Key messages
- The EU-China summit being held in July 2025 will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the start of diplomatic relations, at a time marked by the reconfiguration of international relations and growing mutual distrust.
- Although Trump’s return to the White House initially opened up the prospect of a possible detente, hopes have evaporated amid the prolongation of structural tensions.
- The agenda looks set to be shaped by such frictions, centred on tariff disputes, the trade imbalance and closer ties between China and Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine.
- Against such a backdrop, the present analysis suggests very little scope for substantial cooperation, and even for concrete progress. It concludes, however, with proposals geared towards constructing a positive agenda.
Analysis
1. Introduction
The EU-China summit being held in July 2025 will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the commencement of diplomatic relations between Brussels and Beijing. Apart from the symbolic component, the meeting offers a key opportunity for gauging the health of bilateral relations in a context of special importance, marked by a strategic realignment following Donald Trump’s return to the presidency of the US, the internationalisation of the war in Ukraine and growing instability in the Middle East. This international scenario lends a significance to the relationship between Brussels and Beijing that transcends the strictly bilateral dimension, with direct implications for the management of the main global challenges and the stability of the multilateral system.
However, relations have cooled considerably since the reconciliation between China and Russia, including after the invasion of Ukraine. Such geopolitical tensions have lent a security-led emphasis to the relationship and an increasingly deep-seated mutual mistrust. This situation limits the scope for significant advances regarding the main points on the bilateral agenda. The Chinese President Xi Jinping’s refusal to travel to Brussels for the summit highlights the fact that the EU does not provide the level of dialogue preferred by China, which continues favouring the bilateral channel with its Member States as the most effective way of promoting its interests in Europe. This tendency has been strengthened since the European elections, which, from China’s viewpoint, consolidated the drift towards antagonism in Brussels.
Against this backdrop, the meeting in July looks more like a platform for exchanging positions than a forum capable of generating tangible results. The remainder of this analysis is divided into four sections that address the current state of bilateral relations, the political and economic prospects of the encounter and the real scope for dialogue. Despite the limited room for cooperation, the text concludes with proposals aimed at constructing a positive agenda, expressed in terms of a shared responsibility for sustaining global public goods and the need to rebuild mutual trust by means of exchanges between societies.
2. The differences between Brussels and Beijing persist
The last summit between China and the EU, held in December 2023, was marked by the EU’s shift towards its policy of de-risking –which seeks to reduce economic risks without severing trade links– with the publication of its Economic Security Strategy, and by the launch of the investigation into the subsidies given to Chinese electric vehicles. At the meeting, the EU sought to reduce its dependence on strategic supplies from China and make headway on levelling the playing field in trade, whereas Beijing sought to dissuade the EU from hardening its stance on economic and technological issues. All this took place in a context dominated by the war in Ukraine, which heightened the frictions between the two sides.
These areas of tension continue to affect bilateral relations on the eve of the forthcoming summit. In response to the European investigation, China launched its own investigations of such European products as brandy and pork, and in October 2024 the European Commission announced the formal imposition of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Such episodes reflect structural differences, which hamper a more fluid relationship between China and the EU. On the economic stage, the Chinese model, characterised by considerable industrial overcapacity, generates constant frictions with an EU concerned about the growing trade deficit and the need to protect its productive base. Moreover, both parties tend to view their relations through the lens of their respective geopolitical priorities: China sees the EU as a subordinate actor to the US, while Brussels views Beijing as a facilitator of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
This situation has dampened expectations of a possible rapprochement in bilateral relations, which started to gain traction in the wake of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, in the early months of 2025. In this context, China tried to put itself forward as a reliable partner for Europe, as shown by the speech delivered by Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, at the Munich Security Conference. Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission and one of the harshest critics of China in recent years, also adopted a conciliatory tone towards Beijing, stressing that there is scope for engaging constructively and for strengthening economic ties. In April, during a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Li Qiang, the President reiterated China and Europe’s shared responsibility in defending the multilateral system of trade. In a symbolic gesture the following month, China and the European Parliament simultaneously lifted the sanctions that had beset their diplomatic exchanges since 2021.
The return to an openly critical posture on the part of Brussels suggests greater caution with regard to this diplomatic rapprochement, which is no longer voiced with the same conviction as at the start of the year. At the last G7 summit, the President of the Commission openly backed Trump, accusing China of undermining intellectual property rights and providing mass subsidies in order to dominate global supply chains. Shortly afterwards, the EU’s High Representative, Kaja Kallas, called for ‘a dose of realism’ to temper expectations of a rapprochement between the EU and China. In her speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, one of the main defence forums in the Asia Pacific region, she linked Chinese actors with hybrid operations aimed at critical European infrastructure.
All of this indicates that the underlying differences between Beijing and Brussels continue to set the tone of bilateral relations. China’s decision to restrict rare earth exports in retaliation for US tariffs served to remind Brussels of European vulnerabilities in critical sectors and confirmed the need to make progress on its risk-reduction strategy. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the continuous hardening of the European position, including the imposition of export restrictions on advanced technologies such as the lithography machines made by the Dutch company ASML for manufacturing semiconductors, reinforces its image as an actor subordinated to US interests.
Although accompanied by persistent tensions, sectoral cooperation between the EU and China has not been severed. Active channels have been kept open in the months leading up to the summit such as the monitoring of possible trade diversions, cybersecurity and human rights. The visits made by various European leaders to Beijing reflect a political willingness to keep the dialogue going, even if both sides are sending out increasingly conspicuous signs of frustration about the lack of substantial progress.
3. There will be no major political agreements
The omens emerging from the 13th round of the EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue, held on 3 July between the High Representative Kaja Kallas and the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi, bode ill for the forthcoming bilateral summit. Judging by the communiqués released by both parties after the encounter, there are no signs of substantive convergence in their respective postures. The rhetoric that continues to come out of Brussels and Beijing compared with previous meetings reveals mutual distrust and a perception of relations viewed through the lens of security, competition and systemic rivalry.
In this context, it is highly unlikely that any far-reaching political agreements will be struck at the summit. Indeed, it is highly revealing that the preliminary talks have focused more on lifting various types of restriction that limit the bilateral relationship than on how to strengthen cooperation on bilateral and multilateral issues where the parties share joint interests.
One of the main obstacles to achieving entente lies in the widespread European perception of China as a strategic rival. Key figures in Brussels, such as Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas, take a pro-Atlanticist line that is willing to use China as a bargaining chip in the EU’s relations with the US. This approach has become even more consolidated in the light of the role played by Washington in the continent’s security architecture, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. Europe’s dependency on the US for its defence, particularly in countries most exposed to the Russian threat, profoundly affects the EU’s autonomous room for manoeuvre regarding Beijing.
From this perspective, China’s role as an indirect facilitator of Russia’s military aggression generates enormous frustration in Europe, which crystallises in opposing any progress being made in strategic relations with Beijing for as long as the latter continues offering its diplomatic, economic and technological support to Moscow. The possibility of the EU deciding to include two Chinese banks in its 18th package of sanctions against Russia has heightened tensions even further. Wang Yi’s warnings of retaliation against such a measure reflects a hardening of positions that renders any prospect of a political rapprochement more unlikely.
Another factor contributing to this atmosphere of mistrust comprises growing European concerns regarding the involvement of Chinese actors in hybrid threats against the EU. From the cutting of underwater cables in the Baltic, cyberattacks aimed at public institutions and private companies, to influencing operations, European intelligence services have been warning about a pattern of activities that undermine mutual trust. Despite the fact that European authorities have often chosen not to broadcast such accusations, they have made it clear in private and technical arenas that these practices are incompatible with a relationship based on trust and mutual respect.
From China’s perspective, structural motivations do not provide grounds for optimism either. Beijing views keeping a friendly regime in Moscow as crucial to its own political stability. Russia is the only international power with a firm interest in there not being a change of political regime in China. Moreover, Russia is seen not only as a strategic ally but as a shield against Western efforts to inculcate democratisation in its regional neighbourhood, which could have a contagious effect on China. A hypothetical democratic transition in Russia would not only weaken a key partner, it would also enable Washington to focus more resources on its direct rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, while Xi and his entourage would like Europe to be more strategically independent of the US, they believe that there are no realistic prospects of the EU strategically emancipating itself from Washington over the short to medium term. Many in Beijing therefore take it as read that Brussels will serve as an instrument in the US-led efforts to contain China. This view reinforces the logic of mutual mistrust and reduces the incentives to yield on sensitive issues or explore political agreements of strategic scope. It follows that, far from constituting a turning point, the forthcoming summit runs the risk of turning into an act of mere diplomatic scene-setting devoid of any real political impact.
4. Economic relations dominated by tariffs
From an economic perspective, Chinese state media see the chances of the summit ending with a significant agreement as feasible. The rumour is that the EU may be willing to withdraw tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, or at least accept minimum pricing levels for them, if China completely scraps tariffs on cognac, dairy products and pork as well as its barriers to rare earth exports, and also undertakes to make high added-value investments in green technologies in Europe. The context is propitious. Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the threat of a much more protectionist trade policy on the part of the world’s foremost power ought to provide an incentive to improve economic relations between the EU and China and secure concrete goals at the bilateral summit, in line with what von der Leyen has herself described in the run up to the event as a results-oriented engagement with China.
US protectionism places China and the EU in a difficult situation. The EU can afford its current trade deficit with China thanks to its traditional surplus with the US, but if Washington imposes high tariffs on European products, opening up the Chinese market will become an absolute necessity. From its viewpoint, China sees itself being increasingly shut out of the US market and the European market therefore becomes vital for exporting its surplus stocks. But if it does this, Europe is going to continue erecting more barriers to Chinese products. The solution involves China consuming more, and in a more sustained and sustainable way. What is unsustainable is for China to account for almost 30% of the world’s capital investment and industrial production and only 13% of global consumption. But despite the official rhetoric in China encouraging an increase in domestic consumption, the political priority continues to be to consolidate itself as an industrial and technological powerhouse, with its consequent exporting power, and this hinders any improvement in relations with the EU from an economic point of view. An investment agreement such as that signed in 2020 seems highly unlikely, and the same may be said of greater coordination aimed at reforming the World Trade Organisation.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Chinese overcapacity, or rather under-consumption, and the EU’s de-risking, continue to place strains on relations, which are still marked by mutual distrust and recriminations. The European complaints are well known. There is no level playing field between the two economies. European companies, as is evident from the annual reports issued by the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, complain that the Chinese market remains extremely closed and controlled and that the business environment is still highly inimical. There is also persistent unease about state aid, commercial espionage and the obstacles preventing the repatriation of profits.
In general, there is the feeling that Chinese companies do not operate under the same conditions as their European counterparts and this is reflected in the significant trade deficit on goods that the EU runs with China (€300 billion in 2024 and €100 million less than in 2022, when the deficit hit record levels) and continues to be responsible for much of the tension in relations; particularly because, while the EU runs a surplus on services with China, this is worth only €15 billion, and therefore does not offset the deficit on goods. The EU’s demand is therefore clear: China must consume more.
From the Chinese viewpoint, however, the deficit is seen as the logical consequence of the enhanced competitiveness Chinese companies have acquired in recent years and the remedy for reducing it is for European companies to design and manufacture better products, although it is true that Chinese administrators have recently admitted that their government should stimulate domestic demand. But they also insist that, unless European companies can offer better products, and European goods certainly represent a smaller percentage of Chinese imports, they will not benefit from such an increased consumption; to which European companies reply by insisting that the problem lies not with their products but with the entry barriers that protect the Chinese market.
The row surrounding electric vehicles is the latest battle to encapsulate these tensions. Thanks to its long-term industrial policy, based on state aid, Chinese companies have made themselves highly competitive, but this progress is seen by Brussels as unfair competition, and the decision has therefore been taken to impose tariffs of 27%-45%, depending on whether the Chinese company concerned cooperates with the European Commission in investigating the subsidies. Such tariffs are designed to achieve two goals. First, to protect the European car industry and secondly to incentivise Chinese companies to build their cars in Europe. Spain in particular has a considerable interest in this being the case, given that it is the second largest producer and exporter of vehicles in the EU after Germany and wishes to maintain its activity in this highly strategic sector.
This debate means that bilateral relations are going to be marked by unilateral measures by both parties with the potential for forging agreements, but also heightened tensions, and greater escalation. Beijing’s insistence on buying only Chinese-made medical devices has pushed the EU into deploying its International Procurement Instrument for the first time, to exclude Chinese companies from tendering for public contracts in the health sector, which has in turn triggered a reprisal from Beijing.
In short, the return of Donald Trump and his protectionist policies to the White House could be an incentive for improving relations between the EU and China, but their mutual mistrust and opposing interests make such an engagement unlikely. Beijing claims that talks to address these tensions are entering their final phase, but the EU’s refusal to hold the Trade and Economic Dialogue prior to the summit reflects the meagre expectations of making any real progress. Moreover, the fact that the summit is likely to be cut from two days to just one, with the cancellation of the visit to Hefei, where much of China’s electric vehicle and artificial intelligence industry is centred, is a clear sign of the lack of harmony between the two sides.
Conclusions
Possible areas for cooperation
In the absence of realistic expectations for a geopolitical realignment between the EU and China, the most plausible outcome for the forthcoming summit is restricted to low-profile measures: forms of specific cooperation, of a tactical, verifiable and immediate nature, that might serve as a means of building trust and, over time, pave the way to more ambitious forms of cooperation. Even such modest progress is far from being assured, however. Structural obstacles remain, such as the growing geopolitical instrumentalisation of any cooperation initiative, the yawning regulatory gulf between the two parties and the profound disparity in the balance between state and society that shapes their respective policy frameworks in numerous arenas. Despite this, within the framework of the EU-China Think-Tank Engagement, funded by the European Commission, a range of proposals have been put forward to lend impetus to this kind of pragmatic and limited cooperation. Set out below are some of the most prominent.
In an international scenario marked by geopolitical fragmentation and the erosion of multilateralism, both the EU and China bear a shared responsibility in the upholding of global public goods. Areas such as development aid and the fight against climate change require coordinated responses, capable of securing tangible results. In this context the EU-China summit represents an opportunity to make headway on the formulation of joint commitments enabling not only the strengthening of mutual trust but also the transmission of an image of co-responsibility in global governance. It is therefore worth exploring the possibility of issuing joint communiqués in these fields, founded on concrete measures that go beyond the declaration of principles and express a shared political will to contribute to the stability and sustainability of the international system.
On the subject of development aid, greater coordination could be proposed between the European and Chinese programmes operating in the planet’s most vulnerable regions, particularly those that have seen international aid diminish in the context of the withdrawal of traditional actors, especially the US. Such cooperation could manifest itself by identifying synergies between the Global Gateway initiative run by the EU and the Belt and Road initiative operated by China. A specific example would be a shared commitment to the Eurasia Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). This multimodal route, which connects Europe with China via Central Asia and the Caucasus, represents a strategic alternative to the traditional corridors to the north (via Russia) and south (via Iran), and could become fertile territory for practical cooperation in the areas of infrastructure, logistics and sustainable development.
For its part, the fight against climate change offers an ideal arena for more ambitious commitments, especially in the lead-up to the next climate summit, COP30, to be held in Brazil in November. In a European Parliament debate on relations between the EU and China on the eve of the July summit, von der Leyen picked out cooperation on climate change as one of the three priorities of the bilateral relationship. In this context, an alignment of positions between Brussels and Beijing regarding climate goals for 2035 would be desirable, accompanied by specific gestures such as China’s eventual contribution to the United Nations Green Climate Fund.
There is also scope for a general understanding establishing that mutual investment in green technology has to bear in mind three issues of overriding importance for the two parties: (1) the local siting of production; in other words, that employment and added value is created in the place of final use, both in Europe and in China; (2) the importance of joint technological development for the common good; and (3) designing a framework for governing the data that are generated by this technology to ensure that national security is not compromised on either the European or Chinese sides.
Moreover, a joint initiative could be explored geared towards promoting green trade at the global level. Instead of criticising the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as a protectionist measure, Beijing could assess the possibility of cooperating with the EU in designing a multilateral framework that incentivises more sustainable trade practices. This area has enormous potential, considering that in 2024 the EU and China jointly accounted for almost 50% of the international trade in goods. There is little prospect of securing tangible progress, however: the EU has refused to sign a joint declaration on climate change amid the absence of substantive commitments, despite China’s insistence. Such disagreements prior to the summit illustrate how the current state of bilateral relations hinders significant progress, even in arenas where both parties acknowledge there are shared interests.
In a context of structural mistrust between governments, the promotion of exchanges between societies takes on increasing strategic importance as a tool for building confidence from the bottom up. Among such exchanges, scientific and academic cooperation plays an especially valuable role owing to its ability to create lasting ties, inculcate mutual understanding and yield tangible benefits for both sides. In this regard, the EU-China summit should explore practical measures that facilitate and strengthen such exchanges. High on the list of priorities should be the lifting of restrictions and sanctions that still affect certain European academics and think tanks in China, and taking steps towards greater legal protection for European researchers who undertake their activities on Chinese soil. At an administrative level, it would be desirable to do away with excessive requirements such as the need to present original letters when applying for visas on the part of Chinese citizens, as well as extending visa-free agreements to all EU member states. Meanwhile, it might be possible to set up a bilateral risk-assessment mechanism for academic and scientific exchanges, accompanied by the drawing up of a whitelist of non-sensitive but high-value strategic areas, such as agriculture, climate change, language and culture. All such measures would enable a more structured, foreseeable and mutually beneficial programme of cooperation to unfold.
