Theme: This analysis presents the dominant views in Spain concerning the current state of the European integration process, including the constitutional crisis, the possibilities of further enlargement and the available options for the future.
Summary: The most recent issue of EU-25 Watch, a joint European project in which the Elcano Royal Institute participates, provides a valuable insight into the national debates on key EU topics such as the constitutional treaty, enlargement, foreign policy and the Lisbon agenda during the so-called ‘reflection period’. This ARI reviews the country study on Spain and Spain’s European policy (the full report is available at http://www.iep-berlin.de/publik/EU25-Watch/).
1. The Constitutional Crisis
On 20 February 2005, Spain held a (non-binding) consultative referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). The turnout was relatively low, at only 42.32%, but 76.73% of the voters approved the Constitution, while only 17.24% rejected it and 6.03% cast blank votes.
On 28 April 2005, in accordance with Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution (1978), the Spanish Parliament ratified the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) by 337 votes in favour, 19 against and no abstentions. The main national parties (Socialist –PSOE– and People’s –PP–) voted in favour, along with the centre-right Basque, Catalan and Canary Island nationalists (PNV, CIU and CC, respectively). The left-wing nationalist parties in Catalonia (ERC), Galicia (BNG), the Basque Country (EA, NA-BAI) and the nation-wide left-wing coalition (IU-ICV) voted against. After its successful passage through the Senate (225 in favour, 6 against and 1 abstention), the Treaty was ratified on 20 May as Ley Orgánica 1/2005.
The Nature of the Current Crisis
Rather than ‘crisis’, the Prime Minister has preferred to use the expression ‘difficult situation’. In contrast, the leader of the opposition (Mariano Rajoy of the People’s Party) has openly spoken of a ‘complete crisis’ and has criticised the Government for having ratified the Constitution prematurely. In wider media and academic circles, however, the current crisis is mostly interpreted in terms of the domestic internal political and, overall, economic situation in France and the Netherlands. Attention is also focused on the European level, especially with respect to the poor image of Europe’s institutions and policies among the public at large. The Union is widely being perceived as unable to implement its decisions (eg, the Lisbon Agenda), honour its rules (the reform of the Stability Pact), efficiently communicate with the wider public or truly address citizens’ real preoccupations (employment, crime and terrorism, immigration, etc). There is also a widespread perception of the crisis being a clash between a dynamic Europe, made up of new and old members from the periphery that are growing and are therefore confident in the future, and older members from the core that are in the grip of economic crises and political anxieties about the future.
The Spanish Government has asked for the ratification period to be extended in order to give other citizens and member states the opportunity to express their views, having warned against the Constitution’s premature burial and having emphasised the fact that a majority of EU citizens and member states have already ratified it. The Government is confident that the Constitution will finally be ratified after the French presidential elections, once the economic crisis recedes and following a satisfactory period of reflection.
Public Opinion Since the Spring of 2005
The French and Dutch referendums have led Spaniards to give more credibility to the arguments of the ‘No’ camp. According to the Elcano Barometer of June 2005, the number of people who believed that the Constitution was too liberal and insufficiently social doubled from December 2004 to June 2005. Similarly, the number of people who believed that Spain would lose influence in Europe because of the Constitution rose significantly. However, increased sympathy with the ‘No’ camp has not necessarily led to a radical change in the evaluation of the European Constitution. Whereas in December 2004, 77% considered the Constitution a ‘step forward in the construction of Europe’, the percentage was still at 67% in June 2005. Were the referendum to be held again, it can be inferred from the polls that the ‘No’ to the Constitution would only rise from 6% to 13%. Therefore, Spain’s public opinion is still among the most supportive of the EU in the entire Union.
Ways Out of the Crisis
Concerning the alternatives to the Constitutional Treaty, the official position is that the period of reflection should be used to rebuild the consensus on the necessary ratification of the text, not on preparing any alternatives. The Constitution, the Government emphasised, represents a delicate balance and a point of consensus which cannot be easily replicated. Therefore, the Government’s first option is to save the Constitution and to reject any partial revision, implementation or re-drafting. Initiatives to trim down the Constitution, implement it in parts or aim at a Nice 2 Treaty are considered with concern and would be opposed unless the Constitution is officially declared dead and a new consensus emerges. Therefore, at least at this stage, the Government is unwilling to consider a new Intergovernmental Conference or treaty-making process, no matter the format, unless its clear-cut goal is to help the Constitutional Treaty come into force.
Implementation of Specific Provisions of the Constitution
The Government would accept that some of the innovations and provisions included in the Constitution could be implemented in advance, but only if there is a wide-ranging consensus, they require no Treaty modification and do not upset the institutional balance of power. Preferred areas in which the Government could accept this would relate to: the democratic life of the Union (transparency, early-warning mechanism, popular initiative); the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy, including ESDP; and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (especially as regards immigration, crime and terrorism). Any reform in the size of the Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council is considered unacceptable at this stage.
2. The Future of EU Enlargement
Impact of the Constitutional Crisis on Further Enlargement
Enlargement to the East implies a particular challenge for Spain as it does not stand to benefit from the economic opportunities of enlargement, but will suffer from the consequences (reduced structural funds, increased migratory flows, industrial relocation and disinvestment, trade competition in key markets, etc). Nevertheless, for historical and moral reasons Spain has supported the enlargement process to the East from the very beginning and continues to back the forthcoming entries. Spain’s position regarding the future enlargement process has not changed following the shock of the referendums in France and Holland. The Spanish Government fully backs the entry of Bulgaria and Rumania and expects no delays in the process.
Spain’s general support for enlargement also applies to Turkey. Again, as with Eastern enlargement, support for Turkey’s accession does not necessarily coincide with Spain’s immediate economic or foreign policy interests, as it would introduce further pressures in terms of foreign investment, foreign trade and regional and agricultural policy or would probably require the commitment of additional diplomatic and economic resources that might be detracted from the Maghreb, which is indeed a priority area for Spain. Yet successive Spanish Governments (whether Conservative or Socialist) have backed Turkey’s entry into the European Union for a number of different reasons which have to do with the EU’s general political, economic and security interests, and have not considered issues of cultural or religious identity to be central.
Concerning Croatia, the government has supported the opening of negotiations and the framework adopted by the European Council on 3 October. Still, media commentators have highlighted their concern with the too explicit way in which the Austrian Presidency linked the opening of negotiations with Turkey and Croatia, thus threatening the credibility of the principles of relative merit and non-discrimination governing enlargement. In particular, public opinion failed to understand how negotiations could open despite the fact of General Ante Gotovina not having been handed over to the International Court in The Hague. Enlargement, it has been stressed, should be governed by fair and objective criteria, not by a push and pull dynamic between different sponsors.
Spaniards continue to show a high level of support for enlargement. According to the last Elcano barometer (June 2005), 74% of Spaniards (70% in December 2004) agree that workers from the new member states should be able to work in Spain without restrictions. Still more noteworthy is the acceptance by 62% (52% in December 2004) that certain companies might have to delocalise their factories outside Spain in favour of the new EU members. Furthermore, these ideas are maintained despite the respondents believing that the enlargement of the UE will be less positive for Spain (53%) than for the UE in general (71.7%) or for the new member states (85.1%). Finally, regarding the future enlargement process, 58% of Spaniards (53% in March 2005) believe that Russia should become a member of the EU. In second place is Turkey, with 41% support and a 3-point increase compared with March 2005. In third and fourth positions are Israel, at 23% support, and Morocco, at 21%. Other Spanish surveys, such as the Barometer of the Centre for Sociological Studies (January 2005), indicate that 35.2% of Spaniards are in favour and 20.4% against Turkish membership, while according to the Barometer of one of Spain’s leading radio stations 43% are in favour and 18% against. According to Transatlantic Trends, Spanish support lags behind both the UK and Italy, at 26%.
3. Financial Framework 2007-13
The Basis for Further Negotiations
Spain already experienced major difficulties in accepting the Commission’s proposal for a financial framework for 2007-13. At the European Council of 16-17 June 2005, it showed itself willing to accept the proposals of the Luxembourg Presidency only if they were part of a general agreement which included a revision of the British rebate or ‘cheque’. As the British Government refused any move in that direction, the Spanish Government withdrew its acceptance of the Luxembourg ‘negotiating box’ and called on the next British Presidency to satisfy Spain’s interests with new proposals.
The Government’s strategy in the negotiations was based on three fundamental principles:
- Budget sufficiency. Spain defends the EU’s agriculture and cohesion policies and supports the 2002 Brussels agreement which set and stabilised agricultural expenditure for the entire period. Spain is not in favour of co-financing the CAP and is against capping the EU budget at 1%: in its view, this will mean that the enlarged EU will be below the budgetary ceiling it had in 1985, before Portugal and Spain joined the Community.
- Equity in sharing enlargement costs. Spain wants to distribute the costs of enlargement more evenly, especially with relation to the British ‘cheque’, but also with the so-called ‘net contributors’, whose proposals to set the budget at 1% are considered by Spain to be regressive and unfair in terms of enlargement cost sharing. For a variety of circumstances, Spain is now the third-largest contributor to the British ‘cheque’, after France and Italy. Spain’s position is clear: if there is no limitation –or a progressive reduction in the British ‘cheque’– it will be impossible to reach an agreement for the next financial perspectives.
- Gradualness. Spain seeks a transition period for the regions that have been receiving EU funds for their development and that will lose them because of the statistical effect. Spain is also interested in maintaining the special status of the Canary Islands as an ultraperipheral region with special financial needs.
At the heart of Spain’s concerns lies the fact that comparing Spain’s financial balance with the EU in 2000-06 and 2007-13, its net balance with the EU, which will have reached €48.7 billion in 2000-06, will be reduced to approximately €5 billion in 2007-13. This is due to both increased contributions to the budget, because of its relatively greater economic growth, and to reduced receipts from the EU budget as it ceases to qualify for cohesion, structural and agricultural funds. The Spanish Government recognises that its situation within the EU has changed to the better and that this will mean less financing from the EU budget than in the past. Spain accepts that its GDP is now almost at the average EU level (98.2% of EU-25 and 90% of EU-15). Nevertheless, it still seeks to ensure a smooth transition because its goal is to avoid becoming a net contributor before it reaches full real convergence with the EU-15. Thus, for a long time a net receiver of EU funds, Spain may now end up being a net contributor to the EU budget. Hence, the key question for Spain’s negotiators is not whether Spain will be a net contributor to the budget before 2013, which is largely discounted, but whether Spain is to suffer a sudden and abrupt loss of funds or if it will enjoy a mild and moderate phasing-out.
Concerning the next financial perspectives, Spanish public opinion is pessimistic. According to the 9th wave of the Elcano Royal Institute’s Barometer (June 2005), 73% of Spaniards believe that ‘Spain will end up being harmed by the negotiations for the distribution of EU funds in the coming years’, compared with only 19% who think the country will benefit from them. But almost all Spaniards (85%) agree that their country ‘must show solidarity with the new European member countries that need EU funds’. The argument of solidarity is the most convincing one to Spaniards, 60% of whom reject the idea that ‘no longer receiving aid is good because it means we have reached a certain level of prosperity’ or that ‘it allows us to deal on equal terms with the most powerful EU countries’ (an argument rejected by 68%).
Results of the Negotiations
Spain has had unquestioned success at the negotiating table: the country will continue to have an overall positive balance in the period; the Cohesion Fund will be extended to take into account the so-called ‘statistical effect’ of the enlargement; Spain’s most disadvantaged regions will continue to receive funds (though these will be reduced gradually); the Union will take an even greater part in the control of migratory flows; and, finally, a specific technology fund has been created for Spain –something unprecedented in EU history–. All this has been achieved through long and very tenacious diplomatic work, whose greatest success has been to bring about a complete turnaround in the focus of the negotiations, which were initially characterised by an alliance of net contributors against Spain. In the end, Spain was able to win support and understanding for its demands from the three big contributors to the budget (Germany, France and the UK).
4. A revitalisation of the Lisbon Agenda
According to the Spanish Prime Minister, the accomplishment of the Lisbon Strategy is his Government’s first priority. Rodríguez Zapatero admitted that Spanish progress towards the Lisbon goals has been insufficient. However, the Government decided to become one of the leading countries in the Lisbon Renovation process. In this context, Spain was the first country to present a report on the economic pillar regarding growth and employment. It was also the first country to be visited by the Commission in its negotiating round.
National Reform Activities
Spain has approved its National Reform Programme (13 October), which sets the guidelines for economic policy in 2005-10 in accordance with the Lisbon Strategy.
This document has two main objectives: first, to accomplish full convergence with the EU-25 and, second, to raise the employment rate. There are seven axes for action: budget stability, infrastructures, human capital, research, development and investment, competitiveness, labour market and business promotion.
Directives on Services and Working Times
Spain has maintained a mid-way position between the full liberalisation of the services market and the upholding of the current situation. Spain supports an integrated services market but with red lines (scopes of general interest).
The Future of the Stability Pact
The Spanish Government is in a complex position. The current Economy Minister, Pedro Solbes, was the Commissioner who launched the Services Directive and supported the Stability Pact. However, the Zapatero Government is supported by a centre-left coalition. In this context of domestic limitations, Spain backs the adaptation of the Stability Pact and welcomes the concept of budgetary balance throughout the cycle.
The Spanish Government considers that the choice between two models (social and liberal) is false. Spain is promoting a new model of growth based on dynamic productivity and quality employment.
5. The EU’s Role in the World: CFSP/ESDP
There are a set of factors in play that make Spain the scene of a wide range of challenges, risks and threats to security. These include traditional ones, new ones (international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, etc) and also so-called ‘functional’ threats, related to the concept of human security, such as infectious diseases, accidents, natural disasters and the collapse of basic infrastructures. The fact that Spain is on the southern periphery of the European Union and geographically very close to North Africa and the Middle East, with extra-peninsular and island territories in North Africa, presents us with even more problems and more interests to defend than many other member states whose borders are within the perimeter of the Union. It is unquestionably a fact that among the so-called ‘new’ threats, hyperterrorism has already hit Spanish society hard (eg, the 3-11 attack in Madrid). Illegal immigration, illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, explosives and human beings are problems that have to be dealt with every day on Spain’s borders. This delicate situation reached a crisis point during the past few weeks on the border of the North-African Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, with the final outcome of 11 sub-Saharans dead in confused circumstances.
These issues, which are normally a priority for the Spanish Government, are now at the very top of the Spanish agenda. At the informal meeting in Hampton Court on 27 October, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero proposed a new immigration programme that will be officially presented at the European Council in December. Rodríguez Zapatero’s plan is a joint French-Spanish initiative drawn up between French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and Zapatero himself at a bilateral meeting in Barcelona earlier this month. It will cover guidelines for surveillance of the EU’s exterior borders and push for pan-EU re-admission agreements with transit countries close to the continent as well as more distant Sub-Saharan states where many illegal migrants originate. According to the Plan, the EU should also increase development aid to the Sub-Saharan region, with the new €400 million aid package being double what the EU is spending today on immigration policy.
In this framework, Spain was one of the member states to strongly support the creation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union which took up its responsibilities on May 2005. Its Deputy Director will be a Spanish representative.
Apart from the new instruments and initiatives that are to be implemented, it would also be advisable to complete the measures included in Tampere I, as well as putting into practice the Hague Programme. Besides, Spain is playing a leading role in the fight against terrorism, both in foreign relations and technical support and in designing a strategy against the recruitment of terrorists. By and large, a top priority for Spain is the improvement and broadening of cooperation and coordination, and even integration, in the European Space of Freedom, Security and Justice.
European Security Strategy
With reference to the sensitive issue of the forthcoming security challenges, Spain has a wider spectrum of concerns. The new type of threat does not distinguish between the outer and the inner dimensions, between civilian and military targets or between the public and the private sectors. Consequently, and in the opinion of the Secretary of State for Europe, Alberto Navarro, the answers to these challenges must combine all the available resources, including military, police and judicial responses at the European level.
In the Spanish case a series of factors have combined to create a scene of ample and diverse challenges to security, both traditional and new, as well as so-called functional ones. In relation to threats of a conventional type, Spain relies on its autonomous defence capabilities (on which there is agreement in Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero’s Government and in the Socialist and Popular parties). However, as mentioned in the new Defence Directive (1/2004), Spanish National Security is unavoidably linked to the security of the European continent, ie, it is a shared security. ‘We are Europe and our security is indissolubly linked to that of the continent (…)’, ‘Spain will promote and foster a true European security and defence policy, back initiatives aimed at achieving a common defence’. As mentioned above, Spain offers its full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, Spain promotes the accomplishment of the goals of the European Security Strategy, as well as the immediate implementation of some of the initiatives included in the Constitutional Treaty.
According to the Secretary of State for Europe, Alberto Navarro, the Rodríguez Zapatero Government is fully convinced of the necessity of providing the EU with a real defence dimension without which the European integration project would not be complete. Nevertheless, the Government will continue to promote a close and fruitful cooperation between the European Union and NATO. Spain understands that the Atlantic Alliance continues to be essential for Europe’s defence. The Spanish Government believes that the relation between Europe and the United States will be stronger and more balanced if Europe is willing to assume greater responsibilities in the management of its own security and in the search for international peace and stability. In this context, Spain has given its support to all ESDP operations, specifically in the Althea Mission, which has been deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2 December 2004, with a contribution of 500 troops of the more than 6,000 present in the theatre of operations. Furthermore, and in relation with the battle groups, Spain will provide two of the 13 groups: one of them is the Spanish-Italian amphibian unit, and the second will be mainly national with a minimum contribution from France and Germany.
The Way Ahead for CFSP/ESDP on the Basis of the Nice Treaty
The European Defence Agency (EDA), that became operational at the start of January 2005, had the support of the Spanish Government (both Prime Minister Aznar’s and the current Zapatero Government) from its inception. It is considered animportant instrument for transforming our armed forces and for acquiring new capacities. According to the declarations of the Popular Party’s (the opposition party) spokesman in the Spanish Parliament’s European Affairs Commission, Mr Soravilla Fernández, this agency is one of the most important elements of European Defence, and especially for the European defence industries in which Spain has strategic interests. For that reason, Spain must have a relevant position in the Agency’s management. According to the Popular Party’s spokesman, Spain’s weight in this area is not suitably represented because there are only three Spaniards on the Agency’s staff and they are on the third and fourth levels.
In relation with the creation of the position of EU Foreign Affairs Minister and, particularly, the appointment of this person as a Vice-president of the European Commission, it is believed at the Government level that it would improve coherence in CFSP/ESDP affairs. Spanish public opinion also supports (64%) the creation of this new post. Regarding these issues and according to Eurobarometer 63, Spanish public opinion believes that the biggest problems the country is facing are terrorism (46%) and immigration (30%). In the latter case, Spanish concern has increased by 6 points in comparison with the 2004 Autumn Eurobarometer. The September 2005 barometer of the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS) indicated that unemployment was the principal concern of Spanish public opinion (55.7%) followed by international and national terrorism (35.9%) and immigration (32.8%). The Elcano Royal Institute’s Barometer (BRIE), a periodic survey, has reported the following results related to the perception of threats: international terrorism is considered a fundamental threat by 95% of respondents, Islamic fundamentalism by 91% and the increasing number of illegal immigrants and refugees by 80%. In addition, and according to Eurobarometer 63, Spanish citizens believe that a top priority for the European Union should be the fight against terrorism (41%). In fourth, fifth and sixth positions are the following issues: maintaining peace and security in Europe (33%), fighting organised crime and drug trafficking (20%) and fighting illegal immigration (18%). On CFSP/ESDP issues, Spanish public opinion backs a common foreign policy (68%) and there is more support for a common security and defence policy (70%).
The Barcelona Process is another focus of interest for Spain’s European policy. With the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Mediterranean Conference, Spain is promoting a major commitment by the European Union in the region. Spain should continue to encourage the EU to adopt instruments and policies that contribute to the region’s welfare, progress and democratisation. Specifically, we can mention initiatives such as the creation of solidarity funds for countries including Morocco and Algeria, whose stability is essential to Spanish and European interests.
The Iranian Problem
Spain gives its full support to the EU-3 initiative related to the Iran problem and, in accordance with José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s proposal of an ‘Alliance of Civilizations’, any initiative to solve the Iranian problem should respect international legality.
6. Upcoming Issues and Events
Major Political Events
General elections are still far off (spring 2008) and the Government coalition is stable. The same can be said of important regional elections, which also lie well ahead. Therefore, there are no major pressures stemming from the domestic agenda. This means that the Government can enjoy an ample margin for EU policy making both when it comes to unpopular decisions, such as the foreseeable budgetary cuts which 2007-13 will entail, economic reform measures or further liberalisation efforts (services, Doha, etc).
Priority Issues on the National Policy Agenda
According to national polls, the main problems citizens face are: first, unemployment; second, terrorism; third, immigration; and, fourth, housing. The political agenda, however, is mostly centred on Constitutional reform, the distribution of power between the Government and the regions and the high level of tension between the Socialist Party (in power) and the People’s Party (in opposition) due to the latter’s unexpected defeat in the March 2004 general election.
7. Priorities and Perspectives for the EU 2005-2009
European policy and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe are a key priority for the Socialist Government. Following the positive referendum in Spain on 20 March 2005 and the negative referendums in France and The Netherlands, the Government has decided to ‘wait and see’: it will refuse any premature attempt to bury the Constitution or reopen constitutional or IGC negotiations until the outcome of the presidential elections in France in 2007 is clear.
Policies to Cope with Globalisation
The Government advocates a two-track policy: on the one hand, it fully supports the Lisbon Agenda, the liberalisation of the services, trade and labour markets and the reform of welfare systems so as to make them more competitive. On the other hand, it would like to see the Union progressing further along the path of economic governance, including more fiscal and social harmonisation.
‘Delocalisation’ as a Highly Salient Issue
Delocalisation is on the rise on the Spanish agenda. Foreign investment
(FDI) has already peaked and is on a declining trend; Spain’s export capacity is negatively affected by the poor economic situation in France, Germany and Italy; inflation differentials in Spain are higher and are therefore affecting Spanish competitiveness; and an increasing number of firms are moving East to take advantage of the new EU member states’ comparatively lower labour costs. In some specific cases, the industrial base of some regions (eg, Catalonia) might be very hard hit by these moves (eg, the motor vehicle industry), which may unleash negative feelings towards the EU and the new members. Besides, the next financial perspective for 2007-13 may well mean that Spain becomes a net contributor to the budget sometime around 2010.
Reinventing the European Social Model
Spain is satisfied with its social model. The sustainability of its public pension system is assured due to the increasing levels of employment, which have reached a historic high, and the new affiliations to social security derived from the process of regularisation of immigrants. Therefore, although social expenditure in Spain is still low on average compared with the EU, and reforms are needed in order to safeguard its efficiency, no complete overhaul is needed and the public does not consider the system to be under any immediate threat.
The EU as an International Actor
This is an area in which Spain would like see the EU progress substantially over the next few years. This is because both its foreign policy portfolio is wide and complex (Latin America and the Mediterranean) and its geographical position implies an over-exposure to threats and risks which are common to the EU but for which Spain constitutes the front line (especially as regards immigration, Islamic fundamentalism, regional instability, etc). Spain will actively push for a renewed Mediterranean policy and for giving the EU the instruments necessary to play a wider and more efficient role in issues related with both external (ESDP) and internal (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) security.
José Ignacio Torreblanca
Senior Analyst, Europe, Elcano Royal Institute
Research Assistant, Elcano Royal Institute
 See Alicia Sorroza and J.I. Torreblanca, ‘Spanish Ratification Monitor’, at WP 8/2005; J.I. Torreblanca, ‘The Three Points of Disensus on the European Constitution’, at ARI 22/2005; J.I. Torreblanca, ‘Spain’s Referendum: A Double Disappointment’, at ARI 27/2005; Eva Anduiza, ‘Who Abstained and Why?’, at ARI 34/2005.
 See the Spanish Parliament’s website at http://www.congreso.es/ for further information on Spain’s political parties and parliamentary procedures.
Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (DSCP), Plenary meeting nº 99, 22 June 2005, p. 4965-5003, at http://www.congreso.es/
 Eurobarometer 63, July 2005.
 See ‘Informe del Gobierno al Congreso de los Diputados: Reflexiones sobre el Futuro de la Unión Europea’, Secretaría de Estado para la UE, Madrid, 30 November 2005.
 Pulsómetro Cadena Ser, December 2004, http://www.cadenaser.es.
 Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (DSCP), plenary meeting nº 99, 22 June 2005, p. 4962-5003, at http://www.congreso.es/.
 Declarations of the Secretary of State for Europe, Alberto Navarro González, at the European Affairs Commission of the Spanish Congress, 15 June 2005; see Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (DSCP) at http://www.congreso.es/.
 Further information is available at the Elcano Royal Institute’s website http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/: J.I. Torreblanca, ‘Farewell to Funds? Keys to Understanding Spain’s Position when Negotiating the 2007-13 EU Budget’, WP nr 21/2005, May 2005.
 For an updated analysis on the results of the negotiations, see J.I. Torreblanca, ‘The European Union Financial Perspective for 2007-2013: A Good Agreement for Spain (II), ARI 155/2005, 2 February 2006, at ARI 155/2005.
 Spanish Defence Directive 1/2004.
 Declarations of the European Secretary of State, Alberto Navarro González at the Commission of European Affairs of the Spanish Congress, 15 June 2005, see Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (DSCP) at http://www.congreso.es/.
 ‘Barómetro de septiembre’, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), 2618, September 2005, item 5, http://www.cis.es/