NATO and the South: a tale of three futures

Edited by: Luis Simón along with contributions from: Giovanni Grevi, Said Moufti, Haizam Amirah- Fernández, Irene Martínez, Jassar Al-Tahat, Nicolás de Pedro & Zaid Eyadat. May 2021.

As recently underlined by the NATO 2030 report, NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood is an area of conventional challenges and growing asymmetric threats. On top of all the security dilemmas in the Middle East, North Africa (MENA) and broader Sahel regions, Russia is already a threat in the south, and China’s growing presence in the region is also a source of concern. The Alliance has already agreed that it is needs to engage in capacity building with southern neighbours and partners, improve its awareness and risk monitoring, increase its own resilience and responsiveness to security challenges in the south and work with close partners such as the European Union (EU). However, working out the terms of NATO’s engagement in the south requires a clearer understanding of regional dynamics, and their likely evolution over time.

The study leads to a number of policy recommendations such as NATO invests in partnerships with the EU, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the African Union (AU) and other bodies in the south. The south poses a challenge for NATO’s collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security tasks, but sub-regional complexes are increasingly interconnected and open to exploitation by powers such as Russia and China. In line with the NATO 2030 Report, this study reiterates the importance of a ‘consistent, clear and coherent’ approach to the south.

See also: Roundtable “Scanning NATO’s future to 2030. Implications for the South”.

A moment to reflect: Creating Euro-Mediterranean bonds that deliver

Editors: Haizam Amirah-Fernández, Carmen Descamps and Eduard Soler i Lecha. June 2021.

This report brings together analyses by experts and testimonies by those who are engaged in the creation of such bonds through different professional domains. Its aim is to highlight best practices and provide new ideas for a constructive and future-oriented Euro-Mediterranean relationship in a post-COVID era. The initiative stems from the conviction of the need to strengthen collaboration between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours. Even more so, during and in the aftermath of the pandemic, we have to create and foster platforms for dialogue and joint action.

The current pandemic is an opportunity to relaunch relations between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours, emphasising the existing potential for a more inclusive, prosperous and positive future. Drafted during the 25th anniversary year of the Barcelona Declaration, this Report aims to stir debate by providing reflections and the impetus that go beyond the moment of commemoration. The Report is a joint endeavour by CIDOB –Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Elcano Royal Institute and Friedrich Naumann Foundation Madrid – a partnership between the two most influential Spanish foreign policy think tanks and a German political foundation devoted to political education and dialogue worldwide, and since December 2019 also from its Mediterranean Dialogue office in Madrid.

See also: Publication Launch & Debate: “A moment to reflect: Creating Euro-Mediterranean bonds that deliver”.

China’s Soft Power in Europe. Falling on Hard Times

Edited by: Ties Dams, Xiaoxue Martin and Vera Kranenburg. Peer reviews by: Richard Turcsanyi, Plamen Tonchev, Tim Summers, John Seaman, Tim Rühlig, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Iulia Monica Oehler-Sincai. European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), April 2021.

The sixth edition of the ETNC report examines China’s efforts to enhance its soft power across Europe and their implications. Based on separate analyses of 17 countries and EU institutions, this report concludes that Chinese soft power in Europe –defined as the ability to influence preferences through attraction or persuasion– has fallen on hard times.

The editing of this year’s report has been led by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, with editorial review provided from Ifri, the Elcano Royal Institute, the Institute of International Economic Relations (Greece), the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House in the UK), the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (Slovakia), with active participation from all ETNC members.

• Developing soft power has been a pillar of Chinese foreign policy since 2007 and remains a stated goal of China’s long-term policy orientation to 2035.
• We identify three prominent Chinese approaches to developing soft power in Europe: promoting Chinese language and culture; shaping China’s image through the media; and using the secondary soft-power effects of economic prowess.
• Recently, and over the last year in particular, China has become more assertive in attempting to shape its image by expanding its toolkit, particularly to enhance its political messaging. This includes the systematic use of social media.
• On the importance of China’s economy, the lines can often be blurred between the attractiveness of economic cooperation and the pressures of economic coercion. Withholding market access for European firms and products has long been an observed practice of reactive Chinese diplomacy, but an increasingly formalized development of sanctioning mechanisms, including “unreliable entity lists” and export control legislation, is a cause for growing concern.
• In other words, market access, trade and investment opportunities are perhaps the single largest factor determining China’s appeal in Europe, but also a major source of its coercive power.
• Different patterns of Chinese soft power projections can be seen across four groups of countries analysed in this report:
  • In the first group (Austria, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia), China does not appear compelled to actively project its soft power, mostly because of the lack of public interest in these countries.
  • In Italy and Greece, China’s soft power approach aims to arrest the trend of a deteriorating image and is geared towards damage containment.
  • In Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the UK, perceptions of China are clearly becoming less favourable, and Beijing is struggling with growing vigilance.
  • Finally, in Czechia, Denmark, France, and Sweden, China’s soft power is clearly in a state of free fall.
• In turn, EU institutions appear to follow the trend described in the third group, of growing vigilance, as the risks posed by China’s geopolitical ambitions increasingly underlined.
• A number of factors have driven these trends, from the fallout of COVID-19 to Chinese domestic developments (including in Xinjiang and Hong Kong) and the impact of growing US-China rivalry. These factors ultimately appear to be more substantive drivers of European perceptions and attitudes towards China today than the traditional sources of soft power.
• In response, the Chinese government’s public messaging in Europe has become increasingly proactive, even aggressive, including through the imposition of sanctions.
• These new methods, though deployed differently across the continent and aimed in part at a Chinese political audience, point to Beijing’s objective to increase its sway over Europe by influencing related discourse. They are presumably designed to prevent negative publicity and criticism, rather than achieve likeability.
• An open question can thus be raised: has China become less interested in growing its appeal than in exercising its influence?

See also:

• Covid-19 and Europe-China Relations. A country level analysis. ETNC, April 2021.
• Europe in the Face of US-China Rivalry. ETNC, January 2020.
• Political values in Europe-China relations. ETNC, December 2018.
• Chinese Investment in Europe: A Country-Level Approach. ETNC, December 2017.

European public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19: Differences and common ground across the continent

Editor: Richard Q. Turcsányi. Authors: Richard Q. Turcsányi, Matej Šimalčík, Kristína Kironská Renáta Sedláková, Jiří Čeněk, Andrej Findor, Ondrej Buchel Matej Hruška, Adrian Brona, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Mario Esteban, Beatrice Gallelli, Jelena Gledić, Peter Gries Sergei Ivanov, Björn Jerdén, Marc Julienne, Tamás Matura, Tim Rühlig, Tim Summers. Palacký University Olomouc & Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), November 2020.

The COVID-19 has had a tremendous impact on European societies and economies and put the relations between European countries and China’s on the spotlight. The pandemic has irrupted at a time of a reassessment of these relations and the endorsement of a more critical approach towards China by the EU and most EU member states. The current publication offers a valuable insight on the impact of these dynamics on the European public opinions of China. It points out to predominantly negative perceptions and a widespread degradation of the image of the Asian country, with few exceptions.

This report, from the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Palacký University Olomouc, is the first of a series written in collaboration with thirteen top European think tanks, including the Elcano Royal Institute, based on wide-scale survey of public opinion on China conducted in eleven EU countries plus Russia, and Serbia, in September-October 2020. It aims at providing a European and detailed country-level analysis of evolving European perceptions of China in the post COVID-19 era.

It offers a cross-country comparative analysis of the image of China vis-a-vis other major international actors (the EU, the US, and Russia). Among others, it explores the perceptions of the components of China’s power (economic, military) bilateral relations (trade, investment, culture, and technological cooperation) and China’s international engagement (including the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s on impact global environment), as well as policy preferences and trust towards the Asian country. It also covers the perceived role of China during the pandemic. Overall, this report highlights the limits of China’s soft power in Europe, the resilience of transatlantic ties, and a clear preference for the EU.

Covid-19 and Europe-China Relations. A country level analysis

Edited by: John Seaman, with analysis and peer reviews by Ugo Armanini, Angelos Bentis, Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Ties Dams, Lucas Erlbacher, Mario Esteban, Rudolf Fürst, Hans Jørgen Gåsemyr, Francesca Ghiretti, Markus Herrmann, Björn Jerdén, Yang Jiang, Marc Julienne, Lorenzo Mariani, Tamas Matura, Iulia Monica Oehler-Șincai, Lucrezia Poggetti, Barbara Pongratz, Patrick Renz, Carlos Rodrigues, Tim Rühlig, Michael Settelen, Monika Sie Dhian Ho, Matej Šimalčík, Tim Summers, Justyna Szczudlik, Velina Tchakarova, Plamen Tonchev, Richard Q. Turcsányi, and Frans-Paul van der Putten. European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), Special Report, April 2020.

The COVID-19 crisis has hit at a time when debates over the need to adopt more coherent strategies towards China have been emerging across Europe. In many ways, the current crisis has become a catalyst for a number of trends that have been shaping Europe-China relations in recent years, while in other ways it has turned the tables. It has simultaneously brought Europe and China into closer cooperation, pushed them further apart, and seemingly underlined the fractures that exist within Europe on how to approach an increasingly influential China.

This report seeks to identify and underline key developments in bilateral relations between China and a wide range of European countries, and to highlight debates that these relations inspire across Europe within the context of the evolving health crisis. It is a collection of independent analyses from 19 countries meant to compare notes on country-level experiences and build on the annual reports of the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC).

The goal here is not to be exhaustive or definitive – indeed, the crisis is still unfolding across much of Europe and the globe, and the potential for change is still great. Rather, this report offers a marker in time and a window into some of the issues that will become increasingly important in Europe-China relationships in light of COVID-19.

See also:

• Europe in the Face of US-China Rivalry. ETNC, January 2020.
• Political values in Europe-China relations. ETNC, December 2018.
• Chinese Investment in Europe: A Country-Level Approach. ETNC, December 2017.

Europe in the Face of US-China Rivalry

Edited by: Mario Esteban and Miguel Otero-Iglesias along with Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Alice Ekman, Lucrezia Poggetti, Björn Jerdén, John Seaman, Tim Summers and Justyna Szczudlik. European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), January 2020.

The fifth edition of the ETNC report shows how US unilateralism and Chinese assertiveness have triggered a rethinking of the EU’s strategic landscape. Despite the differences between EU member states, its key finding is that all the countries analysed are in a similar position. They all consider the US their most important ally and they all depend on its military protection, but they also want to do as much business with China as possible.

The report contains 18 country chapters, all from EU member states, and a further one focused on the EU’s perspective on Europe’s difficult balancing act between the US, a long-term strategic and economic partner, and China, the EU’s second most important market and, probably, the next economic superpower. States like Portugal, Greece and Italy, due to their history and geographical location, are keen to present themselves as a bridge between the US and China. Some, like Finland and Hungary, are trying to play the two powers against each in other to extract possible concessions. Others, like Latvia, Romania and Slovakia, prefer to avoid trouble by maintaining a low profile, in wait-and-see mode. Finally, there is a group led by France, Germany and Spain that is working with Brussels to enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and economic sovereignty.

This year’s edition has been led by the Elcano Royal Institute, with editorial review provided from Ifri, MERICS, the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), with active participation from all ETNC members.

See also:

• Political values in Europe-China relations. ETNC, December 2018.
• Chinese Investment in Europe: A Country-Level Approach. ETNC, December 2017.

Political values in Europe-China relations

Edited by Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Björn Jerdén, Frans-Paul van der Putten, John Seaman, Miguel Otero-Iglesias and Alice Ekman. European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), December 2018.

Questions of democracy, human rights and the rule of law have long been a source of tension in Europe’s relations with China, both in exchanges with China and among Europeans themselves. The European Union was in part built on a foundation of common political values, but member states are often at odds over the extent to which these values should constitute a central element of their respective relations with China. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has become increasingly critical of Western political values and sought to position itself as a role model for other countries. In this context, the question of how to treat political values in relations with China only grows more relevant for Europe, as does the question of how China will seek to promote its own understanding of political values in Europe.

Through an analysis of 16 EU member states, Norway and the EU as an institution, this report sets out to examine how political values enter into Europe- China relations. It looks at how European actors treat political values in relations with China, and how China, directly or indirectly, shapes the debate on political values in Europe.

Elcano Global Presence Report 2018

Coordinators: Iliana Olivié (Senior Analyst) and Manuel Gracia (Research Assistant) at the Elcano Global Presence Index Project.
2018

The 2018 edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index ranks 110 countries according to the extent to which they are currently ‘out there’, participating in and shaping the process of globalization. In addition to the incorporation of 10 new countries (Cameroon, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uganda, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Senegal), this year’s edition highlights the following results:

• A stable global presence ranking. The countries in the top positions of the global presence ranking maintain or strengthen their positions. The United States tops the list with a global presence index value of 2,494 points. It still trebles that of China, which is second, with 841 points.
• Globalisation or regionalisation? 88.4% of globalisation occurs within and/or between North America, Europe and Asia and the Pacific. This figure has dropped from 90.9% in 1990, indicating a strong but weakening regionalisation in global flows.
• Africa lags behind in global presence. Compared with the other regions in this Index, Africa shows a low volume of external projection. With a global presence of 408 points in index value in 2017, it ranks 6th out of six regions.

Also available: Informe Elcano de Presencia Global 2018 (Spanish version).

Chinese Investment in Europe: A Country-Level Approach

Edited by John Seaman, Mikko Huotari, Miguel Otero-Iglesias. European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), diciembre de 2017.

Chinese investments in Europe have surged in recent years, and have become a critical feature of Europe-China relations. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the European Union traced back to mainland China hit a record EUR 35 billion in 2016, compared with only EUR 1.6 billion in 2010, according to data gathered by the Rhodium Group. In a historic shift, the flow of Chinese direct investment into Europe has surpassed the declining flows of annual European direct investments into China. As China continues to grow, develop, and integrate into the global economy, its overseas investments expand in quantity and quality, reflecting both the growing sophistication of the Chinese economy and broader Chinese commercial and policy goals. Going beyond FDI, Chinese investment is creating new realities for Europe-China relations.

This report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) brings together original analysis from 19 European countries to better understand these trends and their consequences for policy making and Europe-China relations, including at the bilateral, subregional and EU levels. This is not just a story about FDI strictly defined, but about the (geo)political implications that emanate from deeper economic interaction with China. Ultimately, Europe is far from speaking with a single voice on these matters, and identifying where the divergences and convergences lie, will be crucial in formulating solid and complementary policy positions at the EU and national level moving forward.

Elcano Global Presence Report 2017

Iliana Olivié (Senior Analyst) and Manuel Gracia (Research Assistant) at the Elcano Global Presence Index Project.

2017

The 2017 edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index ranks 100 countries according to the extent to which they are currently ‘out there’, participating in and shaping the process of globalization. In addition to the incorporation of 10 new countries (Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Jordan, Lebanon, Panama, Serbia, Tunisia, and Yemen), this year’s edition highlights the following results:

• China hangs on to the 2nd position of our ranking. There are no relevant changes in the top 20 positions with respect to last year’s Index.
• Decaying countries and emerging economies: blurred categories. Unlike in previous editions, traditional powers and emerging countries do not behave as two distinct and homogeneous blocs.
• The beginning of de-globalisation? The foreign policy space has decreased for the first time in our series. This goes hand in hand with the re-concentration of total global presence in the top global players.

Also available: Informe Elcano de Presencia Global 2017 (Spanish version).