Key messages
- At the time of its 40th anniversary, the Schengen Agreement remains one of the most visible and valued pillars of European integration. However, the increasing recourse to internal border controls raises questions about its stability and future.
- This analysis examines the track record of the safeguard mechanism using three variables: the number of notifications, the average duration of controls and their geographical distribution among Member States.
- Descriptive analysis of the data reveals a structural shift in how the mechanism is used: fewer notifications, but longer durations, concentrated in a small group of countries. This evolution may reflect growing asymmetries in the governance of Schengen and a deeper erosion of mutual trust among Member States. While external threats have undoubtedly played a role, internal dynamics—such as political fragmentation and what some observers describe as a “silent renationalisation” of border policy—could pose a more significant risk to its long-term viability.
- The future of Schengen will depend on the EU’s ability to restore mutual trust, strengthen common instruments, and reaffirm freedom of movement as a cornerstone of European integration.
Analysis
1. Introduction
In mid-June, the Schengen Agreement celebrated its 40th anniversary. The Schengen Area supplies more than 450 million residents with the right to travel freely between countries without undergoing routine border checks. Throughout these four decades, it has been hailed as one of the main achievements of the European project—essential to both the functioning and very existence of the European Union.
The year of its 40th anniversary began with the welcoming of Bulgaria and Romania into the Schengen fold. A Council decision established the lifting of land border controls with these two countries as of January 1, 2025. This brought the number of Member States with no internal border controls to 25 out of 27, turning Schengen into a border-free zone of over 4 million square kilometres.
However, even as the milestone is celebrated and its achievements recognised, many voices have raised concerns about Schengen’s vitality and signs of ageing. Viewed in isolation—and especially when compared to the situation 25 years ago—it is true that opposition and practical challenges appear acute. But are these challenges more severe than those faced by other European institutions, or by the EU project as a whole?
2. Origin. The Schengen agreement and its developments
The Schengen Area began in 1985. A treaty was signed in that year by five European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) in the Luxembourg village of Schengen. The agreement aimed at gradually abolishing border controls between these countries, paving the way for free movement of people, goods, and services within a common area. This was a significant step in European integration, reflecting a desire to overcome Cold War divisions and foster unity.
The need for a true movement of people, a border-free Europe, was inextricably linked to the building of a free market, a necessary condition. And the achievement of this primary goal required the elimination of border checks at the internal borders of participating countries. At the same time, while abolishing internal controls, European countries needed to strengthen security by coordinating border controls at the external borders.
Subsequent years saw significant progress and integration measures, driven by the dual need to eliminate internal controls while reinforcing security at the external borders. The Schengen Area thus became a large and influential free travel zone as well as an essential component of European unity. The Schengen Convention in 1990 provided the legal and operational mechanisms necessary for its effective implementation. The legal framework included provisions for police and judicial cooperation, information-sharing between countries and standardised visa policies.
In 1995 Schengen became operational, and in 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam further incorporated the Schengen rules into EU law, making it a central part of EU policies on border control and movement. The incorporation of the Schengen Protocol into the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 established Schengen as a form of close cooperation between EU Member States and associated countries, formally integrating it into the legal and institutional framework of the European Union.
At 40, the Schengen Area stands as both a milestone achievement and a focus of renewed scrutiny. While it enables borderless travel across most EU Member States and has become a central pillar of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), its future direction is increasingly debated. The AFSJ—a core policy domain of the European Union—encompasses migration, justice, home affairs and fundamental rights. It was designed to address the tensions between facilitating free movement and ensuring internal security, a balance that has become ever more complex in recent years. As Schengen matures, the question is no longer simply how it is ageing, but whether it is at a turning point and if it will survive the challenges ahead.
Today, the Schengen Area free of internal borders includes 29 countries: 25 EU Member States and four non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). Cyprus also participates in Schengen, although its internal border control has not yet been lifted. Given the benefits of Schengen cooperation, Ireland has requested to participate in some parts of Schengen, including the Schengen Information System as well as judicial and police cooperation.
A particularly significant indicator of how Schengen is functioning today lies in the increasing use of the mechanism for the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls. Originally conceived as an exceptional and time-limited tool to respond to specific threats—such as major international events or serious security concerns—this mechanism has become one of the most politically and legally sensitive components of the system. Its application reflects the tensions between the principle of free movement and the imperative of internal security. The following section analyses the legal framework governing this mechanism and the way it has evolved in practice over recent years, focusing on how its use reveals structural vulnerabilities and ongoing challenges to Schengen governance. While it may signal growing internal and external pressures on the system, it could also be seen as a pragmatic safeguard that has allowed the Schengen Agreement to endure despite these very pressures.
3. The Temporary Border Controls Mechanism: legal framework and evolution in practice
3.1. Legal framework
The Schengen system has always included exceptional mechanisms for responding to specific threats, allowing Member States to temporarily reintroduce internal border controls in the event of major incidents such as international summits or serious security concerns. Among these mechanisms, the possibility of reinstating internal border controls stands out today as one of the most politically and legally sensitive indicators of the current state of the Schengen Area. The Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EU) 2016/399), a core component of the Schengen acquis incorporated into the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, establishes a general regime of abolished controls at internal borders. However, Articles 25 to 30 of the Code provide exceptions to this rule, allowing Member States to temporarily reintroduce border controls in cases of serious threats to public policy or internal security.
The reintroduction of internal border controls must always be a measure of last resort (Article 25), applicable only in exceptional circumstances when no other effective means are available to address the threat. It must strictly comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality (Article 26), and both the scope and duration of the controls must be limited to whatever is strictly necessary to respond to the specific threat.
The duration of temporary reintroduction depends on the legal basis invoked by the Member State. As a rule, controls may be applied initially for a maximum of 30 days, and may be renewed for periods not exceeding six months in total (Article 25.4). In cases of exceptional, prolonged threats, Article 29 allows for an extension of up to two years.
Any decision to reintroduce border controls must be notified in advance to the European Commission, the other Member States and the European Parliament (Article 27), including detailed information on the reasons, territorial scope, expected duration and measures adopted. While the Commission may issue an opinion on the necessity and proportionality of the measure, it has no power to veto such decisions, which remain within the sovereign prerogative of the Member States (Article 27.4).
3.2. Track record in practice
The track record of the mechanism for the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls within the Schengen Area reveals a notable change in scale and frequency. Designed as a last-resort response to exceptional threats, it has progressively become a more recurrent feature of Schengen governance. This trend raises concerns about the normalisation of a tool originally intended to be used sparingly, and its potential impact on the principles of free movement and mutual trust. To better understand the extent of this transformation, the analysis explores three core variables: the volume of notifications, the Member States triggering the mechanism, and the duration of the reintroduced controls.
Regarding the number of notifications, between 2006 and July 2025, 472 notifications were issued by Schengen countries under the mechanism for temporary border control reintroduction (Figure 1). During the initial years (2006–2014), notifications were infrequent—ranging from one to eight per year—and typically linked to exceptional circumstances such as high-level international summits or major diplomatic summits. A turning point came in 2015, marked by a sharp increase in the number of controls. This shift can be attributed to two converging crises: the arrival of refugees—particularly via the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean routes—driven by both the war in Syria and the violence caused by the self-proclaimed DAESH caliphate; and, simultaneously, the growing threat of terrorism. DAESH not only fuelled displacement but also called on radicalised individuals to travel to Syria and Iraq or to carry out attacks within Europe. In response, several Member States began to rely more systematically on internal border controls as a security measure, often extending them repeatedly beyond the initial dates.
A second turning point came in 2020, when the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered an unprecedented wave of internal border control reintroductions. In an effort to contain the spread of the virus, most Schengen countries temporarily closed their borders, resulting in more than 100 notifications in a single year—by far the highest annual figure since the mechanism was established. Although the health emergency was formally exceptional, the scale of these controls marked a qualitative leap in the use of the instrument. Notably, the increased levels of use have persisted beyond the pandemic. In the years following 2020, Member States have continued to invoke internal security concerns to justify new or prolonged controls, frequently citing the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and renewed pressure from irregular migration via a variety of routes.
Figure 1. Number of notifications of temporary reintroduction of border controls (per year)
This track record reflects a clear intensification in the use of a mechanism originally conceived as temporary and exceptional. What began as a rarely used safeguard has become a recurrent instrument in response to overlapping crises—most notably the pandemic—placing sustained pressure on the principles of free movement and mutual trust. However, a more nuanced reading of the data suggests a recent shift in the opposite direction. Despite the ongoing geopolitical instability caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine, the number of notifications has declined significantly, with 38 in 2024 and only 15 so far in 2025. While these figures remain above pre-pandemic levels, they indicate that the use of internal border controls is once again becoming the exception rather than the rule. In such a volatile context, this restraint could be interpreted as a sign of resilience within the Schengen framework.
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of another crucial dimension: the average duration of internal border controls. For nearly a decade (2006–2014), the average duration remained consistently low, in the range of 5-16 days per year. A sharp increase began in 2015, with the figure climbing to 116 days in 2016 and peaking at 155 days in 2019. This escalation reflects the increasing use of successive extensions, which, while formally compliant with the Schengen Borders Code, exert cumulative pressure on the principle of free movement. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 produced a sudden drop in average duration (40 days), probably due to the high number of short-term, health-related notifications. However, the trend reversed again after 2021, with a renewed upward trajectory, reaching 143 days by mid-2025. This figure confirms that the mechanism is no longer used only in isolated, time-limited cases, but rather as a prolonged and recurring response to sustained or overlapping crises, reinforcing its gradual normalisation within Schengen governance.
Figure 2. Average duration of controls in internal borders (in days)
This upward trend in average duration may appear contradictory when considered alongside the recent decline in the overall number of notifications. However, both indicators point in fact to the same structural evolution: while Member States are activating the mechanism less frequently, those that do so tend to maintain border controls for longer periods—often through successive extensions. This shift suggests a consolidation of the instrument as a long-term management tool rather than a temporary emergency response, reinforcing the impression that internal border controls are becoming a semi-permanent feature of Schengen governance.
Apart from frequency and duration, the third relevant aspect is the distribution of notifications among Member States (Figure 3). The data reveal a marked asymmetry in the use of the reintroduction mechanism: Austria tops the ranking with more than 67 notifications, followed by Germany with 51 and Norway with 44. Other countries such as Finland, France and Denmark also show substantial use, while a large number of Member States—including the Netherlands, Latvia and Malta—have activated the mechanism only sporadically. This concentration suggests that a limited group of countries consistently rely on the tool, possibly in response to recurring security concerns or political preferences for stricter border management.
Figure 3. Reintroduction of internal border controls by country
When grouped by geographical region (Figure 4), the disparities in the use of the mechanism become even more pronounced. Central European countries—such as Austria, Germany, Poland and Czechia—account for the largest share, with 199 notifications. They are followed by the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland), which collectively issued 142 notifications. By contrast, Southern Europe (62 notifications), Western Europe (46), and Eastern Europe (23) show significantly lower levels of activation. These figures suggest that proximity to external borders or migratory routes is not the sole determining factor. Instead, national threat perceptions, political traditions of border control and varying degrees of trust in neighbouring states may offer a more convincing explanation. The regional divergence points to growing asymmetries in the governance of Schengen, raising questions about the coherence and uniform application of common rules.
Figure 4. Use of the mechanism of reintroduction of internal border controls by region
| Region | Count |
|---|---|
| Central Europe (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Liechtenstein) | 199 |
| Nordic Countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland) | 142 |
| Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Greece) | 62 |
| Western Europe (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) | 46 |
| Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) | 23 |
The combined analysis of frequency, duration and geographical distribution reveals a gradual but unmistakable transformation in the use of the internal border control mechanism within the Schengen Area. The declining number of notifications in recent years might suggest a return to the prescribed exceptional use. However, this trend is counterbalanced by the growing average duration of controls and their persistent concentration in a limited group of countries, particularly in Central and Northern Europe. These patterns indicate not only an intensification but also a shift in the logic of activation: fewer but longer and more nationally embedded controls. What emerges is a model of differentiated implementation, where some Member States have effectively integrated the mechanism into their routine governance of cross-border mobility. This evolution challenges the original premise of the Schengen framework as a space of trust and symmetry and provides a crucial lens for understanding the political tensions and legal ambiguities addressed in the following section.
4. Significance and future
The Schengen Area is widely recognised as one of the most notable milestones of European integration, enabling the free movement of its inhabitants and serving as a backbone for the EU’s internal market and social cohesion. Its practical and symbolic importance is repeatedly emphasised in both official reports and public discourse. Data from the 2025 State of Schengen Report and European Parliament briefings confirm that the removal of internal border checks has brought profound economic and social benefits, making cross-border commerce, labour mobility and daily life smoother and easier for citizens and businesses alike. Such institutional recognition is mirrored by the attention Schengen receives in political debate and in the media, especially in countries where its functioning has become a matter of national importance.
Schengen’s importance extends beyond official statistics and institutional assessments. Media coverage across Europe—particularly in countries such as Germany, France, Poland and Austria—has become increasingly extensive and high-profile. Major outlets regularly report on the reintroduction of internal border controls, the political controversies surrounding irregular migration and security and the public’s growing concern about the future of borderless travel. For instance, in 2025, at least ten Schengen countries—including Germany and France—reinstated internal border checks, citing irregular migration, terror threats, and regional instability. The news media in Germany have highlighted the impact of these controls on trade and daily life, while French and Polish newspapers have debated the balance between national security and European unity. This media scrutiny underscores the fact that Schengen is not just a technical or legal framework but a matter of daily relevance and public concern.
The future of Schengen is marked by uncertainty. In recent years, the system has come under sustained pressure from a succession of crises—the refugee crisis in 2015, terrorist threats, the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions rooted in the war in Ukraine. These external shocks have prompted many member states to reintroduce internal border controls, measures originally conceived as temporary and exceptional. Increasingly however, these controls are becoming structural features of the Schengen landscape, with successive extensions that test the limits of necessity and proportionality set out in EU law.
This trend is not simply a reaction to external events; it probably reveals a deeper crisis of mutual trust among member states. Doubts about the effectiveness of EU mechanisms for managing external borders, the so-called malfunctioning asylum system and resistance to deeper cooperation in sensitive areas like police and intelligence work have all contributed to what scholars describe as a “silent renationalisation” of border policy or even a general trend, not unique to Schengen, leading towards de-Europeanisation. National interests are increasingly taking precedence over collective commitments, threatening not only the Schengen system but also the broader project of European integration.
Our data show that, despite the supposedly temporary nature of internal border controls, several Schengen states have prolonged such reintroductions towards the maximum of six months, while never resorting to article 29, often citing irregular migration pressures, security threats and the pandemic. However, this justification merits closer scrutiny. The asylum applications registered during the 2015–2016 period, though high, were well within the Union’s aggregate ability to manage, as later demonstrated by the large-scale and relatively well-coordinated influx of Ukrainian refugees in 2022. It thus seems less a question of objective capacity than of political will, uneven solidarity and divergent national preferences. In May 2025, 11 Schengen states maintained internal border checks, a marked increase compared to previous years, and a sign of persistent stress within the system. The European Commission and Parliament have both warned that such measures, if normalised, threaten the integrity of the area and the functioning of the Single Market.
The 2024 Letta report makes the same point, arguing that the health of Schengen is inseparable from the health of the Single Market. Letta insists that “the European institutions must firmly oppose any attempt to limit freedom of movement between Member States. This includes technical restrictions on routes and road transport, as well as any suspension of the Schengen Agreement.” For Letta, dysfunctions in Schengen can jeopardise the very foundations of European economic integration and competitiveness.
The erosion of Schengen’s founding principles—shared responsibility, mutual trust, and the primacy of free movement—risks fuelling Euroscepticism and centrifugal forces within the Union. The visible reappearance of border checks, queues, and controls undermines the everyday experience of “Europe without borders” and feeds narratives of division and retrenchment. As Letta warned, the EU faces its “last chance” to consolidate the functional pillars of Schengen and avoid a progressive deterioration of its most visible achievements. The freedom of movement is not just a symbolic right; it is one of the most tangible and visible expressions of the European project for its citizens. Its degradation would have profound consequences for the legitimacy and future cohesion of the Union.
Conclusions
Looking ahead, forty years after its creation, the future of Schengen will depend on the EU’s ability to restore confidence among its members, balance security and freedom, and demonstrate to its citizens that European integration remains both viable and valuable. This will require reaffirming the strictly temporary and exceptional nature of internal border controls, strengthening EU-level mechanisms for border and asylum management, deepening police and intelligence cooperation and, above all, rebuilding a political pact of mutual trust. The choices made in the coming years will determine whether Schengen continues to serve as a model of shared sovereignty or becomes a casualty of resurgent national interests and fragmented governance.
