|
Summary
[1]
Turkey’s
accession to the European Union is one of the most controversial and divisive
topics the EU faces. Both EU governments and citizens are deeply divided on
whether Turkey should become a member or not. This paper takes an in-depth
look at European citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey’s accession to the EU
and explains which elements are key in determining support for or opposition
to Turkish membership. We use new data, derived from the new questions measuring
citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey that have recently been introduced in Eurobarometer
questionnaires. We prove that views for and against Turkish membership are
multidimensional and that citizens use different arguments for both positions.
In particular, we show that the likelihood of supporting or opposing Turkey’s
membership depends on whether citizens adopt a perspective that is utilitarian
(resting on costs and benefits), identity-based (founded on Turkey being part
of Europe) or post-national (linked to the view of a rights-based EU emphasising
democracy and human rights). The main findings are as follows: first, support
for Turkey’s membership is mostly based on post-national arguments; second,
opposition to Turkey’s accession is mainly connected with identity-related
arguments; and third, instrumental reasons (costs/benefits) play a less relevant
role. Turkey’s future membership in the EU, we conclude, will thus not be
won or lost at the public opinion level on the material plane (costs/benefits)
but on the relative weight of post-national visions of the EU vis-à-vis more
essentialist visions of Europe. The key to Turkish EU membership, we suggest,
may well lie in the way accession is argued and justified, and not wholly
in the way it is negotiated.
Contents[2]
Introduction. 1
Three approaches to people’s beliefs concerning Turkey. 2
Utilitarian hypotheses. 4
Identitarian hypotheses. 5
Post-national hypotheses. 6
Debating Turkey: Relevant
dimensions of public support 7
Conclusions.
23
References.
25
Appendix A. Tables.
27
Appendix B. Summary of
SPSS Outputs (Contingency Tables) 29
Appendix C. Figures.
36
Introduction
Ensuring popular support for further integration has
become one of the biggest challenges facing the European Union. Growing levels
of Euroscepticism and the increasing mobilisation of opposition since the
Maastricht Treaty signify the end of the so-called ‘permissive consensus’
that characterised public attitudes throughout earlier decades of integration
(Franklin, Marsh & McLaren, 1994; Sitter, 2001). Yet the problem of popular
consent is multifaceted and complex. Patterns of support for EU institutions,
enlargement and deepening vary extensively across member states. European
integration interacts with national political, economic and social settings,
producing diverse combinations of incentives, expectations and fears. A better
understanding of the dynamics of public opinion and its impact on politics
and policy-making in the EU is thus crucial if the Union’s current dilemmas
are to be solved.
The power of public opinion has been dramatically demonstrated
by a number of recent referenda on EU issues, many of which have produced
popular vetoes to elite-crafted integration plans, including the ill-fated
Constitutional Treaty. Support for enlargement also began to drop substantially
in 2004, as the accession of 10 new member states became imminent, and further
enlargement of the Union has since been amply rejected by citizens in a large
number of countries. But whereas opposition to further enlargement has been
confined to a few of the older member states, which had also been opposed
to the 2004 enlargement, European public opinion is overwhelmingly negative
regarding the specific accession of Turkey.
On 17 December 2004, the European Council took the historic
decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey. In May/June 2005, French
and Dutch citizens voted ‘no’ in the referenda on the ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty. In the debate that followed, both media and political
discourses often cited opposition to enlargement in general (and Turkey in
particular) as a fundamental reason behind the ‘nays’ to the Constitutional
Treaty. Nevertheless, on 17 June 2005, the European Council confirmed its
decision to start accession negotiations and, after intense debates and much
polemic, these formally began on 3 October 2005.
Despite conventional wisdom about enlargement featuring
in the referenda campaigns in France (the ‘Polish plumber’ debate) and the
Netherlands (coinciding with the national debate on Islam and the integration
of Muslims following film-maker Theo Van Gogh’s murder), available empirical
data shows that negative considerations about enlargement did not play a direct
role in turning citizens against the Constitutional Treaty. In France for
example, only 6% of those who voted ‘no’ spontaneously cited Turkey as a reason
for voting against the Constitutional Treaty and only 3% cited “opposition
to further enlargement”. And in the Netherlands, 6% mentioned “opposition
to further enlargement” when they were asked to explain their negative vote
and 3% argued that they did not want Turkey to become an EU member state.[3]
The absence of a direct link between the French and Dutch
‘nays’ to the Constitutional Treaty and Turkish accession does not conceal,
however, the dominant negative mood existing among EU founding member states
when it comes to support for enlargement. Europeans show little enthusiasm
for enlargement in general, and for Turkey’s accession in particular. Positive
views on the 2004 enlargement or future enlargement rounds are a scarce commodity
across the EU. European citizens are fairly divided when it comes to endorsing
the accession of the former Yugoslavian states, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia–Herzegovina
and Macedonia. But when it comes to Turkey, its accession shows the poorest
support indicators (only matched by Albania). Furthermore, owing to the fact
that citizens of the new member states (NMS) predominantly favour future enlargements,
the 2004 enlargement has generally had a positive impact on the levels of
support for the future accession of countries in south-east Europe, yet assent
for Turkish accession has not benefited from this effect. As a consequence,
a split has appeared when it comes to support for future accessions, with
Turkey being located at the most negative end of the spectrum on future enlargement.
What are the reasons for the extremely low levels of
support for the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU? Media and political
discourses tend to point at different factors. Sometimes, they cite religious
or cultural elements (having to do with Christian values, the compatibility
of Islam and democracy, etc.). On other occasions, they concentrate on demographic
factors (either difficulties of accommodating a country as large as Turkey
in the EU’s institutions or fears of immigration stemming from Turkey’s booming
population). Often, too, we hear arguments framed in economic terms (stressing
how the EU’s common structural and agricultural policies would collapse should
a country as poor as Turkey get in). Frequently, we also hear arguments dealing
with security and stability (either in favour of or against Turkey’s membership).
Lastly, some argue that further political integration along federalist lines
would be impossible if the EU overstretches to Turkey, just to mention a few
of the most common arguments.
Can we make sense of this variety of arguments? Do they
point to a coherent set of values, preferences and visions concerning the
European integration process? We think they do, and that it is possible to
organise them into three sets of approaches, which in turn give rise to three
different visions of Europe. As we show, support for or opposition to Turkish
membership among European citizens is both highly consistent and, at the same
time, deeply connected with preferences concerning the European integration
process.
Three approaches to people’s beliefs concerning Turkey
In order to address people’s beliefs concerning Turkey’s
accession to the EU, we first adopt a threefold analytical distinction between
‘utilitarian’, ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ arguments and then derive a testable
hypothesis. These dimensions grossly refer to three sets of beliefs and attitudes
towards the EU and its future evolution. The first refers to a “utility-based”
agreement, the second to a “value-based” community and the third to a “rights-based”
post-national union (Sjursen, 2007, pp. 2-11).
‘Utilitarians’ conceive the EU pragmatically, as a problem-solving
entity to which they lend their support depending on a cost-benefit analysis:
the more they benefit or expect to benefit from EU policies in economic, political
or security terms, the more they support it and vice versa. Therefore, decisions
on enlargement would be assessed in relation to whether the accession of new
members would expand the wealth or security base of the EU.
According to the second view of the EU (‘value-based’),
the EU would be a geographically delimited entity, with a strong sense of
common identity, history, culture and traditions. For those who share this
view, support for the EU would be a function of the perceived congruence of
EU policies and activities with the set of values they believe are constitutive
of Europe in terms of a community (a common history, geography and a set of
values – whether Christian or secular – forming the ‘European way of life’).
It follows that decisions on enlargement would be based on kinship or ‘we
feelings’ and the political discourse concerning enlargement would be predominantly
moral: the more a candidate is like the member states in terms of geography,
culture, history, etc., the more likely such a country’s application would
be supported and vice versa.
Finally, according to the third vision, European integration
would or should rest on a set of universal principles and values, such as
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Should the EU fully develop in
that direction, we would characterise it as a ‘post-national’ or ‘civic’ Union.
Dealing with enlargement, those who hold such beliefs would support enlargement
processes to the extent that they believed the applicants shared those values,
regardless of a high degree of cultural differences and traditions.
Applied to Turkey, each of these visions could lead us
to ask different questions. For example, those holding pragmatic views would
tend to engage in a debate about costs and benefits. Would the foreign policy
and security gains outweigh the economic and budgetary costs of accession?
Would Turkey’s accession collapse European labour markets or help compensate
the impact of an ageing population and declining birth rates across Europe?
Following this logic, the fact that a majority of Europeans oppose Turkey’s
accession would mean that a majority of Europeans consider that the benefits
of membership do not outweigh its costs or, more simply, that Europeans do
not agree on whether accession would be too costly in economic or security
terms.
But what if support or opposition had nothing to do with
costs and benefits? What if Europeans were to oppose Turkey’s accession for
cultural, historical and geographical reasons even if from an economic or
security point of view, the EU would benefit from its accession? Or, alternatively,
what if owing to feelings of shared culture, history and identity, Europeans
were to support Turkey’s membership despite believing that it would be costly
in economic or security terms? Clearly, the political picture would be much
different. Those who considered Turkey to be part of Europe, both geographically
and culturally, would be in favour whereas those reluctant to identify themselves
with Turkey’s geography, history and culture would be most reticent to admit
it into the EU.
Finally, let us suppose that support for or opposition
to Turkish membership was based not on values or on pragmatic considerations,
but had to do with the shared principles on which the EU stands, such as democracy
or human rights. We would then expect Europeans to act on grounds of fairness,
i.e. even if they did not identify with Turkish culture, history or geography,
they would support the right of a fully democratic and human rights-compliant
Turkey to become a member of the EU. In other words, to the extent that Turkey
meets both the requisites of TEU Arts. 49 and 6.1 concerning the principles
and values on which the Union is based and the Copenhagen criteria specifying
the accession conditions, it should be accepted as a member state.
Having briefly summarised the three possible approaches
to what the Union is, or should be, let us see which sorts of operational
hypotheses we could derive.
Utilitarian hypotheses
Our first hypothesis is ‘instrumental support’. The conception
of citizens’ support being based on instrumental considerations (a rational
calculus of costs and benefits) has been widely applied to public assent for
the EU or European integration,[4] but also to the explanation of member states’ support for enlargement.[5]
Following this approach, we may posit that enlargement
has costs and benefits, and that whenever citizens perceive that the costs
will outweigh the benefits, they will oppose it and vice versa. Needless to
say, costs may vary widely in terms of either the level (European, national,
regional or personal) or the dimension (economic, political, security or institutional).
Also, we should not forget that the subjective dimension of cost perceptions
might be as important as the objective one.[6] Accordingly, citizens support enlargement if
and when they perceive the benefits to be larger than the costs – that is,
enlargement can be legitimised by achieving an output that can be seen as
an efficient solution to given interests and preferences.
Our first hypothesis (instrumental support) thus reads
the more that Turkish accession is considered beneficial, the higher the
support will be for accession and, conversely, the more costly accession is
perceived, the higher the opposition will be to enlargement (H1).
Using Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer 64.2, 2005) we
check whether EU citizens see advantages in Turkey’s membership and test the
extent to which those who see these benefits are more inclined to endorse
it than citizens who do not see advantages in Turkey’s accession. We should
find that citizens who think that the benefits outweigh the costs support
Turkey’s membership to a larger extent (and alternatively those who see disadvantages
favour its joining to a lesser extent). If the instrumental dimension has
a positive impact on support for Turkey’s membership, then such support would
only improve if the benefits of accession were to become more evident. Also,
we check whether the relevance of this dimension is homogeneous across EU
member states, along with its impact on support for Turkey’s membership. Crucially,
if perceptions of the costs/benefits were not homogeneous among citizens in
all member states, reaching a decision on Turkey that satisfies all the member
states would be almost impossible.
Identitarian hypotheses
However much the capacity to deliver policies that satisfy
citizens’ preferences is an important dimension of legitimacy and support
(‘output legitimacy’), people may consider legitimate decisions they do not
directly benefit from or of which they do not actually approve just because
they are adopted by a community to which they feel they belong. At the national
level, ‘my country right or wrong’ is a typical expression of identity-based
support. At the European level, the feeling of belonging to a political community
is also a key factor in explaining support for the EU.[7] Empirical data shows that those citizens who
feel European also have a higher probability of supporting the EU (van der
Veen, 2002). Therefore, although instrumental considerations are crucial when
analysing citizens’ support for the European integration process, identification
with Europe is an equally important source of approval.
This line of reasoning might be plausibly applied to
enlargement. From this point of view, enlargement would be endorsed if the
candidate countries were thought to belong to ‘our community’, to be like
‘us’ or to share ‘our values’. The idea that actors’ preferences are contextual
or endogenous – that is, derived from the identity of the community to which
they belong – rather than instrumental or exogenous has been applied to the
explanation of EU member states’ support for enlargement by historical as
well as sociological institutionalism approaches. Sjursen (2002 and 2004)
has argued that citizens support enlargement if and when fellow citizens from
accession countries are considered from a perspective of kinship – i.e. if
citizens from newer and older member states share common references about
what is considered appropriate given the conception of what Europe and the
EU represents.
Thus, in some situations, rather than evaluating the
material costs/benefits of each possible course of action, actors tend to
examine what the “appropriate” behaviour would be, taking into account the
dominant values of the group to which they belong (March & Olsen 1989).
Using this argument, Friis (1998) has explained how the European Council changed
its position concerning the selection of candidates for accession negotiations.
Schimmelfenning (2001) has also used it to show how EU member states were
“rhetorically entrapped” into accepting an enlargement process that they were
not happy about. Lundgren (2006) has drawn upon this argument to explain differences
in support for Turkish and Romanian membership in the EU, and Sjursen &
Riddervold (2006) have cited it to explain Danish support for the accession
of the Baltic candidates. Piedrafita (2006) has argued that Spain supported
eastern enlargement despite its likely negative impact on Spanish interests
owing to the perception that it had a moral duty to do so. Just as the Community
extended to Spain in the 1980s in order to bring it back into Europe, Spanish
policy-makers argued, Spain fully understood that it was now the turn of Central
and Eastern European people to return to Europe. Spain could hence debate
the modalities and conditions of the 2004 enlargement process, but its reading
of (a shared) European history and values framed its attitudes towards enlargement
not only at the elite level, but also at the citizens’ level, situating Spanish
public opinion among the top supporters of the 2004 enlargement.
We may then elaborate a second hypothesis concerning
assent for enlargement: identitarian support. Accordingly, the more
that European citizens believe Turkey is part of Europe (in geographical,
historical and cultural terms), the more they will support Turkish accession
and vice versa (H2).
Eurobarometer data allows us to test whether Turkey is
perceived to be part of Europe. We expect those who see Turkey as part of
Europe to be more supportive of membership than those who see it as separate.
Here, it is also possible that citizens in different countries have different
understandings about the extent to which Turkey belongs to Europe. We later
explore these national divergences and assess the various effects of this
identity dimension on support for Turkey’s membership on a country-by-country
basis.
Post-national hypotheses
According to a third possible view of the integration
process, the EU would be conceived as a rights-based, post-national Union
founded on universal principles such as democracy and human rights and governed
by the rule of law, rather than on traditional ‘national’ values such as language,
ethnic group, religion and culture (Chryssochoou, 2001; Eriksen & Fossum,
2000).
Research has shown that those citizens who fear losing
national sovereignty within the EU (those who have not developed post-national
identities) tend to support the integration process to a lower extent (Christin
& Trechsel, 2002; Carey, 2002). At the same time, scholars have argued
that the development of post-national identities may facilitate and increase
support for the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p. 2). Similarly, when it comes
to enlargement, we may argue (Sjursen, 2002 and 2006) that those conceiving
the EU in post-national ways, i.e. as a rights-based Union, may be more likely
to support enlargement processes. Citizens’ support for enlargement may therefore
stem from recognition of universal standards of justice and principles that
can be recognised as ‘just’ by all parties (such as respect for human rights
or democracy).
Thus, in order to decide whether a country could become
a member of the EU, we would look at the principles governing accession, not
at ‘we feelings’ or shared understandings of culture or history. These principles
are clear. As TEU Art. 49 establishes, “any European State which respects
the principles set out in Art. 6.1 may apply to become a member of the Union”,
and as Art. 6.1 affirms, “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. Complementing these,
the Copenhagen conditions, set out by the European Council in 1993, demand
that candidates meet four criteria:
the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,
the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union…[and] the ability
to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims
of political, economic and monetary union. [8]
Therefore, whether the candidate country is Turkey, Norway
or Switzerland it should not make much difference. We would simply expect
citizens and European institutions to apply these principles in a transparent,
non-discriminatory manner: those who meet the criteria should be let in and
those who do not should not (no matter the balance of costs and benefits,
and no matter the high or low intensity of kinship feelings).
We may then formulate our third hypothesis (post-national
support) as follows: the more importance citizens assign to the set of
shared principles on which the Union is based, and which conform to the enlargement
acquis, the more likely their level of support for or opposition to
Turkish membership will depend on whether they think Turkey meets or is in
the position to meet these criteria (H3).
Regarding this dimension, Eurobarometer data allows us
to test if citizens are still attached to their own cultural values or rather
do cherish post-national ones. We expect the former to support Turkey’s membership
to a lesser extent than the latter. As above, we check the relevance of the
post-national dimension for each member state and look for differences in
support for Turkey’s membership. If the post-national dimension has a positive
impact on assent for Turkey’s accession, then public opinion would improve
as traditional national (ethno-cultural) identities weakened. Yet if post-national
attitudes were not homogeneous among citizens in all member states, i.e. if
national (ethno-cultural) identities remain strong in some of them, then the
probability of ensuring support based on this dimension would be quite low.
Debating Turkey: Relevant dimensions of public support
According to Eurobarometer surveys, citizens’ support
for Turkey’s accession to the EU is not only low, having been at around 29-33% since 2000, but is also shrinking (Figure 1). In the meantime, opposition has been growing. According to Eurobarometer surveys, citizens’ support for Turkey’s accession to the EU is not only low, but also shrinking. This is the result of a double process: whereas accession supporters have remained stable since 2000 (in the fringe of 29-33%), contesters have steadily risen. As Figure 1 shows, the consequence is that “net” support for Turkish accession has visibly deteriorated. Whereas in autumn 2001, Eurobarometer 56.2 reported opposition to Turkey’s membership to be at 46% among the EU-15 member states, this percentage rose to 52% in spring 2005 (Eurobarometer 63) and to a further 57% in autumn 2005 (Eurobarometer 64). Significantly, this increase does not reflect a shift in support, but the fact that a good number of the ‘don’t know’ respondents have lately joined the opposition camp.
Figure 1. Evolution of “net” support for Turkey’s membership among the EU-15 member states (supporters minus contesters, mean for the EU-15)[9]

Source: authors’ elaboration from Eurobarometer
data.
As shown in Table 1, opposition to Turkey’s membership
is not homogeneous among countries. It is much higher among the old EU-15
member states than it is among the 10 NMS (NMS-10). But even among the older
member states, there are substantial differences: the countries with the higher
percentages of opposition are Austria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Greece, France
and Finland. Opposition to Turkey’s membership in these countries is furthermore
a long-lasting characteristic of public opinion (see Table A1 in Appendix
A).
Table 1. Net support for
Turkey’s membership of the EU by country (supporters minus contesters)
| |
For
|
Against
|
Net support
|
|
EU-25
|
31
|
55
|
-24
|
|
EU-15
|
29
|
57
|
-28
|
|
NMS-10
|
38
|
44
|
-6
|
|
Sweden
|
48
|
41
|
7
|
|
Spain
|
40
|
33
|
7
|
|
Poland
|
42
|
37
|
5
|
|
Portugal
|
40
|
38
|
2
|
|
Malta
|
39
|
40
|
-1
|
|
Hungary
|
41
|
43
|
-2
|
|
United Kingdom
|
38
|
42
|
-4
|
|
Slovenia
|
49
|
55
|
-6
|
|
Ireland
|
33
|
40
|
-7
|
|
Netherlands
|
41
|
52
|
-11
|
|
Latvia
|
31
|
51
|
-20
|
|
Lithuania
|
27
|
50
|
-23
|
|
Belgium
|
36
|
60
|
-24
|
|
Estonia
|
27
|
53
|
-26
|
|
Denmark
|
33
|
59
|
-26
|
|
Czech Republic
|
30
|
57
|
-27
|
|
Slovakia
|
28
|
56
|
-28
|
|
Italy
|
27
|
57
|
-30
|
|
Finland
|
31
|
64
|
-33
|
|
France
|
21
|
68
|
-47
|
|
Greece
|
29
|
79
|
-50
|
|
Germany
|
21
|
74
|
-53
|
|
Luxembourg
|
19
|
74
|
-55
|
|
Cyprus
|
16
|
80
|
-64
|
|
Austria
|
11
|
80
|
-69
|
Note: The difference between the percentages for and against is those persons who did not answer or did not know. Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Comparing among candidate countries, Figure 2 shows that
net support for Turkey’s accession among the EU-25 member states is –24, the
lowest of all the candidates. Moreover, Turkey is the only candidate country
upon which the 2004 accession of the NMS-10 has had a negative effect in terms
of public opinion. Although net support for any of the possible future member
states has increased since 2004 (mainly because the new member states are
more supportive of further enlargement of the Union), Turkey has been the
exception to this rule.
Figure 2. Net support for
future members (supporters minus contesters, EU-15 and EU-25)

Notes: Mean net support for the EU-15 is
an average taking into account EU-15 net support for each country in Eurobarometer
surveys 54.1 (2000), 56.2 (2001), 57.1 (2002) and 58.1 (2002). EU-25 net support
is derived from Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) data.
Given the weak and eroding support for Turkey’s membership,
the European Commission has recently introduced a detailed set of questions
in the Eurobarometer survey regarding the reasons EU citizens may support
or reject its accession to the EU. Understanding these reasons can help the
Commission to address EU citizens in terms that are relevant and meaningful.
Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) posed the question below.
QA45. For each of the following please tell me whether
you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree:
–
Turkey partly belongs
to Europe by its geography [geography]
–
Turkey partly belongs
to Europe by its history [history]
–
Turkey’s accession
to the EU would strengthen the security in this region [security]
–
Turkey’s accession
to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values
[comprehension][10]
–
The cultural differences
between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this
accession [cultural differences]
–
Turkey’s accession
would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population [rejuvenation]
–
Turkey’s joining could
risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU [immigration]
–
To join the EU in
about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights [human
rights][11]
–
To join the EU in
about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its
economy [economy].
Some of the items in question A45 can be easily matched
with the hypotheses formulated in the preceding section. As such, ‘security’,
‘rejuvenation’ and ‘economy’ can be positively related to the instrumental
understanding of Turkey’s membership (H1), while ‘immigration’ will be negatively
related. As the correlation among these items is statistically significant,
they have been included within a single scale that we use for further analysis,
thus summarising the information.[12]
If attitudes towards Turkey are based on feelings of
identity, we expect higher percentages of support among those who think that
Turkey belongs to Europe because of its geography and its history than among
citizens who do not share this view (H2). As the correlation among these items
is statistically significant, they also have been included within a single
scale for further analysis and summary.[13]
Finally, if attitudes towards Turkey are grounded on
the post-national understanding of Turkey and the EU as a community sharing
universal values, we expect ‘comprehension’ and ‘human rights’ to be positively
correlated with support for Turkey’s membership, and ‘cultural differences’
to be negatively correlated (H3). Among these three items, however, the view
on human rights is not correlated with comprehension and cultural differences.
Therefore, the scale measuring identity has included only the last two items
(comprehension and cultural differences).[14]
It is worth noting that the importance of each of these
dimensions varies among countries (see Table A2 in Appendix A). At the EU-25
level, we find the identity dimension to be the most important one, with an
average mean of 3.1 on a 1–5 scale; it is followed by the instrumental dimension
(2.9) and the post-national one (2.7). This finding means that judgements
about Turkey, and hence levels of support for its accession to the EU, are
more likely to be based on elements connected with culture, history and geography
than with costs/benefits or universal principles such as democracy and human
rights.
Nevertheless, behind the aggregate picture at the EU-25
level, significant differences exist. In particular, the identity dimension
is below this average in Cyprus (2.0), Greece (2.2), France (2.7), West Germany
(2.8), Austria (2.8), Denmark (2.9), the Netherlands (2.9), Belgium (3.0)
and Luxembourg (3.0). The instrumental dimension is below the EU average in
Cyprus (2.6), Greece (2.6), Austria (2.7), West Germany (2.8), France (2.8)
the Slovak Republic (2.8) and the Czech Republic (2.8). The post-national
dimension is also below the EU average in Austria (2.0), Greece (2.2), Luxembourg
(2.3), Cyprus (2.4), West Germany (2.4) and France (2.5).
The fact that the subset of countries in which citizens’
attitudes towards Turkey are predominantly negative are also those in which
the three dimensions are below the EU average means that negative attitudes
do not have a clear identity, instrumental or post-national component that
can be easily isolated from the others. It suggests that citizens’ latent
negative attitudes towards Turkey’s membership are manifested in negative
assessments about accession consequences.
It is also important to highlight that in none of the
countries is the post-national attitudinal dimension more important than the
identity or the instrumental dimension. In Cyprus, Greece, France, West Germany,
Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands the instrumental dimension is the most
important one in defining citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey’s membership;
while in Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, East Germany, Latvia, the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Lithuania, Northern Ireland, Finland, the Slovak Republic, Ireland,
Sweden, Hungary and Poland the identity dimension is the most important one.
In Great Britain, Portugal and Spain, the identity and instrumental dimensions
have similar importance, both being above the post-national one.
A preliminary analysis using these three dimensions shows
that all the dimensions are correlated with public assent for Turkey’s membership
(Table 2). Yet a post-national understanding of the Union as a community based
on universal rights (H3) shows a stronger correlation with support for Turkey’s
membership than the instrumental understanding of advantages to be derived
from accession (H1) or the feeling that Turkey belongs to Europe (H2). Among
the three dimensions, the last one exhibits the weakest correlation with endorsement
of Turkey’s membership. Thus, the fact that the least-important attitudinal
dimension among EU citizens is the one in which correlation with public support
for Turkey’s accession is strongest offers us a first hint about why public
support is so low.
Table 2. Correlation between
support for Turkey’s membership and attitudinal dimensions towards Turkey’s
membership†
| |
Support for Turkey’s membership
|
Post-national attitudes
|
Instrumental attitudes
|
Identity attitudes
|
|
Support for
Turkey’s membership
|
Pearson’s correlation
|
1
|
.611(**)
|
.515(**)
|
.430(**)
|
|
Sig. (bilateral)
|
–
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
|
N
|
21,315
|
21,315
|
21,315
|
21,315
|
** Correlation is statistically significant at the .001 level (bilateral). † Support for membership is recoded as a dichotomous variable. Attitudinal dimensions are additive scales (1–5). Source: EB 64.2 (2005)
In other words, the more the identity dimension figures
in public debate and attitudes towards Turkey, the more probable it is that
support will be low. Conversely, the more public debate and attitudes towards
Turkey are based on the shared principles on which the Union is founded as
expressed in TEU Art. 6.1, the more likely it is that support for accession
will be high. Therefore, the more citizens’ cultural identities and attachments
prevail, leading to an understanding of Europe as a community of cultural
(and Christian?) values incompatible with Muslim ones, the less likely it
is that support for Turkey’s membership will predominate.
If we use contingency tables to explore the relation
between support for Turkey and individual items (Table 3 and Appendix B),
we see that those who think that Turkey belongs to Europe owing to its geography
or its history (H2) have an 85% probability of supporting Turkey’s membership.
This probability is 35 points higher than that for those who do not think
that Turkey belongs to Europe.
The likelihood that those citizens who share the opinion
that Turkey’s membership will improve security in the area (H1) would also
be those supporting Turkey’s accession is 97%, 44 points higher than that
for those who do not share this view. Citizens who think Turkey’s membership
will rejuvenate the EU’s ageing population would endorse it with a probability
of 85%, while among those who fear increasing immigration, the probability
of favouring Turkey’s membership is only 36%, 16 points lower than that among
citizens who do not fear immigration. By contrast, evaluations of the Turkish
economy, i.e. the wealth differential between the EU and Turkey, are not relevant
(i.e. not statistically significant).
Table 3. Probabilities of
supporting Turkey’s accession depending on attitudes towards Turkey’s membership
| |
Odds ratio
|
Probability
|
|
Geography
|
5.94
|
85% (+35%)
|
|
History
|
5.5
|
85% (+35%)
|
|
Security
|
14.8
|
97% (+44%)
|
|
Comprehension
|
14.7
|
97% (+44%)
|
|
Immigration
|
0.57
|
36% (-14%)
|
|
Rejuvenation
|
5.7
|
85% (+35)
|
|
Cultural differences
|
0.14
|
12% (-36%)
|
|
Human rights
|
2.47
|
70% (+20)
|
|
Economy
|
ns
|
ns
|
Source: EB 64.2 (2005).
Finally, citizens who think Turkey’s membership will
favour mutual comprehension between Europe and Islam are 97% likely to support
it, 44 points higher than that for those who do not share this opinion. Conversely,
among those who think the cultural differences are just too large to allow
for Turkey’s membership, the probability of supporting it is only 12%, or
36 points lower than that among citizens who do not hold this view. The likelihood
that citizens who think Turkey must respect human rights before entering the
Union are also those who would support membership is 70%, or 20 points higher
than that among those who do not consider this aspect important.
To understand the differences in support for Turkey’s
membership, we start by exploring the varying degrees of importance attached
to these dimensions in each country. As shown in Table A1 (see Appendix A),
the identity dimension is the most crucial and is also the one that differs
the most among countries, with divergences as much as 1.5 points (on a 1–5
scale) in the degree of importance. Among those countries/regions in which
the identity dimension is more significant, we find Poland, Hungary, Sweden,
Ireland, the Slovak Republic and Finland. At the other extreme, we find Cyprus,
Greece, France, West Germany, Austria and Denmark (see Figure 3).
The second most important dimension is the instrumental
one, which is similarly relevant for all member states, with small differences
(0.5 points) in the degree of significance among individual countries/regions.
Among those that attach more importance to this dimension, we find Sweden,
Northern Ireland, Denmark, Poland, Ireland and Spain; at the other extreme
are Cyprus, Austria, Greece, the Slovak Republic, East Germany and the Czech
Republic (see Figure 4).
Finally, we find that the post-national dimension is
the least important one in the attitudes of citizens towards Turkey’s accession,
although in the case of this dimension we are able to discriminate among countries,
with differences of 1 point between the extremes (on a 1–5 scale). Among those
countries/regions that attribute more importance to this post-national dimension
are Northern Ireland, Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Spain;
at the other extreme are Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, West Germany, Cyprus
and Estonia (see Figure 5).
Figure 3. Mean importance
of the identity dimension by country

Figure 4. Mean importance
of the instrumental dimension by country

Figure 5. Mean importance
of the post-national dimension by country

Looking in detail at the percentages of people who hold
different attitudes towards Turkey, we see that at the EU-25 level (see Figure
6 and Table 4; see also Appendix C for the figure representing individual
countries), there is a positive consensus about the perception that this country
belongs to Europe because of its geography. Public opinion is divided, however,
on the consideration of Turkey being part of Europe by virtue of its history.
In 10 of the countries/regions, the negative perceptions are predominant (Belgium,
Denmark, West Germany, East Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Cyprus and the Czech Republic). In eight areas, the opinion that Turkey belongs
to Europe also owing to its history is held by the majority (Spain, Ireland,
Austria, Sweden, Northern Ireland, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak
Republic). In another eight countries, public opinion is fairly split between
those who think that Turkey is part of Europe because of its history and those
who do not share this perception (Finland, Italy, Portugal, Great Britain,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia).
Figure 6. Net agreement on
each aspect of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (EU-25)

Source: EB64.2 (2005).
As regards the aspects related to the instrumental dimension,
a majority of EU citizens do not believe that Turkey’s membership will enhance
security in the area or rejuvenate the EU’s ageing population. Yet on the
former issue, at the individual country/regional level citizens are divided
about the impact of Turkey’s membership on security. This is the case in Denmark,
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain and Estonia. Only in
Sweden, Northern Ireland and Poland are the percentages of those who hold
this opinion larger than those who do not agree with this interpretation.
Table 4. Net agreement on
each aspect of attitude towards Turkey’s membership, by country
| |
Geography
|
History
|
Security
|
Comprehension
|
Cultural differences
|
Rejuvenation
|
Immigration
|
Human rights
|
Economy
|
|
Belgium
|
14
|
-14
|
-29
|
-16
|
26
|
-30
|
38
|
94
|
84
|
|
Denmark
|
12
|
-30
|
-6
|
-11
|
26
|
2
|
50
|
96
|
78
|
|
West Germany
|
4
|
-28
|
-38
|
-12
|
50
|
-32
|
54
|
88
|
78
|
|
East Germany
|
29
|
-20
|
-34
|
-24
|
32
|
-40
|
60
|
86
|
78
|
|
Greece
|
17
|
-74
|
-38
|
-54
|
54
|
-50
|
66
|
92
|
88
|
|
Spain
|
26
|
13
|
-4
|
8
|
22
|
20
|
58
|
82
|
76
|
|
Finland
|
32
|
8
|
-28
|
-4
|
23
|
-34
|
66
|
92
|
84
|
|
France
|
8
|
-26
|
-26
|
-24
|
26
|
-32
|
42
|
92
|
74
|
|
Ireland
|
46
|
28
|
-12
|
6
|
38
|
-6
|
58
|
94
|
84
|
|
Italy
|
20
|
0
|
-8
|
-18
|
29
|
-38
|
26
|
66
|
66
|
|
Luxembourg
|
22
|
-22
|
-44
|
-30
|
52
|
-52
|
10
|
92
|
78
|
|
Netherlands
|
20
|
-32
|
-8
|
0
|
-2
|
-26
|
32
|
94
|
74
|
|
Austria
|
6
|
18
|
-58
|
-53
|
66
|
-44
|
62
|
78
|
78
|
|
Portugal
|
30
|
-4
|
0
|
4
|
26
|
-12
|
42
|
74
|
68
|
|
Sweden
|
64
|
16
|
34
|
12
|
10
|
-22
|
38
|
98
|
82
|
|
Great Britain
|
28
|
-4
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
-22
|
36
|
88
|
74
|
|
Northern Ireland
|
42
|
34
|
12
|
30
|
-2
|
14
|
62
|
94
|
82
|
|
Cyprus
|
29
|
-76
|
-30
|
-32
|
44
|
-46
|
80
|
32
|
62
|
|
Czech Republic
|
32
|
-10
|
-24
|
-24
|
32
|
-52
|
56
|
88
|
78
|
|
Estonia
|
42
|
14
|
4
|
-16
|
52
|
-24
|
76
|
90
|
84
|
|
Hungry
|
52
|
50
|
-22
|
-2
|
16
|
-38
|
46
|
86
|
84
|
|
Latvia
|
30
|
-6
|
-18
|
-28
|
42
|
-38
|
66
|
84
|
78
|
|
Lithuania
|
36
|
6
|
-22
|
-24
|
49
|
-36
|
48
|
76
|
76
|
|
Malta
|
30
|
6
|
-12
|
-8
|
38
|
38
|
44
|
90
|
86
|
|
Poland
|
70
|
50
|
18
|
12
|
12
|
-18
|
62
|
89
|
84
|
|
Slovakia
|
44
|
14
|
-30
|
-28
|
30
|
-62
|
46
|
82
|
76
|
|
Slovenia
|
30
|
9
|
-14
|
-12
|
16
|
-24
|
50
|
90
|
86
|
|
EU-25 average
|
30.2
|
-3.0
|
-16.2
|
-12.9
|
30.0
|
-26.1
|
50.9
|
85.4
|
78.5
|
Source: EB 64.2 (2005)
There is less division among member states regarding
the view that Turkey’s membership will not be very important for the rejuvenation
of the EU’s population. Europeans are split in West Germany and Ireland alone;
only in Spain, Northern Ireland and Malta do we find larger percentages of
those who think that the impact of Turkey’s membership will be positive on
this issue. Most EU citizens also agree that Turkey’s membership will increase
immigration to more developed EU countries: the consensus is positive in all
countries, only being weaker in Luxembourg.
There are virtually no divisions among member states
concerning their understanding that Turkey will have to improve its economy
substantially before it can join the Union (we have already commented on the
significance of this aspect).
Finally, on the indicators of post-national attitudes,
Figure 6 shows that the consensus is negative regarding the perception that
Turkey’s membership will have a positive effect on mutual cultural understanding.
In fact, most Europeans think that the cultural differences are too large
to allow for Turkey’s accession. Concerning mutual comprehension, public opinion
is divided in Spain, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain
and Malta; only in Sweden and Poland is there a majority of citizens who think
that Turkey’s membership will have a positive impact on mutual understanding.
There are almost no differences among national public opinions on their view
that the cultural differences are still too large. Only in the Netherlands,
Great Britain and Northern Ireland are citizens split over this topic. There
are virtually no divisions among member states regarding their understanding
that Turkey will have to respect human rights before it can join the Union
(although again, we must note that there are problems with this item in QA45).
Having examined the different dimensions and the importance
given to them across the EU member states, we next consider the extent to
which these dimensions explain support for Turkey’s membership. In other words,
which of these dimensions or aspects (or both) are relevant for explaining
support for Turkey’s membership in each country?
A logistic regression with these three dimensions as
independent variables shows that they are quite relevant (Table 5). On average,
they explain 58% of the variance in public support for Turkey’s enlargement
(60% in the EU-15 member states and 52% in the NMS-10). The dimensions are
also relevant for the explanation of public assent in each individual country,
and while a little less explicative in the NMS-10, they are still pertinent.
As the correlation analysis suggests, the post-national
dimension is the most important one for explaining support for Turkey’s membership,
followed by the instrumental one and then the identity dimension in last place.
Although this sequence is not maintained in all of the countries, in almost
all of them the identity dimension comes last when attempting to clarify public
support for membership (the only exception being Denmark). The instrumental
dimension is the most important one, however, in the following countries:
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, Great Britain, Cyprus, Hungary,
Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (see also Table 6).
Table 5. Logistic regression:
Impact of attitudinal dimensions on support for Turkey’s
membership†
| |
EU-25
|
EU-15
|
NMS-10
|
Belgium
|
Denmark
|
West
Germany
|
East
Germany
|
Greece
|
Spain
|
|
Post-national
|
4.024***
|
4.126***
|
3.649***
|
3.343***
|
5.019***
|
6.164***
|
4.053***
|
3.173***
|
3.976***
|
|
Instrumental
|
3.284***
|
3.289***
|
3.801***
|
2.061***
|
1.876***
|
2.657***
|
2.387***
|
11.663***
|
6.473***
|
|
Identity
|
1.634***
|
1.689***
|
1.210***
|
1.854***
|
2.294***
|
1.793***
|
1.620***
|
1.716**
|
1.461**
|
|
N
|
21343
|
13583
|
7760
|
987
|
945
|
972
|
484
|
998
|
724
|
|
R2
|
.586
|
.597
|
.523
|
0.577
|
0.685
|
0.664
|
.630
|
.633
|
0.5844
|
| |
Finland
|
France
|
Ireland
|
Italy
|
Luxembourg
|
Netherlands
|
Austria
|
Portugal
|
Sweden
|
|
Post-national
|
3.690***
|
4.7***
|
3.322***
|
3.981***
|
4.557***
|
4.187***
|
4.077***
|
1.673***
|
3.799***
|
|
Instrumental
|
2.066***
|
4.185***
|
3.765***
|
2.735***
|
2.352***
|
2.575***
|
8.459***
|
2.895***
|
2.578***
|
|
Identity
|
1.61***
|
2.206***
|
1.713***
|
1.645***
|
2.001***
|
1.774***
|
2.112***
|
1.496***
|
1.610***
|
|
N
|
975
|
891
|
730
|
841
|
475
|
968
|
930
|
728
|
918
|
|
R2
|
0.517
|
0.66
|
0.49
|
0.516
|
0.585
|
0.612
|
0.746
|
0.231
|
0.547
|
| |
Great Britain
|
Northern Ireland
|
Cyprus
|
Czech Republic
|
Estonia
|
Hungary
|
Latvia
|
Lithuania
|
Malta
|
|
Post-national
|
3.778***
|
3.570***
|
1.962***
|
3.485***
|
3.045***
|
2.283
|
2.857***
|
2.813***
|
2.894***
|
|
Instrumental
|
4.015***
|
ns
|
4.862***
|
3.162***
|
3.007***
|
3.665***
|
2.795***
|
3.624***
|
2.614**
|
|
Identity
|
1.641***
|
1.474*
|
ns
|
1.402***
|
1.315***
|
1.373***
|
1.415***
|
1.38*
|
2.199***
|
|
N
|
810
|
217
|
478
|
1020
|
793
|
823
|
832
|
766
|
382
|
|
R2
|
0.552
|
0.269
|
0.34
|
0.512
|
0.465
|
0.432
|
0.393
|
0.432
|
0.503
|
| |
Poland
|
Slovakia
|
Slovenia
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Post-national
|
4.729***
|
3.404***
|
2.860***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Instrumental
|
4.206***
|
4.758***
|
2.937***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Identity
|
ns
|
1.253*
|
1.484***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
N
|
770
|
926
|
970
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
R2
|
0.555
|
0.499
|
0.483
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
†Odds ratios are reported instead of the beta coefficient. The odds ratios are comparable and can be translated into probabilities: (Odds)/(Odds+1). Source: EB 64.2 (2005)
Table 6. Logistic regression:
Impact of individual items in QA45 on support for Turkey’s membership†
| |
EU-25
|
EU-15
|
NMS-10
|
Belgium
|
Denmark
|
West
Germany
|
East
Germany
|
Greece
|
Spain
|
|
Geography
|
2.343***
|
2.462***
|
1.450**
|
3.590***
|
3.284***
|
2.405*
|
2.518*
|
2.651**
|
ns
|
|
History
|
1.730**
|
1.657***
|
1.541***
|
1.749*
|
4.800***
|
2.000*
|
2.331*
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Security
|
4.332***
|
4.604***
|
3.638***
|
2.220***
|
3.783***
|
3.648***
|
7.575***
|
18.987***
|
7.146***
|
|
Comprehension
|
4.188***
|
4.281***
|
4.111***
|
2.290***
|
9.478***
|
7.926***
|
3.267**
|
5.509***
|
6.175***
|
|
Cultural differences
|
.177***
|
.168***
|
.225***
|
.103***
|
.095***
|
.094***
|
.125***
|
.195***
|
.222***
|
|
Rejuvenation
|
2.193***
|
2.304***
|
2.111***
|
2.250***
|
ns
|
2.852***
|
ns
|
4.446***
|
3.527**
|
|
Immigration
|
.618***
|
.593***
|
.641***
|
ns
|
.482*
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Human rights
|
1.201***
|
ns
|
1.470*
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Economy
|
1.025***
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Constant
|
.107***
|
.101***
|
.117***
|
.183***
|
.021**
|
.068***
|
.127***
|
.044***
|
.069***
|
|
N
|
14799
|
9726
|
5073
|
881
|
568
|
800
|
406
|
870
|
382
|
|
R2
|
0.606
|
0.615
|
0.547
|
0.604
|
0.752
|
0.653
|
0.675
|
0.692
|
0.711
|
| |
Finland
|
France
|
Ireland
|
Italy
|
Luxembourg
|
Netherlands
|
Austria
|
Portugal
|
Sweden
|
|
Geography
|
ns
|
3.940***
|
4.357**
|
ns
|
ns
|
3.426***
|
ns
|
1.559*
|
6.850***
|
|
History
|
2.557
|
2.151*
|
ns
|
ns
|
6.212**
|
2.298***
|
13.371**
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Security
|
2.296***
|
6.045***
|
5.088***
|
4.837***
|
6.286**
|
3.476***
|
8.306***
|
2.753***
|
2.396**
|
|
Comprehension
|
3.302***
|
4.045***
|
3.308**
|
5.962***
|
3.993*
|
3.287***
|
7.593**
|
2.654***
|
3.528***
|
|
Cultural differences
|
.178***
|
.132***
|
.140***
|
.193***
|
.063***
|
.170***
|
.104***
|
ns
|
.165***
|
|
Rejuvenation
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
1.948**
|
2.693**
|
1.678*
|
2.435***
|
|
Immigration
|
ns
|
.273***
|
.265**
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
.504**
|
|
Human rights
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
8.199*
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Economy
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
10.641*
|
2.914**
|
ns
|
|
Constant
|
.130***
|
.094***
|
.166*
|
.095***
|
ns
|
.301*
|
.000***
|
.150***
|
ns
|
|
N
|
829
|
621
|
330
|
596
|
293
|
688
|
761
|
501
|
590
|
|
R2
|
0.49
|
0.677
|
0.637
|
0.528
|
0.654
|
0.607
|
0.762
|
0.297
|
0.568
|
Table 6. Continued
|
Great Britain
|
Northern Ireland
|
Cyprus
|
Czech Republic
|
Estonia
|
Hungry
|
Latvia
|
Lithuania
|
Malta
|
|
Geography
|
2.431*
|
|
ns
|
ns
|
2.440*
|
1.923*
|
ns
|
ns
|
3.287*
|
|
History
|
ns
|
|
ns
|
1.943**
|
ns
|
ns
|
1.735*
|
ns
|
3.798**
|
|
Security
|
6.171***
|
|
15.793***
|
3.374***
|
4.771***
|
3.433***
|
ns
|
4.323***
|
ns
|
|
Comprehension
|
3.031**
|
|
6.789***
|
4.352***
|
2.592**
|
2.565***
|
6.541***
|
6.891***
|
4.567*
|
|
Cultural differences
|
.297***
|
|
ns
|
.273***
|
.114***
|
.281***
|
.175***
|
ns
|
.238**
|
|
Rejuvenation
|
.650**
|
|
ns
|
2.182**
|
1.801*
|
2.271**
|
2.243**
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Immigration
|
.233***
|
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
.551*
|
ns
|
ns
|
.194**
|
|
Human rights
|
ns
|
|
ns
|
7.455***
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
4.651*
|
ns
|
|
Economy
|
ns
|
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
4.755**
|
ns
|
.168*
|
ns
|
|
Constant
|
.134***
|
|
.001***
|
.032***
|
ns
|
.284**
|
.233***
|
.084*
|
.136*
|
|
N
|
441
|
79
|
386
|
733
|
495
|
563
|
493
|
374
|
157
|
|
R2
|
0.636
|
|
0.551
|
0.55
|
0.566
|
0.432
|
0.456
|
0.532
|
0.628
|
| |
Poland
|
Slovakia
|
Slovenia
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Geography
|
ns
|
ns
|
1.771*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
History
|
ns
|
1.819*
|
1.912**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Security
|
4.478***
|
3.380***
|
2.506***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comprehension
|
4.436***
|
5.901***
|
3.003***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cultural differences
|
.155***
|
.561*
|
.187***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rejuvenation
|
1.981*
|
2.577***
|
2.018**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Immigration
|
ns
|
.328***
|
.557*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Human rights
|
ns
|
2.378*
|
ns
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Economy
|
ns
|
ns
|
3.170*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Constant
|
.144**
|
.112***
|
.091***
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
N
|
450
|
706
|
766
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
R2
|
0.585
|
0.545
|
0.519
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
† Odds ratios are reported instead of the beta coefficient. The odds ratios are comparable and can be translated into probabilities: (Odds)/(Odds+1). Source: EB 64.2 (2005)
Conclusions
Having examined the available empirical evidence on attitudes
towards Turkey’s membership of the EU, we can offer the following conclusions.
·
First, support for
Turkish membership is not only low, it is also declining. Whereas accession
candidates from the Western Balkans have benefited from increased public support
for enlargement as a consequence of the 2004 enlargement Turkey has been an
exception to this trend. Turkish membership is proving to be the least popular
among recent EU enlargement processes.
·
Second, we show that
public support for Turkish membership can be understood along three different
dimensions: instrumental, identitarian and post-national (or civic). In each
of these dimensions, citizens may find different arguments for being for or
against Turkey’s accession. We show that the publics in different EU member
states and regions mix the three dimensions in varying ways.
·
Third, we find that
supporters for Turkish accession are mostly counted among the ranks of those
having a post-national vision of the EU. Conversely, those against Turkish
accession are more likely to be so departing from identity-related arguments.
We also find that the utilitarian dimension is the least important of the
three.
The policy implications of our findings can be summarised
as follows:
·
First, since public
support for enlargement is increasingly considered a key variable in determining
the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, it seems evident that policy-makers need to
pay more attention not only to the accession negotiations themselves, but
also to the elements determining public support for or opposition to Turkish
accession.
·
Second, given that
public opinion remains structured along national lines, it does not easily
allow for the emergence of a much-needed EU-wide debate. The debate about
Turkey’s accession is and will continue to be a constitutive debate about
European identity and values. Yet the weakness of the European public sphere
implies that consensus on Turkey’s membership will be difficult to reach.
A strategy to ‘Europeanise’ the national debates on Turkey’s membership may
thus be crucial for both those in favour and those against. But because accession
will be dealt with by unanimity, and taking into account that negative sentiments
prevail in a good number of countries, this strategy is more critical for
the former than for the latter.
·
Third, since the instrumental
dimension is not central to the debate, a strategy highlighting the likely
benefits of Turkish membership may hardly impress those already against Turkey’s
accession. With accession lying a decade ahead, the sorts of conclusions we
may derive about the likely impact of membership on budgets, the movement
of people, etc., will at best be probabilistic and never conclusive. Therefore,
we suggest that those in favour of Turkish membership should be more ready
to show that there are more reasons to support accession despite its likely
costs and not merely because of its benefits.
As has been the case with preceding enlargement rounds,
the net balance of membership for both the EU and the acceding countries can
only be properly assessed 20 years after accession, once the full benefits
have been realised. Spain is a good case in point (Piedrafita et al., 2006).
Had the decision on Spanish membership been taken based on the (overwhelmingly
negative) assessment of the costs, Spain would never have become a member
state.
Detailed impact assessments and prospective studies about
the likely costs and benefits of Turkish membership are of course an essential
tool for policy-makers to prepare both parties (the EU and Turkey) for accession.
Still, as membership will not solely be settled on cost/benefit grounds, policy-makers
should pay more attention to the way the debate about EU values is framed.
Thus, those in favour of Turkish accession may do well to devote more time
and energy to try to frame the debate in post-national terms.
The more the discourse on Turkey is played along identity
lines, as we have argued, the more likely it is that support will remain low.
Conversely, the more the discussion about Turkey is held and justified along
post-national arguments, the more likely it is that support will be high.
Therefore, whether those against Turkish accession tend to frame the debate
in terms of European identity, those in favour of Turkey’s membership should
be more ready to justify their position in terms of the European values embodied
in TEU Arts. 49 and 6.1, and the need to treat accession candidates objectively
and according to the same standards. Jon Elster (1991) has defined “arguing”
as the act of “engaging in communication for the purpose of persuading an
opponent, i.e. to make [the] other change beliefs about factual or normative
matters”. To us, it is evident that Turkish membership needs more arguing
and maybe a bit less bargaining.
Antonia M. Ruiz-Jiménez Professor at Universidad Pablo Olavide (Seville)
José I. Torreblanca Senior Analyst, Europe, Elcano Royal Institute and Professor at UNED University
References
Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998), Legitimacy and the
European Union, New York, NY: Logman.
Carey, S. (2002), “Undivided loyalties: Is national identity
an obstacle to European integration?”, European Union Politics, Vol.
3, No. 4, pp. 387-413.
Centre for European Reform (2006), Enlargement Two
Years on: Economic Success or Political Failure?, Briefing paper for the
Confederation of Danish Industries and the Central Organization of Industrial
Employees in Denmark, Centre for European Reform, London, April.
Christin, T. and A. Trechsel (2002), “Joining the EU?
Explaining public opinion in Switzerland”, European Union Politics,
Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 415-43.
Chryssochoou, D.N. (2001), Towards a civic conception
of the European polity, ESRC “One Europe or Several?” Programme Working
Paper No. 33/01, Economic Social and Research Council, London.
Diez-Medrano, J. (2003), Framing Europe: Attitudes
to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Eichenberg, R. and R. Dalton (1993), “Europeans and the
European Community: The dynamics of public support for European integration”,
International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 507-34.
Elster, J. (1991), “Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal
Convention and the Assemblée Constituante”, Working Paper No. 4, Center
for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, University of Chicago
Law School.
Eriksen, E.O. (2003), “Integration and the quest for
consensus: On the micro-foundations of supranationalism”, in European governance,
deliberation and the quest for democratisation, E.O. Eriksen, C.
Joerges and J. Neyer (eds), ARENA Report No. 2/03, Advanced Research on the
Europeanisation of the Nation State, University of Oslo.
European Commission (2006a), Enlargement Two Years
After: An Economic Evaluation, Occasional Paper No. 24, Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, May.
–––––––––– (2006b), Report on the Functioning of the
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (Period 1 May
2004 – 30 April 2006), Draft, COM(2006), IP/06/130, European Commission,
Brussels, 8 November.
Franklin, M., M. Marsh and L. McLaren (1994), “Uncorking
the bottle: Popular opposition to European unification in the wake of Maastricht”,
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 455.
Friis, L. (1998), “‘The End of the Beginning’ of Eastern
Enlargement: The Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-Setting”, European Integration
Online Papers, Vol. 2, No. 7.
Gabel, M. (1998), Interest and integration: Market
liberalization, public opinion and European Union, Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press.
Gabel, M. and H.D. Palmer (1995), “Understanding Variation
in Public Support for the European Integration”, European Journal of Political
Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 3-19.
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2004), “Does identity or economic
rationality drive public opinion on European integration?”, Political Science
Online, July (retrieved from www.apsanet.org).
Kaltenthaler, K.C. and C. Anderson (2001), “Europeans
and Their Money: Explaining Public Support for the European Currency”, European
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 347-61.
Lundgren, A. (2002), “The limits of enlargement”, Paper
prepared for the ARENA Conference on “Democracy and European Governance”,
held in Oslo on 4-5 March 2002.
March, J. and J. P. Olsen (1989), Rediscovering institutions:
The organizational basis of politics, New York, NY: Free Press.
Moravcsik, A. and M.A. Vachudova (2003), National
interest, state power and the EU enlargement, Working Paper No. 97, Center
for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Olsen, J.P. (1996), Europeanization and Nation-State
Dynamics, ARENA Report No. 96/3, Advanced Research on the Europeanisation
of the Nation State, University of Oslo, pp. 245-85.
Piedrafita, S. and J.I. Torreblanca (2005), “The three
logics of EU enlargement: Interest, identities and arguments”, Politique
Européene, 15, pp. 25-69.
Piedrafita, S., F. Steinberg and J.I. Torreblanca (2006),
Twenty years of Spain’s membership in the EU (1986-2006), Elcano Royal
Institute for International Affairs, Madrid.
Ricard-Nihoul, G. (2005), « Le “non” français du
29 mai 2005: comprendre, agir », Etudes et Recherches No. 44, Notre
Europe, Paris, 18 October.
Ruiz Jiménez, A., J. Górnial, A. Kosic, P. Kiss and M.
Kandulla (2004), “European and national identities in the EU’s old and new
Member States: Ethnic, civic, instrumental and symbolic components”, European
Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8, No. 11.
Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000), “The Political Basis of Support
for European Integration”, European Union Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2,
pp. 147-71.
Schimmelfenning, F. (2001), “The community trap: Liberal
norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union”,
International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 47-80.
Sitter, N. (2001), “The politics of opposition and European
integration in Scandinavia: Euro-scepticism a government-opposition dynamic?”,
West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 22-39.
Sjursen, H. (2004), Enlargement in perspective,
ARENA Report 2/05, Proceedings for the CIDEL Workshop held in Avila, May 2004,
Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State, University of
Oslo.
–––––––––– (ed.) (2002), Enlargement and the finality
of the EU, ARENA Report 7/02, Advanced Research on the Europeanisation
of the Nation State, University of Oslo.
–––––––––– (ed.) (2007), Questioning EU enlargement:
Europe in search of identity, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.
Van der Veen, A.M. (2002), “Determinants of European
identity: A preliminary investigation using Eurobarometer data” (retrieved
from http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/vanderveen.html).
Appendix A. Tables
Table A1. Historical trends: Net support
for Turkey’s membership among EU-15 member states (supporters minus contesters)
| |
EB 54.1 (2000)
|
EB 56.2 (2001)
|
EB 57.1 (2002)
|
EB 58.1
(2002)
|
|
EU-15
|
-18
|
-12
|
-16
|
-17
|
|
Belgium
|
-31
|
-22
|
-19
|
-25
|
|
Denmark
|
-20
|
-24
|
-21
|
-33
|
|
Germany
|
-33
|
-22
|
-26
|
-26
|
|
Greece
|
-41
|
-39
|
-49
|
-49
|
|
Spain
|
18
|
16
|
16
|
5
|
|
France
|
-41
|
-41
|
-45
|
-41
|
|
Italy
|
-14
|
-11
|
-27
|
-15
|
|
Luxembourg
|
-40
|
-30
|
-32
|
-29
|
|
Netherlands
|
1
|
0
|
-9
|
-12
|
|
Austria
|
-42
|
-25
|
-21
|
-29
|
|
Portugal
|
10
|
20
|
22
|
14
|
|
Finland
|
-26
|
-30
|
-20
|
-33
|
|
Sweden
|
-9
|
2
|
-10
|
-10
|
|
United Kingdom
|
-2
|
7
|
1
|
4
|
Sources: Eurobarometer surveys 54.1 (2000),
56.2 (2001), 57.1 (2002) and 58.1 (2002).
Table A2. Mean importance of the post-national,
instrumental and identitarian dimensions in support for Turkey’s membership,
by country (1–5 scale)†
| |
Post-national attitudes
|
Instrumental attitudes
|
Identity
attitudes
|
|
Cyprus
|
2.4
|
2.6
|
2.0
|
|
Greece
|
2.2
|
2.7
|
2.2
|
|
France
|
2.5
|
2.9
|
2.7
|
|
West Germany
|
2.4
|
2.8
|
2.8
|
|
Austria
|
2.0
|
2.7
|
2.8
|
|
Denmark
|
2.6
|
3.1
|
2.9
|
|
Netherlands
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
2.9
|
|
Belgium
|
2.6
|
2.9
|
3.0
|
|
Luxembourg
|
2.3
|
2.9
|
3.0
|
|
Great Britain
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
3.1
|
|
Italy
|
2.7
|
3.0
|
3.1
|
|
East Germany
|
2.6
|
2.8
|
3.1
|
Table A2. Continued
|
Malta
|
2.7
|
3.0
|
3.1
|
|
Portugal
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
3.1
|
|
Latvia
|
2.5
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
|
Czech Republic
|
2.6
|
2.8
|
3.1
|
|
Spain
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
3.1
|
|
Slovenia
|
2.7
|
3.0
|
3.2
|
|
Lithuania
|
2.6
|
2.9
|
3.2
|
|
Estonia
|
2.5
|
2.9
|
3.3
|
|
Northern Ireland
|
3.1
|
3.1
|
3.3
|
|
Finland
|
2.7
|
2.9
|
3.3
|
|
Slovakia
|
2.6
|
2.8
|
3.4
|
|
Ireland
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
3.4
|
|
Sweden
|
3.1
|
3.2
|
3.7
|
|
Hungary
|
2.8
|
2.9
|
3.7
|
|
Poland
|
3.0
|
3.1
|
3.7
|
|
Average mean
|
2.7
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
† All differences are statistically significant at the 0.005 level (ANOVA). Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Appendix B. Summary of SPSS Outputs (Contingency Tables)
Table B1. Country * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Belgium
|
Count
|
616
|
371
|
987
|
| |
% of country
|
62.4
|
37.6
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
3.5
|
-3.5
|
–
|
|
Denmark
|
Count
|
610
|
336
|
946
|
| |
% of country
|
64.5
|
35.5
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
4.7
|
-4.7
|
–
|
|
West Germany
|
Count
|
767
|
197
|
964
|
| |
% of country
|
79.6
|
20.4
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
14.4
|
-14.4
|
–
|
|
East Germany
|
Count
|
350
|
139
|
489
|
| |
% of country
|
71.6
|
28.4
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
6.5
|
-6.5
|
–
|
|
Greece
|
Count
|
787
|
201
|
988
|
| |
% of country
|
79.7
|
20.3
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
14.6
|
-14.6
|
–
|
|
Spain
|
Count
|
331
|
411
|
742
|
| |
% of country
|
44.6
|
55.4
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-7.0
|
7.0
|
–
|
|
Finland
|
Count
|
661
|
316
|
977
|
| |
% of country
|
67.7
|
32.3
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
6.8
|
-6.8
|
–
|
|
France
|
Count
|
681
|
209
|
890
|
| |
% of country
|
76.5
|
23.5
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
11.9
|
-11.9
|
–
|
|
Ireland
|
Count
|
402
|
335
|
737
|
| |
% of country
|
54.5
|
45.5
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-1.4
|
1.4
|
–
|
|
Italy
|
Count
|
572
|
270
|
842
|
| |
% of country
|
67.9
|
32.1
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
6.5
|
-6.5
|
–
|
Table B1. Continued
|
Luxembourg
|
Count
|
378
|
96
|
474
|
| |
% of country
|
79.7
|
20.3
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
10.1
|
-10.1
|
–
|
|
Netherlands
|
Count
|
541
|
428
|
969
|
| |
% of country
|
55.8
|
44.2
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-0.8
|
0.8
|
–
|
|
Austria
|
Count
|
813
|
111
|
924
|
| |
% of country
|
88.0
|
12.0
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
19.3
|
-19.3
|
–
|
|
Portugal
|
Count
|
378
|
402
|
780
|
| |
% of country
|
48.5
|
51.5
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-4.9
|
4.9
|
–
|
|
Sweden
|
Count
|
424
|
494
|
918
|
| |
% of country
|
46.2
|
53.8
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-6.8
|
6.8
|
–
|
|
Great Britain
|
Count
|
432
|
383
|
815
|
| |
% of country
|
53.0
|
47.0
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-2.4
|
2.4
|
–
|
|
Northern Ireland
|
Count
|
91
|
130
|
221
|
| |
% of country
|
41.2
|
58.8
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-4.8
|
4.8
|
–
|
|
Cyprus
|
Count
|
402
|
79
|
481
|
| |
% of country
|
83.6
|
16.4
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
11.9
|
-11.9
|
–
|
|
Czech Republic
|
Count
|
664
|
350
|
1.014
|
| |
% of country
|
65.5
|
34.5
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
5.5
|
-5.5
|
–
|
|
Estonia
|
Count
|
533
|
271
|
804
|
| |
% of country
|
66.3
|
33.7
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
5.4
|
-5.4
|
–
|
|
Hungary
|
Count
|
427
|
409
|
836
|
| |
% of country
|
51.1
|
48.9
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-3.6
|
3.6
|
–
|
|
Latvia
|
Count
|
525
|
321
|
846
|
| |
% of country
|
62.1
|
37.9
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
3.0
|
-3.0
|
–
|
Table B1. Continued
|
Lithuania
|
Count
|
511
|
271
|
782
|
| |
% of country
|
65.3
|
34.7
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
4.7
|
-4.7
|
–
|
|
Malta
|
Count
|
201
|
195
|
396
|
| |
% of country
|
50.8
|
49.2
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-2.6
|
2.6
|
–
|
|
Poland
|
Count
|
368
|
416
|
784
|
| |
% of country
|
46.9
|
53.1
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-5.8
|
5.8
|
–
|
|
Slovakia
|
Count
|
618
|
310
|
928
|
| |
% of country
|
66.6
|
33.4
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
6.0
|
-6.0
|
–
|
|
Slovenia
|
Count
|
461
|
510
|
971
|
| |
% of country
|
47.5
|
52.5
|
100
|
| |
Adjusted residuals
|
-6.2
|
6.2
|
–
|
X2 = 36664*** Phi = .381*** V Cramer = .381*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B2. Q45_Tk_geography01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_geography01
|
0
|
Count
|
6,776
|
1,135
|
7,911
|
| |
|
% of row
|
85.7
|
14.3
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
51.2
|
-51.2
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
6,022
|
5,988
|
12,010
|
| |
|
% of row
|
50.1
|
49.9
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-51.2
|
51.2
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,798
|
7,123
|
19,921
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.2
|
35.8
|
100
|
X2 = 2618.271*** Phi = .363*** V Cramer = .363*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B3. Q45_Tk_history01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_history01
|
0
|
Count
|
8,474
|
1,872
|
10,346
|
| |
|
% of row
|
81.9
|
18.1
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
53.5
|
-53.5
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
4,064
|
4,945
|
9,009
|
| |
|
% of row
|
45.1
|
5.9
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-53.5
|
53.5
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,538
|
6,817
|
19,365
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.8
|
35.2
|
100
|
X2 = 2857.673*** Phi = .384*** V Cramer = .384*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B4. Q45_Tk_security01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_security01
|
0
|
Count
|
9,735
|
1,340
|
11,075
|
| |
|
% of row
|
87.9
|
12.1
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
78.4
|
-78.4
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
2,639
|
5,366
|
8,005
|
| |
|
% of row
|
33.0
|
67.0
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-78.4
|
78.4
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,374
|
6,706
|
19,080
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.9
|
35.1
|
100
|
X2 = 6151.610*** Phi = .568*** V Cramer = .568*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B5. Q45_Tk_comprehension01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_comprehension01
|
0
|
Count
|
9,587
|
1,237
|
10,824
|
| |
|
% of row
|
88.6
|
11.4
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
78.0
|
-78.0
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
2,924
|
5,543
|
8,467
|
| |
|
% of row
|
34.5
|
65.5
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-78.0
|
78.0
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,511
|
6,780
|
19,291
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.9
|
35.1
|
100
|
X2 = 6086.152*** Phi = .562*** V Cramer = .562*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B6. Q45_Tk_diff_cult01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_diff_cult01
|
0
|
Count
|
2,666
|
4,359
|
7,025
|
| |
|
% of row
|
38.0
|
62.0
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-60.9
|
60.9
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
10,198
|
2,384
|
12,582
|
| |
|
% of row
|
81.1
|
18.9
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
60.9
|
-60.9
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,864
|
6,743
|
19,607
|
| |
|
% of row
|
65.6
|
34.4
|
100
|
X2 = 3711.720*** Phi = -.435*** V Cramer = .435*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B7. Q45_Tk_rejuvenation01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_rejuvenation01
|
0
|
Count
|
9,230
|
2,282
|
11,512
|
| |
|
% of row
|
80.2
|
19.8
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
52.6
|
-52.6
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
2,717
|
3,812
|
6,529
|
| |
|
% of row
|
41.6
|
58.4
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-52.6
|
52.6
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
11,947
|
6,094
|
18,041
|
| |
|
% of row
|
66.2
|
33.8
|
100
|
X2 = 2769.717*** Phi = .392*** V Cramer = .392*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B8. Q45_Tk_immigration01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_immigration01
|
0
|
Count
|
2,924
|
2,313
|
5,237
|
| |
|
% of row
|
55.8
|
44.2
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-16.6
|
16.6
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
9,797
|
4,484
|
14,281
|
| |
|
% of row
|
68.6
|
31.4
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
16.6
|
-16.6
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,721
|
6,797
|
19,518
|
| |
|
% of row
|
65.2
|
34.8
|
100
|
X2 = 275.229*** Phi = -.119*** V Cramer = .119 Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B9. Q45_Tk_human_rights01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_human_rights01
|
0
|
Count
|
1,211
|
300
|
1,511
|
| |
|
% of row
|
80.1
|
19.9
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
13.4
|
-13.4
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
11,737
|
6,908
|
18,645
|
| |
|
% of row
|
62.9
|
37.1
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-13.4
|
13.4
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,948
|
7,208
|
20,156
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.2
|
35.8
|
100
|
X2 = 179.910*** Phi = .094*** V Cramer = .094*** Source: Author’s calculations.
Table B10. Q45_Tk_economy01 * Q44_member_Turkey01
| |
|
|
Q44_member_Turkey01
|
Total
|
| |
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
|
Q45_Tk_economy01
|
0
|
Count
|
1,539
|
807
|
2,346
|
| |
|
% of row
|
65.6
|
34.4
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
1.3
|
-1.3
|
–
|
| |
1
|
Count
|
11,002
|
6,116
|
17,118
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.3
|
35.7
|
100
|
| |
|
Adjusted residuals
|
-1.3
|
1.3
|
–
|
|
Total
|
|
Count
|
12,541
|
6,923
|
19,464
|
| |
|
% of row
|
64.4
|
35.6
|
100
|
X2 = 1.591 ns Phi = .009 ns V Cramer = .009 ns Source: Author’s calculations.
Appendix C. Figures
Figure C1. Net support for Turkey in
current member states (supporters minus contesters)

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C2. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Belgium

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C3. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Finland
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C4. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Denmark

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C5. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in France

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C6. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in West Germany

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C7. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Ireland

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C8. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in East Germany

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C9. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Italy

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C10. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Spain
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C11. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Luxembourg
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C12. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Greece
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C13. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in the Netherlands
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C14. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Austria
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C15. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in the Czech Republic
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C16. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Portugal
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C17. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Estonia
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C18. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Sweden
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C19. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Hungary
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C20. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Great Britain
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C21. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Latvia
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C22. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Northern Ireland

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C23. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Lithuania

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C24. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Cyprus

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C25. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Malta

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C26. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Poland

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C27. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Slovakia

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
Figure C28. Net importance of single
items of attitude towards Turkey’s membership (supporters minus contesters)
in Slovenia

Source: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005).
|