Key messages
- The transatlantic relationship is facing a monumental challenge. The ‘America First’ slogan of the second Trump Administration is now translating into a policy that is reversing the traditional habit of promoting unity among NATO allies. Washington is replacing this with a strategy that not only challenges the accepted wisdom of partnership but puts the very basis of the Alliance at risk by abrogating an attachment to international norms and reducing the respect for old friends. Such a political posture has generated a feeling of betrayal even among Europe’s staunchest US allies.
- However, it would be unwise to declare the end of the NATO project prematurely, particularly bearing in mind the unique value of the US contribution to European security at the time of a revival of the threat of Russian military aggression. The countries on the eastern flank have a special stake in this. Formally, NATO arrangements are still in place, and its operational potential remains strong and has not been exhausted. There are also political dynamics in the US that could potentially reverse Washington’s current confrontation policy towards its European allies.
- Faced with the new reality, Europeans should adopt a dual policy: one which still tries hard to preserve NATO as long as possible, while in parallel developing their own strength and identity in the realm of defence. Five essential elements can be suggested that would nurture Europe’s urgently needed ‘growing-up process’ as a serious defence player, able to provide security even without an assumed support of Washington. These are: (a) a closer overlap of national threat assessments; (b) an acceptance of imperfection; (3) an ability to exercise collective self-discipline; (d) a greater belief in its own potential; and (e) an embrace of a bolder policy, accepting new ways and novel approaches.
Analysis
Transatlantic grief
At the end of 2025, Ambassador Ivo Daalder, an astute analyst and practitioner of transatlantic security arrangements, served –from the other side of the Atlantic– a bitter diagnosis. He wrote that Europeans are in the fifth, and final, phase of grief over the loss of the transatlantic relationship. The phase is acceptance and follows denial, anger, bargaining and depression.[1]
Daalder’s diagnosis can be taken as a cue for some further observations. Specifically, there are a similar number of recommendations that may help to provide an answer to his key question: will Europe prove genuinely ready to pursue its own interests in the face of a new reality, with the US is neither communicating nor behaving as a real ally?
Before doing so it might be appropriate to offer an important qualifier to the stark diagnosis described above. Yes, it is no longer possible, or desirable, to deny the fact that a tectonic shift is taking place in the transatlantic community of democratic, like-minded allies. The publication of the US National Security Strategy (NSS), a public policy-setting document defining priorities for the whole apparatus of the US government, has confirmed this emphatically.[2]
After a year in office the Trump Administration no longer perceives Europe as its preferred ally and partner. It considers Europeans weak and inferior in strength to other strategic players on the international arena. Moreover, the US is displaying a new propensity to part ways with its long-standing allies on many key issues. Threatening to take over Greenland against the express wishes of a respected ally is an unprecedented step by any standards. Implementing such a policy by force could potentially destroy NATO as we know it.[3] The US voting pattern in the UN has moved closer to one associated with Russia and other authoritarian states. On many occasions Trump has shown a higher degree of sympathy towards Putin’s views than those of Europe.
Ominously, Washington has started communicating, in a frequently brusque manner, that it expects Europeans to speed up the process of taking primary responsibility for security on their continent, perhaps as early as 2027.[4] The US has drastically changed its policy on Ukraine, particularly by curtailing the financial assistance offered by previous Administrations. Moreover, while allowing its partners to buy for Kyiv essential military systems made in US, this Administration has at times adopted a dubious position as mediator between the aggressor, Russia, and the victim, Ukraine. It has even hinted at an option of acting in an equally equidistant manner on matters of European security. In general, Trump and his representatives have started treating European institutions as a bigger threat than Russia or China. In actual fact, they have initiated a process of undermining them. Trade relations with Europe have followed a similar trajectory.
These are sufficiently worrying developments to alarm committed Euro-Atlanticists or even turn them into ‘transatlantic orphans’. Such a feeling of US betrayal –of ideals and values– as well as doubts about the veracity of security commitments, is felt particularly acutely by the nations at the eastern end of the continent.[5] Having emerged successfully from decades of Soviet subjugation (with US encouragement and assistance) they have the most to fear from the newly emboldened form of Russian imperialism.
Too early to bury NATO
But what is not warranted is a temptation to submit to an extreme form of pessimism, to an ‘all is lost’ syndrome. It would be very unwise to conduct NATO’s funeral today and give up hope for a future reappraisal of US policy towards Europe. Most importantly, the US has not yet revoked its collective defence commitment enshrined in the Washington Treaty. US forces are still stationed in Europe, as are its command elements and stored equipment. No formal US document says that Washington intends to leave NATO.
Moreover, there is nothing close to a consensus among allies as to accelerating a potential US disengagement from NATO. Frontier states will surely do everything in their power to keep the essential US security guarantees in place. What else could be expected from them when the majority view within the Alliance now predicts a genuine threat of a possible Russian attempt to test the defences of the eastern flank to emerge as early as 2030?[6] Only a foolish leader would want to unilaterally reject the unique US defence pledge backed by the latter’s defence capabilities (both nuclear and conventional) and declare them no longer valid. It would be highly risky from the point of view of deterrence. The exceptional value (extremely difficult to replace at short notice) of US military capabilities is recognised fully by the Western European capitals as well. The clearest proof of this recognition was recently seen in an almost undignified manner, with the countries forming the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine pleading with Washington to provide backing for the non-US-led reassurance force (vide the Paris Declaration).[7]
NATO itself still has a lot of political and military potential that has not been fully used (or sufficiently acknowledged) to dilute the risk of a full US security withdrawal from Europe. Washington’s demand that Europeans take a much greater responsibility for the conventional defence of the continent is being answered under the agreed NATO defence planning schedule. In percentage terms, for this purpose the European members of the Alliance are already committing more than two thirds of the necessary NATO forces and capabilities under existing plans. The operational burden-shifting process is gathering speed. Also, on specific and current issues of contention, NATO can offer a valid contribution. For example, there is leeway to significantly increase a military input of non-NATO allies for the protection of Greenland and of the entire strategically crucial GIUK (Greenland, Iceland and UK) Atlantic route.
More generally, the military, political and economic assets of US allies can help it in its global confrontation with strategic rivals such as China. They can only be ignored by Washington at an irrationally excessive cost to US interests. A quick glance at GDP and technological comparisons strongly suggests that a dogmatic belief in the ability of the US to beat China in a competition by itself would not stand up to reality.[8]
Access to allied territory in Europe (the same applies to Canada, Iceland and Turkey) provides huge operational benefits to US military planners in terms of military bases, harbours, infrastructure such as hospitals, prepositioned equipment etc. As a case in point, the recent operation conducted by US forces in the Atlantic that resulted in the seizure of tankers suspected of smuggling Venezuelan oil would have been almost impossible to perform without the assistance of the UK. And the low hanging fruit of soft power that entices allies to help the US voluntarily could still be available for the latter to harvest if only this Administration were to appreciate its importance.
Finally, the biggest mistake in giving in to the temptation of embracing the inevitability of transatlantic divorce would be to equate US with the Trump Administration. What seems unstoppable today may still prove reversible in the months ahead. There is no convincing proof that the current course of US policy –inexplicably antagonistic towards Europeans (and Indo-Pacific partners, for that matter)– has solid foundations in US public sentiment. It does not. In fact, in 2025 the net favourable opinion of NATO increased across the entire political spectrum in the US. Up to 75% of those polled support Article 5.[9] The average US citizen judges Putin and other autocrats harshly. In this context, one should not lose hope that the arguments used by the White House claiming that ‘acquiring Greenland as a US national security priority [is] necessary to deter our adversaries in the Arctic region’ potentially by military force against an erstwhile ally, would be regarded by the electorate as unacceptable or at least irrational. Surely most US citizens understand that you do not deter your enemies by attacking your allies. Some bipartisan initiatives in the US Congress bear witness to this hope. Who knows, even if foreign policy is not usually the biggest issue in mid-term elections, maybe it could play a positive role in 2026. No power is ever wielded forever.
The last consideration is, of course, contingent on US citizens themselves. The job for the Europeans –to come back to the question posed by Ambassador Daalder– is to do their own homework. This means discouraging the US from wrecking the transatlantic bond beyond repair and, at the same time, preparing for the maximum degree of self-reliance in the realm of defence. These tasks are not contradictory but rather mutually supportive.
Five guidelines that could lead to European success
There are five elements that would appear to be essential to achieve a genuine and rapid progress on the road to European maturity in defence when faced with a dramatic reorientation in US policy.
Closing the threat perception gap
The first element, perhaps the most fundamental one, is the need to focus on generating a much higher degree of shared threat assessment. Today, the gap between the perception of existential threat driving the security policy of Eastern flank countries, compared with a marked reluctance of states located further away from Russia to feel a sense of urgency, is simply too wide. The gap influences policy decisions, as seen during the sorry saga of trying to overcome the somewhat selfish, commercially-driven objections of Belgium to use Russia’s frozen assets in order to secure funds for Ukraine. The argument that Ukraine is de facto defending Europe’s borders from the Russian imperial onslaught and thus supporting it, requires extraordinary measures benefiting European security is perceived to be self-evident by, eg, Poles, Lithuanians and Swedes; but not so by too many others, including those hiding behind Belgian obstructionism.
To put it bluntly: the case for urgent decisions demanding short-term sacrifices to guarantee a long-term defence potential has not yet been internalised by all capitals. Hence the reluctance to commit substantial budgetary resources for defence investment. Without such a shift, given the absolute priority which should be assigned to defence today, Europeans will collectively fail to match their lofty declarations with concrete policies, generating real capabilities. The latter are badly needed in many domains, such as the equipping and training of sizeable combat-ready military forces, the ability to produce large amounts of ammunition, the development of long-range missile strike systems or UAV technologies, to name just a few. EU funds (which mainly include credit facilities) are fiscally helpful but will not resolve the hard budgetary choices facing governments.
The prospect of being forced to guarantee a credible defence in Europe without the traditional level of US support must act as a systemic shock to wake countries up from their comfortable complacency. Every single state in Europe is affected by the new reality. Russia is no longer hiding its malicious designs on the continent, which it would like to dominate or at least blackmail. When the former President Medvedev publicly calls for the abduction of German Chancellor Merz, only an intellectually challenged observer can claim that Putin’s regime is not a threat to Europe. It is conducting an aggressive hybrid war against everyone. Geographical location does not guarantee immunity from attacks which disrupt airports, incapacitate energy grids, threaten multiple elements of critical infrastructure or sow disinformation undermining electoral processes and democratic institutions.
Perfection as a true enemy of what is good (or realistic)
This leads to the second element that can be defined as accepting imperfection. Why? Because bridging a threat assessment gap in Europe must happen fast. Hence it must be achieved in a realistic manner; and realism advises that it is not wise to set the bar of congruence too high. It is not necessary to expect that the threat perception regarding a potential Russian military aggression against the Baltic states as considered in Eastern Europe will be exactly replicated in, say, Spain or Italy: and vice versa: one should not assume that public opinion in Poland or Finland will fully match the sentiments regarding the risks associated with instability in, eg, North Africa, prevalent in the countries of the Southern flank. However, what is right and rational is to ensure that there is a sufficient level of solidarity in all regions of Europe towards each other.
In this respect, The Elcano Royal Institute’s Luis Simón has introduced the extremely useful concept of fungibility in a recent article on the security dilemmas facing Spain: ‘Spain’s contribution to deterrence on the eastern flank should […] prioritise operational initiatives and capabilities that are fungible, which is to say useful both in terms of strengthening collective security in Europe and in terms of the three major strands of national defence […]’.[10] The principle of matching contributions of the same type and value comes from the world of finance, but it applies fully to the realm of defence as well, and certainly not only to Spain.
It could be argued that it is precisely this rule that has been used extensively in NATO’s policy deliberations. The concept of ‘360 degree’ security –meaning an agreement of all allies to deal with threats emanating from any direction and in any form (be it military, hybrid or terrorist in nature)– has shown how a circle between different regions can be squared on paper and politically. However, implementing the policy always depended on the availability of committed US assets and military tools. Therefore, while the policy remains relevant, if the US input can no longer be taken for granted or the US at least being seen automatically as the first responder in any European conflict, Europe must itself generate such military and financial resources as necessary to make it credible.
Accepting imperfection may also require a tolerance towards different approaches and forms of contribution to Europe’s collective security. It is unrealistic to expect too many countries to quickly develop a large number of mobile land units comparable to the US 82nd Airborne Division. Military planners in a country like Poland have to accept the fact that the bulk of the early fighting on the Eastern flank –were a full-scale war with Russia to break out– would have to be carried out by Polish and German land forces, augmented by contingents from countries present in the North and East. But the same planners should not be forced to accept a situation in which large and rich countries located further away from Russia would fail to invest in preparing large and capable forces that would constitute the essential follow-on forces, ready to be deployed in the second phase of a conflict. This would appear to be the essence of the rule of acceptable imperfection.
Rewarding team players and disciplining spoilers and free-riders
The third element is strongly connected to the second. It centres on the imperative of exercising collective self-discipline by Europeans. Again, that a glaring vacuum exists today in this domain has everything to do with the fact that for decades Europeans have relied on the US to cajole and discipline free-riders and breakers of allied solidarity. When a problem proved too difficult to manage, subsequent Administrations have often simply thrown in US resources to fill the capability gaps affecting European security. The job should now fall on Europe itself.
What does this mean in practice? Surely, at least three things. First, countries that consistently undermine European security across the board –such as Hungary– must have costs imposed on them by other EU and NATO members. Otherwise, their disruptive policies, aligning them with adversaries such as Russia, will continue. Furthermore, they could generate a copycat effect. Blatant cases of wrecking specific projects of strategic importance for security on the continent –such as the issue of Russian assets– should also lead to consequences for the countries responsible. It is unacceptable not to invest in defence and then rely on others to cover gaps: an example is the case of asking for help with drones that disrupt airports.
Secondly, this principle should encourage all European countries to desist from excessive self-promotion at the expense of European and allied unity. Political initiatives with security implications for the entire continent should not be undertaken (ostensibly on behalf of Europe but actually for domestic political ends) without proper consultations and agreements with others. One example is the obsessive ‘telephone diplomacy with Putin’ stunts periodically performed by various European leaders. They lead to nothing, ignore the views of countries better placed to offer insights into the Kremlin’s strategy and disrupt unity.[11] Another is a proliferation of different formats, such as E3 or the Berlin group (in the context of Ukraine), each claiming a unique right to speak on behalf of others while more inclusive formats are readily available.
Third, to stiffen up solidarity and warn those that do not want to engage in teamwork, Europeans would be well-advised to reflect on the perils of self-imposed detachment. The undeniably serious costs of Brexit for the UK[12] and a poor economic performance in Hungary,[13] which frequently likes to align itself with Russia and China rather than with other Europeans, both suggest that there is something interesting to be considered. Unity and collective engagement are a much safer bet for all European countries.
Nothing succeeds like success: an indispensable belief
The fourth element that would help all the efforts to beef up European security is self-belief. There is too much pessimism regarding the ability of Europeans to provide the bulk of their defence capabilities. Again, it would help to define the level of ambition properly. It is neither feasible nor necessary to match the full spectrum of US capabilities. The measuring rod has a different name: Russia; and outperforming Russia is not an impossible task by any means: economically it is not the USSR and its GDP is smaller than the combined GDP of Poland and Spain.[14] Its corrupt and militarised economy is having difficulties keeping up with Ukraine’s war effort. Technologically, Moscow is propped up by China and in the long run cannot compete with Europe. But only on the condition that the latter show a real political will to translate their combined potential into a genuine defence deterrent.
Moreover, the efforts already undertaken by a growing number of countries to catch up after years of underinvestment in defence are beginning to bear fruit. Poland and other frontier states (including new members Finland and Sweden) have shown the way in defence spending, becoming NATO leaders in this regard. Germany is on the cusp of a momentous change, finally gearing up its industrial and technological engine to produce defence capabilities worthy of Europe’s largest country. France has decided to concentrate more on investment in sophisticated equipment at the expense of size. The UK has not yet crossed the Rubicon that only a far bolder expenditure can guarantee. But, even so, both nuclear powers already offer a meaningful array of formidable military tools. Taken together, these defence reorientations have created a momentum for the rest of the continent. Now is the time for others to join the relay, as a minimum in line with the fungibility principle described above.
Old mechanisms may not work: try something new
The fifth element centres around boldness and novelty. If necessity is really the mother of invention, then Europe has a unique chance and needs to think outside the box. By taking centre stage, security concerns should release the energy necessary to harness technological innovation and greater competitiveness. Investment in defence production will likely stimulate economic growth and modernisation. Europeans can speed up their defence modernisation by innovating and exploiting a variety of existing national capabilities into a network of available combat-ready units even without a full reliance on the US. They can improve the collective calculus by drawing on Ukraine’s unique experience and battle-hardened expertise. With the right guidance and resources, engineers and programmers in Europe can develop defence technologies that leap ahead by several generations, drawing on the continent’s deep reservoir of scientific expertise. If the US continues to prefer to go it alone there is no reason not to combine European strength with that of its partners and allies on other continents –think of Australia, Canada, Japan or South Korea, for a start–.[15]
Boldness in thinking and acting should not just be reserved for defence capabilities and technologies. Now, for example, is the time to revisit certain international agreements that hinder effective defence, such as the Law of the Sea, which simply cannot counter the challenge posed by the shadow fleet used for sanctions evasion and hybrid warfare.
Conclusions
A sporting metaphor could be useful. As in a good football team, if Europeans are to answer the call to provide more for their defence, they need to see themselves as players with different skills and talents. Some can pass the ball and be creative, others can show physical strength to go and defend shoulder to shoulder, and then there are those who can score goals given few opportunities. In other words, diversity and an intelligent acceptance of the imperfection that characterises Europe can be used to advantage. But all countries must perform, with no room for idle talk and pretending rather than delivering. The Trump Administration’s disdain towards Europe has thrown the transatlantic alliance into disarray. However, turning this existential crisis into a real opportunity is not just a slogan but the only sensible strategy open to Europe.
[1] Ivo Daalder (2025), ‘Europe’s 5 stages of grief’, Politico, 30/XII/2025.
[2] ‘National Security Strategy’, 2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf, The White House, XII/2025.
[3] Nicholas Vinocur (2026), ‘Europe’s top leaders rally to defend Greenland against Trump’s threats’, Politico, 6/I/2026.
[4] Alex Raufoglu (2025), ‘US promises pre-Christmas arms boost for Ukraine, pushes for Europe-led NATO by 2027’, Kyiv Post, 5/XII/2025.
[5] In a recent poll there were more Poles registering distrust towards the US President than not. In Poland this can be considered quite unprecedented; see Filip Waluszko (2026), ‘Sondaż OGB: Polacy ocenili Donalda Trumpa i USA w roli sojuszników’, Business Insider, 2/I/2026.
[6] NATO’s Secretary General has mentioned the 2030 date in a recent speech. See ‘Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and moderated discussion with Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany Johann Wadephul’, NATO, 11/XII/2025.
[7] ‘Paris Declaration – Robust security guarantees for a solid and lasting peace in Ukraine’, Élysée, 6/I/2026.
[8] Even reports that question different elements of the US allied commitments are noticeably clear in extolling the benefits of working with partners to compete with China. For example: ‘[…] if Washington consistently pursues a statecraft that undermines allied trust in the United States, allied leaders will not support U.S. global objectives, weakening America’s hand in competition with China’. Quoted from Christopher S. Chivvis, Kristin Zhu, Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, Maeve Sockwell, Lauren Morganbesser & Senkai Hsia (2025), ‘Legacy or liability? Auditing US alliances to compete with China’, Carnegie Endowment, 8/X/2025.
[9] See Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute, 2025 National Defense Survey Executive Summary, About the Survey, XI/2025.
[10] Luis Simón (2025), ‘Finding the balance: Russia, the South and the future of Spain’s defence’, Elcano Royal Institute, 26/XI/2025.
[11] Following a predictable initiative by President Macron, the Italian Prime Minister has now jumped on the bandwagon; ‘Meloni urges Europe to talk to Russia, sees no swift return to G8’, Reuters, 9/I/2026.
[12] For a thorough review of the losses suffered by the British economy as a result of Brexit see ‘Brexit has deepened the British economy’s flaws and dulled its strengths’, The Economist, 30/XII/2025.
[13] A relative decline of Hungary in the last decade has been noted even outside Europe; see, for instance, ‘Poorest country in EU: once prosperous, Hungary is now the poorest nation in EU – meanwhile, this tiny nation tops the wealth rankings, The Economic Times, 20/VI/2025.
[14] See, for instance, World Economic Outlook (October 2025) – Real GDP growth, IMF, XI/2025.
[15] The author wrote about the opportunities offered by increased security coordination and cooperation between NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners in a report published in 2024; see Robert Pszczel (2024), New horizon Implications for Poland’s security of NATO’s approach to the Indo-Pacific’, OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 1/VIII/2024.
