US-China rivalry and how these are expected to evolve.
The 2025 ETNC report underscores how these developments have compelled Europe to reevaluate its strategic positioning. This new geopolitical context has broadened the debate on strategic autonomy across most countries surveyed. Although the pace and ambition of this shift differ, support for strategic autonomy is growing in most of these countries. At the heart of this discussion is the shared understanding that Europe must reduce its reliance on external powers in key areas such as security, economy and technology.
On the security front, defence cooperation with the US has deepened across most of the countries featured in this report, particularly in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the return of Donald Trump casts a shadow over this momentum, reviving concerns about the long-term prospects of transatlantic ties. At the same time, there is growing unease in European capitals about China’s impact on European security –fuelled in part by the perception that Beijing has enabled Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine–. Together, these developments are transforming the debate on European strategic autonomy into a more urgent and concrete policy agenda.
Economic security has also become a central focus, reflected in stricter national regulations and enhanced EU-level policy coordination. Nevertheless, national approaches to economic security –and the reassessment of dependencies on China and the US in particular– remain inconsistent, with some countries showing signs of scepticism or only limited engagement. The return of Trump to the White House has not been perceived uniformly across European capitals. Likewise, the ongoing reappraisal of economic vulnerabilities in relation to Beijing does not necessarily diminish the importance of China as a major market and partner in addressing global challenges. However, it adds to long-standing tensions over the fairness of trade with China, particularly as Europe’s trade deficit continues to widen. These concerns are now compounded by renewed US protectionism. Although the US remains a significant trade and investment partner, and recent years have seen general continuity in Europe’s economic relations with both the US and China, this apparent stability may be unsettled by the Trump Administration’s aggressive foreign and trade policy and the implementation of the EU’s emerging economic security agenda. The overall trend can therefore be summarised as increased distrust vis-à-vis the US, cautious and selective re-engagement with China, and a greater willingness to pursue strategic autonomy.
Introduction: national perspectives on US-China rivalry
In 2020 the European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC) examined how European countries were positioning themselves amid the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the US and China.[1] Five years on, the global and European landscapes have evolved significantly, notably due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and a disruptive second Trump Administration. As a result, European countries are increasingly compelled to navigate these tensions, which are reshaping global alignments, trade dynamics, and security frameworks. This has injected new dynamism into the ongoing debate on European strategic autonomy, as traditional US allies and partners in Europe reflect on how to constitute themselves as an autonomous strategic actor.
Following the first Trump Administration, the continuation of tensions with China during the Biden presidency further underscored the structural nature of the US-China rivalry. A series of strategic documents –including the National Security Strategy (2022) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022)– confirmed the consensus in Washington that China’s actions undermine US interests across multiple domains. Building on this assessment, the US continues to significantly expand export controls on sensitive and dual-use technologies, aiming to slow China’s progress in critical areas such as semiconductors and AI.
However, while there was some continuity with the first Trump presidency, Biden’s approach placed greater emphasis on working with allies. This shift facilitated renewed transatlantic coordination including through new frameworks such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), launched in June 2021. While the Biden presidency provided a period of relative stability in transatlantic relations, cooperation was not necessarily always smooth, as interests and approaches were not fully aligned. Additionally, points of friction remained, particularly over US industrial policies[2] and its unilateral imposition of export controls on advanced AI chips, including on some European countries.[3] These measures revealed the negative impact of certain US decisions on European interests and underscored the challenges they pose for maintaining European unity.
The 2020 ETNC report observed that Beijing’s growing assertiveness had prompted a reassessment of the EU and its Member States’ approaches towards China. It was released shortly after the publication of EU-China – A Strategic Outlook by the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), which introduced the tripartite characterisation of China as simultaneously a partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. In the years since, the balance among these three dimensions has shifted markedly. China’s ‘no-limits’ partnership with Russia –signed just before Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and maintained since– has underscored the geopolitical dimension of this rivalry. As a result, the risks associated with growing dependencies on China are increasingly being reappraised. Concerns over the fairness of economic relations also persist. The data collected for this report shows that the trade imbalance between Europe and China has continued to widen over the past five years accompanied by growing scepticism towards Chinese diplomatic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite these challenges, some chapters in this report reflect an enduring interest in economic engagement and cooperation with China on global challenges. However, the prevailing mood across Europe is one of caution, shaped not only by worsening tensions with China and the US, but also by a heightened sensitivity to Washington’s expectations and the potential political costs of appearing too closely aligned with Beijing.
In 2020, we argued that neither the EU nor its Member States were equidistant between the two powers. This assessment remains valid despite the inauguration of the new Trump Administration. Most European countries maintain significantly deeper ties with the US across security, economic, and societal dimensions. However, the return of President Donald Trump has added new pressures to Europe’s already delicate strategic positioning, not least because he has directed coercive measures against European countries. Trump has adopted a highly unpredictable approach to China, oscillating between overtures of cooperation and expressions of personal affinity with President Xi Jinping, and aggressive tariff escalations, such as the ones announced in the so-called ‘Liberation Day’ on 2 April 2025. This volatility has heightened European uncertainty not only about the reliability of the US as a partner in managing relations with China, but also on critical issues such as support for Ukraine and the future of the global trade regime, and the entire multilateral agenda.
Against this backdrop, the ETNC has dedicated its 10th annual report to reassessing how European capitals perceive and respond to the evolving US-China rivalry. Building on our 2020 analysis, this report looks into the approaches of 22 European countries, and the EU, with the aim of identifying the key variables that explain both change and continuity in their positions vis-à-vis the US-China strategic competition. Each chapter is written by China experts who set out to address the same array of questions with respect to their own country:
- What is the state and direction of relations between the country, the US and China?
- How is the country dealing with growing frictions between Washington and China?
- To what extent might changes in political leadership affect the country’s policies toward China and/or the US?
Essential ally, unsettling partner: the US and European security
European defence cooperation with the US has remained strong and has intensified among the countries covered in this report, reinforced by a heightened perception of US relevance for European security in the context of the war in Ukraine. In contrast, security and defence cooperation between European countries and China remains virtually non-existent. Not only is the EU arms embargo on China still in place, but recent developments have also brought forward debates on restricting transfers of dual-use technologies. Additionally, the perception that Beijing has enabled Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine has raised concern in European capitals about China’s impact on European security. The alleged involvement of Chinese actors in the sabotage of seabed cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea has further reinforced these concerns.[4]
A notable development took place in April 2023 and March 2024, when Finland and Sweden officially joined NATO, ending their long-standing policy of military non-alignment and reflecting broader adjustments in regional security dynamics. Besides these striking examples, many EU Member States have similarly expanded military cooperation with the US. Hungary agreed to designate Kecskemét and Pápa Air as facilities for US use; Slovakia signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the US in 2022 and Denmark, Sweden and Czechia did the same in 2023; and US troops were deployed in Latvia and Estonia following the 2022 NATO Madrid Summit. In Spain, the US committed to increase from four to six the number of destroyers stationed at Rota’s Naval Base under a bilateral agreement announced at the same summit.[5] In 2024, the Redzikowo missile defence site in Poland was officially inaugurated and handed over to NATO command, completing a project initiated under the Obama Administration in 2009. The port of Alexandroupolis in northern Greece has become a major logistics hub for NATO’s eastern flank. Procurement of US military equipment has likewise increased. Czechia signed its largest-ever arms contracts with the US, while the Netherlands sourced 97% of its arms imports from the US between 2020 and 2024 –up from 76% in the previous five-year period–.[6]
This deepening of transatlantic defence ties has taken place alongside a growing European interest in the Indo-Pacific. The importance of the region has continued to increase in the European debate. A few countries have adopted Indo-Pacific strategies France (2018 and updated in 2020), Germany (2020), the Netherlands (2020), the EU (2021), Czechia (2022), Lithuania (2023), and Sweden (2024), while the previous UK government put forward an ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ (2021). While the US-China strategic rivalry forms an important backdrop to this debate, the adoption –or absence– of such frameworks should not be understood solely through this lens. These choices are also shaped by the economic attractiveness of the Indo-Pacific, national foreign policy priorities, resource constraints, and a broader recognition of the region’s geoeconomic and geopolitical importance. At the same time, countries such as Spain and Italy feel represented by the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Italy, for instance, issued a brief policy document in 2022 titled The Italian Contribution to the European Strategy for the Indo-Pacific, framing its engagement within the broader EU context. Despite the lack of formal Indo-Pacific strategies, Italy and Spain have made some efforts to increase their visibility in the region, including through engagement in security dialogues and participation in joint naval exercises. While these actions demonstrate a degree of interest, they remain largely symbolic and often serve broader objectives, such as supporting their defence industries.
The war in Ukraine has intensified transatlantic security cooperation and increased awareness of the growing interconnections between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific strategic theatres. However, the return of Donald Trump to the White House casts a shadow over this momentum. While his open hostility towards the EU and the unpredictability he brings to transatlantic cooperation are not new, Trump now presents a more direct challenge to European security. His erratic foreign policy behaviour, including regarding his claims over Greenland and shifting stance on Ukraine illustrate this disruptive role. In response to both this uncertainty and unprecedented security threats, Europe is increasingly reassessing its security posture. This includes renewed momentum behind EU-level initiatives such as ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 initiative to strengthen and finance European defence.
Fragile continuity in economic relations
In our 2020 report, we noted that the only area in which the EU’s economic links with China were significantly stronger than with the US was goods imports, a pattern that largely persists. The economic data collected for this report[7] shows that economic ties with the US have remained stable, both in trade and investment. In contrast, the EU’s trade deficit with China has widened, whereas investment relations with Beijing remain limited and uneven. While the data presented here reflects overall continuity in economic relations, this stability may be constrained by the ongoing impact of Trump’s economic policies and the emerging European economic security agenda. Although these trends are yet to materialise, they have the potential of disrupting established economic dynamics.
On average, the share of trade in goods between the EU and the US has remained relatively stable over the past five years, with a 5% decline in the share of EU exports to the US and no significant change in the share of imports from the US. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, both imports and exports have increased, for the EU as a whole (15% and 13% respectively), as well as for most countries. In Germany, the US overtook China in 2024 to become the country’s largest trading partner for the first time in nearly a decade. The US is also the largest non-EU trade partner for Sweden. Some countries, such as Denmark, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and Hungary, have seen notable increases in the share of their exports to the US. In Portugal, the US is now the fourth-largest export destination outside the EU. Since 2018, all countries except Estonia and Latvia have increased the absolute value of their exports to the US, with Germany leading at USD 171.65 billion, followed by Italy and the UK, with USD 72.7 and USD 71.9 billion respectively.
Similarly, several countries have seen a significant increase in the share of imports from the US. Lithuania stands out, with its share rising by 392% since 2018–though US imports still account for just 6.4% of its total–. Poland, Greece, Spain and Denmark also registered notable growth, with the value of imports from the US doubling or nearly doubling between 2018 and 2023. While increases in the Netherlands and the UK have been more modest, both countries maintain some of the highest shares of US imports among those surveyed, at 10.4% and 12.5% respectively –only behind Ireland, whose share slightly declined but still remains the highest overall at 15.6%–. In absolute terms, the biggest importers of US goods are Germany (USD 100.96 billion), the UK (USD 94.93 billion) and the Netherlands (USD 68.99 billion).
The trade imbalance between Europe and China has continued to widen over the past five years. Between 2018 and 2023, the share of EU exports to China declined by 19%, while imports from China increased by 3%. Although the US remains a more important export destination than China for all countries surveyed, China continues to rank ahead of the US as a source of goods imports for most, with the exceptions of Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Lithuania. While the value of exports to China increased in most countries, only six –Slovakia, Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands, Estonia and Italy– registered an increase in the share of their exports to China over this period. In terms of export value, of the countries covered by this report, Germany remains by far the leading European exporter to China, with USD 105.95 billion in exports –well ahead of the UK, the second-largest exporter at USD 34 billion–. The sharpest declines in export share were observed in Greece (where the share of exports to China dropped by 72% and the absolute value fell by 60%), Slovenia, Lithuania and Hungary, although in each case, exports to China accounted for less than 3% of total national exports.
On the import side, the trend has been predominantly upward across Europe both in the share and value of imports. In absolute terms, Germany and the UK remained the largest importers, with imports valued at USD 172 billion and USD 99 billion, respectively. Slovenia recorded the most significant increase, with the share of Chinese imports rising from 6.2% to 15.7% of its total imports –equivalent to a 327% increase in the absolute value–. However, a few exceptions stand out. Three countries –France, Denmark and the Netherlands– experienced a decline in the share of imports from China. Among them, France registered the sharpest decline, with its share falling by 36% and, notably, it was the only country where the absolute value of Chinese imports also decreased by 24% It was the only case where the trade deficit with China also narrowed. This trend is consistent with France’s leading role in promoting EU’s de-risking efforts and level playing field in its trade relations with China. In Denmark and the Netherlands the share of imports from China declined by 14% and 6% respectively; however, in both cases the absolute value of imports still grew, albeit at the slowest pace among the countries surveyed.
With the exception of France, the trade imbalance with China has widened for all countries surveyed and more sharply for Slovenia, Germany and Belgium. Although in 2023 both Germany and Belgium’s trade deficit dropped from their 2022 peak, it is substantially higher than in 2018. For the EU, the persistent trade deficit in goods with China –amounting to USD 316.63 billion as of 2023– constitutes a significant irritant in bilateral relations. The EU’s trade deficit with China is currently offset by a large surplus with the US. If Trump’s trade policies reduce that surplus, the EU may lose this cushion, exacerbating tensions with China unless Beijing adopts a more open trade stance.
Regarding foreign direct investment (FDI), the US remains the leading partner compared with China across all the countries surveyed. As of 2022 the US was the leading source of foreign investment in the EU, with 16.8% of total FDI stock, and the leading destination of outbound investment from the EU, at 15.5%. The US was the first destination and origin of FDI for Spain, Denmark, France, Ireland and the UK, with Ireland (39.2%) and the UK (31.7%) registering the highest shares of US inward investment. Lithuania has seen a dramatic surge in outward FDI stock to the US, rising from just 0.3% to 40.4% of its total outward investment stock (an increase from USD 13 million to USD 4.8 billion) –by far the sharpest increase among the countries surveyed–. This remarkable shift is likely linked to China’s coercive economic measures against Lithuania, which prompted a reorientation of its investment and trade flows.
In contrast, China’s FDI presence remains more limited. Hungary is the country surveyed with the highest share of Chinese inward investment (5%), followed by Greece (4.2%) and more distantly by the Netherlands (2.1%). In absolute terms, Chinese investment Hungary saw the largest increase, rising by 174% from USD 2.22 billion to USD 6.98 billion. As of 2020 –the most recent year for which comparable data is available across all countries–, the Netherlands, the UK and Germany accounted for the highest amounts of Chinese investment in absolute terms, with approximately USD 58 billion, USD 32 billion and USD 18 billion respectively.
Regarding outward investment to China, the Netherlands and France are the two largest European investors, with total stocks of approximately USD 65 billion and USD 46.9 billion, respectively. In terms of the share of total outward FDI, the countries with the highest are Germany (5.9%), Denmark, the UK and Greece (all around 5.5%). However, trajectories vary over their respective periods surveyed: Danish and UK outward investment has increased both in absolute terms and as a share of their total FDI, while Greece’s investment has decreased in recent years. Not surprisingly, however, the biggest decline in outward investment comes from Lithuania, from USD 52 million to USD 6 million.
A European economic security agenda in the making
Economic security has become increasingly salient in the European debate. The Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting disruption of global supply chains heightened awareness of the risks posed by strategic dependencies. These concerns have only intensified with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and more recently Trump’s fixation reducing the large US deficit by introducing tariffs. In response, the European Commission launched its Economic Security Strategy in June 2023, aiming to foster a more active and coordinated EU-level approach.[8]
Across the countries surveyed in this report, there are varying positions regarding China and the broader economic security agenda. While many European governments are reassessing their economic relations with China in response to rising concerns over strategic dependencies and geopolitical risks, others remain ambivalent, disengaged, or openly dismissive of economic security as a policy priority. The coercive economic measures imposed by China on Lithuania (2021-2022) served as a wake-up call, not only for Vilnius but across the EU, speeding the adoption of the EU’s the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). France has taken a leading role in promoting de-risking and a broader economic security agenda. These concerns are also reflected in Austria’s 2024 National Security Strategy, which emphasises the need to reduce critical dependencies, and in the proliferation of economic security measures across the EU. In Germany, a more critical posture is also emerging, particularly in sensitive areas such as scientific collaboration and technological infrastructure. At the other end of the spectrum, Hungary has rejected the notion of de-risking altogether, while Slovakia, under the Fico government since October 2023, has dismissed security concerns and prioritised (potential) infrastructure cooperation with China. In the middle, Greece and Romania have shown little engagement with the economic security agenda.
Economic security concerns are increasingly shaping policy debates across a range of strategic domains, including engagement with the BRI, 5G regulation and infrastructure, and the more recent discussions on dual-use export controls and outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI). European positioning across these areas reflects some degree of scepticism towards Beijing, but forms part of a broader reassessment of Europe’s strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities –not only in relation to China–.
Reassessing Europe’s engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative
Engagement with the BRI has declined significantly since the publication of the 2020 ETNC report, signalling growing disillusionment with the initiative and a widespread perception that it has failed to live up to initial expectations. This shift is also tied to Europe’s evolving economic security concerns. The BRI is increasingly observed through a security lens, particularly due to its focus on strategic infrastructure and the view that it serves as a vehicle for expanding Chinese geopolitical influence.
As a result, many European governments have become more cautious about China’s flagship initiative. In 2019, most European countries covered in the 2020 ETNC report sent high-level delegations to the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing. Of the 18 countries surveyed in the 2020 ETNC report, 14 were represented by either a head of state or government, or a minister. By 2023, however, only two countries –Greece and Hungary– sent high-level delegations, and only Hungary maintained its previous level of participation. Greece, which had been represented by its prime minister in 2019, downgraded its presence to ministerial level.
This disengagement is also visible in the growing number of countries withdrawing from the initiative or allowing their BRI Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to end. Italy is the most prominent example, formally disengaging from the BRI after its MoU expired in December 2023. Estonia and Lithuania, which had signed MoUs in 2017, also chose not to renew them after their expiration in 2022. Latvia and Romania have similarly allowed their MoUs to become inactive. Other countries, such as Slovakia and Portugal, still maintain active MoUs, signed in 2015 and 2018 respectively as these agreements did not provide a timetable for expiration or renewal. In Poland’s case, the 2015 MoU remains formally in force, as it was automatically renewed, but it is effectively inactive, with no substantive activity or dialogue underway. Slovenia and Greece both signed MoUs with the BRI in 2017 and 2018, respectively but the agreements were never made public. In Slovenia’s case, the Chinese embassy has stated that the MoU remains valid as of spring 2025, though this has neither been publicly acknowledged nor problematized. In the case of Greece, it remains unclear whether the MoU is still in force. If it follows the five-year duration model, as in Italy’s case, it may have expired in 2023 –though no public debate emerged on the matter–.
Toughening on 5G
The 2020 ETNC report observed that most European countries had already begun tightening their regulatory frameworks regarding the presence of Chinese providers in their 5G networks. Five years on, this trend as taken clearer shape. While some countries have adopted explicit bans –such as Romania, Sweden and Lithuania– most countries prefer a more cautious or indirect approach. Hence, a tighter regulatory framework remains the dominant model across much of Europe, even if outcomes are uneven.
In some cases, regulations are lax and allow for some level of involvement of and cooperation with Chinese providers. For instance, in Austria, Chinese companies are partnering with Austrian companies to provide 5G technology. Huawei is also building factory for 5G kit in France, which is expected to become operational in 2025/26. Ireland, despite introducing stricter regulation, made concessions following lobbying from Huawei. In 2023, the Irish government revised wording in its telecoms bill, replacing the term ‘high-risk vendor’ with ‘relevant vendor’, aiming to mitigate negative economic impacts and ease bilateral tensions.[9]
By contrast, several countries have implemented de facto bans without necessarily codifying them as explicit exclusions. In the UK, for instance, the government has ordered Huawei’s presence to be removed by 2027. Denmark has also tightened its regulatory framework in a way that effectively excludes Chinese vendors. In Germany, a more decisive stance was taken in 2024, when the government and mobile network operators agreed to remove components from Huawei and ZTE by 2029. Notably, however, despite such a shift, Germany is among the European countries surveyed with most significant presence of Chinese providers, together with Czechia, Austria and Hungary. Moreover, the final version of Germany’s coalition agreement softened its language on the need for ‘trustworthy providers’, reflecting a potential shift in Berlin’s position towards Huawei and ZTE.[10] This patchwork of approaches underscores the enduring tension between national security concerns, pressures from the US and economic or technological considerations in Europe’s 5G landscape.
Moving forward with the economic security agenda
Certain aspects of the economic security agenda, such as 5G, have prompted tighter regulation and increased oversight across Europe. However, the broader agenda remains a work in progress. Public debate on several key dimensions is still limited, and significant gaps persist in both the understanding of the challenges and the design of effective policy tools to address them. Moreover, the level of political attention and priority given to economic security varies substantially across European countries.
In particular, the European approach to dual-use export controls and OFDI reflects an ambiguous and fragmented landscape. As part of its efforts to strengthen the EU’s economic security framework, the European Commission published a White Paper on Export Controls in January 2024, proposing new actions to improve the effectiveness and coherence of the existing system. In 2025, it followed up with a recommendation urging Member States to review OFDI by companies operating in non-EU countries. This process remains ongoing, with Member States expected to submit a progress report by July 2025 and a comprehensive implementation report, including risk assessments, in 2026.[11]
National approaches to OFDI remain mixed. Spain, for instance, has taken new regulatory steps, establishing procedures for declaring foreign investments and submitting annual reports.[12] By contrast, France is generally sceptical of the utility of OFDI mechanisms and opposes EU involvement, viewing this area as a national competence. More broadly, the overall picture remains unclear, as national-level debate has been modest and many governments display ambivalence or scarce engagement. Regarding dual-use export controls, national positions are similarly diverse but generally more aligned than on OFDI. Several countries –including Austria, France, Denmark, Lithuania, Spain and Italy– support strengthening export control frameworks. Notably, Lithuania, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy have gone a step further by adopting national control lists that extend beyond the scope of the EU Dual-Use Regulation, indicating a more proactive stance.[13] By contrast, others have shown limited enthusiasm, reflecting a more cautious or reserved approach.
Overall, despite growing support for de-risking, most European countries continue to acknowledge the strategic importance of access to Chinese markets and supply chains and remain hesitant to transfer too much authority to Brussels. This cautious approach is particularly evident in countries such as France and Sweden. While Sweden has reinforced its legal framework for dual-use export controls in 2022 and has actively participated in EU-level discussions aimed at improving the export control regime, it has expressed ambivalence towards adopting additional measures proposed by the European Commission –reflecting broader concerns about preserving national discretion in sensitive areas of economic policy–.
Moving towards a greater strategic autonomy
Over the past five years, the debate around European (open) ‘strategic autonomy’ has continued to evolve, largely driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and now accelerating further with the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency. Spain played an active role in advancing this agenda during its presidency of the Council of the EU. At the informal meeting of EU Heads of State and Government in Granada in October 2023, the 27 leaders issued the Granada Declaration, recognising the need to advance a ‘strong, dynamic, competitive and cohesive Europe in a changing world’.[14] On that occasion, Spain introduced the non-paper Resilient EU 2030 aimed at contributing to the development of a comprehensive, balanced, and forward-looking approach to reinforce the EU’s open strategic autonomy.[15] The emphasis on ‘openness’ builds on a prior joint non-paper with the Netherlands and reflects a continued commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation and proportionality.[16]
Although the debate lacks a clear definition, by European strategic autonomy, we refer not only to EU initiatives but more broadly to the idea that the EU, and geopolitically aligned countries in Europe, should reduce its reliance on external powers across key areas –including security, technology and economic resilience– while maintaining openness and cooperation with international partners. In this context, recent geopolitical developments have injected new momentum into efforts to enhance European coordination. This is evident in the Franco-British leadership of coalitions of the willing supporting Ukraine, as well as in the recent reset of EU-UK relations, which led to the conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership affirming that ‘the UK and the EU share a responsibility for the security of Europe’.[17]
Since the 2020 ETNC report, Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain have maintained their support for European strategic autonomy. Denmark not only abolished its defence opt-out from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy in 2022, but has also shown increasing support for strategic autonomy. Portugal and Latvia have also moved in favour of European strategic autonomy, particularly in response to the shifts in US foreign policy under Trump. The Greek government has been vocal in advocating joint European defence capabilities as well as the inclusion of security and defence in the European Investment Bank’s list of strategic priorities. Sweden and Czechia remain ambivalent but have gradually warmed their stance on strategic autonomy. Lithuania, previously sceptical towards this concept, is now showing signs of a more ambivalent stance in the context of Trump’s return to power.
The growing support for greater European strategic autonomy should be interpreted with caution. The European stance largely reflects a desire to push forward EU strategic initiatives without undermining the alliance with the US. This is the case with Ireland which maintains a cautious strategic stance due to close economic and security relationships with the US. Additionally, some countries have maintained their scepticism or even reversed course. In Italy, both the Draghi and Meloni governments have maintained strong ties with Washington and are wary of straining transatlantic relations by endorsing a strategic autonomy agenda. In Hungary, Orbán has said that theoretically he supports Europe’s strategic autonomy, but only if that means the autonomy of the Member States and not of a federal EU.
The analysis also reveals distinct subregional dynamics in European approaches to strategic autonomy. In Southern and Western Europe support remains strong and consistent, with countries such as Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain maintaining a firm commitment to the agenda. The UK, with its own post-Brexit realities, and Ireland adopt a more cautious stance, given their strong Atlanticist orientation. The Nordic and Baltic countries also show a slight trend towards greater support: Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden reflect increased engagement with this idea amid evolving regional security concerns. In Central and Eastern Europe, ambivalence is the most prevalent stance, and positions have remained relatively stable. It should be noted that Hungary and Italy are the only countries where support for strategic autonomy is decreasing as a manifestation of the strong rapport that Meloni and Orbán are cultivating with Trump.
Europe in the face of US-China rivalry, five years on
As tensions between Washington and Beijing worsen and become entangled with other global crises, European countries navigate an increasingly complex and uncertain terrain. This introduction has highlighted some continuity with the trends identified in the 2020 ETNC report. At the time, we noted that China’s growing assertiveness was already prompting a strategic re-evaluation across Europe, a dynamic that has only become more pronounced in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this reassessment is not entirely uniform across the continent, it is evident in the growing disillusionment with initiatives such as the BRI and a broader reconsideration of Europe’s economic ties with China, even if this shift has not yet clearly materialised in the data on trade and investment figures. The US also remains the key partner for most European countries, with important developments in the field of security, even though Washington is increasingly viewed as a disruptive actor in the European economic and security landscapes. Although the effects of US economic policies are not yet observable in the data, they hold the potential to significantly disrupt existing patterns of economic cooperation.
In navigating US-China tensions and broader geopolitical challenges, there is a growing push across Europe for greater strategic autonomy. This report finds increasing convergence around the idea that Europeans should reduce their reliance on external powers, a shift reflected in the wider traction the concept of strategic autonomy has gained compared to the last ETNC report on this topic. However, the practical implementation of this principle remains challenging. The difficulties in articulating a coherent economic security agenda exemplify the broader problem of translating these ambitions into actionable policy frameworks. While meaningful progress has been made in some domains, others still lack clear definitions, coherent instruments and sustained public debate, reflecting differing national priorities and positioning vis-à-vis China and the US.
Moving forward, European countries will continue to navigate a complex set of factors: managing their relationships with China, responding to the demands and expectations of the transatlantic alliance, and advancing their national foreign policy priorities. These competing pressures are particularly evident in the balancing act many have faced on issues discussed in this chapter, such as 5G regulation and the adoption of Indo-Pacific strategies. As US-China tensions deepen, these dynamics will remain central to shaping Europe’s positioning in the evolving rivalry between the two powers.
This introduction and the accompanying national chapters were last updated on 30 May 2025. The trends outlined here draw on insights from the national chapters to highlight broad developments in the Europe’s positioning vis-à-vis the US and China. Readers are encouraged to explore the full set of country analyses for a more detailed understanding of the diverse national contexts and evolving policy responses.
[1] M. Esteban, M. Otero, et al. ‘Europe in the Face of US-China Rivalry: A Report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC)’. Real Instituto Elcano. November 2021.
[2] J. Hayden. ‘Von der Leyen calls for EU to “adapt” state-aid rules in answer to US green subsidy scheme’. Politico. 4 December 2022.
[3] C. Powers. ‘Biden divides EU with new AI chip export controls’. Euractiv. 14 January 2025.
[4] M. Bryant. ‘Sweden seeks clarity from China about suspected sabotage of undersea cables’. The Guardian. 28 November 2024.
[5] Reuters. ‘US to add 2 destroyer ships in southern Spain’. Reuters. 8 May 2023.
[6] P.D. Wezeman, A. Fleurant, A. Kuimova, D.L. da Silva, N. Tian & S.T. Wezeman. Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). March 2020. M. George, K. Djokic, Z. Hussain, P.D. Wezeman & S.T. Wezeman. Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). March 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf
[7] This introduction uses trade data from UN Comtrade (2018–2023) and investment data from OECD and Eurostat (mainly 2017–2022), with variations depending on data availability, as noted in Figure 2. Data was retrieved October-November 2024. Discrepancies may exist between these figures and the official data published by each country. Chapters may rely on different sources to complement this data.
[8] For a detailed discussion on de-risking see P. Andersson & F. Lindberg (lead eds.). National Perspectives on Europe’s De-risking from China. European Think-tank Network on China. 28 June 2024.
[9] Seanad Éireann. ‘Communications Regulation and Digital Hub Development Agency (Amendment) Bill 2022 [Dáil Bill Amended by the Seanad], No. 86b of 2022’. Houses of the Oireachtas. 2023. The Irish Times. ‘Last-minute concession to telecoms firms after Chinese criticism of new law’. The Irish Times. 13 February 2023.
[10] N. Barkin. ‘Watching China in Europe – May 2025’. German Marshall Fund of the United States. 1 May 2025.
[11] European Commission. Commission calls on Member States to review outbound investments and assess risks to economic security. 15 January 2025.
[12] Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa. Declaraciones de inversiones exteriores. Accessed 4 June 2025.
[13] European Commission. White Paper on Export Controls. 24 January 2024.
[14] European Council. ‘The Granada declaration’. 6 October 2023.
[15] Gobierno de España. ‘Resilient EU2030’. 15 September 2023.
[16] Spain and the Netherlands. ‘Spain-Netherlands Non-Paper on Strategic Autonomy While Preserving an Open Economy’. 25 March 2021.
[17] EU and the UK. ‘EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership’. 19 May 2025.
Image: Composition of three interlocking golden gears on a Europe map background. Photos: http://www.fotogestoeber.de – miniature / Getty Images
