Towards an agreement on growth and job creation? The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20

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Carmen González, Roderick Parkes, Alicia Sorroza and Andreas Ette
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Analysis

This paper analyses the positions of –and main cleavages between– the leading players that led to the failure of the November EU summit, highlighting the questions that must be solved to enable an agreement on the MFF 2014-20 to be reached in the coming months.

Summary

Just a few days ahead of the EU Council starting on 7 February, many observers are optimistic that the EU’s leaders will manage to reach an agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20. For the second time the Council will be negotiating this complex issue after a failed attempt on 22-23 November 2012. There are various interpretations of the failure of the November summit, with some observers considering that the pressure during the summit was insufficient to give rise to an agreement while, conversely, others underline that there was too much pressure to allow a common position or compromise to emerge. This paper analyses the positions of –and main cleavages between– the leading players that led to the summit’s failure, highlighting the questions that must be solved to enable an agreement on the MFF 2014-20 to be reached in the coming months.

2 Statement by the Members of the European Council, 23/XI/2012, Brussels.
3 29/X/2012: Negotiating box (15599/12).
4 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
5 France, Spain, Italy and Ireland.
6 Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Expectations for the EU Council were in any case high and the negotiation of the MFF 2014-20 finally appeared on the front-pages of the European media that covered the negotiation. The Council President Herman Van Rompuy had made preparations to keep the EU leaders and their interpreters in Brussels until the evening of 24 November and some insiders mentioned that since everyone was unhappy with the proposals tabled they had the impression that a compromise would be possible. However after pushing certain spending headings downward and others upwards and offering side payments to some member states, the EU leaders only needed until the late afternoon of 23 November to decide to break off the negotiations and postpone them to another summit.

In a statement published shortly after the European Council, the Heads of State and government gave the Council President the mandate, along with the President of the European Commission, to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks in order to find a consensus. The heads of state and government also underlined that the European budget is important for the Union’s cohesion and for jobs and growth in all countries, a message aimed at reinforcing the expectations for the summit of 7-8 February see a final deal being struck.

Despite the fact that it was labelled the US$1 trillion negotiation, the EU budget is small, at around only 2% of the Union’s total public expenditure and 1% of its GNI. However, the MFF 2014-20 will determine the EU budget’s role in responding to the economic crisis and global competition. Europe urgently needed a signal that the EU is capable of reaching agreements on such an important issue. The fact that the summit produced no results has made scepticism and disappointment rise and kept yet another conflictive topic on the agenda.

This paper will analyse the main positions of –and cleavages between– the leading actors that have led to the summit’s failure, highlighting the questions which must be resolved during the EU Council of 7-8 February in order to reach an agreement on the MFF 2014-20.
The European budget is important for cohesion and growth

The Prelude to the European Council

The negotiation of the MFF 2014-20 started after a broad public debate during the EU budget review, which took place from 2007 to 2009. On 29 June 2011 the European Commission presented its proposals for the MFF 2014-2020. By the end of 2011, 57 proposals relating to the legal basis for European spending programmes had been submitted in almost all policy areas. Finally, an amended version of the MFF 2014-20 was published on 6 July 2012. This version foresees a total volume of €1,033 billion (at constant 2011 prices), or around 1% of the EU-27’s GNI.

The proposals presented no radical changes in the structure of the EU budget, but made a serious attempt to improve the quality of strategic planning and policy implementation, aligning expenditures with the Europe 2020 objectives. The end of the negotiating process was intended to lead to a compromise acceptable to all the member-states and the three EU organs: the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament.

Over the past months the Polish, Danish and Cypriot EU Presidencies made an effort to narrow down the Member States’ positions. After taking over the EU Presidency, Nicosia confirmed its ambition of reaching an informal agreement at the October European Council, a deal with the European Parliament in November and the final agreement in December. The Cypriot government held a series of bilateral meetings with Member States and at the General Affairs Councils on 24 September presented a first revised version of the negotiating box. Although the box did not yet contain any figures for the expenditure ceiling or spending headings, the Presidency already considered that the Commission’s proposal would ‘have to be adjusted downwards’. It was not until the end of October 2012 that a revised proposal with concrete figures for the MFF 2014-20 was presented. The revised negotiating box contained cuts amounting to at least €50 billion compared with the European Commission’s original proposal. The revision immediately heated up the debate, being criticised by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States. In the debate three broad opinion groups can be identified: the ‘Friends of Cohesion Policy’, 4 the ‘Friends of the CAP’ 5 and the ‘Friends of Better Spending’. 6 While the first group focuses on the fact that the EC’s budgetary proposal constitutes the absolute minimum for Cohesion policy and the second defends spending on CAP, the third insists on the need to limit and reduce EU spending and considers that the quality of spending is the key to creating additional growth.

Despite the tight schedule proposed by the EU Presidency and the President of the EU Council and the manifest conflict, the Member States expressed their willingness to reach an agreement at a special European Council scheduled for 22-23 November and solely devoted to the MFF 2014-20. Some days ahead of the Council the debate between the net payers and the net beneficiaries of the EU budget was further complicated by the position of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, who received a strict mandate from Parliament to defend acquired rights such as the British rebate and insist on additional cuts. Not only did the British Parliament exert pressure on these issues, but an opinion poll, released a week before the summit, showed that in the event of a referendum 56% of the UK’s citizens would vote for withdrawal from the EU.

The EU Council

In order to prepare the European Council, President van Rompuy released a proposal with cuts of around €80 billion to the budget proposals presented by the European Commission. This implied 2% (€20 billion) less than the current 2014-20 framework. The paper raised fierce protests among the Friends of Cohesion and the main beneficiaries of the CAP as it included cuts of around €30 billion in Cohesion funding and of €25 billion in agricultural expenditure. Taking into account the pressure from the Friends of Better Spending and the debate on Cohesion and CAP, it was already clear that the Council would concentrate on these two main spending areas and that a compromise would only be reached by applying ‘savings’ in the remaining headings.

Friends of Cohesion, CAP or better spending?
With the aim of downplaying expectations, already on 20 November the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that there was no rush to reach an agreement and that an agreement in 2013 might be more likely: ‘Positions are too far apart, but as I said before, it would not be dramatic if we need to come back next year’.8

On the morning of 23 November Van Rompuy presented a new compromise proposal which offered €97.2 billion in global expenses, 7% less than the Commission’s proposal. In an attempt to reduce tension, spending on Cohesion Policy and the CAP was increased without changing the MFF 2014-20’s overall ceiling. Van Rompuy proposed to restore €10.6 billion to Cohesion and €8 billion to the CAP at the expense of investments in competitiveness and external affairs.

The following paragraphs analyse the different spending headings and the position of each Member State.

Overall volume: in terms of the overall volume the majority of Member States could sign up to the last proposal presented by Van Rompuy. Four countries were pushing for more cuts: the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. Germany and Poland seemed to be relatively satisfied. Other Member States, including France and Italy, had directly or implicitly threatened to use their veto if spending were to be further reduced.

Heading 1a Competitiveness: the last proposal re-established expenditure for Cohesion and the CAP, mainly through cuts in the Competitiveness Heading and the Connecting Europe Facility. The latter, which will finance major transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructure was the target of the largest part of cuts in the first round of negotiations. The latest proposal reduced it again by €5 billion, setting a maximum allocation of €41.25 billion. Of that total, transport would receive €26.95 billion (of which €10 billion from the Cohesion Fund), energy €7.13 billion and telecommunications €7.17 billion. Nevertheless, the Competitiveness Heading was set at €139.54 billion, up by 50% compared with the current financial framework.

Heading 1b Cohesion Policy: in a context of economic crisis, the Cohesion countries tried to minimise the cuts in Cohesion, one of the policies with the greatest impact on growth and recovery prospects.

Although the last proposal presented could be considered an increase, the overall budget of €320.15 billion for Cohesion is nearly €20 billion less than the European Commission’s proposal.9 Accordingly, the Cohesion Fund would receive €66.34 billion with an increase in aid intensity. Moreover, outermost regions, such as the Canary Islands, Azores, Madeira, Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Reunion, Saint Martin and newcomer Mayotte, would receive €1.39 billion, more than in the Commission’s initial proposal thanks to specific aid of 30€ per inhabitant.

Furthermore, and answering the concerns of Spain and France, the safety net for the regions set to leave the ‘less developed’ category in 2014 was also raised slightly. Accordingly, these regions will be able to keep at least 60% of their current allocation. The Council President proposed establishing the absorption limit at 2.35% of national GDP, a slight reduction which left some funds available for other countries in need (Greece and Portugal). The mechanism is adjusted for states that have been hit the hardest by the crisis: in this respect, in states where GDP fell by more than 1% from 2008 to 2010, the absorption limit would be set at 2.59%.

After the summit, the Cohesion countries seemed to be satisfied, as they were also offered some additional side-payments, including €1 billion for Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece and €1.2 billion for Hungary. Furthermore, the method proposed to calculate aid for the less developed regions was more advantageous than in the first Van Rompuy proposal: for instance, the unemployment premium rose from €800 to €1,300 per year per person and from €300 to €500 in transition regions. According to first calculations, Spain would get an extra €2.75 billion and Ceuta and Melilla, with strategic interest, €50 million, following the precedent of the last negotiations in 2005.10

Heading 2 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): one of the main issues at stake in the European Council negotiations was the financing of the CAP, a policy strongly criticised by the UK and the Netherlands but strongly defended by France and Spain as the only real common EU policy.

The latest version of the negotiation box contained cuts of up to €17.5 billion compared with the European Commission’s proposal and set the CAP ceiling at €372.23 billion. It allocated €277.85 billion to market-related expenditure and direct payments, accounting for an increase in the CAP envelope of €8 billion compared with the last proposal. The increase was aimed at France, which had consistently defended expenditure in agriculture, as well as at Spain. Despite this, the French President François Hollande, backed by Spain, Italy, Ireland and Romania, pushed for a further €6 billion to be re-injected into the CAP budget. As a concession to the new Member States,

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9 The funds would break down as follows: €161.427 billion for the less developed regions; €31.393 billion for the transition regions; and €50.872 billion for the more developed regions.
10 Multiannual Financial Framework/
Two main spending areas: Cohesion and CAP

Agriculture will be the decisive item to unblock
the proposal maintained the system of rebalancing direct payments across the EU so that in this respect the latest version of the draft conclusions set a minimum level for direct payments to be reached by 2020 (€196 per hectare).

Under pressure from Member States faced with growing budgetary constraints, greater flexibility between the two CAP pillars was included. This could negatively affect Pillar 2 (rural development) expenditure. Van Rompuy’s latest paper proposed allowing all Member States to shift up to 15% of their rural development money to Pillar 1. As a result, the reduction in rural development spending could reach 23% compared with the Commission’s proposal, although side payments were foreseen for Italy and Austria.

The failure to adopt MFF 2014-20 has pushed back the agenda for CAP reform, placing the whole process in stand-by. For the coming negotiation, agriculture will be the decisive item to be unblocked in order to secure an agreement.

Headings 3 Citizenship, freedom, security and justice and 4 External expenditure: in general terms, Member States approved the structure of headings 4 and 3 and up until the October council almost no Member State had asked for a reduction in the overall ceiling for the two headings. Nevertheless, in the current negotiating situation, Member States are seeking to keep specific spending categories (such as CAP and Cohesion Policy) at a high level, demanding that cuts be made elsewhere. Other Member States advocate a reduction in the EU budget independently of where. In this context, headings 4 and 3 were the most affected by cuts in the last proposal, in order to increase or maintain spending on the CAP and Cohesion, and were set at €60.6 billion and €16.6 billion, respectively.

Heading 5 Administration: the proposed reform of the status of EU civil servants in December 2011 is aimed at saving €1 billion by 2020, mainly through a 5% staff reduction and increasing the number of hours worked per week. Nevertheless, the proposal did not satisfy some Member States, such as the UK, which seek more radical cuts. In the past months Van Rompuy has backed the idea of maintaining spending in administration at nearly the same level as the Commission’s proposal, €62.6 billion, with a slight cut of €536 million.

Correction mechanisms: these are among the most sensitive issues which come up in the negotiations regarding EU resources to the budget and are often left for the last moment. The British position is heavily marked by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who in 1984, some years after the UK’s accession, negotiated the so-called British rebate, which accounted for €3.6 billion in 2011. Although there is a strong demand from all Member States to abolish the rebate, the British cheque seems safe considering that it would take the unanimous agreement of the 27 Member States to eliminate it, including the agreement of the British Parliament, which is very difficult to imagine. Even the failure of the negotiation of the MFF 2014-20 would not mean cancelling it and this leaves the UK in a strong position. Its stance has been reinforced by the fact that Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria have also got their own rebates, introduced in 2000 at the Berlin European Council, and are determined to defend them. Moreover, Denmark requested very strongly that it would also need a correction mechanism in order to improve its net balance. The debate on the correction mechanisms hindered the discussion on new ways to finance the EU budget—such as the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax— but this issue will need to be discussed at the next European Council as it is one of the main demands of the European Parliament, which must give its consent to the financial framework.

### Table 1. Commission, Cypriot Presidency and Council President Proposals on the MFF 2014-20 (€ bn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Cypriot</th>
<th>Van Rompuy</th>
<th>Van Rompuy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a. Competitiveness for growth and jobs</td>
<td>165.00</td>
<td>146.32</td>
<td>153.00</td>
<td>148.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>of which Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>36.31</td>
<td>46.25</td>
<td>41.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. Economic, social and territorial cohesion</td>
<td>379.24</td>
<td>326.49</td>
<td>309.49</td>
<td>320.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sustainable growth: natural resources</td>
<td>386.47</td>
<td>378.97</td>
<td>364.47</td>
<td>372.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which market-related expenditure and direct payments</td>
<td>283.05</td>
<td>277.40</td>
<td>269.85</td>
<td>277.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Security and citizenship</td>
<td>18.81</td>
<td>18.11</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>18.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Global Europe</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>64.65</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>60.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Administration</td>
<td>63.16</td>
<td>63.16</td>
<td>63.00</td>
<td>62.60</td>
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<td>Side payments</td>
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<td>Italy (€1 billion)</td>
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<td>Portugal (€1 billion)</td>
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<td>Spain (€2.75 billion)</td>
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<td>Greece (€1 billion)</td>
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<td>Austria (€700 million)</td>
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<td>Finland (€500 million)</td>
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<td>Slovenia (€150 million)</td>
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<td>Luxembourg (€20 million)</td>
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</table>
Tension between austerity and national needs

Graph 4. Commission, Cypriot Presidency and Council President Proposals on Headings 3 & 4 (€ bn)

Source: the authors.

Graph 5. Commission, Cypriot Presidency and Council President Proposals on the MFF 2014-20 (in %)

Source: the authors.

Conclusions

J ust a few days ahead of the EU Council that starts on 7 February, many observers are optimistic that the EU’s leaders will manage to reach an agreement on the MFF 2014-20. Until now, the insistence of several Member States on red lines which they are unwilling to cross has allowed little room for flexibility during the past European Council negotiation. In this respect, the Council Presidency and the EU Presidency had to propose from the beginning additional cuts in spending. The strategic decision to reduce the CAP and Cohesion Policy was, nevertheless, strongly opposed by France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and the new Member States and did not last long. The EU budget’s limited resources, again mainly concentrated on the CAP and Cohesion policy, will therefore leave insufficient funding available for financing European policies such as R&D and the EU’s external action. It would not be fair to blame the ‘Friends of Better Spending’ alone for the summit’s failure, since other Member States had also requested the maintenance of EU spending in their respective countries and had shown no flexibility on further cuts in the ‘traditional spending headings’. National interests must be subordinated
As in previous negotiations, the tension between austerity demands and national necessities has again arisen with force at a time of economic crisis and growing unemployment in Europe. It is clear that a volume of around 1% of the EU’s GNI for the budget is too small to achieve a true steering effect in such a complicated context. Moreover, the numerous correction mechanisms and growing number of side payments will make the MFF 2014-20 again highly complicated and less transparent.

Additionally, according to the negotiation agenda no increase in EU budgetary autonomy can be expected. The debate on a reformed own-resources system which started in the public consultation process during the EU budget review failed to mature and was postponed at an early stage of the negotiation process.

It is now very difficult to say who will get the best agreement because many factors come into play (aid intensity by type of region, premiums granted in terms of unemployment, special allowances, individual perks, etc.). However, it can be assumed that Spain’s position can be improved, as well as the net balance of France and the countries most heavily affected by the crisis.

The EU Council on 22-23 November has again brought to the fore the limited political ambition and vision for Europe among the EU’s leaders. The focus on national net balances, once again, has ignored the impact the EU budget could have in overcoming the crisis, as well as the MFF 2014-20’s role in supporting growth, employment, competitiveness and convergence in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy.

The Council has confirmed the long-standing argument that no multiannual financial framework negotiation ends in success at the first attempt. Experience also shows that small Member States make good EU Presidencies, since they are cautious in their external behaviour and act as honest brokers. However, so far no small country has reached an agreement on a MFF. It has always been the larger Member States that have been able to subordinate certain national material interests in order to reach an agreement. At the beginning of 2013 Ireland assumed the Presidency for the seventh time since joining the EU in 1973. The Irish government will be decisive in reaching an agreement on the MFF 2014-20, a goal which is necessary not just for the success of its Presidency but especially for the EU’s own cohesion and growth.11

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11 Declarations by President Durão Barroso and other European leaders after the European Council can be found in Bulletin Quotidien Europe, 24/XI/2012, Agence Europe, Brussels.
El papel de la cooperación internacional en la construcción de una marca-país

A partir de la experiencia de trabajo del autor con la cooperación española en América Latina y en Uruguay en particular, este ARI aborda las posibles aportaciones que la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) española puede hacer a su imagen-país.

Martín Rivero Illa

AOD en “Fortalecimiento Institucional del Gobierno Local” en un alejado poblado de Bolivia o Uruguay.

El desafío está en intentar evitar centrarse en los intereses más políticamente interesados e inmediatos y levantar la mirada con una visión más estratégica y de largo plazo respecto de los beneficios, tangibles o intangibles, que a la sociedad española en su conjunto –y por tanto también a ese ciudadano de a pie– le ha dado el hecho de que España haya sido el donante global de mayor crecimiento y con más presencia en América Latina en la última década.

Cooperación y marca-país

Quien escribe no es en absoluto un especialista en el tema de la imagen internacional de los países, pero parece claro que una marca-país tiene, entre otras funciones, la de proveer una identidad unívoca y valorada de las diferentes expresiones de un país a nivel global. Estas expresiones incluyen cualquiera de las características, personas, ámbitos o actividades que se visibilizan de ese país en el resto del mundo. Éstas pueden ser tan diversas como el propio Estado o gobierno de un país o sus representantes en el país o en el exterior, sus productos y servicios (especialmente los exportables), las características y forma de ser de sus habitantes, su patrimonio arquitectónico, cultural y artístico, sus particularidades geográficas, su oferta turística y gastronómica, las diversas representaciones deportivas y un largo lista de etcéteras. No se me ocurre ninguna buena razón para pensar que la cooperación internacional al desarrollo que un país brinda –es decir, los diversos programas y proyectos de desarrollo que apoya a lo largo del mundo– no sea potencialmente una dimensión muy importante de esa marca o imagen-país.
También parece razonable pensar que estas diferentes dimensiones deben aprovechar las sinergias que generan entre sí y explotar estratégicamente los aportes que cada una de ellas le puede generar a las demás. Canadá y Nueva Zelanda son dos países que parecen manejar esas sinergias de manera articulada y coherente, al menos en términos visuales. Piense el lector por un momento si no visualiza el silver fern (helecho de plata), símbolo de Nueva Zelanda, de manera verdaderamente idéntica en todas sus expresiones hacia el exterior, desde su equipo nacional de rugby, hasta la tarjeta de un embajador, pasando por una reconocida marca de mantequilla. Esa imagen es también el símbolo de su entidad de Cooperación NZ-AID.1

Obviamente, lo importante de estos símbolos no es la calidad estética o gráfica del logo en sí mismo, sino los contenidos o valores que a través de él se logran transmitir. Hacer que todas las expresiones de un país apreciadas globalmente “acumulen” o viertan valor a un mismo símbolo seguramente es una tarea compleja, costosa y de largo aliento. Pocas dimensiones de las relaciones entre países y pueblos pueden ser tan valoradas como aquellas que hacen que, con la mutua cooperación y el trabajo conjunto, mejoren las condiciones de vida y el ejercicio efectivo de todos los derechos de todos de sus habitantes. La AOD indudablemente tiene esta capacidad privilegiada de aportar contenido sustantivo y universalmente valorado a la imagen del país que brinda cooperación.

La AOD bilateral española con América Latina

La experiencia de varios años desde la Agencia Uruguaya de Cooperación Internacional (AUCI) como entidad contraparte oficial de la cooperación española me ha dado la oportunidad de conocer de primera mano las características y el valor agregado que hacen destacar a esta cooperación respecto de la de otros países y organismos internacionales. Documentos oficiales de la Presidencia de Uruguay, reflejados en el último Marco de Asociación 2011-2015 firmado entre ambos países, destacan sobre la cooperación española su flexibilidad y capacidad de adaptar los instrumentos de cooperación a cada proyecto, y su efectividad para identificar con agudeza las capacidades técnicas e institucionales de España adecuadas para trasladarlas a la realidad del Uruguay como país de renta media.

En Uruguay se comparte la opinión de que España, como donante, ha sabido escuchar y atender las necesidades de la sociedad uruguaya en diversos ámbitos. Estas capacidades se basan en la fortaleza y vasta experiencia de sus técnicos e instituciones, brindando cooperación con una amplia gama de instrumentos en materia de fortalecimiento de la gobernabilidad, descentralización, desarrollo local, urbanismo y ordenamiento territorial, género, medio ambiente, salud, educación, fortalecimiento institucional o cultura para el desarrollo. La ayuda española en este país es altamente valorada por el apoyo al fortalecimiento de las capacidades de investigación en tecnologías de la información (TIC) aplicadas a la educación y, en particular, a la educación superior universitaria.

Asimismo, la ayuda sin condicionalidades de la cooperación española favorece la apropiación real de los proyectos e iniciativas por parte de las instituciones beneficiarias. Éstas pueden así trabajar en la consecución de los objetivos estratégicos definidos de acuerdo al interés nacional por el gobierno. Conviene, por tanto, destacar, más allá de los resultados y productos específicos de los proyectos de cooperación, una metodología de trabajo conjunta por las capacidades que esto ha generado en Uruguay para gestionar su propia cooperación —tanto la recibida desde otros donantes como la cooperación sur-sur (CSS) que el propio país comienza a desplegar—.

En este sentido, el proceso de realización del último marco general de cooperación entre España y Uruguay, denominado Plan Director, generó un mecanismo de definición de las prioridades de cooperación, resumido en el Gráfico 1, que desde entonces es parte de la política de la AUCI para gestionar toda la cooperación de todos los donantes.

Mediante este proceso, es posible: (1) identificar los objetivos nacionales de desarrollo más allá de que no estén explicitados en un plan nacional de desarrollo; (2) determinar cómo esto se traduce en los objetivos sectoriales de los ministerios u organismos competentes; (3) establecer cuál ha sido su asignación presupuestaria; (4) identificar la ayuda sin condicionalidades de la cooperación, una metodología de trabajo conjunta por las capacidades que esto ha generado en Uruguay para gestionar su propia cooperación —tanto la recibida desde otros donantes como la cooperación sur-sur (CSS) que el propio país comienza a desplegar—.

Desde que se realizara este proceso con la cooperación española, éste se aplica sistemáticamente para todos los ámbitos de las políticas públicas y para todos los países o instituciones cooperantes. Sin embargo, en los diferentes ámbitos regionales o internacionales en los que participó como director de cooperación, no he visto que se hiciera ni una sola vez alguna referencia de España a sus propias capacidades en este sentido. Parecería que los países receptores de ayuda están en mejores condiciones para identificar mejor y poner en valor las virtudes de la cooperación española que el propio donante.

La cooperación española en organismos multilaterales y fondos globales

Otro de los ámbitos en que España parece no haber capitalizado para su visibilidad pública o imagen-país –o al menos no en todo su potencial– es en el relativo a las

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1 www.aid.govt.nz/.  
2 www.mdgfund.org/es.  
3 www.vivicultura.org.uy.  
importantes contribuciones a los organismos multilaterales o programas temáticos globales de cooperación al desarrollo. Un buen ejemplo de ello puede ser el Fondo Para el Logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (F-ODM) que se estableció en 2007 a través de un acuerdo entre el gobierno de España y el Sistema de Naciones Unidas, con el objetivo de favorecer la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM).

Este fondo ha sumado una contribución total de más de 900 millones de dólares, en su enorme mayoría por aportes de España. Con cargo a él se han financiado 130 programas conjuntos en ocho áreas programáticas en 50 países. Los programas abarcan una importante diversidad de sectores como salud, empleo, igualdad de género, medio ambiente, cultura, agua y desarrollo del sector privado. Otro elemento distintivo de este fondo es que los programas financiados reúnen en cada proyecto a múltiples agencias, comisiones, fondos y programas de Naciones Unidas, de modo que se procura fortalecer la capacidad del Sistema de Naciones Unidas para actuar de manera conjunta y articulada.

Este mecanismo de financiación al desarrollo, estructurado temáticamente y vinculado a los objetivos y metas planteados en los ODM, dio protagonismo a España en las iniciativas globales de desarrollo en al menos dos sentidos. Por un lado, le permitió aumentar su importancia y peso como país en el único organismo multilateral de desarrollo de representación universal e igualitaria. En segundo lugar, este fondo permitió desarrollar iniciativas en países de renta media que habitualmente están fuera de las listas de países elegibles para la cooperación tradicional por sus niveles de desarrollo medio relativo, pero que presentan severas desigualdades y vulnerabilidades en varios de los ODM.

En Uruguay este fondo financió un proyecto en el área de cultura y desarrollo, denominado Viví Cultura con una gran dotación de fondos (más de 3,4 millones de dólares), lo que lo constituye en uno de los mayores proyectos de cooperación en cultura que ha tenido el país. Sin embargo, en el sector de la cooperación al desarrollo en Uruguay pocas personas saben que ese proyecto, desarrollado con la cara visible del Sistema de Naciones Unidas, ha sido posible gracias a significativos aportes de fondos españoles. Otra paradoja sobre este proyecto es que, a pesar de la reconocida capacidad de la AECID para coordinarse con el gobierno nacional, y de las dificultades de las diferentes agencias de Naciones Unidas para articular sus acciones, la cooperación española no ejerció el liderazgo en la ejecución, lo que se derivó en problemas de gestión que podrían haberse evitado.

Una marca-país tiene, entre otras funciones, la de proveer una identidad unívoca y valorada de las diferentes expresiones de un país a nivel global.

La ayuda sin condicionalidades de la cooperación española favorece la apropiación real de los proyectos e iniciativas por parte de las instituciones beneficiarias.
que la mayoría de sus miembros son clasificados como países de renta media por los principales organismos multilaterales y donantes tradicionales y, por tanto, la ayuda canalizada hacia esta región se ha reducido significativamente en las últimas décadas. Es así que la región latinoamericana recibió entre el 6,5% y el 8% de la AOD total mundial en 2010, lo que comparado al 14% que recibió en 1960, demuestra el significativo descenso relativo. 4 Mientras tanto, según el informe de 2012 sobre la CSS en Iberoamérica de la Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB), durante 2011 se ejecutaron 586 proyectos y 229 acciones de CSS bilateral. 5

Desde el comienzo, el proceso referido de la CSS en la región ha contado con el papel protagonista de España en el marco de la SEGIB. La propia creación y financiación de esta Secretaría, la dinámica político-estratégica que generan anualmente las cumbres presidenciales, sus correspondientes reuniones de coordinadores nacionales y responsables de cooperación, así como la creación y publicación del informe anual de CSS son tres pilares muy relevantes de esta construcción estratégica y singular. Si a esto se le suma el apoyo al Programa Iberoamericano para la CSS, que se construye con las aportaciones y la participación de otros 19 países iberoamericanos, queda clara la relevancia del papel de España en la construcción de la institucionalidad y actuales características de la CSS en la región.

Desde el espacio iberoamericano, y a través del programa para el fortalecimiento de la CSS, los países miembros lograron articular una posición común sobre la CSS 6 de cara al IV Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan, que luego fue también presentada ante el Foro de Cooperación al Desarrollo del ECOSOC en julio de 2012. Entre los principales elementos de la postura de estos países se puede destacar que la CSS latinoamericana se deriva de acuerdos entre países que afrontan desafíos de desarrollo similares y que facilita la adecuación de las actividades a necesidades y perspectivas comunes y el respeto por los aportes locales al desarrollo, favoreciendo el entendimiento y la relación entre socios en condiciones de reciprocidad y permitiendo el aprendizaje mutuo, al tiempo que consolida las relaciones entre países de una misma región, promoviendo el desarrollo regional y la integración, así como la relación con otras regiones y la preservación de bienes públicos regionales y globales.

La articulación de una posición común en un documento consensuado por estos países relleja una experiencia única de articulación de posiciones sobre la CSS en el seno de la región. Este proceso es el resultado de un trabajo sostenido en los últimos años que ha permitido no sólo la acumulación conceptual y metodológica sino también la construcción de confianza entre países en el ámbito de la CSS. Los actores protagonistas de ese proceso han sido los países latinoamericanos, pero buena parte del éxito del mismo reside en el compromiso político de las autoridades españolas y en las capacidades y recursos de ese país destinados a este proceso.

**Conclusiones**

El crecimiento exponencial que han tenido los fondos españoles de cooperación al desarrollo en la década pasada constituye una inversión del Estado español, y por tanto de sus ciudadanos, enormemente relevante. Es posible que este crecimiento pueda haber sido mayor o más rápido que el de las capacidades institucionales para gestionarlo eficazmente en todas sus dimensiones. No obstante ello, es evidente que se generaron resultados de desarrollo concretos, productos y capacidades institucionales y profesionales tanto en los países receptores de esa AOD como en la propia España.

Entre los resultados de este proceso también están la construcción y consolidación de relaciones y “cercanías” políticas, institucionales, profesionales y personales con las diferentes autoridades políticas y técnicas de los países socios y de organismos internacionales. Este acervo parece particularmente importante en América Latina. Indudablemente, esto puede constituir un activo valioso del país para su imagen global, o la construcción de la marca-país.

Cabe preguntarse qué impacto tendrá la severa reducción del presupuesto de la ayuda de España en su imagen internacional, particularmente en América Latina y otras regiones en las que tiene importantes intereses geoestratégicos y comerciales. Es decir, esta merma de AOD puede desmejorar la imagen-país, lo que también podría impactar en los intereses más generales (económicos y políticos) de España. Por tanto, lo que en el corto plazo puede ser una forma de estricción del gasto para la reducción del déficit público, en el mediano o largo plazo puede tener un impacto, ciertamente difícil de cuantificar pero sin duda tangible, en sentido contrario sobre ese mismo déficit público.

**Martín Rivero Illa**

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4 Los países que se adhirieron el documento Posición sobre la Cooperación Sur-Sur en el marco de la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo ante el IV Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan son Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, España, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, Portugal, Principado de Andorra, República Dominicana y Uruguay (www.cooperacionsursur.org).
The missing spring in the EU’s Mediterranean policies

The changing political and social realities in North Africa and the Middle East, following the antiauthoritarian uprisings that started in Tunisia in late 2010, took Europe’s institutions and governments by surprise.

Haizam Amirah-Fernández

Summary

The changing political and social realities in North Africa and the Middle East, following the antiauthoritarian uprisings that started in Tunisia in late 2010, took Europe’s institutions and governments by surprise. The fall of the wall of fear in Arab societies represents a major challenge, of unknown proportions for Europe, but also an unprecedented opportunity for building a new regional stability based on good governance, inclusive development and mutually beneficial exchanges.

The EU responded to these various challenges by launching a major revision of its neighbourhood policies. This represents a clear shift from the EU’s previous policies that, deliberately or not, favoured “authoritarian stability”. While this shift from authoritarian to sustainable stability does represent a long overdue course correction, the EU’s strategic adjustment remains incomplete in many regards. The geopolitics of the Mediterranean region have been altered and the EU risks paying a hefty price in terms of security, influence and access in case it opts for a passive, wait-and-see approach.

Analysis

1. The EU’s new neighbours in the south

Since its creation, never before the so-called Arab Spring had the EU faced such a wide and profound bottom-up transformation in its southern neighbourhood as the one produced by the antiauthoritarian uprisings that started in Tunisia in late 2010 and quickly spread across the Arab world. The new political and social realities in North Africa and the Middle East took Europe’s institutions and governments by surprise and called into question their capacity to foresee, analyse and react to major challenges in the EU’s immediate vicinity. Arguably, the fall of the wall of fear in Arab societies represents a major challenge of unknown proportions for Europe, but also an unprecedented opportunity for building a new regional stability based on good governance, inclusive development and mutually beneficial exchanges.

The deep demographic, economic and cultural changes witnessed in the Arab world in recent years are giving rise to multiple forms of social mobilisation against authoritarian rule, corruption and a lack of opportunities after decades of apparent resistance to change and deceptive stability. In a matter of a year and a half, four Arab autocrats who had been exercising almost absolute power were overthrown; democratic elections were held in different countries; at least two bloody civil wars broke out; two foreign military interventions took place; emergency constitutional reforms were made; some unpopular governments were reshuffled; and economic measures were taken to alleviate domestic pressure. Those developments are undeniably startling and they show a paradigm shift in a region linked to the EU by various partnership agreements and regional frameworks of cooperation.

The new context that has emerged around the Mediterranean following 2011 is accompanied by enormous uncertainties. The decades-long status quo that prevailed in the Arab world has revealed serious shortcomings and, with it, the stability of its political systems – both old and new ones – can no longer be taken for granted. Today it would be incautious to predict that any Arab country can remain unaffected by the regional wave of changes or, for that matter, to think that changing dynamics in different countries will inevitably follow similar paths.

The EU, among other international players, needs to adapt its policies towards the southern Mediterranean in order to deal with the new political systems. This includes building ties with recently formed governments that have a strong presence of parties with which Europe had not established relations in the past, as well as creating efficient channels of communication with emerging social movements, civil organisations and economic actors.

There is much at stake for European societies, both if the incipient transitions in Arab countries are thwarted (the resulting frustration due to unmet expectations could turn into radicalism and anarchy, easily spreading throughout the region), but also if they advance gradually towards more participatory systems with separation of powers and where economic and social development is inclusive. In the latter case,
the opportunities that would arise for European economies in a more democratic and prosperous Mediterranean would be huge. These changes may translate into investment opportunities, greater trade, transfer of knowledge, joint projects and other economic advantages and complementarities.

2. The slow shift in the EU’s vision

For years, the EU was criticised for the lack of consistency between its declared goals and actual policies in the southern Mediterranean. The failure to translate its pro-democracy and pro-human rights discourse into effective action, while at the same time supporting authoritarian and corrupt regimes, led to a growing disenchantment among Maghrebi and Middle Eastern societies. In Euro-Mediterranean relations, contradictions between short-term political calculations and the stated objectives of major regional initiatives have been a constant factor over the years. In the months that followed the fall of Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, the EU and its Member States attempted to adapt to the new regional environment around the Mediterranean, combining expressions of support for the transitions already begun with the old policy of backing those autocracies still in place.

Western governments pursued stability in the Maghreb and Middle East almost at any cost. This implied uncritical support for repressive and internally delegitimised regimes in return for keeping their societies under control, allowing access to resources (chiefly energy) and trade and economic relations. On the other hand, Western policies towards the region have often been centred on fighting real or perceived threats such as terrorism and illegal immigration. This has allowed the Arab authoritarian regimes to restrict their populations’ freedoms and political and social rights with almost complete impunity. Nobody can escape the fact that the West’s excessive permissiveness towards the Arab lifelong dictators has helped widen the economic and emotional gaps between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

The problem is that this support, both from the EU and the US, did not translate into meaningful progress towards good governance and the rule of law. Nor did it help generate opportunities or create sufficient jobs in societies brimming with young people who aspire to have a decent standard of living and are increasingly in contact with the outside world. It is the sum of these elements of social malaise that triggered the widespread mobilisations against abuses of power in the region as a whole.

The socio-political transformations that have already started in some Arab countries – and those that may come next – will require that the EU reflects on its own policies in order to learn from past mistakes. Despite the difficulties, there is a need to realise that the more satisfied the inhabitants of the southern Mediterranean are with their own countries, the better off everyone will be on both shores. In this new context, the EU would be well advised to gauge the success of any initiative using a specific, simple criterion: whether or not it contributes clearly to increasing the opportunities for greater wellbeing for considerable sectors of societies south and north of the Mediterranean. Unless this takes place, the root causes of future instability will remain a menacing reality.

One thing is clear: the geopolitics of the Mediterranean region have been altered and the EU risks paying a hefty price in terms of security, influence and access if it opts for a passive, wait-and-see approach. Prudence is needed, given the bumpy road ahead of ongoing Arab transitions. However, there is a growing feeling that the EU is wasting precious time not acting decisively to help shape a more democratic future in its southern neighbourhood. European countries are the main trading partners and creditors of the Arab region. It would be incomprehensible for the EU not to play a central role in giving full support to the democratic aspirations of those who made immense sacrifices to rid themselves of dictatorship. The inability of the EU for over a year and a half to stop the bloodshed caused by the Assad regime in Syria is a case in point.

3. The EU’s new strategic compass

The EU responded to these various challenges by launching a major revision of its neighbourhood policies. Although hesitant and divided at first, EU policymakers rapidly cobbled together a new regional strategy as they grasped the strategic relevance and far-reaching consequences of the protests. The core tenets of this new approach were initially laid out in the Commission’s ‘Communication on a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean’ in March 2011. This was followed by further communications on ‘A new response to a changing neighbourhood’ in May 2011 and on ‘Delivering a new European Neighbourhood Policy’ in May 2012, as well as a flurry of accompanying EU documents and communications.

Together, these documents sketch out a new set of strategic priorities for the EU’s neighbourhood policy that builds broadly on the core demands of the protest movements. First amongst these is the creation of “deep democracy” that goes beyond formalistic electoral processes and respects fundamental liberal principles. Second comes the building of “people partnerships” that are able to foster pluralistic civil societies and engage with the diverse new spectrum of civilian actors in the Mediterranean. Finally, the EU has committed itself to promote “inclusive growth” that leads to sustainable development and greater socio-economic equality. Through these measures the EU seeks to foster “sustainable stability” and build closer ties between the EU and the new Arab democracies.

This represents a clear shift from the EU’s previous policies, which, deliberately or not, favoured “authoritarian stability” based on the precept that political change could only flow from gradual social and economic transformations. While this shift from authoritarian to sustainable stability does represent a long overdue course correction, the EU’s strategic adjustment remains incomplete in other regards.

First, the EU has largely failed to give some meaning to most of the new catch phrases that it so liberally deploys. The EU’s democracy promotion concept remains fuzzy and definition of deep democracy vary throughout the speeches of EU officials, inadvertently raising suspicions of a hidden EU agenda. The EU has been more concrete when it comes to redefining its civil society engagement through a new Communication, but remains ambivalent about its relations with faith-based and traditional parts of civil society. The
The opportunities that would arise for EU economies in a more democratic and prosperous Mediterranean would be huge.

Second, the revised ENP struggles to fully grasp the “failure of gravity” in the EU’s relationship with the southern Mediterranean. The sagging attraction of the EU model and the new confidence of the young Arab democracies have meant that the EU-centric vision of a European Mediterranean has lost some of its appeal. While the EU has responded by introducing greater differentiation into its bilateral approach, it has barely started to consider the consequences of a more independent and diverse region. Instead, the needle of the EU’s strategic compass remains firmly fixed in a northerly direction.

Finally, it is not enough for the EU to focus its attention exclusively on the ongoing political transition processes in Tunisia and Egypt. While the evolution of these countries is indeed pivotal, other problems linger. The EU urgently needs a new strategy for engaging countries, like Algeria, that are unlikely to follow the Tunisian model any time soon. Moreover, some of the more “traditional” regional challenges require the EU’s immediate attention. The collapse of the Middle East peace process, the Iranian nuclear crisis, smouldering Sunni-Shia tensions, and mounting instability in the Sinai and the Sahel all have the potential of derailing ongoing transition processes. The EU, in other words, requires a strategy that considers the impact of the revolutions in their broader regional setting.

4. New tools, old toolbox

The EU’s failure to embark on a more radical overhaul of its regional outlook has, unsurprisingly, limited the effectiveness of some of the new tools it has developed in response to the Arab Spring.

Prime amongst these is the use of EU conditionality. The adoption of the “more-for-more principle” in order to incentivise and support domestic reforms has been one of the key changes that emerged out of the ENP revisions. Based on Catherine Ashton’s 3Ms of money, markets and mobility, EU conditionality was to become more objective and more effective. Arguably, neither goal has been met. The EU now wields an impressive bag of new incentives that include amongst others its newly launched SPRING programme, Mobility Partnerships and so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). While these are mouth-watering rewards for countries eager to move closer to the EU, they may appear as poisonous fruit to some of the more independent Arab democracies and are likely to be outright unappealing to the remaining democracy laggards. The limited size of some of these rewards further diminishes their potential use as concrete leverage for reforms, especially in a situation where alternative sources of funding are available from the Gulf.

Moreover, despite all the talk of clear benchmarks and objective criteria, the EU appears to have dispensed these rewards in a somewhat random fashion. Regardless of serious questions remaining over the depth of political reforms in Jordan and Morocco, both countries have been amongst the winners of the EU’s more-for-more bonanza. Somewhat surprisingly, the EU has also front-loaded a good deal of its incentives: Task Forces have been initiated, DCFTA negotiations launched, and Mobility Partnerships are being negotiated. Backtracking on commitments and suspending aid if reforms falter will be predictably difficult. The EU’s paralysis following the Egyptian constitutional crisis stands testimony to this. In truth, much of the EU’s more-for-more approach has been about channelling additional funding to specific issues and countries, not providing the EU with additional leverage.

More successful have been the EU’s concrete measures to support elections and democratic institution building through training, technical assistance and help with judiciary reforms. The EU’s willingness to employ sanc-
Civil society: The EU could do well to promote dialogue across the Mediterranean, but also amongst southern civil society organisations, in order to prevent the dangerous segmentation of southern civil society. Greater dialogue and cooperation with Islamic donors and NGOs is particularly important in this regard, in order to prevent a politicisation of civil society assistance and to break down mutual stereotypes and misperceptions. Moreover, while there are good reasons for the EU to emphasise the watchdog function of civil society, it should promote a cooperative and consensual style of state-society relations and avoid undermining the legitimacy of new state institutions. Finally, the EU should apply its civil society concept more flexibly and acknowledge the potential of counterpart traditions in promoting pluralism and democracy.

Inclusive Growth: In a time of tightening fiscal budgets, any substantial increase in ENPI funding for the region beyond the current Commission proposal appears unrealistic. However, there is much room for upgrading EU support when it comes to trade (especially agriculture products) and mobility. Greater progress on these issues would not only help the region but also has the potential of kick-starting growth in Europe. But rather than relying on lengthy and acrimonious negotiations of DCFTAs and mobility partnerships, more urgent action is required. The idea of extending the EU-Turkey customs union deserves serious consideration. Similarly, the EU could do more to foster regional trade and integration by supporting the revival of the Arab Maghreb Union and other regional initiatives and by reassessing the EU-sponsored Agadir Process.

Comprehensive regional strategy: While the Arab Spring has been disconnected from issues such as the Middle East peace process, the failure of the EU to re-think its approach to this and other regional issues is dangerous. The potential for spillover is considerable and clinging to old realities does not seem to make much sense in the new context. One way forward to encourage a more comprehensive strategy that goes beyond the “transitional paradigm” could be by reviewing the 2000 EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region, which would enable a discussion on more strategic regional issues. This would also provide an opportunity for the EU to reconsider the future role of the Union for the Mediterranean and to rethink its relationship with “new” regional actors such as Qatar and Turkey and emerging external actors such as China.

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Summary

European efforts to attract highly-qualified immigration face several obstacles, from the non-existence of a true intra-European labour market to the difficulties resulting from the overly timid design of the Blue Card. It is still impossible to evaluate the Blue Card’s effect but the changes that have taken place in the European migratory framework since its approval in 2009 should now allow the re-drafting of the Directive to offer a more attractive channel to qualified immigrants. During the past few years, several European countries have adopted new initiatives to attract this immigrant-type, bringing about a set of experiences over which a new common and more ambitious framework can be built. In this context, the Policy Paper presents several proposals such as enhanced cooperation amongst sub-sets of Member States with similar salary structures, the opening of the academic admissions gate, or measures to enhance intra-European labour mobility of both EU citizens and third-country nationals.

Introduction

Innovation is the key to halting the progressive loss of markets for European products and services. That was clearly stated in the Lisbon Strategy for 2010, and repeated in the Europe 2020 Strategy. But innovation is the fortuitous result of two main elements: public and private investment in basic and applied research as well as the development of both technology and talent. Does Europe have enough investment and talented researchers and engineers to face the challenge of being more innovative than China or the US? It seems not: according to the World Intellectual Property Organization, Japan, the US, China and Korea are well ahead of the EU in terms of the number of registered patents. As for individual EU countries, only Germany, UK, France and Poland are among the top 20 producers of patents worldwide. Most people would agree that immigration is a means of boosting the numbers of innovative, high-qualified individuals in the population. But the data collected by the Organization for Economic and Development Cooperation show that migrants from third countries living in European countries have a significantly lower level of education on average than those living in Canada or Australia (64% of migrants born in non-OECD countries and living in Canada have a university degree, compared with 30% in France or 10% in Italy). Of course, OECD data refer to stocks, i.e. the accumulated number of immigrants living in each country, including migrants who arrived in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, usually with little education. Nevertheless, among the regions of origin for most migrants to the European Union – Turkey or North African countries for instance – a clear division appears between highly-skilled migrants (HSMs) who overwhelmingly look for a job in the New World, and low-skilled migrants who travel to Europe, now mostly through mechanisms of family reunification.

European migration policies have changed considerably in recent times, and the doors of many EU countries are now willingly opened only to highly-skilled immigrants. This policy is partly the consequence of shortages in domestic labour markets and partly the result of the European Commission’s insistence upon the need to open those markets to highly-skilled immigrants. Following the Lisbon Agenda (2000), the European Commission encouraged Member States to discard the ‘zero-immigration’ policy followed by the majority since the mid-seventies, since these had failed both to prevent ‘unwanted’ immigration and to attract more desirable forms of labour. In 2001, it presented a proposal for a Directive to establish a common legal framework for migration to the EU, covering a full range of labour migration. It proved too much for the Member States, which blocked it. In response, the Commission proposed ‘segmented’ alternatives: it put forward individual measures for different types of migration. The so-called Blue Card Directive (2009), for highly-skilled immigrants, has been the first to achieve approval and Member States were obliged to transpose it by...
mid-2011. It is too soon to judge the real impact of this Directive, as states are not obliged to produce statistics on the use of Blue Cards until 2013. Still, the Directive is generally considered to have fallen short of its central goal. It does not give immigrants access to the whole European labour market, but only that of the first country they go to, allowing subsequent movement to a second state under strict conditions only. This only highlights the disparity between the EU and its main competitor, the US. For one thing, labour markets are bigger in the US and the migrant who begins working in Illinois can then move freely to California or Oregon, while in the EU he or she must usually begin another application process to migrate to other Member State. Secondly, even if they could move freely across Member States, the divisions in the ‘common’ European labour market would hinder their mobility, as it does that of EU citizens. Income disparities between EU states are the main reason for the refusal of some richer countries, like Germany, to accept the free movement of HSM, as many could qualify for a permit in a poorer Member State – the national average salary is the main reference – and then move to a richer one.

1. The long-term agenda: tackling the absence of a European labour market

In the long term, Europe intends to tackle the challenges of labour-market shortages with a dual approach. One involves promoting intra-EU labour mobility, in a bid to increase the efficient distribution of labour between EU countries and channel national emigrants to the countries for which their skills will be most productive.1 The second involves the attraction of migrants from outside the EU. Both issues are linked, since the lack of a genuine European labour market to facilitate and promote intra-EU mobility will present the EU with serious difficulties in attracting skilled immigrants.

Of course, the two approaches are not wholly complementary, and each brings its own specific benefits and trade-offs. The mobility of EU citizens within Europe can, for instance, mitigate the negative effects of a brain drain from those European countries most affected by the financial and economic crisis (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece) if at least the highly qualified remain in EU countries rather than migrate elsewhere. Concentrating on HSMs from abroad, meanwhile, fosters the accrual of knowledge from non-European education systems.

It goes without saying that the free movement of labour is already a right afforded all EU citizens. The principle of the free movement of workers is enshrined in Art. 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and should allow them to move where they are best suited or where there are jobs. Over time this right was extended to all EU citizens, not just workers, under certain conditions. Despite the advances made in recent years, however, a number of serious limitations and obstacles to internal mobility remain within the EU for EU citizens.

Internal mobility inside the EU is very low, especially in comparison with the US, Canada or Australia. According to the OECD, only 3% of working-age EU citizens live in a Member State other than the one where they were born.2

It was only when eastern Europeans began to move in significant numbers to western countries, both legally and illegally, that the figures improved. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 resulted in a regularisation of this previous mobility and promoted an increase in migration, although many EU15 countries applied transitional, restrictive arrangements. The stock of EU8 plus EU2 (new Member State) nationals residing in EU15 countries increased between 1997 and 2009 from 1.6 million to 4.8 million, a figure that represented 2% of the EU-15’s working-age population. Since then, the financial crisis has negatively affected migration flows in the EU. As the OECD highlighted, intra-EU labour mobility has decreased alongside international migration to the worst-affected European countries.3

The good news is that some indicators show an increasing participation of immigrants with tertiary degrees both among third-country nationals (TCN)s and intra-EU migrants. In Germany, for instance, less than 1% of all TCN migrants arriving in the late 1990s did so on a highly-skilled migration scheme – a number which increased to at least 11% in 2011. The data presented by the European Migration Network in 2011 also show a relevant increase of HSM among TCN in several other countries, like France, together with a higher increase in the amount of EU migrants with a tertiary degree.

Highly-skilled non-EU nationals living in the EU do not, however, even benefit from the free movement rights afforded to EU citizens. These TCNs thus suffer all the problems that European citizens do when they decide to move from one European country to another, to which are added legal and bureaucratic difficulties associated with having to restart the process for obtaining work and residence permits. In this sense, the relevant provisions of the Blue Card (Art. 18) do not facilitate intra-European mobility of HSM from non-EU countries.

The lack of a genuine EU labour market and the reality of a space fragmented into 27 pieces, are one of the main obstacles to the mobility of both EU citizens and TCNs in the EU, and consequently diminish the EU’s prospects of becoming a pole of attraction for HSM. Over the long term, it is therefore essential to improve the processes so that a HSM from a third country who is already (legally) in the EU can easily move to another EU country.

Among the most significant obstacles to HSM labour mobility within the EU, we include:

Legal obstacles: a Blue Card holder and their family members may move to a different Member State, but they

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3 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2011, SOPEMI.
must present an application for a new Blue Card, including all the same documents for the second Member State. In addition, the second Member State may decide, in accordance with its domestic law, not to allow him or her to work until the application has been approved.

- Linguistic obstacles: despite the extension of the use of English as a working language, in daily and administrative lives, national languages (even regional languages) play a relevant role and could act as a disincentive. Administrative obstacles: for example there is still no system providing mutual recognition of official documents.
- Pension rights are not always easily portable between EU countries.
- There is a lack of information about job vacancies in other EU Member States.
- Transaction costs in housing markets in Europe are very high.
- Migrants from third countries face important difficulties in obtaining recognition of their professional qualifications. EU citizens also must overcome several obstacles, despite the Directive on “Recognition of Professional Qualifications” that came into effect in 2007. Currently, degrees are only automatically recognised in seven cases (architects, doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, pharmacists and veterinarians). All other professional qualifications must pass long, complicated and uncertain processes to receive recognition. The Bologna Process, which should have facilitated automatic recognition, has not, in fact, dealt with this issue. Only in 2012 did promoters of the Process begin to think about it. This in one of the reasons behind the overqualification of many mobile workers and migrants from outside the EU. This is also a characteristic of the workers moving from one EU15 country to another, and especially for the workers from the EU12.

**Some proposals for promoting EU intra-labour mobility**

To this end, the most pressing issues seem to be to:
- Re-open the debate regarding the possibility of establishing a simplified process (some kind of fast track) to facilitate internal labour mobility for non-EU HSM between Member States.
Make progress in overcoming the many obstacles, especially administrative and bureaucratic, which hinder intra-
EU labour mobility for European citizens as well as immi-
grants from third countries. The automatic recognition of
degrees with only well-grounded exceptions (such as law
degrees) would make a big contribution to the EU internal
labour market.

- Shift from the heavy focus on temporary migration. The
Green Paper, which guided the recent reform of Europe’s
labour migration policy, focuses first and foremost on tem-
porary admission systems, and discussions are still focused
on circular migration schemes. In the context of highly-
skilled migration, however, linking temporary immigration
schemes with options for status changes would significantly
increase the attractiveness of the EU as a destination for
highly-skilled migrants.

2. The medium-term agenda: completing the Blue Card

In light of the apparent unwillingness of governments to
pool competencies and tackle these obstacles, it seems that
the creation of an EU-wide labour market will be a labori-
ous, long-term effort. In the short to medium term, mean-
while, three prominent fault lines in the Blue Card Directive
are likely to produce suboptimal outcomes and require more
immediate attention.

A first aspect concerns the fact that the Blue Card is
hardly holistic when it comes to the migration context.
As highlighted above, the Blue Card was adopted in relative
isolation from other migration measures due to the way
that the Commission reacted to the veto of its more com-
prehensive 2001 proposal. As a result, the EU has ignored
the fluid distinctions between categories of migrants, and
overestimated the utility of the Blue Card mechanisms – as
opposed to, say, education or research policy – in attracting
foreign workers.

The second is down to the nature of intergovernmental bar-
gaining in Council, which meant that the Blue Card was not
just lowest common denominator, but bore the influences of
certain national regimes more than others, even if these were
not easily applicable to the EU as a whole. Such outcomes
are particularly problematic in a measure like the Blue Card,
where the EU needs to adopt the most attractive practice availa-
ble. That situation is particularly lamentable today, since, in
their domestic efforts to attract HSM, some Member States
now provide international best practices of their own.

Third, governments initially aspired to emulate the US
and use the EU-wide labour market to make the EU more
attractive to third-country nationals. It is not just because of
the blockages to mobility explored above that they failed.
Member States simply do not have a sense of the collect-
ive benefits of together attracting immigrants. Instead,
and to a much greater degree, they feel in competition with
one another. The Blue Card has, however, had an effect: it
has stimulated individual domestic efforts. While this is no
mean feat, of course (in 2007, only 10 members had pro-
grammes to attract HSM), it is not the original goal of the
exercise and has occurred in a rather uncoordinated manner.

All this shows, however, that any evaluation of the Blue
Card’s implementation should not concentrate solely on this;
it should investigate existing dualist national admission sys-
tems spurred by the negotiation and the implementation of
the Directive. The fact that the Directive does not affect the
right of Member States to adopt or retain more favourable
provisions has resulted in a situation where many Member
States now run a dual HSM admission system in which the
Blue Card offers only an additional channel of entry.

Besides the “classic”, long-term option of improving the
attractiveness of the EU as a migrant destination by
offering policies of scale along the lines of the US Green
Card and H1B visa, there exists at least three alternatives to “complete” the Blue Card. First, competition and differ-
ences between the Member States could be harnessed with
some kind of ‘reinforced cooperation’ between different
subsets of members offering beneficial packages amongst
themselves. Second, the proliferation of parallel national
admission schemes offers some inventive ideas to refine
and advance the current system and to iron out some of the
quirks in the current version. Lastly, the EU could take a
more holistic approach, tapping other means of generating
a highly-skilled workforce, for example by making greater
use of the academic gate of immigration.

2.1. From competition to reinforced cooperation

In the short run and on the basis of the current Directive,
different forms of enhanced cooperation amongst subsets of
Member States might cure some of the Blue Card’s existing
shortcomings. Within the external dimension of Europe’s
migration policy, the Global Approach for Migration and
Mobility underlined the importance of Mobility Partners-
ships and its tailor-made approach aiming for closer coop-
eration between a number of Member States and a selected
third country. Through such targeted agreements with third
countries, groupings of Member States with similar points
of attraction would woo highly-skilled immigrants. For
those EU Member States which share a similar need for
highly-skilled labour and are able to offer similar working,
salary and living conditions, it could make sense to work to-
gether to recruit foreign workers with the right profile whilst
competing against other sub-groups. In recent years, many
Member States have followed the lead of the European Im-
migration Portal and launched their individual recruitment
campaigns, which could be effectively replaced by common
efforts between Member States sharing similar interests.

2.2. From the lowest common denominator to the
highest

As regards the medium-term perspective of recasting
the Directive, the dualism of EU and national measures
has been a welcome development for two reasons. First, it
should allow for the harmonisation of highly-skilled migration schemes on a far higher level than the existing Directive does. The world of HSM admission systems in Europe today looks very different compared to the situation in 2007 when the Directive was originally proposed, and Member States are more at ease with such policies. Second, the Directive has provided a wide range of national practice to emulate. Examples of successful national practices include the job seekers’ visa, which was recently introduced in Austria and Germany. This instrument, originally included in the Draft Directive in 2001, introduces a residence permit for highly-skilled immigrants, allowing them to search for an equivalent job for up to six months, therefore significantly reducing the difficult matching process between employers and employees.

2.3. Taking a holistic approach by opening the academic admissions gate

As part of that medium-term reform, the Blue Card regime should be released from its segmented corset and aligned with other aspects that are usually part of a highly-skilled migration regime. In traditional immigration countries, one complementary strategy includes making use of foreign students and graduates, which have emerged as one of the key sources of highly-skilled migration. In Germany, for example, every fourth highly-skilled migrant is admitted today on the basis of graduating from a German University.

Despite the importance of the academic admission gate, the Students Directive from 2004 established only a first step towards harmonisation and the intention so far has not been to create incentives for foreign graduates to remain in the EU after the completion of their degrees. Even today, Member States regularly fail to utilise this potential source of well-qualified and integrated foreign labour, and this is something that should be addressed in the process of redrafting the Students and Researcher Directives. The negotiations will provide a welcome opportunity to develop this important part of the jigsaw of Europe’s comprehensive highly-skilled immigration regime.

Although the Bologna Process will be long and drawn out, and truly international courses in English or other widely-spoken languages still constitute only a tiny minority in most Member States, this relatively recent shift in the systems of higher education in the EU has already made them more attractive to foreign students. Promoting the use of English as a vehicular language in more European universities would attract many foreign students who want to become fluent in English while they earn a degree.

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Federico Steinberg
Comentario Elcano 13/2013 - 11/02/2013
Especiales y secciones web

**Estrategia Global Europea**
**Secciones:** Cuatro think-tanks europeos han sido seleccionados para elaborar un informe que contendrá los aspectos fundamentales y los posibles elementos de una Estrategia Global Europea (EGE).
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/EstrategiaGlobalEuropea

**RIBEI**
Asociación fundada por 38 centros de estudios de América Latina, España y Portugal, tiene como objetivo establecer un nuevo mecanismo de cooperación orientado al estudio y debate de las relaciones internacionales con perspectiva estratégica.
**Secciones:** Novedades, Qué es RIBEI, Centros Integrantes, I Conferencia Internacional RIBEI, Publicaciones.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/RIBEI

**Crisis en el mundo árabe**
Sección sobre los acontecimientos en el mundo árabe con el objetivo de proporcionar análisis de la situación y facilitar a sus lectores el acceso a materiales e informaciones disponibles sobre el tema.
**Secciones:** Respuesta a la crisis, notas del Observatorio, Notas de actualidad, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano, think tanks y Materiales de interés, medio y Web Social, Actividades y multimedia.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/EspecialesElcano/CrisisMundoArabe

**Índice Elcano de Presencia Global**
Índice sintético que ordena, cuantifica y agrega la proyección exterior de diferentes países en los terrenos económico, militar, científico, social y cultural.
**Secciones:** Componentes e indicadores, Estudio Elcano 2 (metodología), Resultados 2010.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/IndiceElcanoPresenciaGlobal

**Euro Crisis**
**Secciones:** Novedades/News, Euro crisis en los medios/Euro Crisis in the Media, España y la crisis en la eurozona/Spain and the Eurozone Crisis, Comentarios Elcano/Expert Comment, Análisis y publicaciones/Analyses and Publications, Euro crisis en los medios/Euro Crisis in the Media, Materiales de interés/Key Documents.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/EspecialesElcano/Eurocrisis

**ENERGÍA Y CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO**
Sección Especial del Programa de Energía dirigido por Gonzalo Escribano, vincula la geopolítica de la energía y la política energética, española y europea, con los recursos energéticos disponibles, su distribución geográfica y su impacto medioambiental, incluyendo las energías renovables y la eficiencia energética como instrumentos para combatir el cambio climático.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/ProgramasElcano/Energia-Cambio-Climatico
01/03/2013
Organizado por el Instituto Gobernanza GLBOERNANCE, Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente, participó en la presentación de “El Manifiesto por una Democracia Global”, celebrado en el Museo San Telmo de San Sebastián.

7-10/03/2013

9/03/2013
Gonzalo Escribano, director del Programa de Energía, presentó una conferencia en el Curso de Experto universitario del Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado “La nueva geopolítica energética del Norte de África”, en Madrid.

11/03/2013
Emilio Lamo de Espinosa impartió la conferencia “¿Post Occidente?”, organizada por la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Salamanca.

11/03/2013
Federico Steinberg, investigador principal de Economía Internacional, participó como ponente en el seminario sobre gobernanza económica europea organizado por Chatham House y AREL.

11-12/03/2013

12/03/2013
Emilio Lamo de Espinosa impartió la conferencia “La Marca de España en nuestro mundo global” en el XXI Foro Marca España. Claves para generar confianza en nuestras empresas, organizado por el Club Excelencia en Gestión, y celebrado en Madrid.

14/03/2013
Con la conferencia “¿Postoccidentalismo?”, Emilio Lamo de Espinosa clausuró en la Academia General Militar de Zaragoza el XV Seminario de Economía y Defensa, titulado “La crisis económica, su incidencia sobre la seguridad nacional.”

17/03/2013
Iliana Olivié, investigadora principal de Cooperación Internacional, viajó a Marruecos para la realización del trabajo de campo para el estudio sobre “The cost of Non-Europe: Donors coordination in development cooperation” (estudio comisionado por el Parlamento Europeo),

19-22/03/2013
Gonzalo Escribano participó en el seminario sobre “Geopolítica de la Energía”, organizado por Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy, Malta.

20/03/2013
Federico Steinberg participó como ponente en el Workshop “The future of the International Monetary System”, organizado por el Ghent Institute for International Studies.

22/03/2013
Fernando Reinares, investigador principal de Terrorismo, impartió con Carola García-Calvo, ayudante de Investigación, un seminario sobre “Estrategias europeas de prevención de la radicalización violenta”, en el Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista (CNCA), en Madrid.

22/03/2013

25-26/03/2013
Charles Powell intervino en el cuarto seminario del European Global Strategic Project, organizado por el Swedish Institute of International Affairs, y celebrado en Estocolmo.
5/02/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Energía, que contó con la intervención de Gonzalo Sáenz de Miera, director de Prospectiva Regulatoria de Iberdrola.

5/02/2013

5/02/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Economía Internacional, con las intervenciones de Fernando Fernández (Profesor del IE Business School), José Fernández Albertos (Investigador del CSIC) e Ignacio Sánchez Cuenca (Director del Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales del Instituto Juan March).

6/02/2013
Segundo desayuno-coloquio del ciclo sobre seguridad y defensa en América Latina.
Intervino en esta ocasión el contralmirante Vidal Preciado, Agregado Naval de la Embajada de México en España.

6/02/2013
Reunión con Yoshihide Soeya, profesor del Departamento de Derecho y director del Centro de Estudios de Asia Oriental de la Universidad de Keio, Japón, que habló sobre “Troubled Waters in East Asia and Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy”

11/02/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo sobre Cumbres Iberoamericanas que trató el tema “El futuro del espacio iberoamericano” con la asistencia de Enrique Iglesias, Secretario General Iberoamericano, Ricardo Lagos, presidente de Chile, y Patricia Espinosa, excanciller de México.

11/02/2013
Presentación del libro “La imagen de España en el mundo” de Javier Noya, primer volumen de la serie “Visiones del exterior” editada por Tecnos y el Real Instituto Elcano. Participaron en el acto Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente del Real Instituto Elcano; Ángel Alloza, Office Manager de Corporate Excellence; Gonzalo Brujó, consejero delegado de Interbrand; Fernando Prado, director general de Reputation Institute y Javier Noya, investigador principal de Imagen Exterior de España y director del OME del Real Instituto Elcano.

12/02/2013
El presidente de Guatemala, Otto Pérez Molina, visitó el Instituto para hablar sobre “Los retos a la gobernabilidad en Guatemala”.

18/02/2013
Seminario a puerta cerrada sobre “Repensando Marca España. ¿Qué lugar para el desarrollo, la inversión extranjera directa y la cooperación al desarrollo?”

18/02/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Economía Internacional, con la intervención de Jaime García-Legaz, secretario de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.

18/02/2013
Acto público de presentación de las conclusiones del seminario “Repensando Marca España. ¿Qué lugar para el desarrollo, la inversión extranjera directa y la cooperación al desarrollo?”, con la participación, entre otros, de Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente del Real Instituto Elcano

22/02/2013
Presentación de la 32ª oleada del BRIE

25-26/02/2013
Seminario “The European Union: What Kind of global Actor?”. Segundo de la serie de seminarios sobre la Estrategia Global Europea con la participación de representantes de los cuatro think tanks designados por los gobiernos de España, Italia, Polonia y Suecia para el desarrollo de dicha estrategia y que en esta ocasión acogió el Real Instituto Elcano.

27/02/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Energía con la intervención de Paul Isbell, Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS, que habló sobre “La energía y el Atlántico: perspectivas estratégicas”.

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