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Contents
Introduction
(1) External Security
(2) Internal Security
(4) Conclusions
References
Bibliography
Introduction
Italy does not have a National Security Strategy (NSS) in the strict sense of the word, ie, a single
governmental document for the medium-to-long term identifying the
main security threats and response guidelines at a strategic level.
Instead, it has several documents on the institutional responsibilities for the external (military) and internal (civil) dimensions of security.
By ‘external security’ is meant the assessment and countering of threats from the exterior, or those
developed abroad before materialising at a national level. The military are traditionally in charge of this task. By ‘internal
security’ is meant responding to interior risks and threats,
both of an intentional or accidental nature. This study starts with
the description of these two dimensions of national security, following the approach adopted at the institutional level, although
from the perspective that in the present international scenario both
should form part of a single strategy, in line with the current trend
in several European and Western countries. Some of the proposals in this document are in accordance with this idea.
(1) External Security
(1.1) The Main Official Documents Relating to the External Dimension of Security
It is appropriate to begin by considering some of the official documents relating to the external dimension of
security and regarding defence and foreign policy. This is particularly useful not only to identify a middle-to-long term
perspective for external security (which, as we shall see, has an impact on the life of citizens), but also because the Armed Services
are, by law, obliged to cooperate in support of other administrations
involved in the internal dimension of security. This means that, apart from the Arma
dei Carabinieri, which is entrusted with important law and order tasks, the other Services can be also
called on to operate in situations where public security is at risk,
alongside Civil Protection and other actors involved on these
occasions. The documents considered here take note of the changes in the
international scenario, single out the new threats facing Italy and
provide guidelines and strategic orientation on defence in order to
adjust the military response. They can therefore be considered part of the more general National Security Strategy (NSS).
The Defence White Paper (2002, p. 1) has a
political value. It ‘was born from the Government’s will to take stock of the situation of the
Armed Services and, more generally, of the whole sector of defence with
respect to the new geo-political framework outlined after [...] September 11th [...]’ (italics added). It is a document of over 600 pages
whose first part studies the new international strategic scenario and which then goes on to accurately describe the condition of the
military forces: from defence to missions, from economy to industry, from (military and civil) personnel to materials and infrastructure.
The document also identifies the general guidelines to continue the transformation, already in progress, of the tool (balancing and/or
reorganisation of personnel, means and materials, and of the defence budget) for the Armed Services to be more efficient and adapted to
the post-cold war context. It does not pave the way for a single Armed Service or provide a response to specific threats in the
middle-to-long term, although it does provide a necessary starting point for such an effort.
The Strategic Concept of the Chief of Defence Staff (2005) is prepared by the Joint Staff of the highest military authority, reporting directly to the Minister of Defence. The
Strategic Concept ‘delineates the conceptual reference frame for the planning, arrangement and employment of the Armed Services,
as a concrete technical-military accomplishment of the politico-military guidelines included
in ministerial directives’ (italics added). Such a document, with a multi-year scope, is meant to provide the Chiefs of military staff of the three Services, the
General Commander of the Arma dei Carabinieri and the National
Armaments Director (responsible for the technical, operative and industrial areas) with the conceptual references for the development
of the military tool in accordance not only with the changes in the
international strategic environment but also with the evolution of
NATO and the ESDP. It is therefore a concrete step towards a NSS: it
proposes short, middle and long term objectives and the operational capacities necessary to accomplish the missions entrusted, again at a
general level and not for any single Service. Worth noting for its completeness is a document of 2005 by the Chief of Defence Staff
–‘Investing in Security’– which, however, contains no added value in terms of middle-long term national
strategy compared with the Strategic Concept.
The Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione della Difesa is the document prepared by the Minister of Defence for allocating,
year by year, the financial resources assigned by the Government. The Nota Aggiuntiva for the year 2009, like previous ones, is made up of two main parts covering: (1) the international general context in which all the Services operate, in
accordance with the above-mentioned documents, but with a greater
level of precision as regards the current year; and (2) Ministry missions and programmes, with expenditure provisions in accordance
with the budget law for 2009. This latter part, moreover, contains a
chapter devoted to the ‘Defence Function’, covering the three traditional Services, and another on the ‘Public Security
Function’ covering the Arma dei Carabinieri. It is evidently not a document on middle-to-long term strategy but, on the basis of the
economic and financial resources available in a certain year, is in a way a continuation –through the assignment of resources to
programmes– of the broader view outlined in the above-mentioned documents. The Nota Aggiuntiva contains expenditure provisions for multi-year programmes, contingent upon the availability of resources on annual basis.
Finally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs commissioned a group of experts to explore challenges and
opportunities with a horizon to 2020 for Italian foreign policy. As a result, The Rapporto 2020, le scelte di politica estera (Report 2020, Choices of Foreign Policy) was
published in 2008 and it has certainly had an appreciable effect because it is the first time that an official document envisages
Italian interests, objectives and national priorities in foreign policy under a non-partisan and shared approach. The Report, which is expected to be regularly updated, aims at laying out a coherent and reasoned route for Italian foreign policy in the middle-term. It has an essentially thematic approach
(energy security, economic and financial policy, world governance), with a chapter devoted to regional priorities and specific references
to the Balkans and the Mediterranean. What is relevant to this document –even if foreign policy intersects but does not either
fully contain a NSS or is fully contained in it– is the bipartisan effort to identify national interests in the middle-term,
an approach which should be followed when creating an Italian NSS.
(1.2) External Threats and Implications for Internal Security
There are two reasons why it is appropriate to consider documents concerning defence: (1) national security includes
the function of defence (or external security); and (2) defence actors, with their specific expertise and means, can be directly
involved in internal security actions on national territory.
The first point has now been confirmed and is included in all of the Italian documents mentioned, and is shared by
other European countries such as France, Germany and the UK (in their respective NSSs), and the EU itself (in the European Security
Strategy, ESS). As the Nota Aggiuntiva says (2009, I-3), the new international scenario ‘implies an extension of the traditional concept of defence now oriented towards the protection and safeguard of national interests while disclosing and expressing not only from a military point of view but also especially economic, social, financial and, more generally, geo-politic ones. Such an extension also embraces aspects which are generally connected to internal security’ [italics added]. The two dimensions are therefore closely connection,
often indistinguishable from one another and therefore part of a single concept of national security.
As for the identification of threats, the defence documents (White Paper, 2001, p. 8) do not seem to identify a
clear list, affirming instead that it is about risks which ‘base their own capacities not only on armaments, but rather on more
diversified and sophisticated instruments’, ‘it is about a plurality of asymmetrical activities which, variously combined and
articulated, configure those risks [...], terrorism represents a catalyzing and multiplying factor [of]’.
The four fundamental missions of the Armed Services remain unchanged [italics added]:
- To defend the vital interests of the Nation against any possible aggression, with the aim of safeguarding the integrity of national territory –land, territorial waters and air space– as well as the security and integrity of lines of communication and the security of areas of national sovereignty and of Italian citizens residing abroad, from any possible threat.
- To safeguard the Euro-Atlantic area within the framework of the Nation’s strategic and/or vital interests, by contributing to the collective defence of NATO.
- To contribute to the management of international crises, by
participating in crisis prevention and management operations with
the goal of guaranteeing international peace, security, stability and legitimacy, as well as affirming fundamental human rights in the
spirit of the United Nations Charter, within the framework of international organisations –above all NATO,
the EU and the UN– and/or bi-and multi-lateral agreements, with particular regard to Europe’s capability to manage crises autonomously.
- To participate in the safeguarding of free institutions and carrying out specific tasks in the event of catastrophes and in other cases of extraordinary need and urgency.
- Nevertheless, the Ministerial Directive [italics added] ‘indicates, as a common factor for the four delineated missions, the
prior necessity to extend the action of the military tool to the most recent forms of asymmetric conflict, with particular regard to
international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’.
It is interesting to remark that Report 2020 (2008:49) also points out a series of external threats, or better, [italics added] ‘from
the perspective of Italy [points out] the priorities of an agenda for global security: [...] fight against
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental protection, energy security, crisis management, with
their possible spill-over effects, the promotion of human rights and democratic values’. Such
challenges entail a series of risks for Italy’s national interests and citizen security which materialise or can be
materialised in many different ways –eg, terrorist attacks on national territory, piracy on important trade routes, transnational
criminality, illicit trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings or clandestine immigration–. The latter is of particular concern
to Italy, not only for geographical reasons but also for the lack of an immigration policy to handle the arrival of thousands of
immigrants and refugees during the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Italy continues to be a preferential destination for those who come from or
cross Eastern Europe and the southern shore of the Mediterranean. A report by the Joint Research Centre on security highlights that Italian citizens perceive clandestine immigration as the most important threat to their own security, not
only in occupational terms, but also as regards economic, social and criminality factors.
Report 2020 devotes a whole chapter to the internal and external dimension of energy security. Besides the
development of a national and European energy policy for the protection of critical energy infrastructures and the diversification
of sources, it also believes that it is necessary to engage in external action to maintain or create bilateral relations with
supplier and transit countries, as well as to maintain the regional situation stable (Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, North Africa and the
enlarged Middle East). In such a framework, it is necessary for Italy to contribute to the International Community to prevent and contain threats.
As regards the public security tasks carried out on national territory, since the year 2000 Italy’s Arma dei Carabinieri is an independent
service (Law 78/2000), and in this respect the official documents determine the resources and directives for the accomplishment of
military tasks. Such tasks can be developed both on Italian territory as well as abroad. As a police force, the Arma depends from the Ministry of Interior for the permanent development of judicial police and public security tasks. Finally, as anticipated, the other three ‘classic’ Services can also
be called on to operate on national territory in a cooperative way in the event of ‘public danger circumstances and in other cases of
extraordinary necessity and urgency’. The Government recently deployed soldiers in the streets of some cities even without such conditions having arisen.
(1.3) Multilateral Intervention Framework
As noted above, the protection of national security assumes a wider meaning and includes cooperation for
stability and international security. Of course, such a concept is part of the responsibility of the greater international organisations
Italy belongs to, particularly NATO, the EU and the UN. It is also necessary to consider the engagements assumed after ad hoc bi/multi-lateral agreements, such as the US-led mission in Iraq which concluded for Italy in 2007.
The military have been assigned new scenarios to operate in and new tasks to accomplish, without however abandoning the traditional task
of defending the country’s institutions, territory, airspace and waters, which although downgraded to ‘possible threats’
have still not disappeared. The new types of mission abroad focus essentially on crisis prevention and management with activities
(often of a civil nature even if developed by military personnel) connected to assistance and the training of military, police,
judicial, border and custom forces, among others.
At the moment, Italy is engaged in 21 countries with 33 international missions, totalling around 8.832 troops
deployed, according to ministerial sources. The total commitment in terms of forces provided ranks Italy 9th among UN contributors, while it is ranked 4th for its contribution to EU and NATO missions (Nota Aggiuntiva 2009,
p. IX). As for the funding of international missions, Decree nr 209 (made
into Law 24/2009) foresees an increase of funding for the missions in Afghanistan, probably after insistent demands by the Alliance (around
€261 million for the first six months, compared with around €170 the previous year) and in Africa, probably due to the stronger
European commitment in this area (€29 million, compared with around €8 million the previous year).
Throughout the post-cold war period, Italy has been balancing its support between its Atlantic and European
initiatives. The high number of personnel and resources invested in international security mirrors Italy’s willingness to affirm
its importance within the alliances it belongs to, actively engaging itself not only in the regions of its interest (Balkans, the
Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East), but also in more distant theatres. Italy understands that the commitment of third
countries and organisations to deal with threats against Italy –such as terrorism– and their contribution to the stability of
regions like the Balkans implies that, in exchange, Italy makes itself available elsewhere, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is
easy to perceive that such engagements generate additional costs, not just in terms of personnel and materials (burdening both the defence
balance and ad hoc funds authorised by Parliament) but also in terms of training, maintenance of the means and technological advances to keep up with
its international partners (financed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance for research and development).
The decreasing trend in Ministry of Defence resources –except for the year 2008– makes it even more urgent to adopt a middle-to-long term strategy to establish security and
defence priorities as well as to determine Italy’s interests. It is necessary, in other words, to adopt shared criteria for the
Government to decide whether and on what terms to participate in international engagements, and for the authorities to ensure
coherence between the role Italy is to play and the resources that are realistically available. With regard to the lack of priorities
and middle-to-long term strategic planning, there is a risk that because of contingent economic reasons, responsibilities that it
should be necessary to assume will have to be renounced in order not to waste resources on missions for which there is only a limited
interest. In this respect, Report 2020 can provide some ideas, identifying priority areas and themes for Italy’s external
action. The document should, however, be read in combination with the European Security Strategy and the NATO Strategic Concept in order to
ensure coherence with the European and transatlantic dimension, that Italy cannot leave aside.
(1.4) The Main Actors Involved
The following institutions contribute to Italy’s external security decision-making (as outlined in the White Paper and not in order of importance:
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Head of State. According to the Constitution (art.87), the President of the Republic is Commander of the Armed
Services and President of the Supreme Council of Defence and has the capacity to declare the state of war after deliberation by both
Chambers of Parliament. The role of commander of the Armed Services has no executive power, but neither is it purely symbolic, since the
President of the Republic maintains his fundamental function of guarantor of the Constitution in matters of political orientation
and defence and security policy, and has increased relevance as head of the Supreme Council of Defence (which he chairs), following the
reorganisation of the highest ranks of the defence structure.
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The Supreme Council of Defence. The Council, chaired by the President of the Republic and comprising the Prime
Minister, the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy and Finance, Productive Activities (and others according to
necessity) and by the Chief of Defence Staff, examines general, technical and political problems, and takes fundamental decisions on
matters of defence and national security. The Council is the place where timely information on the decisions taken by the Government is
collected, even at times of crisis, so as to allow the President of the Republic to ensure their constitutionality. Recent decisions
taken by the Council demonstrate that it acknowledges the new ‘multidisciplinary’ dimension of security, even if it has not (yet?) evolved into a real part of its functions or responsibilities.
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Parliament. Apart from its legislative function, Parliament has the task of orienting and controlling the
Government’s activities, which it exercises through, first of all, the vote of confidence in the Government at the beginning of
every legislature. Confidence can be verified (or revoked) through a no confidence motion (in the case of a parliamentary initiative) or
a confidence question (if a governmental initiative). Other instruments for parliamentary direction are motions (debates in
Congress followed by a Government directive) and resolutions (with which debates and discussions are concluded). Finally, as for
information and control, Parliament has instruments such as interrogations (to which it is possible to answer orally or in
writing), interpellations, inquiries and auditions. In security and defence, Parliament has a strong influence in approving the budget
(including the Ministry of Defence’s) and in the refunding of international missions. In the past, when there has been a division
of opinion in the country and among political parties (even if part of the same coalition) about missions and Italy’s role in
them, the Government has been forced to pose the ‘confidence question’, putting in danger its very survival especially if
endowed with a only minimal parliamentary majority. Moreover, when an international mission is to be launched, Parliament exercises its
power by voting on the Government’s proposal (mandate, strength of the mission, etc), as it does with any other law regarding internal or external security.
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The President of the Council of Ministers, or Prime Minister. According to the ex art. 95 of the Constitution and
more specifically ex Law l.400/1988 and its subsequent modifications, the Prime Minister’s main competences in
matters of security and defence are: to direct the government’s general policy, draw up the programme and establishing directives;
to coordinate the activities of the individual Ministers involved in such policy; and to promote and stimulate the Government’s
activity in fulfilling its programme. Even if the adoption of measures in security and defence is attributed to the Government as
a whole, due to time constraints the principle of collegiality is tempered in favour of the Prime Minister (as confirmed by the
Constitutional Court). It is therefore President of the Council who is in charge of general political responsibility, the coordination
of the various ministries involved and the direction of the information services and internal and external national security
action coordination. The Prime Minister has a supporting organisational structure in the Presidency of the Council.
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Minister of Defence. The Minister has the task of carrying out the resolutions adopted by the Government, issuing
directives and approving strategic and joint operational planning with the associated technical, financial and procurement programmes.
The Minister also issues general directives to the Chief of Defence Staff on the relations of the Italian Armed Services with those of
third countries and on the national position to be represented at the main military fora. He also establishes directives in matters of
scientific research and political-administrative guidelines. All these dispositions, and others, are laid out in the ‘Ministerial
Directives’ and their concrete implementation is in the Strategic Concept of the Chief of Defence Staff.
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Chief of Defence Staff. At the top of the Armed Services’ chain of command, the Chief of Defence Staff’s
responsibility, ‘based on the directives issued by the Minister”, is to plan, arrange and employ the Armed Services
globally. The single Armed Service Chiefs of Military Staff and the General
Commander of the Arma dei Carabinieri, as well as the General Secretary and Director of Armaments, who are entrusted with the
functioning and development of the technical and industrial dimension (an essential part of the defence compartment for the
country to dispose of the means to accomplish its politics), depend directly from the Chief of Defence Staff.
This rapid description entails a series of considerations. First, the institutional actors defining the defence
strategy are diverse, from general political figures down to those with more concrete and technical functions, along the whole
political-military hierarchy. Moreover, some of the authors of the documents mentioned above are among them, including the Chief of
Defence Staff for the Strategic Concept and the Minister of Defence for the White Paper and the Nota
Aggiuntiva. The most general guidelines are, however, given by the Prime Minister (supported by
the Presidency of the Council) who is the only one to have a general view of the activities of the various ministries and is the only one
who can guarantee their coherence and coordination.
(2) Internal Security
(2.1) Government Guidelines (Threats and Responses)
It is to internal security, starting from the higher level (strategic/political/institutional) that the third of
the seven ‘missions’ of the current Government Programme refers: (1) to ‘ensure more security and more justice’ and ‘strengthen the resources for security and social inclusion’;
and (2) to ‘strengthen the resources for justice and ensure legal certainty’.
Point (1) aims to increase and rationalise resources for security, crime control and crime prevention (public
order/public security tasks) and, also quantitatively, deals with illegal immigration and issues that are (questionably presented as)
connected, particularly internal and international terrorism and the strict control over places used for fundamentalist preaching. For
every mission and under-mission it is possible to identify some connected (strategic) actions that give an idea of the variety and
sectoral nature of the legislative initiatives undertaken.
Missions and actions replace the last Directive of the President of the Council of Ministers available (March 2007)
on guidelines for the strategic programming and the arrangement of general Ministers’ Directives for the administrative activity
and management for the year 2008. Here the main guidelines for the country were identified in three interrelated objectives: growth, new welfare and security.
Security, in turn, is divided into internal and external security. The former includes: the fight against crime,
ranging from micro-criminality to large-scale organised crime; the reinforcement of counterterrorism; the prevention of human trafficking and exploitation (especially of women and children).
Even if referred to the previous Government, and while awaiting the (imminent) publication of the new one, it is interesting to note the trends that, as regards security, it has in common with the present Government, although the approach to immigration is different. Focusing on internal security, a selection is appropriate as there is no official document specifically devoted to it.
To see how the Ministry implements the Government’s guidelines, it is useful to look at two documents,
of which the second (drafted by the Ministry of Interior) is the implementation of the first (drafted by the Government). The most recent general Directive issued by the Minister of the Interior is the General Directive for administrative activity and management for the year 2009.
Table 1 shows (1) the Government’s priorities, (2) the Ministry’s and (3) the strategic objectives. To give an idea of how general priorities are implemented in practice a selection of extracts from ‘public order and security’ is provided [italics added]:
Table 1.
(1) Government priorities |
(2) Political priorities indicated by the Ministry for 2009 |
(3) Strategic objectives |
- More security, more justice [...] |
To fulfil the programme aimed at coordinating and modernising the security system, in order to:
- reinforcing the respect of legality, counter criminality and prevent terrorist threats;
- ensure an effective response to the community’s demand for security, in close synergy with other territorial government levels. |
To consolidate the security system and establish an effective response to the community’s demand for security through
action aimed at reinforcing legality and preventing and countering criminality, by:
- Strengthening, in the framework of communitarian and international cooperation, of analysis and assessment of threats as well as of
joint information connected with the purpose of countering interior and international terrorism.
- Strengthening, in the framework of communitarian and international cooperation, operational and analytic instruments with the purpose
of countering organised crime, both internally and internationally with particular regard to the mafia associations, clandestine
immigration, trafficking of human beings, exploitation of women and minors and drug trafficking.
- Strengthening cooperation initiatives with the EU and cooperation instruments with the States of origin and transit of immigrants,
promoting technical assistance appropriate to guarantee the wider reciprocal collaboration with the purpose of countering clandestine immigration.
- Responding to the community’s demand for security through improved instruments of cooperation
with the other territorial levels of government for the development, in a coordinated form, of actions in questions of
order, public security and urban security, as well as the implementation of projects of participated security, integrated
security and proximity police with particular attention to the strengthening of prevention of widespread crimes.
- The optimal valorisation of security operators and the rationalisation of resources in their employment also through the
simplification of operational instruments, the integration of data banks, information systems and operational centres […] |
The first part of Section 2 is devoted to ‘Reference framework and political priorities’ and highlights the following priorities:
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Implementing the draft programme aimed at coordination and security system modernisation: (1) enforcing the respect of legality, countering
criminality and terrorist threat prevention; and (2) ensuring an effective response to the community’s demand for security, in
close synergy with other territorial government levels.
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Implementing the strategies of joint intervention of the institutional components involved, to contribute
to improve the management of phenomena like immigration and asylum and to combat clandestine immigration, also in the
perspective of developing cohesion, social integration and the sharing of values and rights.
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Strengthen inter-institutional cooperation with new synergies and connexions, with the aim of improving social cohesion.
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Maintaining efficiency at maximum levels for civil defence and the prevention of risks.
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Simplifying and reorganising administration, linking the improvement of the quality of services and their optimal sizing to
cost reductions and resource recovery, and leveraging on the operational integration made possible by digitalisation.
Finally, the second part of Section 2 deals with ‘Strategic objectives and action plans’. Here the
objectives are outlined in a series of actions included in the ‘action plan of the strategic objective’ with the
connected internal and external ministerial structures involved and the financial resources available.
On several occasions reference is made to the ‘security system’, but no definition of it is presented.
It can, however, be concluded, based on the text, that it includes the following areas: enforcement of legality, prevention of and
opposition to organised internal and international crime, prevention of internal and international terrorist threats and the provision of
an effective response to the community’s demand for security.
As for the action necessary to achieve this, the ‘strategic objectives’ highlight some of the elements
that are required to develop the ‘security system’: enforcement of coordination at a national level (including local
government and joint levels), as well as at EU and international levels; and administrative simplification and reorganisation to
enable the integration of operational instruments for activities of joint threat analysis (informational connection of data bases, of
informational systems and of operational centres). Regarding optimisation, it highlights the valorisation of security operators
and the rationalisation of resources as well as maintaining at a maximum the efficiency of the national civil defence system and of
the instruments of risk prevention and public rescue.
As regards the identification of threats, it is important to consider the document produced by the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers, the Report on Intelligence Policy for Security (2007), issued by the Information and Security Department. The index
shows the areas considered but the introduction highlights the areas of interest for internal security, covered mainly by the activities of the internal intelligence Agency (Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza interna, AISI) [italics added]:
‘[...] Intelligence agencies (AISE - foreign intelligence; AISI - internal intelligence) under the co-ordination of the DIS (Information and
Security Department) focus their attention on the following main threats and risks:
- major threats, i.e. imminent, potentially lethal threats – at home and abroad – affecting substantial numbers of Italian citizens
(i.e. attacks on personnel of military missions abroad or civilians working in crisis areas; acts of jihadist terrorism; activities by
national and transnational organised crime);
- potentially lethal risks, but considerably more limited than those under the previous category, ascribable to subversive terrorist groups,
or arising from riots which can be kept under control by the law enforcement (i.e. actions by domestic extremist groups and by organised and
violent football supporters);
- longer term threats with potentially disastrous consequences which can be posed by both States and organised terrorist groups (proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction);
- risks to property (know-how, resources of the State or of the general public, economic interference, espionage, attacks on information
systems).
[…] According to the above-mentioned set of risks and threats, the first risk factor to be considered is organised crime, with particular
reference to the infiltration in vital local economic sectors and institutions. AISI’s activity is prominent in this context.
[…] As for the second major threat – attacks abroad and jihadist terrorism – three areas are regarded as particularly critical: North Africa (Maghreb), Afghanistan and Lebanon. These areas represent a top priority for AISE and AISI, according to their respective
competences, in addition to other criticalities in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and South-East Asia.
[…] Though strongly cut down by anti-terrorist operations, domestic
subversive groups have engaged in efforts to reorganise clandestine groups styled after the Red Brigades; Anarchist-insurrectionalism, too, has continued to
show aggressive intentions.
[…] WMD proliferation is a longer term threat, but with potentially disastrous outcomes. The counter-proliferation branch of AISE,
together with other ministerial departments, is actively engaged in monitoring its different aspects and developments.
[...] Last but not least, we will examine the category related to risks to private and public property, economic interference, espionage,
attacks on information systems.
Most of the criticalities dealt with in the last report did not change. Here we will draw the attention on new aspects. In general, two priorities
have emerged: the evolution of energy markets and their consequences on national security of energy supplies and the rise of economic crime.
[...] The main activities of AISE and AISI in countering the attacks against legal economy have been carried out in: money laundering, financing
of terrorism, national and international economic crime. [...]’.
At this point some other remarks are apposite: some of official documents selected here –both by the previous
and the present governments– define the bounds of a (sectarian) definition of what ‘internal security’ is (identification
of specific threats), as a phenomenon that is complex and capable of being interpreted differently, and especially so in terms of to how
to implement it (identification of specific measures). The threats are presented only as general areas (inevitably perhaps, due to the
comprehensiveness and rapid changes that characterise them) and the measures –while outlined– fail to have the sufficient
clarity. But are the characteristics of these threats and measures compatible with a strategy, or with part of it, on a long-term basis?
Besides, the documents are partly unbalanced, with a greater bias towards the identification of threats, to the
detriment of measures. That is certainly true as regards the Relation, whose aim is to report monitoring and progresses in AISI
and AISE activities and therefore to support only indirectly the identification of responses. Nevertheless, the communality of threats
(for example, with other Ministries, especially Defence, but also Foreign Affairs) remains a necessary but insufficient condition for common responses.
The central role of the identification of threats and responses, at a permanent level of policy definition
(basically long-term) and security policy coordination, is referable –as it has partly emerged and is partly going to emerge–
to the President of the Council and the Council of Ministers. Now, based on the premise that –following one of the possible
approaches– national defence is composed of civil defence (internal security) and military defence (external security), –the next paragraph will deal with the main players involved in
Italy in civil defence/internal security, both at the policy level –in a permanent and ‘precautionary’ way– and at the crisis emergency (operational) management level.
(2.2) Main Players Involved in Internal Security/Civil Defence
Following the definition given by the Minister of the Interior –outlined in Decree 300/1999–, Civil Defence ensures the continuity of Government action (the vital interests of the State) through the protection of the nation’s economic, productive and logistic (social) capacity and the reduction of the impact of crisis events on the population. Although this classic civil defence role has evolved through the years towards more complex scenarios (see below), today it still defines the essentials of an internal crisis decision structure. Starting from the top of the political and institutional level –responsible for the identification of threats and responses–, there are the following national decision-making bodies:
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President of the Council of Ministers.
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Council of Ministers.
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Strategic Political Committee (Comitato Politico Strategico, CPS, formed by
the President of the Council of Ministers and Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Interior). This is responsible for decisions
(and coordination) on intervention. Participation in the sessions is also foreseen for the Undersecretary to the Presidency of the
Council, the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Council and, in an advisory capacity, the Defence Chief of Military Staff and the
General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It meets exclusively during a state of crisis, and builds on the results of
the pre-decisional phase obtained by the technical staff.
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The National Decisional Centre (Centro Decisionale Nazionale, CDN), is the
support site of the Strategic Political Committee (and alternatively of the Council of Ministers), whose decisions it turns into concrete
action. The decision room, control room and situation room are the modular elements working in close functional connection with the
corresponding key points of the single Ministries and the information services. The activation of the National Decision Centre
manages the consultations with Ministries and relevant state administrations, in accordance with the various competences specified by the law.
The natural crisis manager is therefore the Government working in confidence with the Parliament. There are also national coordination organs:
-
Political and Military Unit (Nucleo Politico Militare, NPM), comprising the representatives of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers
(and the Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council) and the representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and
the Interior (particularly those from the General Staff, the AISE and the AISI). The participation of ad
hoc representatives from other Ministries and public and private boards (as essential services suppliers) is also possible if necessary. It is a permanent organ, chaired by the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Council, or on delegation by the military adviser of the President of the Council of Ministers. Under normal circumstances it also monitors and assesses situations of interest for the internal and external security of the nation with the purpose of prevention. At the collective meetings the participants provide the information they have available and all contribute in accordance with their competence to determine the course of action and propose operational measures to be adopted. In the event of a crisis the Political and Military Unit cooperates with the Strategic Political Committee on an advisory and consultative basis.
The Political and Military Unit avails itself of technical interdepartmental commissions. The supporting organ for
the technical coordination of ‘civil defence’ activities is the Technical Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Defence
(Commissione Interministeriale Tecnica per la Difesa Civile, CITDC) that meets within the Ministry of the Interior, who chairs it and
supervises. It was foreseen by the Crisis
Management National Handbook (1980) and instituted by a Decree of the Minister of the Interior of 28
September 2001, chaired by the heads of the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Protection Department and composed of the
representatives of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, state administrations (Defence, Interior, Health and others, as needed), by
the National Autonomous State Routes Board (Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali,
ANAS), the Superior Inspectorate of the Military Body of the Italian Red Cross, the Environmental Protection for Technical Services Agency
(Agenzia per la protezione dell’ambiente e per i servizi tecnici, APAT) and can be joined by the representatives of other organs:
National Board for Civil Aviation (Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile, ENAC), National Board for Flight Assistance (Ente
Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo, ENAV), Trenitalia, Poste Italiane, etc. The CITDC, as coordination organ, supports the Military
Political Unit and ensures the coordination of civil defence at a central level (of the central state administrations) while the
Prefects ensure coordination at the peripheral level and the operational phase is guaranteed by the Armed Services, Law Enforcement Forces, Civil Protection and other organs.
Going back to the areas covered by Civil Defence –which ensure the continuity of Government action and
the state’s vital interests through the protection of the nation’s economic, productive, logistical and social capacity
and the reduction of the impact of crisis events on the population– we had anticipated that such a classic role had evolved over the past
few years towards more complex scenarios. The tasks of the CITDC range from the most traditional ones –as regards the
population, the Chemical Biologic Nuclear and Radiological (CBRN) risk is internationally considered a problem pertaining to Civil
Defence– to others so defined [italics added]: ‘[...] assess the emerging situations and plan the measures to be taken in
the case of crisis. The Commission also evaluates other risk hypothesis, not directly referable to intentional actions, which can
determine crisis situations for the continuity of the Government action as well as damages to the population and generally to the
security of the country. It is in this perspective that the Commission and the [Fire brigades, Public Rescue and Civil
Protection] Department elaborate themes connected to critical infrastructures and, in close cooperation with the Ministry of
Health, the conditions of management of a crisis produced by serious epidemic diseases becoming widely spread’.
These two last areas insert themselves respectively into a functional definition of security which we will
return to and in a renewed and widened vision of the traditional NBCR risks which we will talk about in the next paragraph.
(2.3) The CBRN Case
The CBRN sector is of absolute importance due to the various factors that enhance its risk –for instance, the
increased potential availability of CBRN agents and of know-how for their conversion into weapons even by non-state actors, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the development of nuclear capacities in countries outside NATO–.
Here we consider selected and relevant parts of the theme to show an example of coordination mechanisms between the
internal and external security systems. In 2001 the Presidency of the Council of Ministers prepared a national plan for defence against
terrorist CBRN attacks, a classified document which identified threats, possible scenarios and possible countermeasures. The Plan
was conceived as a general directive to support the preparation of subsequent plans and sector plans by the public and private
administrations that provide essential services, and of the 103 Provincial plans established by the Prefects. The plans are submitted
to periodical exercises to test their functionality and operational capacity.
It is interesting to note the fundamental role played, both at the planning and operational levels, by the
Ministries of Defence, Interior and Health. This helps explain the interaction between the internal (civil, sanitary) and external
(military) security systems. In particular, the cooperative support of the Armed Services is included at various levels: strategic and operational planning, decision-making, training and exercises, operational intervention where necessary (supporting Fire Brigades, which depend from the Ministry of Interior and which are principally responsible for such types of intervention). Besides, coordination between the forces typically assigned to internal security and the forces normally assigned to external security can also be carried out going up towards the decisional, political and support organs, based on the above mentioned Strategic Political Committee, the Political and Military Unit and the CITDC.
Finally, to conclude with a short final reflection on the military role, it is important to make a
distinction: the civil/military synergy is an added value, but while the strategic military level is appropriately placed in the decision-making system, its operational use in internal security is
desirable only for ‘emergencies’, with the aim of preventing the distortion of an instrument which follows specific
training and motivational dynamics and has special equipment sustainability and balance requirements.
(2.4) The Civil Protection Function
We shall now consider selected and relevant parts of the Civil Defence element primarily in order to clarify the
central importance of the chain of command in the event of a crisis. The development of the structure in recent years has led to the
availability of new instruments, but there are also problematic institutional overlaps.
Briefly, to indicate the possible differences between civil defence and civil protection in Italy it can be said
that while civil defence concerns, as we have already seen, intentional acts, civil protection concerns safeguarding, rescuing
and assisting the population and protecting and recovering goods in the event of natural as well as man-made calamities of an involuntary
nature.
In Italy the two domains, contrary to the organisational models largely adopted abroad, depend on two different
administrations: the Civil Protection Department in the Presidency of the Council at a central level –Fire Brigades, Public Rescue–
and the Civil Defence Department in the Ministry of the Interior.
However, civil defence also covers complex scenarios when it becomes involved in emergency situations
unconnected to voluntary acts, therefore, in a certain sense, overlapping civil protection tasks. Besides, the relevant events for civil protection include, by way of
Law 996/1970, the concept of public calamity as a man-made event. Moreover at the organisational level of the two functions, the framework is made more complex due to certain institutional aspects that, as regards civil protection, devolve some powers upon regions, provinces and municipalities that had hitherto pertained exclusively to the State. In the case of CBRN risks, orders/decrees 3275/2003 and 3285/2003 of the President of the Council of Ministers appoint the Civil
Protection Department chief as delegated Commissioner of the President of the Council of Ministers (with the exception of the
powers of the Minister of the Interior) who is responsible for the coordination and implementation of the necessary countermeasures.
The duality between the Fire Department (part of the Ministry of the Interior) and the Civil Protection Department
(part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers) together with these factors can mean that, in emergency situations, the definition
of the chain of command and of coordination at certain levels is not easy. A problem often solved by the government nominating an
extraordinary commissioner either directly or through ad hoc legislation or by the use of an
urgent decree, which to some extent bypasses the original mandates that might therefore be considered inadequate.
The civil protection system has taken on an increasing importance in recent years because of its closeness to the
Presidency of the Council, flexibility, capillary presence, budget availability and a versatile command and control structure. A
recently established ‘Italy’ situation room provides the theoretical possibility of handling contacts with other institutional
actors, although not in cases of emergency –de facto a supremacy/technological
comprehensiveness leads to an institutional centrality–, so that in normal times there is a permanent presence of officers and officials of other administrations seconded to the Department.
Besides, as we have seen, civil protection also reveals, in its interaction with civil defence, the system’s
weaker points, such as the issuing of emergency decrees, and in general the preventive lack of clarity of some levels of the chain of
command. Such indefiniteness recomposes itself (only) at the top by the choice
of the President of the Council of Ministers with political leadership (capacity and powers) both for civil defence emergencies
and civil protection (exercised through the civil protection department). The importance of the chain of command is essential and
should certainly be included in the elements which form a NSS for Italy, as explained in the next chapter.
(3) Consideration of a Single National Security Strategy
Despite the existence of several documents, procedures and practices concerning the external and internal
dimensions of security, it would be convenient to draw up a single document to describe a National Security Strategy (NSS) for Italy.
Here are some elements to consider in the preparation of such a document.
(3.1) Convergence Between External (Military) and Internal (Civil) Dimensions of Security
From our analysis it emerges clearly that the internal (civil) and external (military) dimension of security
present many overlapping areas in terms of actors, functions and means. The convergence between the concepts can be seen, both at a
national and European level, in different domains: political and institutional (superimposition of the functions and regulations
between different institutions), operational (deployment of civil and military personnel during the same missions, assignation of civil
tasks to military personnel), and technological and industrial (technologies that in several cases give rise to an overlap in the security and defence market).
At a European level, these trends are in full motion and generally accepted and pursued. But problems connected to the artificial separation of these two dimensions are now emerging; the full organisational development
which should follow is, however, obstructed by the Union’s pillar structure, which foresees different tracks for political and
decisional –as well as economic and financial– matters, depending on whether they are placed in the sphere of civil security
or military defence. Having confirmed that Europe’s evolution towards a cross-pillar organisation essentially depends on the
political and conceptual effort of the states, which will not happen in the short and medium term, it is natural to think that an approach
which encourages such a convergence at a national level is the right starting point.
The main European countries, like France, Germany and the UK, have recently adopted NSS in which the convergence between internal and external security is explicitly
recognised, together with the necessity of developing relevant synergies between civil and military instruments. The French case is
perhaps the most evident proof: the document title –Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale–
already points to a new perspective. The formal recognition of such an evolution and its explicit mention in official documents is
followed by some consequences on the practical side. Among them, there is the adoption of a series of initiatives aimed at enforcing
the coordination of the administrations involved (primarily the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence), the formation of
interdepartmental tables to decide jointly on the policies deriving from the general document, the development of synergies at an
operational level, as well as procedural and financial aspects. The French Livre Blanc foresees
the formation of a Conseil de la Défense et de la Sécurité National to connect the various Ministers and security and defence experts, to
be chaired by the President of the Republic. Germany is also moving towards interdepartmental coordination, both civil and military,
although with thematic subdivisions (air security, counter-terrorism, etc).
Italy should first of all acknowledge these trends and model future considerations on them. In spite of such a
delay, some elements of the Italian system are in line with this convergence, as for example in the sphere of some decisional and
advisory organs which are specifically for internal security (Strategic Political Committee or Military Political Unit) or in the
sphere of intelligence reorganisation, that is no longer based on the division between civil and military information services, but on a
‘geographical’ approach, where AISI deals with internal and AISE with external security. Some concrete steps can be also
singled out at the technological and industrial level: in the space sector, particularly, Italy is a pioneer in the conception,
development and use of a satellite system of Earth Observation with a dual-use character. The truth is, however, that the main reasons that
pushed the Ministry of Defence and the Italian Space Agency to share the system are the lack of the necessary resources to separately
develop similar systems, rather than in a strategic and conceptual far-sightedness. Whatever the reasons, the COSMO-SkyMed is an
important step forward in the mental approach and an administrative, procedural and industrial socialisation which can be useful in the future.
By adopting NSS documents based on this approach, and having concrete initiatives to follow through with
different plans, European countries not only ensure in the most effective way their own security, but also establish a basis for a
shared strategic security culture which should be seen in the future also at a European level, especially with regard to the desired
evolution of EU institutions.
(3.2) The International Dimension
The NSS should contain a series of elements (for example, threats, responses, strategic objectives) compatible
with the commitments assumed by Italy in the European and Euro-Atlantic domain. The real communality of values and interests,
which is at the basis of alliances and agreements, should make such a conclusion natural. For that reason, making a NSS coherent with the
ESS is supposed to be easy, not only because of the rather general and certainly shared nature of the European document, but also because of its focus on the external dimension of security.
Many of the European states are also part of NATO and for this reason making the Italian NSS coherent with the new
Strategic Concept of the Atlantic Alliance in preparation should not entail great difficulties. The new Strategic Concept will update,
after 10 years (the last is dated 1999) the missions that the Alliance wants to give itself, more generally the unsolved matter of
its raison d’être after the end of the cold war. It is possible that NATO will decide
to extend its own functions as a security actor for current matters like terrorism, cyber security, environment and energy security. In
this case it will also deal with shared challenges, endorsed at the European and national levels.
Belonging to NATO, more than to the EU, has influenced the national military tool: it guaranteed Italy the
development of planning and conduct doctrines, shared with its allies, and a high level of interoperability of equipment and
procedure (the best example is the net-centric transformation started in Italy) as well as a good level of joint and combined training.
Defence policy, especially as regards methods, was also inspired by the defence ‘Ministerial directive 1999’ that was the
first national attempt to fix the planning of the Armed Services on the basis of the ‘NATO Ministerial Guidance 1998’.
Italy, as an active EU and NATO member, is therefore being asked to take note of values, threats and objectives
which are shared with its allies, as it has up to now in the preparation of the different institutional defence documents.
(3.3) Functional Security: A Concept
The blurry borders between the external and internal dimension of security, is one of the main components of the
concept of functional security, which also provides some useful elements for the definition of an Italian NSS.
Focusing on the human factor, it aims to ensure the efficient and effective continuity of the vital functions of
modern societies, in the case of events which might cause their disruption. As to what is to be safeguarded, particular attention is
given to infrastructures such as transport networks, energy and water supplies, banking and financial systems and cyberspace and
telecommunications. Moreover, as distances today are no longer determined by mere
geographical factors, but also by the potential rapidity of connections (infrastructures), this makes a response to the system’s
vulnerability and interconnections particularly urgent. As for the risks connected to such an interpretation of security, there is a
juxtaposition between intentional, natural and accidental events in some cases of crisis-disruption protection and management, which can
essentially be the same, be it in a ‘casual’ or a ‘caused’ emergency. It goes without saying that this
aspect can be considered a favourable point for possible synergies.
Besides, it is undeniable that these salient points of the category, connected to critical infrastructure, are
shared both in Europe and internationally (at the institutional and the research level) and must be reckoned with to create a realistic NSS. The complex interweaving of systems of systems means that no state can consider
itself immune from the functional disruptions of another State: security has a transnational nature.
And security also has a ‘transfunctional’ nature since the interruption of a function (for example,
electricity) can lead to interruptions of functions of another kind (for example ICT, information and communication technology) and vice
versa, in an interconnection of vulnerabilities.
Another advantage in such a conception is that it highlights the necessity of including the private sector in all of
the phases of security management (from prevention to consequence management). It is clear that any initiative for critical
infrastructure protection must involve the private sector: private boards are always to a greater extent owners/managers (of the
control) of systems (eg, in the telecom sector), providers of goods and services and the focal points of research and innovative
technologies for security. These reasons, together with the more traditional ones of budgetary limitations, make the development of
adequate public-private partnerships necessary.
By the way, the nature of such threats, in a context of systems of systems –for which geographical,
economic, bureaucratic, political –in a word functional– bounds no longer matter– implies a proliferation of authorities involved in security
management. That is certainly evident at EU level if we think about the increase of the number of Agencies and on a national level [italics added]:
‘[…] national security lacks a centralisation of tasks and structures. There
are at least about ten institutions and agencies that, in several ways and upon different titles, deal with the Italian Homeland
Security: the Presidency of the Council, the Civil Protection Department, the National Authority for Security, the Ministry of Transports, the
Ministry of the Interiors, the Health office, the Defence office, the Border and Custom Police, which refers to the Ministry of Economics
and Finance, not to talk about the lots of local agencies. Unfortunately it is necessary to remark how in this scenario, overlaps and
duplications are dangerous as never before. The fragmentation of accountability centres can, indeed dramatically reduce the efficiency
and the well-timed intervention of responses to a terrorist threat and of the emergency intervention in case of attacks to our country.
This normative complexity causes confusion within the institutional framework in which contrast and management responsibilities of a
possible terrorist act must mature [...]’.
Such a proliferation calls into question traditional institutional competences, with further interactions and
overlaps. All these must be recognised and then organised and managed.
(3.4) Institutional Improvements
There can be different ways of designing political and institutional coordination policies as a key point of
security management. As regards to both what is already present in the institutional organisation and to proposals, it is likely that
any reform hypothesis in Italy cannot leave aside the prominent role of the President of the Council/Presidency of the Council concerning
both policy tasks (basically long-term) and emergency management tasks. Two examples highlight this.
The first has to do with a structure which is in some sense multipurpose, a National Security Council [italics added]:
‘[...] the achievement of such objectives overcomes the single reference
offices’ capacities and calls for a global and continuative action by the Presidency of the Council. In recent what has long been
discussed (without anything being done) is the institution of a National Security Council and/or
a Council for International Economics. Even without getting to that, it would already be an important step forward if a
strong and full-bodied Secretary of the Council of Ministers were instituted, directly
connected to the President and his Undersecretary, with capacities for the programming and assessment of the governmental policies, to
collect competencies which are now strewn here and there in various offices such as those of the Diplomatic advisor, the military advisor
and the Executive Committee for Information and security services (in Italian, CESIS), thereby enriching and connecting them more organically to the decision-making. Such
an organism should therefore develop two key tasks: first, provide the Government with a middle term perspective which would encourage
coherent decisions, second, control the correspondence between such initiatives and the resources which
will have to be assigned to the interested offices, not just in the short term but also in the longer term (at least three years), so as
to permit a more certain and effective planning. [...]’.
The second example has to do with the more specific –but just as vast– field of the CBRN threat,
against which several institutions intervene at different governmental levels in various ways and under various titles. Also in
this case the traditional institutional competences are called into question and the fragmentation of accountability can invalidate the
effectiveness and efficiency of the response. Such complexity must be managed through a clear normative and institutional framework in
charge of the CBRN threat. A framework which is today lacking because of the absence of a political and institutional strategy to be
developed within a national security system reorganisation [italics added]:
‘[…] The hypothesis developed in research suggests a support structure to
be headquartered in the Presidency of the Council of the Ministers, which would be the decision-making base at a national level, able permanently to draw upon the capabilities of the various administrations and competent agencies. […] a Council
of the Ministers for Emergencies (Consiglio dei Ministri per le Emergenze,
CME), composed of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Economy and Finance. The
Prime Minister could invite to the meetings other Ministers, whose participation he/she considers useful depending on the nature of the
event and the decisions to be taken. The multiplicity of agencies that could be involved in an emergency would result in a ‘call
to arms’ of numerous central and local administrations, for which the decision-making at the general level or in particularly
serious cases would be coordinated by the CME. Moreover, the Prime Minister would be flanked by an Undersecretary
to the Prime Minister expressly delegated for the management of emergencies (Sottosegretario
alla Presidenza del Consiglio delegato per la gestione delle Emergenze,
SSE), who would support or, if need be, replace him / her. This would ensure that there is a strongly specialized figure in the Government able to
provide the necessary continuity in management of interventions. At the executive level, an Interdepartmental Emergency Committee
(Comitato Interministeriale per le Emergenze, CIE) could be set up, composed of representatives of the Ministers
making up the CME and chaired by the SSE, with the support of the Chief of the Civil Protection Department. Depending on needs, even
the SSE could invite representatives of other administrations to the meetings. The representatives should be appointed directly by the
respective Ministers, regardless of their formal positions. It is crucial, in fact, that they be able to act with the authority that
comes from being able to interface directly with the competent Minister and with the autonomy that derives from this. The
CIE should meet and act in different forms, depending on the emergency, with regular meetings aimed at planning the necessary
activities of prevention and training, including simulations, of all bodies potentially involved and acquiring an adequate level of
experience in the management of emergencies. The new structure, which would take over command and control in the
event of a CBRN emergency, would favour the permanent development of a common substrate of language, praxis, exchange of information,
arrangements, technical-operational standards, training and exercises between agencies that have different histories and competences, and
which would benefit the optimum functioning of the system. More generally, it would be a tool for planning and verifying government
policies. [...]’.
(4) Conclusions
This paper’s point of departure is Italy’s lack of an institutional document devoted to a NSS. It
therefore goes on to consider some institutional documents –unclassified and available by 1 March 2009– about the
external and internal dimensions of security that are relevant to identifying national security threats and establishing guidelines for
the appropriate strategic responses.
From an analysis of these documents it is possible to identify some of the elements that, even if not
exhaustive, should be inserted into a NSS for Italy. Here we report on some of these factors, particularly those that deal with both the
external and internal dimensions of security. The convergence between the two dimensions of security should certainly be included in the
NSS and such a synthesis should occur at both strategic (especially political and institutional) and other levels (technical and
operational, financial, industrial...).
The two dimensions have, as we have said, reciprocal implications. The undefined border between the two areas
calls into question the traditional divisions of competences between institutional actors belonging to one or the other, implying the need
for legislative and procedural measures to enforce coordination at the institutional and political levels as well as at the technical
and operational, giving rise to synergies that would otherwise be impossible.
When seeking a reference point for such coordination, the political and institutional level is certainly
vital for both dimensions to flow together in the NSS: the identification of threats and, above all, guidelines for response.
Such individuation should be done jointly by the relevant administrations as a necessary but not sufficient condition to
establish coordinated responses up to the technical and operational levels.
The leadership decisional structures presented in the proposal for an institutional improvement attempt to implement
an accountability centralisation/principle of a single authority that is already evident from the centrality of the roles of the Prime
Minister and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, both for internal security and –in a less direct way– for external
security, and that is already present in existing structures.
Regarding the internal dimension of security, we have looked at the functioning of civil defence/internal security
leadership. Looking at the rather technical and operational chain of command in the event of emergencies, it should be borne in mind that
there is a strong potential in the Civil Protection Department due to its flexibility and its closeness to the Presidency of the Council
and the direct relation with the President of the Council in the event of a crisis. If a NSS can go as far as individuating an
‘internal’ operational chain of command, the development of the department should aim at enhancing coordination between
typically internal (civil, sanitary) and typically external (cooperative contribution of the Armed Services for emergencies and
public dangers) security systems in the national territory.
The sense of such a coordination was confirmed by the recent reform of the intelligence service, which is no longer
based on the distinction between civil and military information services but rather on a ‘geographical’ approach, in
which AISI deals with internal intelligence and AISE with foreign intelligence while they both report to the President of the Council
of Ministers. This confirms just how central it is for administrations within a country to exchange information.
Along with the administrations, especially at the technical and operational levels, the private sector must also be
involved, where relevant. The latter’s role will be necessary when considering the interpretation of threats. With regard to the
centrality of citizen security, for example –a theme which is also recognised at the institutional level (ESS) and in EU policies
(as in the research sector financed by the EU Commission)– it can be assumed that this is covered by the concept of functional
security which aims to safeguard the key functions of modern societies. Here the direct reference to infrastructures and services
requires the involvement of the private sector, which is not only the owner and/or manager of most of them and/or of their security, but
more generally is in the front line of the research, development and production of (even dual) technologies.
At a strategic level, the individuation and prioritisation of threats and response guidelines –to be further refined at the technical and operational levels–
should be considered a ‘historical’ exercise: a NSS must therefore aim to have a middle-to-long term validity, evolving
according to conditions and subject to systematic revision, but not be tied down by the alternation of governments. Hence, it must be a
bipartisan document.
A future NSS should start from these essential requirements for the identification of national security interests
which, concerning external security for instance, should be coherent with Italy’s membership of UN, NATO and the EU. As for the
internal dimension, it should have a transnational nature because security is transnational and so must be its management.
The NSS should therefore be wide-ranging enough to provide the necessary flexibility for interpretations and
implementations at the less strategic political and institutional levels and at the technical and operational levels –ie, it does
not have to be in the nature of a doctrine– and sufficiently well defined to be an important reference in safeguarding national
security interests, thereby differing from the partiality inherent to the different policies undertaken in the various sectors concerning national security.
Nevertheless, the question of what national security is remains open –as in the changeable use of the
appeal to national security, for example to exercise a veto in international organisations in order to not apply EU common market
rules–. Any attempt to understand it following verifiable criteria clashes with its changing character. The management of
security is currently subject to changes and calls for a high-level, constant (apart from emergencies) and long-lasting political
attention to face complex evolving scenarios to which a strategy and a national security system should be adapted.
Federica Di Camillo and Lucia Marta
Analysts at the Security and Defence Department, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
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