



Spanish Trajectory: A Source of Inspiration for Turkey?

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First edition, November 2008, Istanbul

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Cover image

Anton Gaudi, Park Guell, Barcelona

Printing

A4 Ofset Matbaacılık San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.

Otosanayi Sitesi, Yeşilce Mahallesi

Donanma Sokak, No: 16

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© 2008, Open Society Institute AF – Turkey

ISBN 978-605-89716-3-9

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FOREWORD

Spain's transformation has occasionally been proposed as a model for what Turkey may also experience. Like Turkey, Spain had a brush with a conservative and authoritarian political culture, an imperial past and an activist military. Again like Turkey, the European project brought together disparate social forces for change in Spain, but Spain was not always met with open arms north of the Pyrenees. In this study, William Chislett, a thoughtful observer of Spanish and Turkish affairs, analyses the similarities and the differences of the Spanish and Turkish trajectories. Turkish readers and students of Turkey around the world will find revealing similarities and even more striking differences between the two trajectories. The study also includes commentary by Volkan Vural, who prepared Turkey's first EU reform program in 2001, and who subsequently served as the Turkish Ambassador to Spain.

There are two vital differences between Spain and Turkey: Spain in 1978 had a higher Human Development Index than Turkey today, and was twice as wealthy. While the Spanish catch-up with the European averages is truly remarkable, Turkish cohesion is likely to be significantly more difficult, as the country starts from a substantially lower baseline. Furthermore, Spain had Almodóvar, Cervantes, Plácido Domingo, Gaudi, Goya and Picasso, all familiar and revered names in the EU-12 which Spain joined. The shared cultural references between Europe and Turkey are sparser. Spanish accession was after all the return of Spain to Europe, while for Turkey it is entry into Europe with uncertain prospects.

Open Society Institute AF-Turkey
November 2008

INTRODUCTION

Spain's experience of joining the European Union (EU) is a particularly interesting one for Turkey as the two countries have some striking similarities. Spain is also a very good example of the tremendously positive impact that EU membership can have on a country if the appropriate policies are implemented, particularly in the economic field. Spain's substantial progress is most graphically illustrated by the fact that in 2007 its per capita income overtook that of Italy's. Spain's reached 107% of the EU-27 average and Italy's was 101%. This is not to say, however, that the Spanish 'model' can be exported, nor that one day Turkey will enjoy the same kind of success as Spain. Turkey is a much poorer and more populous country than Spain, and so it starts from a relative disadvantage.

There is much that Turkey and Spain have in common; even the climate and physical configuration of the Anatolian and the Iberian peninsulas are similar. The similarities include:

- Spain and Turkey, at opposite ends of the Mediterranean on the periphery of Europe and both controlling strategic straits (Turkish and Gibraltar straits), are frontier countries which have been points of encounter for many different cultures and peoples. Anatolia and Iberia were under the rule of the Roman Empire. After the emergence of Islam both were invaded by Arabs. Southern Spain was under Muslim rule between 711 and 1492 when King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella unified Spain in the religious sphere and expelled Muslims and Jews. The first printing press in Constantinople was set up by Sephardic Jews in 1493.
- Both Turks and Spaniards founded empires, mostly terrestrial in the case of the former, maritime in the case of the latter. The Ottoman empire sought to assume leadership of the Muslim world and Spain of the Christian world. These empires reached their zenith at around the same time and clashed. The fleet of the Holy League, including Spain, beat the Ottoman fleet at the battle of Lepanto in 1571, at which Miguel de Cervantes, author of *Don Quixote*, lost the use of his left arm. Both nations' empires subsequently contracted and withdrew to their original

territories. The Spanish armada was defeated in 1588 by the English fleet. Both defeats were turning points. Spain lost its last colonies (Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico) in 1898 and the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War.

- Today, Spain and Turkey are co-sponsors of the UN-backed Alliance of Civilizations that seeks to bridge the divide between the Christian and Muslim worlds.
- Both Spain and Turkey have suffered from 'black legends' that even today unfairly affect the countries' images abroad. Spain's dates from its conquest of Latin America in the 15th and 16th centuries and the Inquisition, and Turkey's from the siege of Vienna.
- Both were significantly agricultural economies and had *dirigiste* policies. Agriculture remains a significant though fast dwindling sector in Turkey.
- Both countries have undergone massive internal migration from rural areas to cities and towns.
- Both nations were enlisted for geostrategic reasons during the Cold War years by the United States. Military bases were established in Turkey in 1952, one year before Spain. Turkey and Spain today are the most anti-American European countries, according to the annual surveys conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project. In the 2008 survey, only 33% of Spaniards had a favourable view of the US (essentially its foreign policy) compared to 12% of Turkish respondents.
- Both countries joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, Turkey as a founder member.
- Both countries have 'exported' hundreds of thousands of workers to Europe. Turks began to emigrate to Germany as guest workers at around the same time as Spaniards in the early 1960s.
- Both have problems in containing minority nationalisms, in Turkey's case the Kurds and in Spain's case the Basques and Catalans. (Incidentally, Basque is an agglutinating language and in that respect is closer to Turkish than to Spanish). Terrorism exists in both countries. ETA has been fighting for an independent Basque Country since 1968. More than 30 years of democracy, after the ending of the dictatorship of General Franco in 1975, have still not resolved this problem.
- Both have experienced *kulturkampf* between traditionalists and modernizers – clericals and anti-clericals in Catholic Spain,

secularists and Islamists in Turkey. The tussle in Turkey continues and to some extent in Spain.

- Both are active in UN peacekeeping missions in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
- Lastly, the military in both countries during most of the 20th century were major players on the political stage. This is still the case in Turkey, though less so. Both Atatürk and Franco were military men. The comparison, however, ends here; Atatürk, who died in 1938, was a far-sighted moderniser and Franco, who died in 1975, a traditional conservative. The Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, was forged on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, while the Franco regime was established after the 1936-39 Civil War. The military in both countries were the self-proclaimed guardians of their respective constitutions and thus of institutional order – in Spain’s case the armed forces were particularly adamant defenders of a very centralised state, while in Turkey maintaining the *sui generis* secularism remains the key concern. Spain was far from being a secular state under Franco, as generally understood in Western Europe; the Catholic Church enjoyed immense power, influence and privileges, some of which remains today.

There is another striking similarity, and that is the looking to Europe of the enlightened classes during the first half of the 20th century. The loss in 1898 of Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the remnants of Spain’s once vast empire, to the United States turned Spain in on itself and gave rise to the ‘Generation of 98’, a group of intellectuals who scrutinised the defects of Spain’s cultural, political and economic organisation and sought to prescribe remedies. One influential school of thought, led by the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, held that Spain was the ‘problem’ and Europe the ‘solution.’ Ortega y Gasset said this in 1911, and substitute Spain for Turkey and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a contemporary of his, could have made the same remark. Ortega y Gasset was referring to Spain’s inability to be in step with liberal democratic Europe (there were 47 *pronunciamientos* -coups- during the 19th century), epitomized in the sneer, popularly attributed to the 19th French author Alexandre Dumas, that ‘Africa begins at the Pyrenees’ (the mountains that divide France from Spain). The British poet WH Auden called Spain in 1937 ‘that arid square, that fragment nipped off from hot Africa, soldered so crudely to inventive Europe.’

When Atatürk talked of elevating Turkey to the 'highest level of civilization', he was referring to Europe. For both Atatürk and Ortega y Gasset, EU membership – had it existed during their time – would have been a national goal.

The crucial difference between Spain and Turkey is that Spaniards have a Catholic Christian background and Turks a Muslim one.

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Spain at the end of the Franco dictatorship

When General Franco died in 1975 at the age of 82, after ruling the country since winning the country's three-year Civil War in 1939, Spain was essentially a single-party (the *Movimiento Nacional*) and highly centralised state, with a backward agrarian economy (accounting for close to 20% of employment) which had taken off under the Development Plans of the late 1950s. These policies, guided by an IMF stabilization plan, ended a period of autarky and opened the country to the outside world and industrialisation, particularly shipbuilding, steel and the manufacturing of cars. Between 1961 and 1973 the Spanish economy expanded by 7% a year in real terms – the fastest growth rate of all non-communist countries apart from Japan. Turkey during this period was a poorer than Spain, but much more democratic (the first elections regarded as free were held in 1950). Spain's per capita income in 1975 was \$2,890 and Turkey's \$1,000, according to the OECD. Spain had 136 cars per 1,000 inhabitants and Turkey eight.

Multiple exchange rates were abolished, the peseta devalued, wages frozen and some trade liberalised. The initial cost in terms of unemployment was high and whole families emigrated, particularly to France, Germany and Latin America. Internal migration from rural areas to cities and towns was even higher. It is estimated that between 1961 and 1970 nearly 4.5 million people moved on a permanent basis within Spain – mainly from villages and towns to Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao. The migration to Istanbul has been much bigger. Turkey's pace of urbanisation has been even faster than Spain's; by 2015 the two countries will be in a similar situation (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Urban Population in Spain and Turkey (% of total), 1975-2015*

	1975	2005	2015
Spain	69.6	76.7	78.3
Turkey	41.6	67.3	71.9

Source: UN Human Development Report, 2007/08.

(*) Because data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area, cross-country comparisons should be made with caution.

Spain's foreign investment policy became export-oriented and open-door: complete freedom was allowed provided foreign ownership of companies was less than 50%. The country also began to be opened to tourism (entry visas for tourists from Western Europe were abolished in 1959). The importance of tourism cannot be overstated; without it, Spain would not have had the foreign currency to finance industrial development and create infrastructure. Tourism – and emigration – also played an important role in Spain's democratic development because it brought Spaniards into contact with different peoples and ideas (particularly from European democracies) and broadened their horizons.

In 1970 Spain signed a preferential trade agreement with the then European Community (EC) but, because of the dictatorship, no political links were established with Brussels. Special tariffs on Spain's industrial exports to the EC were reduced but little provision was made for agricultural goods. Spain, in return, made some tariff cuts.

Turkey, by then, had been an associate member of the EC for seven years. In the same year that Spain achieved its preferential deal Ankara signed an Additional Protocol envisaging Turkey's eventual membership. Turkey was also ahead of Spain in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – in 1952, 30 years before Spain – and it was also a charter member of the United Nations in 1945. The victorious Allies isolated Spain - which was officially neutral in World War Two but followed a pro-Axis policy (fascist Germany and Italy had helped Franco win the Civil War)– and barred it from the US Marshall Plan (1947-51), which Turkey benefited from, and from joining the United Nations until 1955.

The 1973 oil shock hit Spain very hard since, like Turkey, it is one of the most energy-dependent OECD countries. Compounding the

severe economic problems, political paralysis had set in as the Franco regime's period of tenure drew to a close. In December 1973 Spain's Prime Minister, the 70-year-old Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's most trusted aide and 'anchor-man' for the succession, was assassinated by the Basque separatist organisation ETA. His death was a severe political setback for the octogenarian Franco who was too shaken to attend the funeral. Carlos Arias Navarro, another staunch right-winger and a former secret police chief, was appointed Prime Minister and, in July 1974, the ailing Franco handed over powers to Prince Juan Carlos, his chosen successor and grandson of Spain's last king, Alfonso XIII, who had departed for exile in 1931 just before the proclamation of the Second Republic. Franco resumed power after 45 days and his regime entered its twilight days, plagued by mounting political and social unrest. He died on 20 November, 1975. In the words of one study, he was: 'Wired and plugged into a battery of medical machines, beside him the arm of Saint Teresa and on his bed the mantle of the Virgin of Pilar. In his death-bed agony he was a symbol of the Spain he ruled: a modern industrial state, a consumer society haunted by the relics of a Catholic, traditional state created during and after the Civil War.'¹

Turkey's ambassador to Madrid (1972-79), the distinguished diplomat Zeki Kunalalp, wrote in his memoirs *Just a Diplomat*, the following: 'Spain was a country whose people were poor and whose rulers were weak, where political leaders fell victim to assassination and one civil war followed another. In recent years the case has altered. The people have grown rich: the per capita income has risen. New industries have been created, the road network and other infrastructure have developed.'² He noted that a 'strong middle class' had emerged under Franco, but Turkey was more democratic than Spain as by the time the dictator died in 1975 Turkey had been holding regular elections for 25 years with alternating governments.³

The prescient Kunalalp, however, was in no doubt that Spain would move relatively easily to democracy and join the EU as a result of the economic and social progress under Franco and the high level of culture in Spain.

¹ *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy* by Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi (Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 1.

² *Just a Diplomat* by Zeki Kunalalp (Isis Publications, 1992 trans. Geoffrey Lewis), p. 148.

³ See "After Kemal" by Perry Anderson (London Review of Books, 25 September, 2008). http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n18/ande01_.html. Despite much lower per capita income, Turkey was able to become a democracy much earlier 'because the Spanish dictatorship was the product of a bitter civil war, pitting class against class, social revolution against counter-revolution, which the Nationalist crusade had needed German and Italian help to win. After the war democratisation was an unthinkable option for Franco: it would have risked a political volcano erupting again, in which neither army nor church nor property would have been secure.'

European Union accession, 1978-86

Under the so-called Pact of Silence, the status quo at the end of the Franco regime and the newly legalised political parties agreed to forgive and forget and turn the page on Spain's past. Political prisoners and people in exile benefited from an amnesty, the Franco regime was not put on trial and there was no truth commission along the lines of South Africa or Argentina. Spain's transition in this sense was *sui generis*.

In the first free general election since the Civil War in 1977 (with close to 80% participation), the extreme right Francoist parties gained less than 1% of the total votes. They were the only ones against Spain joining the European Union (EU), and they counted for very little. All other parties – conservatives, liberals, centrists, Christian Democrats, regional nationalists, socialists and communists – buried their differences and threw their weight behind EU accession process.

This wholehearted acceptance of the accession process was in marked contrast to earlier negotiations with the United Kingdom and Denmark, or subsequent ones with Austria and Sweden. Spain's political parties, unlike Turkey's, did not use the EU negotiations to gain partisan advantage or try to score points off one another.

Spain has also benefited from strong and single-party governments which have pushed through reforms. Although the electoral system – the d'Hondt, or highest average method, and a threshold of 5% of the total vote before a party can win seats in parliament – is designed to enable smaller parties to win seats in parliament, Spain has not had a single coalition government in 30 years, whereas Turkey has been plagued by squabbling and weak coalitions until the AKP won power in 2002. Turkey's political parties have to win 10% of the total vote before they can win seats in parliament. Whereas Spain's lower threshold for gaining seats is aimed at bringing into the political system nationalist parties from its regions and producing a parliament that fully reflects the country's realities, Turkey's – by setting the bar much higher skews the parliamentary representation: the AKP was catapulted to power in 2002 with only 34% of the vote but 67% of the seats in the Assembly as only one other party cleared

the hurdle. Half the electorate was thus disenfranchised. The AKP won 47% of the vote in the 2007 election and 62% of the seats as two other parties cleared the hurdle.

Spain has had 10 governments since 1977, exactly half the number of Turkey; only during 1983-91 and in the last six years has Turkey had a stable government and it is no coincidence that during these periods it has progressed much more economically and politically. The 1990s were very much a 'lost decade' in terms of economic and political advancement. Over the past 25 years Spain's two main parties, the Socialists and the conservative Popular Party, have won a combined share of the total vote in general elections of between a low of 65% (in 1989) and a high of 84% (in 2008), while Turkey, until the victory of the AKP, suffered from a high level of voter and ideological volatility (switching votes from one party to another, often to newly created parties).

There was also a consensus in Spain on the economic policy required to resolve Spain's economic crisis (inflation hit 40% in the summer of 1977) and prepare the country for the rigors of EU membership. The Moncloa Pact of October 1977 promised the left tax reforms to redistribute wealth, a better social security system and freedom for trade unions, in return for wage restraint, while employers agreed to accept tighter credit and higher taxes in return for economic liberalisation.

Spain's EU process was essentially driven from the bottom upwards. The EU was seen as the means by which the country would shake off its past and take its rightful place among European democracies. It was a matter of national pride as much as anything else. In contrast, Turkey's process has been driven much more from the top downwards, initially by the secularist elite and the heirs of Atatürk, and in recent years, ironically, by the AKP, a party with its roots in Islamism. The great majority of Spaniards wanted democracy because they believed it was a good thing in itself, and not just because it was the prerequisite for joining the EU. The political will to do what was needed existed throughout society. This was the case in 2002, but sadly not so today in Turkey.

They are called accession negotiations, but there is very little that can be negotiated in the proper sense of the word other than the

time scale for implementing the *acquis communautaire*, the body of EU law that a candidate country has to assume. It is like joining a select club. If you don't like the rules or cannot comply with them then you do not become a member.. And like all clubs, existing members seek to minimise the cost for themselves of adding new members. Spain understood this early on.

In July 1977, the Spanish government applied for membership of the then EC, followed in October by an application to join the Council of Europe, of which Spain became the 20th member in the November - 28 years after Turkey. A new democratic constitution was approved in 1978 and bore no resemblance whatsoever to the one drawn up under Franco. Turkey has yet to tear up its constitution (ratified in 1982 during the military junta of 1980-83), which gives too many rights to the state and not enough to the individual. Spanish politicians realised that root and branch reform was what was required and not just tinkering around with some of the constitution's articles, as has been the case so far in Turkey.

Accession negotiations began in earnest in 1978 and lasted until March 1985; but for the failed military coup in 1981, the last gasp of Francoism, which halted the process, they would have ended earlier. Seven years for a country such as Spain, much smaller than Turkey and with fewer structural problems and whose membership was much less controversial, is around half the number of years that many analysts expected Turkey's negotiations to last when they opened in October 2005. Today, that looks optimistic but not impossible.

Spain's accession presented a big challenge for the then 12 members of the EC because of its size and the lack of complementarity between its economy and that of member states. Turkey's population today (71 million) is roughly double that of Spain when it started to negotiate, making it much more difficult to fit into an EU of 27 countries or more. But Turkey has one advantage that Spain did not have during its accession negotiations, and that is the Customs Union it formed with the EU in 1996 for industrial goods and processed agricultural products. Turkey is the only candidate country to have had this status BEFORE becoming a full member. The main obstacles for Spain were the length of the transition period for granting unrestricted access to the EU for its agriculture

and fisheries sectors, the transition period for granting EC industrial products access to the Spanish market and the free movement of people. French farmers, in particular, feared competition from Spanish agriculture; during and even after the negotiations they regularly attacked Spanish lorries transporting products through France. EC enlargement (Portugal and Greece were applicants at the same time as Spain) was a major issue in the 1978 French parliamentary elections, with both the Gaullist Jacques Chirac and the Communist George Marchais strongly opposed to the accession of all three applicants. Giscard d'Estaing, the French President between 1974 and 1981, was also no friend of Spain's EU entry, as well as an arch opponent of Turkey's accession.

Spain's accession in 1986 increased the EU's agricultural labour force by 25%, the amount of land by 30%, production of fresh fruit by 48% and output of olive oil by 60%. Turkey's impact on EU agriculture will be even greater. A similar situation existed in fisheries; Spain's industry was the largest in Western Europe. Such were the fears over fisheries that the initial transition period envisaged was 17 years; it was reduced to 10 after Spain took advantage of negotiations with Norway to cut it.

When it joined the EU Spain's agricultural and fisheries sector generated 5.6% of GDP (compared to an EU average of 3.4%) and it employed 14% of the labour force (EU average of 7%). It was thus inefficient. Today, 22 years later, this sector employs less than 5% of the work force and accounts for less than 4% of GDP, a substantial structural change. Turkey's agriculture, fisheries and forestry sector, in comparison, accounts for 29% of civilian employment and generates around 7% of GDP. Spain, today, has more students at university (1.4 million) than people working in agriculture (around 900,000), reflecting the phenomenal growth in Spanish universities as much as the demise of the sector and one which but for immigrant labour would be hard pressed to function in key areas such as fruit and vegetables. Turkey's agricultural sector has also been noticeably shrinking (in 2001 it generated 12.9% of GDP and accounted for 36.6% of civilian employment).

Spain's agricultural products did not obtain unrestricted access to EU markets until 1996. The French saw to it that trade in Spain's most competitive products was at a standstill for four years until

1990, followed by a six-year transition period. In the specific case of vegetable oils, farmers were saddled with a five-year standstill. Nevertheless, the most advanced sectors of Spanish agriculture took advantage of the enlarged EU market: exports rose from 574 million pesetas in 1986 to 883 million pesetas in 1991 and the trade balance was in Spain's favour. The free movement of Spaniards within the EU was not granted until 1991, five years after the country joined the Union.

The substance of Spain's accession has been described as granting EU industrial goods access to Spanish markets in exchange for Spanish agricultural products winning access to Community markets. An inherent element in this was preparing Spanish industry, which was in crisis at the end of the Franco regime, for greater competition. State ownership was significant in mining, steel, shipbuilding, utilities and transport (for example, the flag carrier Iberia). Like Turkey, Spain, after its devastating 1936-39 Civil War, had pursued autarkic policies via the National Institute of Industry (INI) in order to create basic industries and cocoon them from the outside world. In the early 1980s, Spain's state-owned companies accounted for around 10% of value added and generated 15% of total gross fixed capital formation. Many of them were inefficient and depended on government subsidies. Between 1978 and 1982, one in eight jobs was destroyed. Over this five-year period, the number of Spaniards in employment plummeted by 1.35 million. Around 700,000 jobs were lost in manufacturing and 300,000 in the construction sector.

Privatisation was not very active during the accession negotiations and did not really start seriously until 1986, Spain's first year in the EU, when the Socialist government of Felipe González sold the bankrupt car producer Seat (founded by INI in 1950) to Volkswagen. Today, the state's ownership is negligible and is confined to some coal mines, the shipbuilder Navantia, two TV channels, the chain of *parador* hotels and not much more. Turkey's privatisation programme only really began strongly a few years ago and from a higher level of state ownership than Spain.

Spain was also hit by a banking crisis between 1978 and 1985, when around 60 mostly small and newly established banks collapsed. The main banks owned significant portions of Spanish

industry to which they provided loans at below-market rates. Some of them were responsible for promoting the development of industry and were hard hit by these industries' problems. The absence of a developed capital market made companies highly dependent on banks, particularly for short-term credit. The Rumasa group, which included some 20 banking institutions, was nationalized in 1983. The Bank of Spain, whose role then was little more than a 'banknote factory', in the words of the economic historian Gabriel Tortella, learned many lessons from that crisis and it is partly thanks to its close monitoring and prudent policies that Spain's banking sector today is one of the most solvent in the world and has escaped unscathed from the subprime mortgage and toxic asset crisis. Turkey suffered a major banking crisis in 2001 and its financial sector today is much stronger.

Macroeconomic matters, as such, were not part of the accession negotiations, but the government was expected to move towards reducing inflation, lowering the budget deficit and public debt and keeping its currency, the peseta, stable. Meeting the criteria for replacing a national currency, with the euro, however, is not a condition for joining the EU. When Spain joined the EU in 1986 its inflation was 11% and its general government budget deficit 5.5% of GDP – far from the criteria subsequently created for forming part of the euro. By 2002, when the single currency was launched, Spain's inflation was down to 3.6% and its budget deficit was 0.3% of GDP. Turkey, too, has made substantial progress in these areas as we will see.

Reducing the power of the military

Spain's military, like Turkey's, was a powerful institution during most of the 20th century, and in Turkey's case it still is. Both Atatürk and Franco were military men at the helm of their nations until their respective deaths in 1938 and 1975. Their portraits were hung in public offices and buildings – in Atatürk's case they still are. The missions of the two countries' armed forces, however, were very different. While the military under Franco won a civil war and then spent the 36 years of the dictatorship ensuring that the ideals for which it had fought its fellow countrymen remained in force, particularly a unitary state, according Catholicism a privileged status and combating anything deemed to smack of communism, Turkey's military had other priorities, although its concerns also included, and still do, keeping the Turkish nation intact. Franco suppressed and outlawed the Basque, Catalan and Galician languages (all of them are freely spoken today) and Turkey squashed the Kurdish language until recently. Chief among the Turkish military's (ongoing) priorities is to remain as the guardian of secularism, as defined in the constitution it drew up during the junta of 1980-83 and which is still in force. Franco's Spain, on the other hand, was very far from being a secular state; the country has only timidly moved towards being one since the 1978 democratic constitution.⁴

⁴ Catholicism was a fundamental part of training in military academies. In 1973 several cadets were expelled from the Toledo academy for "abandoning their Catholic faith." Religiosity was a potent agglutinative of the military's ideological profile. Not until 1988, 10 years after the democratic constitution, was it voluntary for soldiers to attend mass on military festive ceremonies. Turkish military, in contrast, remains negatively disposed towards excessive religiosity, and periodically purges the ranks.

When Franco died Spain's armed forces were top heavy with officers and even in 1982 every single member of the army's High Council had fought on his side in the Civil War. Forty of the 114 ministers during the Franco regime were military men and 955 of the almost 4,000 members of his Cortes (parliament). Each of the armed services (army, air force and navy) had their own ministry and the military controlled the Public Order Tribunals for many years. These ministries were abolished and a Defence Ministry created in 1977, paving the way for a civilian Defence Minister in 1979. In the words of Albert Oliart, a former centrist Defence Minister (1981-82), "The (Francoist) military only had two basic political ideas: one, communism was enemy number one; two, Spain was different to other countries and democracy impossible." The military was a caste apart from the rest of the population and out of touch with the majority of the population. Something similar can be said of Turkey's military, but with one very important

difference – Turkey’s armed forces, unlike Spain’s during Franco, are the most popular institution among a wide cross section of society.

The military and paramilitary forces in both countries, for very different reasons, had internal and external enemies and were the target of terrorists - the Basque separatist group ETA in Spain and the PKK in Turkey. This is still the case in Turkey today, much more than in Spain. The combined troop strength of Turkey’s armed forces today is more than half a million (the second-largest standing force in NATO after the United States), while Spain’s is around one-fifth the size of Turkey’s as it has been slimmed down. Turkey’s military expenditure in 2006 was 2.8% of GDP compared to Spain’s 1.1%. According to the latest (2006) figures from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Turkey has seven active troops per 1,000 citizens, double Spain’s number.

While Turkey’s membership of NATO (since 1952) did nothing to keep the military out of politics – there have been three coups since 1960, one coup that was termed “post-modern” in 1997 as it did not involve direct action and another labelled an “e coup” in 2007 – Spain’s process of joining NATO (in 1982) acted as a significant catalyst for reform. More important, however, was the general democratisation process that was ushered in after Franco’s death. According to Narcís Serra, the Socialist Defence Minister between 1982 and 1991 and the politician who did more than anyone to overhaul the military and bring it into line with the practices of other Western European countries, “Success in the overall transition process is essential for avoiding failure in the military sphere. Unless there are advances in the general process of democratisation, armies cannot be democratised, and even in cases of democratisation where firm progress is made the evolution in the sphere of military control can be slower and prolonged.”⁵ Part of Spain’s success in the military sphere was due to a comprehensive process of democratisation, whereas Turkey’s process has been more piecemeal.

When a group of paramilitary Civil Guardsmen led by Lt. Colonel Antonio Tejero, a staunch Francoist, stormed into the parliament and staged a coup in February 1981 against the centrist government’s reforms and the wave of political violence by ETA (96 people were killed in 1980) Spain’s democratisation in all spheres of

⁵ *La Transición Militar* by Narcís Serra (Plaza & Janés, 2008), pp. 279-280.

life was so far advanced – and enjoyed – that the coup quickly collapsed through lack of support, among the rest of the military, the general public and politicians, and the skilful work of King Juan Carlos in defusing the situation. One of the very few people to literally stand up to the pistol-waving Tejero – almost everyone else dived to floor - was the 68-year-old General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, the Deputy Prime Minister for Security and National Defence, who had persuaded the military to accept reforms. Four years earlier, Gutiérrez Mellado, had told the armed forces in a conference, "Let us not forget that we military are not the only ones who love the fatherland."

Turkey had a successful coup in 1980, one year before Spain's but for very different reasons to Spain. While Spain's coup was the work of reactionary forces who wanted to turn back the clock, Turkey's military intervened to prevent the country – battered by extreme left wing and right wing groups – from slipping into anarchy and put it back on the path to democracy, albeit one under the military's tutelage. In this sense, their "love of the fatherland" was more deep seated than that of those elements of the Spanish military who staged their coup for their own particular ideological interests.

The main driver behind reducing the military's role and influence in politics in Turkey has been the country's EU membership process. This has led, among other improvements, to a civilian heading the National Security Council General Secretary, a kind of shadow government in the past, the closing down of the State Security Courts and a degree of transparency in the military's budgetary appropriations, but, in the words of the EU's 2008 report on Turkey's progress towards accession, the military still exerts "significant political influence." The report called for a better civilian oversight of the armed forces. This was particularly evident when the armed forces General Staff posted a declaration on its website cautioning Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, in so many words, against putting up his right-hand man, Abdullah Gül, the then Foreign Minister, as president. Such declarations in Spain during its EU accession negotiations would never have been tolerated by the government and would have led to sackings among the top brass. In 2006, Lieutenant-General José Mena Aguado, a distinguished cavalry officer and head of the army's land forces, was sacked after he addressed a military parade and criticised the

government's move to grant greater autonomy to Catalonia. He reminded Spaniards that the 1978 constitution accorded the army the mission of "guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Spain" and that it might have to intervene. José Bono, the then Defence Minister, said, "A general has to be politically neutral." A trial began in October in Istanbul where a diverse group was accused of plotting bombings and assassinations to destabilise Turkey and provoke a military intervention. If this trial leads to the uncovering of alleged unsavoury connections between mafia and security forces, referred to in short hand as the "deep state" in Turkey, this would certainly be a positive step. It is in the military sphere, especially the key area of ensuring full civilian control, that Spain and Turkey still differ considerably.

The performance of the Spanish economy since EU membership

Spain has enjoyed an unprecedented period of growth and wealth creation since joining the EU in 1986. Apart from a mild recession in 1993 and a sharp slowdown in 2008, the economy has grown at a faster and sustained pace than the EU average almost every year. Turkey has also experienced strong growth over that period, but it has been volatile with sudden swings between “boom and bust” cycles (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. GDP Growth in Spain and Turkey, 1986-2007*, Selected Years

	1986	1990	1993	1994	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	2005	2007
Spain	3.3	3.8	-1.0	2.4	2.8	3.9	4.7	3.6	3.1	3.6	3.8
Turkey	7.0	9.3	8.0	-5.5	7.2	7.5	-3.4	-5.7	5.3	8.4	4.5
EA-12¹	2.5	3.5	-0.7	2.5	2.4	2.6	3.0	1.9	0.8	1.6	2.6

Source: Eurostat.

(*) National currency: annual percentage change. At 2000 market prices.

¹ Former Euro area 12.

Spain’s per capita income, a good yardstick for measuring a country’s living standards, tripled between 1985 and 2007 to more than €23,000 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Over this period Spain’s population rose from 38.5 million to 44.8 million, an increase of 16%. Turkey’s per capita income increased from \$3,843 in 1985 to \$12,888 in 2007 in PPP and its population from 50.1 million to 74 million, rises of 335% and 48% respectively. Spain’s and Turkey’s relative progress measured against the EU-15 and the EU-27 and over a much longer period is shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3. Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices in Purchasing Power Parity (EU-15=100)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2008*
Spain	61.8	75.3	74.0	77.0	84.7	95.3
Turkey	38.0	34.4	31.2	33.3	34.7	38.5

Source: Eurostat.

(*) Forecast.

Figure 4. Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices in Purchasing Power Parity (EU-27=100)

	1993	2000	2008*
Spain	92.3	97.5	105.8
Turkey	42.7	40.0	42.8

Source: Eurostat.

(*) Forecast.

The macroeconomic stability required for European Monetary Union (EMU) membership (in terms of low inflation and interest rates, currency stability and fiscal discipline), coupled with free market reforms and the massive inflow of EU funds (and foreign direct investment), locked Spain into a virtuous circle of sustained GDP growth that did not peter out until 2008 when the country's imbalances (in inflation and the enormous current account deficit), accumulated over its boom years, were exacerbated by soaring oil prices and the global credit crunch.

Had Spain not abandoned the peseta and formed part of the EMU (in 1999) and hence the euro, its economic fundamentals would not have improved to anywhere near the same extent. The imbalances would have forced the country into a devaluation a long time ago. The 1992 crisis of the European Monetary System – the peseta became part of the wide band of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1989 – led to three devaluations of the peseta and the destruction of many of the jobs created in the second half of the 1980s. As an EMU member, devaluation, which usually only provides temporary relief unless accompanied by other measures, is an option no longer available to Spain unless it leaves the Euro zone, which is unthinkable.

By adopting the euro, the peseta exchange rate risk disappeared. Interest rates in Spain (set by the European Central Bank) since the adoption of the euro have been either negative or neutral in real terms, depending on the country's inflation rate, which has been (and still is) higher than the Euro zone average. In fact the 'one-size-fits-all' monetary policy of the ECB has been too expansive for Spain and drove the consumer boom, particularly the surge in mortgages. This, in turn, sustained, the decade-long construction boom and led to the bursting of the real estate bubble in 2008.

In Turkey's case, the very process of EU accession negotiations – and with no entry date in sight – and orthodox policies (started by Kemal Dervis when he was Minister for Economic Affairs between March 2001 and August 2002) have been very good for improving the economic fundamentals and spurring GDP growth, which averaged 7% between 2002 and 2007. Turkey's inflation came down from 47% in 2002 to 8.8% in 2007, its general government debt was reduced from 93% of GDP to 38.8% and its general government deficit from 12.9% of GDP to 1.2% (see Figure 5). Turkey's general government balance and the level of public debt already meet the requirements set in these two areas for joining the euro. The maximum limit for the public debt level is 60% of GDP and that for the general government deficit 3% of GDP. The tax systems of Spain and Turkey have also become much more efficient, although tax evasion and fraud remain relatively high in both countries (see Figure 6).

Figure 5. Inflation, General Government Debt and General Government Balance in 2002 and 2007

	Spain		Turkey	
	2002	2007	2002	2007
Inflation (%)¹	3.6	2.8	47.0	8.8
General Government Balance (% of GDP)	-0.5	+2.2	-12.9	1.2
General Government Debt (% of GDP)	52.5	36.2	93.0	38.8

Source: Eurostat.

1 Average annual rate of change in harmonised indices of consumer prices.

Figure 6. Total Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP, Selected Countries

	1975	1985	2007*
Spain	18.4	27.6	37.2
Turkey	11.9	11.5	23.7
OECD total	29.4	32.7	35.

Source: OECD.

() Provisional and 2006 for the OECD total.*

The EU accession negotiations, coupled with privatisation and investment-related reforms, have, as in Spain's case, significantly increased the attractiveness of Turkey for foreign direct investment (FDI). Turkey received more FDI in 2006 and 2007 (\$42 billion) than in the previous 30 years, but the inflow is still relatively small compared to Spain (see Figure 7). Spain's FDI inward stock in 2007

of \$537.4 billion represented 37.4% of GDP compared to Turkey's 22.2% (\$145.5 billion), according to UNCTAD. As a proportion of GDP, Turkey's inward FDI rose fourfold between 1990 and 2007 and Spain's threefold. Most of the FDI going to Turkey in recent years is coming from EU-15 countries: their stock of investment in Turkey rose from €5.7 billion in 1999 to €32.9 billion in 2006. The major achievement was the enactment of the new FDI law in 2003. Among other things, this law guarantees treatment of foreign investors as national investors, eases restrictions on FDI, abolishes the minimum capital limit, grants foreign investors full convertibility in their transfers of capital and earnings, and allows them to own property without restriction and recognizes foreign investors' rights to international arbitration.

Figure 7. Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Spain and Turkey (\$ billion) and Stock (% of GDP)

	1990-2000 (annual average)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Spain	14.5	25.8	24.7	25.0	26.8	53.4
Stock as % of GDP	12.7 (1990)					37.4
Turkey	0.8	1.7	2.8	10.0	20.0	22.0
Stock as % of GDP	5.6 (1990)					22.2

Source: *World Investment Report 2008*, UNCTAD.

Tourism is another area where, like Spain, Turkey has tremendous potential. Spain received more than 59 million tourists in 2007 (14 million more than the country's population), the world's second largest number, and Turkey 22.2 million, the ninth highest number (see Figure 8). The trends in both countries have been very strong over the last 20 years, particularly in Turkey. The number of tourists going to Turkey tripled between 1995 and 2007 (from a relatively low starting point) and in Spain less than doubled (from a high starting point). Turkey's share in Europe of tourists more than doubled between 1990 and 2006 to around 4.5%, while Spain's remained virtually unchanged at close to 13%. Turkey, unlike Spain, still has plenty of coastline to develop and it is to be hoped that it does not become as overcrowded and ravaged as Spain's.

Figure 8. International Tourist Arrivals and Receipts**(millions of people and € billion)**

	1990	1995	2000	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Spain arrivals	34.0	34.9	47.8	50.8	52.4	55.9	58.2	59.2
Turkey arrivals	4.8	7.1	9.6	13.3	16.8	20.3	18.9	22.2
Spain receipts	14.5	25.4	32.4	35.0	36.3	48.0	51.1	57.8
Turkey receipts	2.5	5.0	7.6	11.6	12.8	18.2	16.9	18.5

Source: World Tourism Organisation.

Lastly, the structure of trading partners has changed in both countries. The share of Spain's total exports that go to EU countries increased from 60% in 1986 (EU-15) to 70% in 2007, while Turkey's, since its Customs Unions, came into force rose from 49.7% in 1996 (EU-15) to 56.3% in 2007 (EU-27). The proportion of Spain's imports from the EU climbed from just over 50% in 1986 to close to 60%, while Turkey's dropped from 53% in 1996 to 40.3% in 2007. Spain's exports rose from 8.5% of GDP in 1975 to 25.7% in 2007, while Turkey's climbed even more successfully from 5.1% to 27%. The imports of both countries rose from 17% to 32.7% of GDP and from 12.9% to 22.2% of GDP, respectively. The structure of exports also changed in both countries. While Spain's exports of agricultural exports dropped from 16.2% of total exports in 1986 to 13.7% in 2007, Turkey's declined from 9.3% to 3.6% between 1996 and 2007. Spain's exports of chemicals increased from 8.6% to 21.6% of the total between 1986 and 2007, while Turkey's exports of vehicles rose from 4.2% to 15.8% between 1996 and 2007.

The phenomenal rise of Spanish multinationals

Anyone who had predicted 15 years ago that Spanish companies today would own the largest mobile telephone company (O₂) in the UK, operate three lines of the London underground and the country's largest airports (including Heathrow), acquire a leading mortgage bank (Abbey) and power company (ScottishPower), or that its two largest banks (Grupo Santander and BBVA) would dominate the Latin American banking scene and Inditex would become the world's second-largest fashion retailer by number of shops would have been laughed at for making an absurd joke. But this is precisely what has happened, and it is only a small part of the overall picture. While the influx of immigrants is the most significant inward factor since Spain's EU membership (see the following section), the most important outward factor is the massive investment abroad by Spanish companies and the creation of a significant number of multinationals.

The catalyst, as in so much else, for this drive in outward FDI, came from joining the European Community in 1986 and the introduction of the European Single Act in 1993, which created the European Union. The strategic focus of corporate Spain changed from one of defending the relatively mature home market to aggressively expanding abroad. The liberalisation of the domestic market as European single market directives began to unfold made the largest Spanish companies – especially the state-run companies in oligopolistic sectors such as telecommunications (Telefónica), oil and natural gas (Repsol and Gas Natural) and electricity (Endesa), all of which were to be privatised and become cash rich – and the big private-sector commercial banks conscious of the need to reposition themselves in the more competitive environment. The tougher environment was underscored by an FDI boom in the first years after EEC entry, when hardly a week passed without an acquisition and it seemed that Spain was up for sale.

The strategic response of Spanish companies to the threat of acquisition was to become bigger via mergers and go on the offensive. Some Turkish companies have also begun to expand abroad. While the bulk of Spain's outward FDI (OFDI) is in Latin America and Europe, most of Turkey's is in the Balkans, the

Caucasus, the Russian Federation, and the Central Asian Turkic Republics, regions either geographically or culturally close to Turkey, as Latin America and Europe are to Spain. Also, like Spain, most of the Turkish firms that have invested abroad are small and medium-sized enterprises although large enterprises such as Koç Holding and Sabanci Holding account for most of the total value of OFDI (as do a handful of Spain's largest companies).

Liberalization gave Spanish companies the chance to become multinationals, and they seized the opportunity in the 1990s provided by the privatization of companies in Latin America. Total OFDI surged from an average of \$2.3 billion in 1985-95 to \$18.9 billion in 1998 and a peak of \$119.6 billion in 2007 (see Figure 9). The stock of outward investment stood at \$636.8 billion at the end of 2007, (44.3% of GDP) compared to Turkey's \$12.2 billion (1.9% of GDP). Spain's outward FDI has exceeded inward FDI every year since 1997 (with the exception of 2002), producing a major structural change in the economy and enabling these companies to weather much better the downturn in their domestic market as of 2008 as they have substantially diversified their revenue sources and origins of risk. As a proportion of GDP, Spain's OFDI rose by a factor of almost 15 between 1990 and 2007 and Turkey's tripled.

Figure 9. Outward Direct Investment Flows by Spain and Turkey (\$ billion) and Stock (% of GDP)

	1990-2000 (annual average)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Spain	15.1	28.7	60.5	41.8	100.2	119.6
Stock as % of GDP	3.0 (1990)					44.3
Turkey	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.0	0.9	2.1
Stock as % of GDP	0.6 (1990)					1.9

Source: World Investment Report 2008, UNCTAD.

The expansion abroad, as of the early 1990s, came after a wave of mergers, restructurings and privatizations that enhanced the critical mass of companies such as Repsol, Endesa and the banks BBVA and Santander, among others. Mergers have yet to take place in Turkey on a significant scale, but it will most probably happen. Spain has 11 companies in Fortune's latest Global 500 ranking of the world's

largest corporations based on 2007 revenues (a decade earlier it had none) compared to Turkey's one (Koç). Three of these companies – Telefónica, Repsol YPF and Endesa – are among the world's top 100 non-financial transnational companies (TNCs) ranked by foreign assets; they were ranked 11th, 43rd and 54th, respectively, in the 2008 World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Grupo Santander and BBVA were ranked among the top 50 financial TNCs (22nd and 35th, respectively).

Latin America was a natural first choice for Spanish companies wishing to invest abroad in a significant way. As well as the companies' own push factors, there were several pull factors. Two of them were purely economic: liberalization and privatization opened up sectors of the Latin American economy that were hitherto off limits, and there was an ongoing need for capital to develop the region's generally poor infrastructure. Two are cultural: the first is the common language and the ease, therefore, with which management styles can be transferred. Another attraction is the sheer size of the Latin American market and its degree of underdevelopment. The macroeconomic fundamentals of Latin America as a whole and some countries in particular, such as Mexico, had also become sounder as a result of major reforms, making the region a less risky place to invest. Democracy was also gradually taking root in an increasing number of countries. Last but not least in importance, Spanish executives were ideally suited to handling new businesses in Latin America, as they had gained a lot of experience of how to compete in industries under deregulation in their own country.

Most of this rationale can also be applied to Turkish companies and their potential to invest in the Middle East and the Turkic Republics. Turkish textile and apparel manufacturers began investing in East European countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, as of the late 1990s, where labour costs are cheaper. Between 2001 and 2006 EU-25 FDI inward stocks from Turkey increased from €2.3 billion to €11.2 billion. Recently, Turkish companies began to invest in Egypt and Jordan.

Most of Spain's FDI in Latin America has taken place in public utilities, telecommunications, financial services and infrastructure,

sectors protected like Spain's once were and that began to be liberalized and privatized. The push into Latin America was the path of least resistance' for Spanish companies. By 2005, Spanish companies had become the largest operators in telecommunications, electricity, water and financial services throughout the region. Since then they have shifted away from Latin America and diversified more into Europe and to a more limited extent in Asia.

The trail that Spain's infrastructure and construction companies blazed in Latin America is one that Turkey's companies could well follow in other countries. Indeed, the construction conglomerate Enka has it been doing it successfully for some years. Ten of the world's largest infrastructure transnational corporations ranked by foreign assets (2006 figures) are Spanish, the largest number of all EU countries, according to UNCTAD's latest report. The foreign assets of these 10 companies accounted or 53% of their total assets. Turkey has one company in the ranking – Enka.

Immigration and demographics

One of the obstacles to Spain (and to a much greater degree Turkey) joining the EU was the resistance in some countries, particularly France, to the free movement of Spanish workers. This fear of large movements of people after an enlargement of the EU is not new. Every time the Union has accepted new and poorer members movement has been restricted. Although Spain joined the EU in 1986, it was not until 1991 that its citizens were able to enjoy free movement within the Union and work. In retrospect this is ironic because not long after Spain entered the EU the country stopped being a net exporter of people and gradually became a net importer. Between 1981 and 1990 there were only around 50,000 departures (based on those assisted by the Ministry of Labour, the only figures recorded). The change in migratory flows occurred when the economic differences between Spain and other EU members had hardly been reduced. What triggered the change was the perception among Spaniards working abroad and at home, and later among immigrants from non-EU countries, that Spain's economy would improve over a sustained period and hence employment prospects would get better. Something similar is happening in Turkey; indeed, according to the latest trends Turkey is no longer the main origin of immigrants to the EU.

As Spain became richer, under the EU impetus, so the flow of immigrants accelerated. It began to decline in 2008 when the economy slowed down sharply. But for this influx of immigrants over the last decade the Spanish economy would not have enjoyed such a long period of sustained and strong growth as immigrants filled the gaps in sectors with labour shortages, particularly in the construction and agricultural sectors. By 2005 17% of people working in the agricultural sector were immigrants, up from a mere 0.1% in 1975, and 20% in construction (0.3% in 1975). Whether Turkey will experience similar trends in migration after it joins the EU is far from clear – after all, the country is much bigger and poorer than Spain and its demographics are different – but Turks working abroad can be expected to return in greater numbers (it is already happening) and Turkey may well become more of a magnet for workers from some of the countries with which it shares a border (also occurring).

When Bernardo, a shepherd in the village where this author has a home, decided to retire a couple of years ago, the only person he could find to take over his flock was a Romanian. Several women from Latin America look after elderly people in the same village and a couple work in the village's hotel. Even the smallest of places in Spain has found it difficult to function without hiring immigrants. Spain today, according to official figures, has more than 4.4 million immigrants (5.2 million including naturalised citizens), 11.3% of its total population (2% in 1998), compared with a mere 165,000 foreigners with a residency permit in 1975 (0.4% of the population) when General Franco died (see Figure 10). This figure includes everyone, from the more than 760,000 Brits estimated to be living permanently in Spain (many of them retirees and legal immigrants by virtue of being members of an EU country; EU citizens do not have to apply for a residence permit), to North Africans who illegally cross the Straits of Gibraltar in rickety boats, sub-Saharanans who cross the Atlantic from Senegal and other West African countries to the Canary Islands in *cayucos* (many of whom die en route) and Latin Americans who entered Spain either directly by air or by various other means after entering another Schengen country.

Figure 10. Spain's Population, 2000-2008, and Foreigners' Share

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Population									
(million)	40.5	41.1	41.8	42.7	43.2	44.1	44.7	45.2	46.06
Foreigners'									
share (%)	2.3	3.3	4.7	6.2	7.0	8.4	9.3	10.0	11.3

Source: INE (National Statistics Office).

Note: The figures at January 1 of each year are based on those registered with local town halls. Foreigners have an incentive to do this as it entitles them to public health care and education, although not everyone does so.

Immigration is a new phenomenon in the history of Spain, historically an intolerant country that for centuries drove its citizens into exile for religious, political or economic reasons. Between 1492, with the massive expulsion of Jews and Muslims (a significant number of whom went to parts of the Ottoman Empire), and 1975, when the Franco dictatorship ended, around three million Spaniards left the country under political or economic pressure, without counting the very many others who formed part of a regular process of emigration according to the eminent historian

Henry Kamen.⁶ All the more remarkable then is the country's swift transformation, in less than two decades, from a net source of emigrants to a big recipient of immigrants and the creation of a much more heterogeneous and tolerant nation. And this has happened at such a speed that Spaniards have hardly realised it. The largest number of immigrants come from Romania (more than 700,000 at the last count), followed by Morocco (more than 600,000) and Ecuador (more than 400,00), both of them non-EU countries and so without the right of free movement of people within the EU.

Turkey, for a large part of the second half of the 20th century, was an emigration country. From around 1980, however, immigration and transit migration became significant phenomena. The UN Refugee Agency estimates that about 2 million refugees entered Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s, mainly from Iran, Iraq and Bulgaria. Over the past two decades there has been net migration into Turkey.

Like Spain, but later, Turkey is undergoing a significant demographic transition. The first census (in 1927) after the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 showed a population of 13.6 million. By 2007 it had grown to 70.5 million, an average rise of just over 2% a year. During this same period Spain's population increased from 22.7 million to 46 million, an average growth of around 0.75%. While Spain's population doubled, Turkey's multiplied by more than five. Turkey's population continues to grow much more quickly than Spain's, but the pace of growth has declined considerably, due to a lower fertility and mortality rates. Spain's average annual population growth rate dropped from 0.7% between 1975 and 2005 to a projected 0.6% between 2005 and 2015, while Turkey's is forecast to fall from 1.9% to 1.2%.

The number of births per Turkish woman of fertile age declined from just over five in 1975 to 2.2 in 2007, while that of Spain fell from 2.8 to 1.4 over the same period (see Figure 11). Spain's fertility rate has been below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman needed to maintain a stable population for many years; but for the influx of immigrants in recent years the country's population would have hardly risen.

⁶ See the preface of *The Disinherited* by Henry Kamen (Allen Lane, 2007)

Figure 11. Fertility Rates in Spain and Turkey (births per woman),**1975-2007**

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2007
Spain	2.80	2.20	1.64	1.36	1.17	1.24	1.40
Turkey	5.09	4.36	3.59	2.99	2.62	2.57	2.20

Source: Council of Europe and national statistics offices.

Turkey's infant mortality rate dropped from 122.2 per 1,000 live births in 1975 to 24 in 2006, while Spain's declined from 18.8 to 4 (see Figure 12). Life expectancy at birth in both countries increased over the same period, respectively, from 56.1 years to 71 years and from 73.2 to 81, reflecting the better living conditions, particularly much improved public health systems (see Figure 13). Turkey has achieved relatively more progress in the UN's Human Development Index than Spain as its starting point was much lower (see Figure 14). Among OECD countries, Turkey registered one of the greatest gains in life expectancy between 1960 and 2006, with an overall increase in longevity of 23 years, rapidly narrowing the gap with the average across OECD countries. In 1960, life expectancy in Turkey was 20 years below the OECD average. By 2006, it was only about seven years lower than the OECD average

Figure 12. Infant Mortality Rates in Spain and Turkey (per 1,000 live births),**1975-2006**

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2006
Spain	18.8	14.2	8.9	7.6	5.5	4.4	4.0
Turkey	122.2	93.0	93.1	54.5	45.6	39.8	24.0

Source: Council of Europe and World Bank.

Figure 13. Life Expectancy in Spain and Turkey (years), 1975-2005

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2006
Spain	73.2	75.2	76.2	76.8	77.9	79.1	81.0
Turkey	56.1	58.1	62.0	66.1	67.5	68.1	71.6

Source: Council of Europe and World Bank.

Figure 14. UN Human Development Index Trends, Spain and Turkey, 1975-2005*

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Spain	0.846	0.863	0.877	0.896	0.914	0.932	0.949
Turkey	0.594	0.615	0.651	0.683	0.717	0.753	0.775

Source: UN Human Development Report 2007/08.

(*) The index measures the average achievements in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, which converts GDP into a common currency and produces a better comparison. The maximum score is one.

As a result of these changes, Spain's population has been ageing for some years now and the same is happening in Turkey, albeit at a slower pace. Between 1975 and 2007 the share of Spaniards over the age of 65 in the total population increased from 9.6% to 16.6% and over the same period in Turkey it rose from 4.6% to 7%. The ratio of dependents – people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the working age population (those aged 15-64) - is also a good measurement of changes in demographics. Spain's ratio for the young was 0.2 in 2005 and Turkey's 0.4 and for the old the figures were 0.2 and 0.1, respectively. In other words, Turkey's proportion of young dependents as a proportion of the working age population is twice that of Spain and its proportion of old dependents to the working age population is half that of Spain, as befits a much younger population (26.4% of Turkey's population was under the age of 14 in 2007 compared to 14.3% in Spain).

The creation of autonomous regions

Spain has moved from the unitary state ruthlessly upheld during the Franco regime to one of the most decentralised nations in Europe. Excluding Social Security, the 17 autonomous communities account for more than 50% of total public spending, compared with 23% by the central government (53% at the start of the 1980s) and 24% by local governments. In all but name, Spain today is effectively a federal state. Ruling the country as a whole from Madrid is a complex matter and one fraught with tensions, particularly with the Basque Country (where the terrorist organisation ETA has not yet given up its struggle of almost 40 years for an independent state) and Catalonia, the two most 'nationalistic' regions. Turkey, in contrast, is still a very centralised state.

Spain's regions have varying levels of wealth, but nowhere near as wide as between some of Turkey's 81 provinces. The poorest Spanish regions are Andalusia and Extremadura and the richest Madrid and Navarra. The complex financing system implemented by the central government, based on the principle of *solidaridad* (solidarity), which was being renegotiated during 2008, has helped to narrow the wealth differences between the richest and poorest regions (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Per Capita Income of Spain's Regions in Purchasing Power Parity (EU-15=100)

	2000	2007
Andalusia	69.3	74.0
Aragon	100.3	104.0
Asturias	77.7	82.2
Balearic Islands	107.4	100.3
Basque Country	107.8	114.6
Canary Islands	87.3	92.2
Cantabria	87.4	95.6
Castile-La Mancha	79.5	80.5
Castile and León	87.3	94.5
Catalonia	107.9	102.7
Extremadura	65.1	74.7
Galicia	74.9	79.3
Madrid	120.4	120.5
Murcia	78.1	77.9
Navarra	113.9	116.9
Rioja (La)	103.3	96.5
Valencia	86.6	84.8
Ceuta*	81.2	83.4
Melilla*	80.0	87.8
Total	91.5	93.4

Source: Funcas.

(*) Enclaves in North Africa.

The 1978 Constitution recognised autonomous communities but, at the same time, entrusted the armed forces with the mission of 'defending (Spain's) geographical integrity and constitutional order.' The Constitution was approved by all parties except the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). Basques ratified their autonomy statute in a separate referendum in 1979. The ambiguity of the Constitutional text reflected the political realities of the heady post-Franco years, when the pressure for democratic change was intense. The government had to balance avoiding a head-on clash with the very active Basque and Catalan autonomous movements seeking redress after a long period of repression with averting a backlash from the military for undermining national unity (there was a failed coup in 1981). Catalonia had gained home rule under the Second Republic before the 1936-39 Civil War, the Basque Country enjoyed it in 1936 after the war started and Galicia was on the way to autonomy.

Between 1979 and 1983, 17 regions were created with varying degrees of power. Devolution defused conflicts with the central government, but it was somewhat artificial in that not all regions had enjoyed a degree of autonomy in the past (for example, Madrid). A pecking order was established among the autonomous regions. First came the 'historic' regions – the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, all of which have their own languages. Andalusia in southern Spain does not have its own language but gained a similar status in a referendum. These four regions have the right to call their own elections, while the remaining ones vote at the same time. Within this group, however, there are major differences, with the Basque Country in northern Spain (formally comprising the provinces of Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa and Alava) enjoying the greatest degree of fiscal autonomy (under an agreement dating back to 1878) and the strongest in all of Europe. It collects all direct taxes itself and passes on a share to Madrid, has its own police force (as does Catalonia) and can teach the Basque language in schools.

The central government controls foreign policy (which does not stop the heads of regional governments making their own high-level trips abroad to promote their areas), trade, defence, macroeconomic and competition policy. The regions are responsible for education, healthcare, transport, public works (not of a state nature), housing and culture (many are very active in this field). Most of them have their own local television and radio stations.

Spain's electoral law is more generous than Turkey's as a political party only has to gain 5% of the vote before it can win seats in parliament compared to 10% in Turkey. Instead of making it difficult for parties representing the interests of a particular region to win parliamentary seats, as is still the case in Turkey, the fathers of Spain's electoral law wanted to bring these parties into the system and not shut them out. Batasuna, the political arm of ETA, won three seats in the 1979 general election and five in 1986. The party was outlawed in 2003 for its links with ETA and two other parties were banned in September 2008, the Communist Party of the Basque Lands and Basque Nationalist Action. The seven nationalistic parties that ran in the March 2008 general election (i.e., those that only ran candidates in their regions) captured 7% of the total vote and won 24 of the 350 seats in the national parliament (Congress). The ruling Socialists and the conservative Popular Party have 323

seats, the United Left two and Union, Progress and Democracy one. The Catalan Convergence and Union is the largest regional party with 10 seats, followed by the Basque Nationalist Party (six), the Republican Left of Catalonia (three) and the Galician Nationalist Bloc and the Canarian Coalition two each. Were Turkey to reduce its threshold for representation in the legislature to 5%, its parliament would, like Spain's, be more representative of the country's political realities.

The new face of Spain

In a remarkably short period, Spain has moved from being the Western European country with the most traditional values and attitudes to one of the most liberal, tolerant and permissive societies. The country is ranked 16th out of 167 countries, just ahead of the US, in the democracy index drawn up by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Turkey is ranked 88th. The index is based on five categories that are interrelated and form a coherent conceptual whole: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture

Divorce and abortion were authorised early on in the transition and in 2005 Spain became the fourth country in the world, after Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada, to allow same-sex couples to marry and adopt children. The authoritarian Franco regime, backed for most of the time by the Catholic Church (which supported Franco's 'crusade' against the Republic during the Civil War and was rewarded with privileges afterwards), kept the lid on individual and social freedoms, but as soon as the dictator disappeared it blew off, like a pressure cooker releasing steam, and the country moved directly and rapidly towards a 'post-modern' society. Spain was able to do this because, as in so many other aspects, it arrived late and the pressure to catch up was intense. There are, however, strong intergenerational differences.

7 Article 16 of the Constitution proclaims that "no confession shall have a state character" and then states that "the public authorities will take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the consequent relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions." Jurists say the state's commitment to finance the Church expired many years ago and that the Church has failed to meet the commitment in Article 2.5 of the 1979 Concordat with the Vatican to "achieve by itself sufficient funds to meet its needs."

Under the 1978 Constitution, Spain is a non-confessional state. For centuries – and with the exception of brief intervals –, Spain had been a confessional state, and Catholicism its official religion. The country, however, is not yet truly secular (taking France as the model). The matter is not helped by the Constitution, which is ambiguous on this matter.⁷ Thirty years later, the Church still enjoys an influential position in areas, for example, such as education (out of proportion to the dwindling numbers who regularly go to church) and it is the only religion that receives money directly via taxpayers' annual returns (a box can be ticked), even though Spain today has around 1 million Muslims, the fourth largest number in the EU-15. Islam is the country's second largest religion. Spain, however, does respect religious minorities, as

required by the EU, with regard to the practice of different faiths, an area where Turkey has not yet made sufficient advances as noted by successive EU progress reports.

One of the most striking changes over the past 30 years has been the greatly improved position and rights of women in a country that still has a strong streak of *machismo*. Women in Spain were granted full suffrage in 1931, three years before Turkey, and then lost ground during the Franco regime. Article 57 of Franco's Civil Code stated, 'The husband must protect his wife and she must obey her husband.' Married women needed the permission of their husbands to go out to work, sign a contract, apply for a passport and open a bank account. Wives could not even undertake a journey of any length without her husband's approval. A great deal has changed since then, as it has in Turkey also. The current government of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has more female than male ministers including the Minister of Defence, Carme Chacon, and its youngest-ever cabinet minister, the 31-year-old Minister for Equality, Bibiana Aido. Women make up 36.6% of the deputies in the Spanish parliament (9% in Turkey), the fifth-highest figure in Europe, and female university students outnumber male undergraduates. A law introduced by Zapatero in 2006 prohibits men or women from making up more than 60 per cent of the candidates of any political party that contests national or local elections. It also demands, but does not require, that by 2010 any company negotiating for public contracts should appoint women to 40 per cent of the places on their boards of directors. But there are still very few women in top positions in Spain's corporate world. And domestic violence, as in Turkey, persists: 71 women were killed by their husbands or partners in Spain in 2007. The AKP's record on enhancing women's rights is also relatively impressive. For example, it made rape in marriage and sexual harassment in the workplace criminal offences, and sexual crimes in general were classified as violations of the rights of the individual. They were previously classified as crimes against society, the family or public morality. According to the Berlin-based think tank European Stability Initiative the AKP's reforms are "the most radical changes to the legal status of Turkish women in 80 years".⁸

EU membership has also greatly reduced corruption in Spain (rampant during the Franco regime). Spain was ranked 28th out of

⁸ See Sex and Power in Turkey: Feminism, Islam and the Maturing of Turkish Democracy, European Stability Initiative, 2007.

180 countries in the 2008 Perceptions Index produced every year since 1998 by the Berlin-based Transparency International. Its score in the index was 6.5 (the closer to 10 the cleaner the country). However, this was down from 6.7 in 2007 and 7.1 in 2004. Corruption in Spain has been on the rise, particularly in the construction sector and the illegal payments made to obtain permits and reclassify land for urban use. Turkey's score over the same period improved from 3.4 in 1998 to 4.6 in 2008 when it was ranked 58th.

Lastly, the vibrant democracy that EU membership has brought Spain has given the country the confidence to face painful episodes in its not too distant past. In November 2007, the government approved the controversial Law of Historical Memory. The law condemns the Franco regime, provides public funds to help associations locate mass graves and identify and bury the dead, declares the dictatorship's political trials illegitimate, but does not repeal them outright, bans Francoist symbols on public buildings and political acts, such as the annual homage to Franco on the 20 November anniversary of his death at the underground basilica at the *Valle de los Caídos* (Valley of the Fallen) where he is buried. In September 2008, judge Baltasar Garzón asked the authorities to provide a list of names of those buried in unmarked graves after they were killed by Franco's supporters during and after the Civil War. That request followed a petition from campaigners who have been looking for and digging up the hundreds of mass graves containing victims. They delivered a list of more than 130,000 victims. Garzón also opened an investigation into the victims of the so-called "red terror" unleashed by supporters of the Republic. In recent years, Turkey, too, has shown increased propensity to discuss difficult chapters of its past including the Armenian issue.

Spain-Turkey relations

Spain and Turkey enjoy a burgeoning economic and political relation. Two-way trade between the two countries more than tripled between 2001 and 2007 to €7.2 billion in 2007. Turkey has a substantial trade surplus with Spain, which is its sixth largest export market and almost on a par with the Russian Federation. While Turkey has the advantage in trade (between 2001 and 2007 its exports rose from €1.1 billion to €4.2 billion), direct investment from Spain in Turkey has been growing significantly. Last year Mapfre, the insurance company, bought 80% of Turkey's Genel Sigorta for €285 million. There have also been Spanish investments in tourism and cement production and trial runs began in September on the high-speed rail track between Ankara and Eskisehir, built by Spain's OHL and CAF and Turkey's Alarko.

At the political level, Spain is one of the most active supporters of Turkey's full EU membership. Both the ruling Socialists of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the Popular Party of José María Aznar, which governed between 1996 and 2004, support Turkey's entry.

Zapatero and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan enjoy a close relationship; both are co-sponsors of the Alliance of Civilizations project, which was proposed at the UN General Assembly in 2005, to defuse tensions between the Western and Islamic world. The project is supported by the UN which has assigned it a High Representative. The two prime ministers agreed in September 2008 to upgrade their relations and hold as of 2009 an annual summit. Spain only has such a relationship with six other countries: France, Portugal, Poland, Italy, Morocco and Germany.

CONCLUSION

Spain and Turkey have a lot in common and if any country can be regarded as a model for Turkey's EU membership process, it is Spain. Yet Turkey's path to Brussels is much more unique than Spain's was or indeed that of any other country, because of its size, relative underdevelopment and different culture. Indeed, Turkey is in a category of its own. Some lessons, however, can be drawn from the Spanish experience when applying it to Turkey.

Perhaps the main one is the need for unity among the political class during accession negotiations and to make EU membership a national goal at all levels of society. Another is to keep economic reform in tandem as much as possible with political reform, something that Turkey is doing and which is yielding positive results. Lastly, the military has to be kept out of the political arena in the widest sense of the word. This Spain achieved successfully, despite a (failed) coup in 1981. Turkey has not yet managed this, but there are grounds for optimism that it eventually will. Equally, it should be remembered that no country accepted as a candidate for accession to the EU has ever, once negotiations were opened, been rejected by it.

A REMARK ON THIS STUDY BY VOLKAN VURAL

William Chislett's analysis of Spain as possible source of inspiration for Turkey is well documented and offers striking resemblances between the two countries. Spain's experiment with autonomous regions, while admittedly complicated, nevertheless allowed the maintenance of a unitary state in a more democratic and contemporary fashion. This should help alleviate some fears of EU sceptics in Turkey regarding the maintenance of a unitary state in the EU context.

There are two fundamental differences between Turkey and Spain regarding their EU accession process. Spain joined the EU in the post-Franco mood of optimism for democracy and at a time when public opinion in European countries was not so much involved in the enlargement issues. The second major difference is the cultural divide. Spain's Christian heritage and identity made it more acceptable for EU membership.

William Chislett is quite right when he says in his analysis that "Turkey's path to Brussels is much more unique. . ." Yet, irrespective of some important differences, readers will not miss the positive contribution of EU integration to the political, economic and social life of Spain and can expect similar developments with Turkey's accession.

Volkan Vural
Turkish Ambassador to Spain, 2003-2006

APPENDIX OF COMPARATIVE STATISTICS

Basic Statistics, Spain and Turkey*

	Spain	Turkey
Population (million)	46.0	70.5
Unemployment rate (%)	8.6	8.5
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity, \$bn)	1,351,608	887,964
GDP per head (Purchasing Power Parity, EU-27=100)	106.9	42.3
GDP structure (%)		
Primary sector	3.6	7.7
Secondary sector	30.2	24.5
Tertiary sector	66.1	67.8
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	25.7	21.9
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	32.7	27.0
Number of tourists (million)	59.2	22.2
Current account (% of GDP)	-10.0	-7.3
Consumer price inflation (%) ¹	2.8	8.8
Gross national saving (% of GDP)	22.0 (2006)	17.0
General government balance (% of GDP)	+2.2	-1.2
Public debt (% of GDP)	36.2	38.8
Public spending (% of GDP)	38.3	23.8
Inward stock of foreign direct investment (\$ billion)	537.4	145.5
Outward stock of Spanish investment abroad (\$ billion)	636.8	12.2
Total tax revenue (% of GDP)	36.5 (2006)	23.7
Spending on R&D (% of GDP)	1.16 (2006)	0,7 (2006)
Passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants	445 (2005)	80
Fertility rate	1.3	2.2
UN human development index ²	0.949 (2005)	0.775
Average life expectancy (years)	81 (2006)	71
Percentage of population under the age of 15	14.5	26.4
Percentage of population over the age of 65	16.6	7.0
Transparency International Corruption		
Perceptions Index (Ranking and score, 2008) ³	28 th , 6.5	58 th , 4.6
Number of governments since 1977 ⁴	10	20
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	1.0 (2006)	2.9

Source: Eurostat, OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute, UNCTAD, UN Human Development Report and World Development Indicators.

(*) 2007 unless otherwise stated.

1 Average annual rate of change in harmonised indices.

2 The maximum value is one.

3 The closer to 10 the cleaner the country.

4 This is taken as the reference year because it was when Spain had its first free elections since 1936.

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