Key messages
- The major US military deployment in the Caribbean, which has Venezuela in its sights and was initially justified as an operation against drug trafficking, points to larger policy goals given the size, cost and sophistication of the force. These include putting pressure on Nicolás Maduro and preparing for internal crisis scenarios in the Caribbean country.
- Marco Rubio, who currently serves as the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, is the main ideologue devising policy on Venezuela. His security-focused and anti-authoritarian approach has been responsible for sanctions, the Latin American ‘axis of evil’ narrative and now the designation of the Cártel de los Soles as a terrorist organisation, increasing the scope for military action. Moreover, the military campaign against ‘narco-terrorism’ has generated tensions between the White House and congressional leaders, because it could set a significant legal precedent.
- The Trump Administration wants to rebuild US influence in its hemisphere, with the support of its allies (Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay and others) and isolating the Cuba-Nicaragua-Venezuela axis. The fall of Maduro would constitute its greatest geopolitical victory in the region in decades.
- Even if the US manages to force Maduro’s exit, major uncertainties persist, starting with how the country is run thenceforth and including issues such as internal stability, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), the risks of violence, the capacity of the new government, the influence of Russia and China, the impunity or justice for members of the military and the real possibility of the country drifting towards failed statehood.
Analysis
In 2025, under the name ‘Operation Southern Spear’, the US Administration sent one of its most daunting military campaigns in decades to the Caribbean. On 13 November the US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, announced it officially, although curiously the name ‘Operation Southern Spear’ was mentioned in January 2025 in a 4th Fleet communiqué referring to technological tests of maritime surveillance. Washington seemed to re-use the name, broadening and transforming the initial concept into an operation on a large scale against the backdrop of increasing tensions with Venezuela.
The official announcement of the operation confirmed an increase in the naval, air and infantry presence in the region, initially justified as part of an operation to curb drug trafficking that flows from Venezuela via the Caribbean to the US.
The experts point out that the drugs arriving in US cities from Venezuela are marginal. Most of the cocaine produced in Colombia arriving in the US does so via Ecuador and the Pacific, while a large proportion of the US-bound fentanyl and other synthetic drugs, which are Donald Trump’s real headache and constitute a genuine public health issue in the US, are made in laboratories in Mexico and Central America. What is clear is that the concentration of arms and personnel deployed to the Caribbean would serve only a sledgehammer used to crack a nut if the real task of the deployment were the fight against organised crime. Unless the sources of drug trafficking financing are put under direct attack it is highly likely that the cartels will re-emerge with renewed vigour after a period of hibernation, which could be more or less prolonged depending on the operation, an operation that incurs vast cost.
Therefore, beyond the initial justification of curbing drug trafficking –which does not require an aircraft carrier– the level and nature of the military deployment point to a more political and strategic goal, from exerting military pressure on Nicolás Maduro’s regime in order to trigger regime change, to preparing options for a possible deterioration in Venezuela’s domestic situation or gaining privileged access to its oil. Ascertaining the true objective is a difficult task, not only because Trump’s designs are inscrutable, despite his apparent transparency, but also because they can change from one day to the next. Nevertheless, President Trump has declared on various occasions that he believes Maduro’s days are numbered. Lack of ambition has never been a weakness of the current occupant of the White House.
The military operation
Since mid-August 2025, when the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Groupset off from Norfolk (VA), the US has deployed one of its most powerful military contingents in decades to the Caribbean, assembling a naval and aerial presence without recent precedent in the waters off Venezuela. The operation began with the sending of the amphibious group led by USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) –with around 4,500 personnel between sailors and some 2,200 marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit– and various destroyers, reinforced towards the end of that month by seven additional warships and a nuclear-propelled attack submarine deployed to the southern Caribbean.
In November, Washington made a qualitative leap with the arrival of the attack group led by the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, the largest and most advanced in the US Navy, accompanied by F-35 fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers and the special operations support vessel MV Ocean Trader. At the same time, it increased the use of military facilities in Puerto Rico –reactivating old bases and adapting them to sustained operations involving fighter jets and transport aircraft– consolidating the archipelago as a key logistics platform.
It was against this backdrop that the first attack recognised as being part of the anti-drugs campaign took place: the sinking of a vessel that, according to the White House, had set off from Venezuela and was being operated by the Tren de Aragua (a Venezuelan criminal organisation with alleged ties to Maduro). Since then, some 20 vessels have been attacked by US forces, raising serious legal and constitutional issues within the US itself.
The military anti-drugs campaign has been pursued without the explicit authorisation of the US Congress, leading to a clash between the executive and legislative branches over the use of force. An article in the Washington Post revealed that the White House had ignored the warnings of its own legal advisors, who suggested that the lethal and sustained nature of the attacks could trigger the obligations contained in the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which requires Congress to be notified and, in the absence of its approval, for forces to be withdrawn or hostilities halted within 60 days.
The Administration argues that the attacks do ‘not constitute hostilities’ in the traditional sense: they are carried out from ships and drones in international waters, the targets do not attack US forces and are ‘one-off events’ against drugs-traffickers. But experts in constitutional law and the use of force maintain that such arguments undermine the democratic oversight of Congress and set a dangerous precedent.
Almost concurrently with this debate, it has come to light that the US government has issued an authorisation (known as a ‘presidential finding’) that empowers the CIA to undertake covert activities in Venezuela; this provides another avenue for action interrelated with the military deployment that will enable the US to operate with strategic flexibility against Venezuela.
This ramping up of the tone and the military action has also coincided with the abrupt closure of the diplomatic channel between Washington and Caracas. At the beginning of October, President Trump ordered Richard Grenell –his special envoy– to halt all his diplomatic dealings with Venezuela. Until that moment, Grenell had been the main interlocutor with Maduro: following a January meeting with him in Caracas, he secured the resumption of deportation flights of Venezuelan citizens from the US, the release of US prisoners and the awarding of energy licences to large US and European oil companies, headed by Chevron. Trump’s order put an end to this communication channel just as the military dimension of the policy on Venezuela reached its zenith.
The US and Venezuela
Washington’s desire to topple Maduro is nothing new; during his first term in office, Trump instigated a campaign of the utmost pressure that sought to trigger the fall of the Maduro-led government. But this has not always been the case.
Up until the start of the new millennium, the US was Venezuela’s main trading partner and the obvious recipient of its oil. For decades, the large US oil companies –Exxon, Mobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips– operated under extremely favourable conditions in Venezuela, sheltering under the legal status of the former PDVSA, which through CITGO accumulated as many as eight refineries on US soil. Venezuela had, and continues to have, the largest proved reserves of oil in the world, combining light and ultra-heavy crude; these include most notably the immense deposits of the Faja del Orinoco region.
In the 1970s and 80s, during the so-called ‘Saudi Venezuela’ period, the oil boom transformed the country into a Latin American economic powerhouse, with high levels of per capita income and much greater regional influence than it has now. Relations with Washington were intimately entwined: constant cooperation on energy, diplomatic alignment in regional forums and profoundly interdependent economic ties. In the opinion of many analysts at the time, the relationship was almost ‘carnal’.
The ascent of Hugo Chávez to power in 1999-2000 marked a major shift. The consolidation of chavismo transformed the country’s ideological, economic and geopolitical orientation. Chávez instigated a progressive rupture with the US and forged a strategic alliance with Cuba, through the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA), as well as with Russia, China, Iran and other actors with which he shared political affinities and anti-US rhetoric. The shift manifested itself in nationalisations, the expulsion of US companies and the complete restructuring of the energy sector.
In 2018 Washington shut down most of its diplomatic presence in Caracas and recognised the opposition as the legitimate authority. Bilateral contact since then has been minimal, barring one-off issues: humanitarian negotiations, prisoner swaps, repatriations and energy exceptions, such as Chevron’s.
In order to understand current US policy towards Venezuela –particularly the reasoning that has led to the current military deployment and the ‘narco-terrorism’ narrative– it is crucial to focus on the role played by the former senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. Since the first Trump Administration, and much more forcefully in the second, Rubio has been the main political and ideological architect of Washington’s strategy towards the Latin American ‘axis of evil’ (Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela), especially in relation to the Maduro regime.
His worldview, shaped by his origins among the Cuban diaspora of Miami and by seeing Latin American authoritarianism through the lens of security, has for over a decade moulded sanctions, diplomatic pressure, the international narrative on Venezuela and now the way in which the administration interprets the legal use of force. In practice, Rubio is the connecting thread that joins the hardline shift against Maduro in 2017, the expansion of the sanctions regime, the instrumentalisation of cross-border crime and –more recently– the justification of military operations without congressional approval.
The options
The US lost its hegemony over its backyard years ago. And it is a long time since such a high degree of interest in Latin America has been evident in Washington. ‘America First’ has thus been transformed into ‘Americas First’, reflecting the goal of restoring control over this part of the world. This could constitute both an ambitious and inspiring goal for Trump. If he managed to topple Maduro and instal a lasting and pro-US democracy in Latin America, possibly to be followed by Cuba, it would comprise a great success for US foreign policy. It would also represent a great advance in the National Defense Strategy, which is expected to prioritise security in the western hemisphere.
This is also a policy that may unite the diverse factions within the Trump movement. Reaganite Republicans would approve the end of a regime such as the one ruling in Venezuela. And the MAGA Republicans would applaud the effort to address the problems of border security and drug trafficking that affect ordinary US citizens, on the strict proviso that Trump does not go too far. Nor should it be forgotten that there will be mid-term elections in less than a year and it is none other than the Latinos who have started to vote for the Republicans, there being around 770,000 Venezuelans in the US, half of them in Florida.
All this leads to the great unanswered question regarding the purpose of the enormous military deployment in the Caribbean. There are various possibilities. The first would be to use military threats to induce Maduro to remove himself voluntarily. If this fails to work, Trump could increase the pace of military operations against Venezuelan drug shipments and broaden the target to include attacks on land or special forces operations against oilfields or against Venezuela’s military forces and bases. This would increase the pressure on Maduro to seek an exit. The third option would be to carry out a direct attack on Maduro and other regime targets, using either missiles or aircraft. What nobody envisages, however, is a military invasion, occupation and the replacement of the government with a pro-US, democratic alternative. Trump likes the rapid, overwhelming and decisive use of force, and has always voiced doubts about prolonged military campaigns, with no clear end in sight, as in Iraq, Afghanistan and also in Ukraine. There is no way in which the Trump Administration is going to carry out a large-scale invasion of Venezuela in the near future.
Latin America
Regardless of how one views Trump’s true intentions with his naval and aerial deployment, what is clear is that the Administration’s actions are related to its new outlook on Latin America, which exhibits an almost absolute support for Javier Milei and Argentina’s economic policy and the alliances with Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. The military deployment has also enabled it to strengthen its ties with some Caribbean countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. This involves diversifying the agenda beyond the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime or putting a stop to illegal immigration.
Any response to these questions must for the time being start from a substantial dose of speculation and rules out any headway being made in establishing what is really going on in Venezuela. On the basis of the comments made by María Corina Machado and her inner circle, as well as a good deal of the opposition both within and outside the country, there is evidence of too much, indeed unrealistic, hope that ‘Operation Southern Spear’ will put an end to chavismo-madurismo at one fell swoop and enable the vigorous reemergence of a democratic Venezuela. As easily and as simply as that. And, moreover, it would appear to be the only path towards resolving Venezuela’s acute crisis.
Little is known apart from the self-interested comments that have emerged; it is not known if there are negotiations under way, or whether an exit route has been suggested for Maduro and his inner circle (there has been plenty of talk about Russia). However, one of the major topics of debate is whether this path, even if it were successful, would ensure the restoration of democracy in Venezuela or, on the contrary, would pave the way to a new scenario of instability and uncertainty. This scenario could be marked by clashes of all kinds, by score-settling, by a mutual search for reprisals and scapegoats, none of which would serve to calm what would already be an explosive situation.
Regardless of the course of the operation (invasion by land, an aerial attack on key military sites, on targets linked to the narcotics trade or rather more indiscriminate attacks involving many collateral victims, or a one-off attack against the upper echelons of power), the most important issue will be how the country is run the following day. And not only how it is run: who will take charge of the new regime? Who will lead it? María Corina Machado and her closest confidantes? By whom and how will public order be managed? What will happen to the police? How and with what resources will this new phase be funded? Will it be paid for by the US? Will the Trump government send the more than 200,000-250,000 troops needed on the ground to stabilise the situation and defend the new government from internal and external attacks?
Mention was made earlier of expectations, and once the head of the regime has been removed many of these involve enlisting a large number of the high-ranking leaders, officers and non-commissioned officers in the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) to the ranks of those fighting for democratic regeneration. It is true that the FANB is a veritable black box, with little to nothing known about what is unfolding within its ranks, barring the fact that it is deeply infiltrated and monitored by the Cuban intelligence service so any attempt at opposition is swiftly repressed. Indeed, military personnel are among the most persecuted, with ex-officers and NCOs imprisoned, tortured and exiled. According to the Venezuelan NGO Foro Penal, of the 884 political prisoners being held in the country at the start of November, 173, almost 20%, were former members of the armed forces.
Another issue that should be highlighted is the response capability of the FANB, the number of its troops and reserves and its state of preparedness, the level of armaments available and the military support it receives or may receive from two of its chief allies, Russia and China. Expressions of support for Maduro from Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are almost constant. Cuba is a fundamental partner for Venezuela, but Caracas is also crucial for Havana. The collapse of the Maduro regime would open the way to their being the next step in the US regional strategy.
A major starting point to be ascertained is what type of negotiations, if any, are under way with the military, and if there are, what promises are being made to ensure they are enlisted to form part of national reconstruction. Will there be immunity for crimes committed in the past? Will those responsible for the abuses perpetrated and the plundering of billions from the state coffers be held to account? How high up will accountability go?
Regardless of the answers it is clear that a large number of winners and losers will emerge from this process, creating a major breeding ground for the flourishing of social discontent. There is no good solution to situations such as this, and it will be extremely difficult for it to give rise to a virtuous circle that facilitates democratisation. There is a stark risk of Venezuela accelerating its drift towards becoming a failed state.
Latest developments
On 16 November the US State Department classified the Cártel de los Soles as a terrorist organisation; this constitutes a qualitative shift because it directly implicates Maduro’s political and military apparatus, enabling the Trump Administration to frame its actions against Venezuela in terms of the fight against terrorism and not only against drugs trafficking. In this regard it is curious to witness how each step that the Trump Administration takes against the Maduro regime is greeted by the opposition as though it were another step towards the final outcome, no less than the end of the dictatorship.
The Tren de Aragua and the Cártel de los Soles have been the two names most closely associated with Venezuelan criminality, but their nature and their political utility to the US are radically different. The Tren de Aragua is a cross-border criminal gang that emerged from Venezuelan prisons, then spread to large parts of Latin America thanks to Venezuelan emigration, although it is not formally designated as a terrorist organisation. By contrast, the Cartel de los Soles is a quasi-state network comprising high-ranking Venezuelan military commanders linked to drug trafficking. According to Insight Crime, the Cártel de los Soles ‘is a term used to describe groups within Venezuela’s armed forces implicated in a wide range of criminal activities, including petrol smuggling, illegal mining and other corruption schemes –most notably drug trafficking–. Rather than a hierarchical organisation, the Cártel de los Soles functions as a loose network of cells within the army, navy, air force and Bolivarian National Guard, spanning from the lowest to the highest ranks. Although the concept is mainly associated with military sectors, other branches of the state have also been identified as being embedded within the same criminal network, including police forces, the executive branch and various public officials’.
Its designation as a terrorist organisation by the US has much more far-reaching geopolitical implications: it directly connects the Maduro regime with terrorism and drug trafficking networks and probably provides the Trump Administration with a more solid legal basis for ramping up sanctions, covert operations and even military escalations.
According to US sources, everything indicates that Washington is on the verge of launching a new phase of Venezuela-related operations. This phase could include both covert operations and an increase in its military presence in the region. Added to this is the fact that the Federal Aviation Administration has issued a warning for aircraft regarding Venezuelan airspace owing to the ‘security risk’ and greater military activity. As a consequence, various international airlines –including European ones– have cancelled flights to Venezuela.
Conclusions
Having ruled out a full-blown military invasion, the great question is how the Trump Administration will respond to the Venezuela crisis it has intensified with its military deployment. Given all he has put into his seaborne and airborne operation, including its substantial monetary cost, Trump cannot recall it with no results whatsoever, since this would have a tangible impact on his image and on in his cherished MAGA project.
It is clear, first of all, that US public opinion is opposed to the intervention. This is a domestic factor of great significance that may limit or influence the extent to which the Administration decides to approve a military escalation. Secondly, the Maduro regime, knowing how difficult a full-scale landing would be, has chosen to double down on its narrative of victimisation and resistance, with a twofold goal: to mobilise its most loyal supporters and the public in general, and to try to dissuade the US not to make a false move. Nevertheless, both the warning to civil airlines not to enter Venezuelan airspace and the restrictions on Thanksgiving and Christmas leave for US military personnel would tend to focus minds on the next armed move, regardless of its scope.
The striking thing about the large military deployment, including the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, is that some short- to medium-term return would seem reasonable for its exorbitant daily cost, although at the moment this has not exceeded the sinking of at least 20 supposed drugs vessels. Up until now this is as far as matters have gone, despite the wide range of options available, starting with covert interventions on Venezuelan soil.
Currently the game being played is one of cat and mouse or, as others might argue, a game of chicken. Neither of the two sides, in any of the multiple scenarios, can hold on for a prolonged period of time, so it cannot be ruled out that before the end of the year some sort of decisive move will be made by the US, which has the initiative and needs to take the next step. Any preventive Venezuelan military response will be viewed by Washington as a direct attack or hostile act, which will require prompt retaliation in accordance with the magnitude of the challenge.
As far as the Maduro regime is concerned the great unknown is its ability to withstand pressure of this intensity, even though it has Russian and Chinese backing. It is a question not only of the survival of the Chávez-Maduro leadership but also the entire apparatus of a regime that has engulfed the Venezuelan state for more than a quarter of a century. At stake is not only the survival of the dictatorship but also the very movement Chávez founded, which depending on the circumstances could turn into a prolonged catalyst for instability and destabilisation. It is important not to forget the precedent set by Peronism, which after all was one of the inspirations cited by Hugo Chávez when he laid the foundations of his ‘revolutionary’ movement.
