Key messages
- Amid the prospect of greater investment and attention being paid to the defence sphere, Spain needs to find a balance between Euro-Atlantic solidarity and attending to its own strategic priorities. This means prioritising ‘fungible’ or multipurpose initiatives and capabilities. Such a prioritisation should yield a twofold reward: adding value to Spain’s national defence and creating political and diplomatic capital within the frameworks of both NATO and the EU.
- The direction that defence spending takes cannot be solely determined either by numbers or by economic, social or industrial objectives. Otherwise, there is a risk of putting the cart before the horse. The revival of Spanish defence will only be sustainable if it is based on strategic and national security criteria. This requires greater investment in ‘strategic culture’ and in fomenting an intellectual infrastructure that inculcates knowledge of defence and strategy matters in Spain.
- Spain benefits from geographical, industrial and operational advantages for leading in domains such as air defence, missiles, naval and submarine operations, and the protection of critical infrastructure, all of them fundamental when it comes to bolstering deterrence in Eastern Europe and furthering Spain’s specific strategic defence objectives. Harnessing –and safeguarding– these advantages requires a profound debate on the subject of how the proliferation of low-cost precision technologies will affect such top-priority operational areas for Spain, channelling investment towards and wielding greater leadership in such areas within both NATO and the EU.
Analysis
1. Defence: a Euro-Atlantic and Spanish strategic priority
Defence has become a priority in Europe and Spain alike. The rise in the importance of defence matters may be explained by the resurgence of inter-state geostrategic rivalry, both at the global –particularly between the US and China– and regional levels, as exemplified by the war in Ukraine.[1]
Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, the persistent threat it poses to Europe (witness its recent violation of various NATO members’ airspace) and the uncertainty regarding the Trump Administration’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic security have (re)awoken the debate about whether Europe can defend itself[2] or keep Ukraine afloat.[3]
At their recent summit at The Hague towards the end of June 2025, NATO leaders agreed to raise their defence spending to 3.5% of GDP within a period of 10 years, in response to the Trump Administration’s pressure.[4] The allies also agreed to devote 1.5% of GDP to security, safeguarding civilian infrastructure, civil resilience and innovation, reflecting the growing menace of hybrid and cyber-attacks.
For its part, the EU has identified defence –and security– as a priority of the highest order and has launched a series of financial instruments and industrial initiatives with the goal of incentivising European cooperation around the defence industry and reviving the industrial and technological foundations of European defence.[5]
2. Spain’s stance on the increase in defence spending
Spain opted out of the consensus regarding the 3.5% figure agreed at The Hague summit however, relying on two main arguments.
The first is that the allies’ solidarity should not be restricted to a spending figure (input), rather that other fundamental parameters should be taken into account, such as the creation of military capabilities (output) and the actual contribution to NATO initiatives and operations.[6] In this regard, successive deployments of Spanish fighters, warships and defensive missile batteries on NATO’s eastern flank, the country’s participation in the ‘Eastern Sentry’ operation (launched after recent Russian violations of allied airspace) and its commitment to Ukraine vouch for Spanish solidarity and its willingness to contribute towards countering shared threats.
The second argument is that Spain has already taken significant steps towards increasing its investment in defence. In April 2025, the Prime Minister announced new investments that would lift Spanish defence spending above 2% of GDP.[7] While the executive does not rule out future increases, it believes that a level slightly higher than 2% would be sufficient to meet the Capability Targets set by the NATO Defence Ministers as recently as the start of June 2025.
Even so, some allies continue to describe the Spanish effort as insufficient and maintain that the 3.5% agreement reached at The Hague should also be binding on Spain.[8] Apart from the debate about figures, the key question is: how should Spain direct this growing investment in defence?
3. Invest by all means, but with a strategic focus
A large part of the political and media debate in Spain has focused on the economic, social and industrial benefits linked to defence investment. Defence investment is often referred to as providing impetus to innovation, employment and technological competitiveness.[9] Even though such benefits are genuine, they should not constitute the starting point. Justifying defence spending using industrial and social arguments is a double-edged sword: if the goal is economic, why should the money not be spent on areas that would yield more profit?
The constant attempt to justify defence investment in economic, social, technological and industrial terms undoubtedly originates from the lack of strategic culture in Spain. For the current process of transforming and reviving the defence sector to be effective, Spain needs to invest in its own intellectual infrastructure in defence and strategic affairs.
Unlike other European countries –such as France, the UK, Poland and Finland– Spain lacks a critical mass of experts in security and defence outside the military establishment. This circumstance stems from both the lack of sensitivity to strategic affairs among Spain’s general public and its concern with domestic matters, and the longstanding preoccupation among Spain’s political, diplomatic and intellectual elites to be perceived as ‘constructive’ allies or partners, something that deters homegrown thinking and reflection about national interests. If the goal is to channel the increase in spending effectively, it will therefore be essential to accompany it with sustained investment in independent strategic training, talent, knowledge and debate, especially in the civilian domain.
Ultimately, the revival of Spain’s defence will only be sustainable if it is founded upon strategic and national security considerations. If not, there is a risk of putting the cart before the horse, allowing industrial, political and economic objectives to determine decisions about military capabilities with critical implications, which could lead to outcomes that are suboptimal from an operational perspective.
4. Euro-Atlantic solidarity and national defence: a necessary balance
It is often argued that, owing to its geographical location, Spain does not view the Russian threat with the same intensity as Eastern countries. Its priorities lie in the South and in more diffuse problems that are not strictly military. This would explain why it is so difficult to anchor the debate in matters concerning national defence.
That said, there is also a broad consensus that Spain’s prosperity, stability and security depend on European stability. According to the most recent findings of the Elcano Royal Institute Barometer (BRIE) released in July 2025, three quarters of the interviewees (75%) believe that Europe should continue sending military aid to Ukraine and more than half (52%) are in favour of Spain sending troops to ensure security in Ukraine. This is an extremely high percentage in light of the fact that Spaniards are typically averse to the deployment of military force in any circumstances. The notion that Ukraine represents the first line of resistance against Russian revisionism seems therefore to have taken root in Spanish public opinion. This fact would seem to justify Spain’s commitment to Ukraine and the East.[10] However, when asked which country could pose a threat to Spain the majority of interviewees pinpoint Morocco (55%), easily outranking Russia (33%), which is especially striking bearing in mind the stability of relations with the former and the belligerence of the latter. This traditional fixation on the southern neighbourhood –where the security challenges tend to be perceived in terms of hybrid rather than military threats– tends to limit Spain’s room for political manoeuvre when it comes to prioritising defence.
Spain’s path towards the revival of defence ought therefore to be conceived as the search for a (difficult) balancing point: between solidarity with its European and Atlantic allies on the one hand and, on the other, paying heed to its own strategic priorities. This balance requires two complementary lines of action:
a. Identifying the military, industrial and technological capabilities that add value to the security of Eastern Europe (shared threats), but that are also useful for national defence; in other words, prioritising fungible capabilities.
b. Ensuring that European programmes and initiatives (whether NATO’s or the EU’s) reinforce Spain’s highest-priority capabilities, rather than squandering resources on capabilities and projects that have little value from the national perspective.
This entails addressing a key question: what are Spain’s strategic priorities in the defence arena?
5. Three major strategic strands of Spain’s defence
It is possible to point to three major strands or priorities of Spain’s national defence, in the form of concentric circles and in order of importance:[11]
a. Having an autonomous form of deterrence in sovereign spaces[12] requires maintaining a military and technological advantage over any actor in North Africa, above all in the aerial and missile domains. This entails investing in aerial superiority, offensive and defensive missiles, advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, electronic warfare and cyber-defence, and superiority in the submarine arena.
b. The ability to exert power in ‘Spain’s maritime axis of strategic projection’, which extends as far as the Caribbean at its Atlantic limit and covers the West-African coast in its entirety (as far as the Mozambique Channel in the south of Africa’s Indian Ocean coast), the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the far north-western part of the Indian Ocean.[13] This underscores the importance of aeronaval, amphibian and, particularly, submarine capabilities. It is also worth including here the Sahel-Saharan belt (Mauritania, Mali and Niger), which constitutes a sort of ‘backyard’ that lends strategic depth to parts of the maritime axis and may therefore be a source of insecurity in itself. As far as this latter space is concerned, the main operational area involves the capabilities of Special Operations forces and reforms of the security sector.
c. Situational awareness and capacity for residual global strategic impact, beyond the first two circles, normally in the context of a coalition or a multilateral framework or in cooperation with favoured partners.[14] Here it is worth noting that the fact that the world’s strategic centre of gravity is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre entails that a good deal of what takes place within Spain’s maritime axis of strategic projection will stem from elsewhere. Hence, although Spain is unable prioritise the Indo-Pacific, it should ensure that it enjoys a certain degree of access, presence and connection to this region. This requires strengthening collaboration with the US, France, the UK, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia. The US tendency to structure industrial naval cooperation around the Indo-Pacific (via AUKUS and naval agreements with South Korea and Japan) obliges Spain to search for formulas for integrating itself into such industrial and technological clusters, given its interest in operational and technological-industrial excellence in the naval sphere. In this context, industrial cooperation with Australia in the naval sector represents a firm foundation for strengthening Spain’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Starting from these principles, there is a need to determine how Spain can contribute to deterrence on the eastern flank (shared threats) in a way that is coherent with these three strategic priorities of its own (threats that are either not shared or to which Spain assigns a greater level of priority than a large number of its partners and allies).
6. Fungible or multipurpose capabilities: contributing to the East without neglecting the South
Spain’s contribution to deterrence on the eastern flank should therefore prioritise operational initiatives and capabilities that are fungible, which is to say useful both in terms of strengthening collective security in Europe and in terms of the three major strands of national defence set out above. This approach would avoid duplications and investments that divert resources from non-shared threats and Spain’s own priorities.
This consideration affects not only material capabilities but also the operations arena, which is fundamental from the perspective of experience and effectiveness. Naval deployments in the Black Sea and the Baltic, or the strategic use of submarines in the Atlantic, would enable Spain to operate in a demanding and highly competitive environment, thereby strengthening competences in spheres that are directly linked to its interests. At the same time, such deployments would enable Spain to have ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground, absorbing operational lessons and technological innovations arising from the Ukraine war and in Eastern Europe.
The balance between solidarity with Spain’s allies and defence of its own priorities involves identifying fungible or multipurpose capabilities that serve as a means to both ends. From this it follows that the key capabilities for Spain should be those that contribute value to the collective effort: air and anti-missile defences, offensive missiles, latest-generation aerial power (with an emphasis on stealth platforms), drones, advanced naval capabilities (including in the submarine sphere), cyber-defence, Special Operations Forces and a sustained strengthening of munitions and precision-guided munitions. Such capabilities would form the nucleus of a coherent strategy, aligned with the three major Spanish priorities set out above. Prioritising fungible capabilities would yield a twofold benefit: contributing to the goals of Spain’s national defence and creating political and diplomatic capital within the frameworks of both NATO and the EU.
Here it is worth pointing out that the growth of commercial technologies for military applications is unleashing the proliferation of low-cost precision attack capabilities and, in particular, drones and autonomous systems. This means that, rather than searching for a limited number of highly sophisticated, expensive and precise capabilities, armies are bringing ‘mass’ back to the battlefield. In this regard, Michael C. Horowitz –former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities– has set out a novel paradigm, comprising a new era in which precision and mass of military materiel converge.[15] The growing role of drones both in the Ukraine war and in the context of the recent Russian incursions into NATO airspace would tend to support this new reality. Both NATO and the EU have acknowledged this new strategic reality, characterised by the combination of precision technologies and the proliferation of low-cost autonomous systems, as well as the fact that western and European air defence and anti-missile capabilities are not optimised for confronting it. Specifically, the fact that the Europeans need to deploy sophisticated F-35 fighter jets and use missiles costing approximately €1 million each to bring down Russian foam-rubber drones costing €1,000 places the West in an unsustainable situation.[16]
The EU Defence Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, recently highlighted the importance of detecting and downing drones and to this end investing in the development of acoustic sensors (following Ukraine’s example) and the introduction of lasers to bring down non-crewed aircraft at minimal cost.[17] In a similar vein, Brigadier General Jyri Raitasalo from Finland has recently set out the importance of developing kinetic and non-kinetic solutions for countering the threat implicit in the proliferation of low-cost drones, which could include the introduction of interception drones, low-cost portable air defence systems (for example, shotguns) and electronic warfare.[18]
Spain needs to be at the forefront of these innovations, given their relevance to the national defence objectives. Specifically, Spain should move towards operational concepts, capabilities and industrial and technological solutions that incorporate the ‘precision and mass’ paradigm in such top-priority areas as deterrence and aerial and anti-missile defences, naval warfare and submarine capabilities.
7. Missiles: an opportunity for strategic leadership
A key area in which Spain should focus its contribution to Eastern Europe’s security (shared threat) constitutes missiles, whether defensive or offensive. This arena takes on a critical aspect both from the perspective of military deterrence in Europe[19] and from the standpoint of Spain’s specific interests. Superiority in missiles and aerial capabilities compared to any actor in North Africa is key from a national defence perspective. Given the US’s strategic and technological advantage in this sphere, Spain should aspire to becoming its main point of focus in Europe as far as the (co)production of missiles and anti-missile defence systems, the deployment of such capabilities and research and development in this field are concerned.
Spain already enjoys major advantages for fulfilling this role, being home to five Arleigh Burke destroyers in Rota, a key element in the US’s anti-missile defences in Europe, having various Patriot batteries and a geographical position (away from the eastern flank) that makes it the ideal candidate for the pre-positioning of US and NATO guided missiles in the European theatre.[20] Spain should therefore work towards a comprehensive agreement with the US that would enable it to perform a role similar to that of Italy and the UK with the F-35: operational, technological and industrial leadership in a key area for its national defence. Moreover, Spain should take on a leadership role in the various facets of this field (operational, capability development, industrial and technological) within both the NATO and EU frameworks. This would fulfil the twofold objective of bolstering its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security by adding genuine value and enriching its experience and capabilities in a critical area from a national security perspective. Furthermore, as already pointed out, incorporating the lessons of the ‘precision and mass’ paradigm into defence and aerial and anti-missile deterrence constitutes a fundamental challenge for Spain. This leads on to the next point: the value that greater involvement in Ukraine may have for Spain’s national defence objectives.
8. Ukraine as a laboratory and hothouse of innovation
In this context, its presence in Ukraine represents not only Spain’s contribution to combatting shared threats but also an opportunity for absorbing operational lessons and technological developments capable of providing significant yields in the arena of non-shared threats. Ukrainian forces are deploying capabilities that are critical from a Spanish national defence standpoint, especially low-cost drones and anti-drone, aerial defence and anti-missile systems, including electronic warfare.[21] Playing an active role in assisting the Ukrainian armed forces therefore offers a means of accelerating the learning curve and strengthening the culture of military innovation in Spain and its adaptation to the ‘precision and mass’ paradigm, particularly in such critical areas as drones and anti-drone capabilities.
Moreover, the prospect of Europe earmarking significant public resources to support the funding of military purchases by Ukraine also offers opportunities for Spain and its companies. A presence in this market would yield not only economic benefits but also gains in terms of technological innovation. Ukraine is establishing itself as one of the main military innovation laboratories or hubs in Europe, both in terms of operational concepts and technological development. Spain should therefore have a presence in Ukraine with the aim of getting closer to the forefront of these innovations. This will reap dividends in terms of strengthening its stance on shared threats (Russia) and on non-shared threats (the southern neighbourhood).
Conclusions
Anchoring the incipient revival of Spanish defence to a clear strategic vision –linked to specific priorities of national defence– will enable us to move beyond the commonplaces that dominate the public debate surrounding defence matters in Spain. Affirmations such as ‘more needs to be invested’ and ‘new technologies have to be tried’ are empty unless they are tied to concrete priorities, anchored to geostrategic reality and the specific threats that Spain faces.
The fascination stemming from the growing role played by software and digitalisation in the military domain should not make us lose sight of the fact that the military application of these technologies needs to generate tangible effects in physical space. This inevitably brings us back to geography. The key resides not in the technology itself but in how it is applied to solve specific strategic and operational problems.[22] Spain is, above all else, a maritime power. And this circumstance should guide its decisions on investment in technological innovation. Specifically, Spain should steer its investment in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, drones, radars and electronics towards applications in aerial and maritime environments, which is where its competitive advantage lies and which will ultimately determine its level of security.
Spain faces a key opportunity for redefining its role in the Euro-Atlantic security arena. This requires a strategic approach that takes its own national priorities as its launchpad, but which contributes in a tangible way to collective deterrence and allied cohesion. The goal should not be to spend more but to prioritise fungible capabilities and initiatives that strengthen the defence of both the East and the South, and that enable Spain to consolidate itself as an important and dependable actor in the new European security ecosystem.
[1] Mira Milosevich-Juaristi (2025), ‘La guerra en Ucrania’, Elcano Royal Institute, 25/II/2025; Luis Simón (2022), ‘Autonomía estratégica y defensa europea después de Ucrania’, ARI, Elcano Royal Institute, 18/X/2022.
[2] Alexandr Burilkov & Guntram B. Wolff (2025), ‘Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed’, Bruegel, 21/II/2025.
[3] Pablo del Amo (2025), ‘¿Puede la ayuda militar europea a Ucrania llenar el vacío estadounidense?’, ARI, Real Instituto Elcano, 14/V/2025.
[4] Félix Arteaga y Luis Simón (2025), ‘La Cumbre de la OTAN en La Haya: Habemus 5%’, Comentario, Real Instituto Elcano, 26/VI/2025.
[5] Félix Arteaga, Daniel Fiott y Luis Simón (2025), ‘El dilema de la defensa: ¿puede España capitalizar la revitalización de la defensa europea?’, Elcano Policy Paper, junio.
[6] Regarding this debate, see Robert G. Bell (2022), ‘Fixing NATO’s 2014 Defense Investment Pledge’, CSDS Policy Brief, nr 3/2022,
[7] Prime Minister’s press conference following the Council of Ministers, La Moncloa, 22/IV/2025.
[8] ‘NATO’s New Villain: Spain’, Politico, 24/VI/2025.
[9] Eg, ‘Defensa e innovación: la nueva frontera industrial que España no puede ignorar’, El Economista, 22/VII/2025.
[10] Charles Powell & Carlota García Encina (2023), ‘Respuestas españolas a la inversión rusa de Ucrania’, ARI, Elcano Royal Institute, 23/II/2023.
[11] This classification relies on an analysis of the National Defence Directive of 2020, the National Security Strategy of 2021 and the Foreign Affairs Strategy of 2025. For an analysis of the architecture of Spain’s national security and defence, see Enrique Pérez Ramírez (2020), ‘La Directiva de defensa nacional de 2020 y los problemas que permanecen sin resolver’, Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies, nr 102/2020.
[12] Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy (Madrid, 28/XII/2021); and Office of the Prime Minister, National Defence Directive (Madrid, 11/VI/2020).
[13] Specifically, the Foreign Affairs Strategy refers to a radius of 4,000 km, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, ‘Estrategia de Acción Exterior de España 2025-2028’ (Madrid, 10/VI/2025). See also Luis Simón (2017), ‘¿España como potencia atlántica?’, ARI, Elcano Royal Institute, 7/XII/2017.
[14] Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy (Madrid, 28/XII/2021); and Office of the Prime Minister, National Defence Directive (Madrid, 11/VI/2020).
[15] For an analysis of this new paradigm, see Michael C. Horowitz (2024), ‘Battles of precise mass’, Foreign Affairs, 22/X/2024.
[16] Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (2025), ‘Llegó la hora de que Europa de una respuesta sin fisuras a Putin’, Elcano Royal Institute, 20/IX/2025.
[17] Euractiv (2025), ‘EU defence chief says ‘drone wall’ could be ready in a year’, 24/IX/2025.
[18] Michael Kofman & Brig. Gen. Jiry Raitasalo (2025), ‘Finland’s frontline and NATO’s northern defense’, The Russia Contingency, War on the Rocks, 25/IX/2025.
[19] On the importance of missiles for deterrence, see Lotje Boswinkel (2025), ‘Europe, deterrence and long-range strike’, War on the Rocks, 20/III/2025; Fabian Hoffmann (2025), ‘Denial won’t do: Europe needs a punishment-based conventional counterstrike strategy’, War on the Rocks, 08/IX/2025.
[20] Luis Simón (2017), ‘España, EEUU y la defensa: ¿de base operacional a socio estratégico?’, ARI, Elcano Royal Institute, 13/III/2017.
[21] Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (2025), ‘Llegó la hora de que Europa de una respuesta sin fisuras a Putin’, Commentary, Elcano Royal Institute, 20/IX/2025.
[22] Andrew Krepinevich & Barry Watts (2015), The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy, Basic Books, Philadelphia, PA.
