Theme: Turkey's occupation of 37% of Cyprus is a protracted legal and political anomaly that the EU is morally obliged to address
Summary: Over one-third of Cyprus's territory remains occupied since the 1974 Turkish invasion. As an act of
aggression, the invasion was immediately condemned by the institutions of the
international community. The occupation and the illicit 1983 secession of the
occupied territory have also been condemned repeatedly by the United Nations,
the European Community/Union, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
And yet the gross victimisation of the Cypriots continues unabated, even though
they are EU citizens since 1 May 2004. Simultaneously, the EU is pursuing a
global role under the aegis of its principles and values of freedom, human
rights, democracy, dignity, solidarity and justice; it also threatens with sanctions
states that violate their citizens' human rights. Therefore, if the EU's cardinal
principles and values are to be taken seriously, it follows that Turkey (a candidate for EU membership) should be properly condemned while the process of liberating Cyprus should begin immediately. Otherwise, the EU will undermine its
internal credibility and international prestige.
European Union (EU) is an international actor claiming to advance a more rational
and humane global order. Accordingly, it tries to accumulate moral kudos in
various international activities involving, inter alia, human rights,
peace-keeping and peace-making, ecological sensitivity, humanitarian assistance
and generous foreign aid.
The relevant discussion of the EU's international role and emerging
identity is currently addressed by the literature on 'civilian power EU', 'military
power EU' or 'normative power Europe'. By implication, there is an expanding 'ethical' dialogue on the EU's cardinal principles, norms and values, even though most
scholars shy away from employing the terms 'ethical' or 'moral'.
Intriguingly, no such discussion has addressed the EU's moral
obligations towards the Republic of Cyprus, although it is a full Member State since May 2004. Given, however, that part of Cyprus remains occupied by Turkey, given the demonstrable illegality and immorality of the
occupation and given Turkey's intransigence and manifest bad faith, it follows
logically and ethically that the Cypriots' human rights and fundamental
freedoms should be restored. Therefore, while the EU must advance its ethical
role globally, its moral obligations towards one of its Members should,
arguably, have logical and political priority.
Sources and Nature of the Union's Moral Obligations
As the 2006 EU Annual Report on Human Rights emphasised, 'Human
rights defenders and victims of human rights violations in different parts of
the world expect a lot from the EU. Rightly so: the EU as a value-based
community can be expected to further the cause of human rights and
democracy with great ambition'. Similarly, according to Commissioner Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, 'Respect for human rights is one of the most fundamental and
universal values of our world. All of us, in our official capacity and in our
private lives, have a responsibility to promote and protect the
rights of our fellow members of the human family, be that at home or elsewhere
in the world'.
Professor Ian Manners, elaborating on the 'normative' character of
this 'value-based community', has noted the EU's five 'core norms': peace,
liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. These norms are solidified, and even
celebrated, in every programmatic document of the EC/EU, including the
Preamble and founding principles of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European
Communities (TEC, art.177 and art. 11) and the 1991 Treaty on European Union
(TEU, art. 6 and art. 11), the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, the principles and
norms of the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter, the
draft Constitutional Treaty and the December 2005, European Union Guidelines on
promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL)'. Manners,
building on the EU's 'founding principles', recalled the Union's 'fundamental
rights': dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizenship and justice.
Elsewhere, I propose the notion of a 'pragmatic
idealist EU' as a fruitful conception of the Union's global role, as an
intimation of the EU's ethical goals and as a further conceptual
explication of 'normative' in 'normative power Europe'. In any event, my main
concern is the insertion in the debate of the terms 'moral' or 'ethical' and
the assertion that the EU is 'already' a prima facie ethical actor.
But, then, can the EU qualify as an authentic 'normative power' or 'pragmatic
idealist actor' if it hesitates to apply its essential principles and values to
correct the on-going ethical anomaly in Cyprus' The answer presupposes
demonstrating that the Republic of Cyprus deserves the EU's ethical
protection. This desert can be established by proving Cyprus's prolonged victimisation, primarily by Turkey.
Cyprus's Victimisation by Turkey
victimisation of Cyprus since the 1974 invasion is easy to establish, once bias
and misinformation are exposed. As the relevant record is widely available, a
mere sketch should suffice here to show that, whereas the Greek Cypriots (G/Cs)
have long worked to achieve liberation and 'reunification', Turkey is trying to
exploit the occupation in order to attain its own EU accession and to 'reunify' Cyprus under crudely self-serving terms.
Besides this blackmail, its geopolitical significance has guaranteed
sustained 'Western' favouritism to Turkey since the Truman Doctrine. As regards
the triangle Turkey-Cyprus-Greece, Washington and London's frequently immoral Realpolitik has covered both Greece and Cyprus. The most recent such instance is the
attempt to sell the Annan Plan as 'a UN Cyprus reunification plan'. In truth,
this plan was tailor-made to serve the strategic interests of the US, the UK and Turkey and the idiosyncratic needs of the Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs).
Simultaneously, it intended Turkey's full exculpation for the invasion and the
occupation, it by-passed the complete restoration of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots and it turned a blind eye to the anxieties
and rational concerns of the Greek Cypriots, the overwhelming majority of Cyprus's population.
In my 2006 book, Unfair Play, I demonstrated
how the Annan Plan violated cardinal principles and norms of international and
European law, thereby creating a deleterious precedent in their legal and
ethical culture. Moreover, the plan was manifestly unworkable and blatantly
unfair to the G/Cs, as shown by the following selection of structural flaws:
provisions for inter-communal majorities amounted essentially to giving the
right of veto to the minority T/Cs.
(2) In cases of an inter-communal
decision-making impasse, the plan appealed to the new Supreme Court. But here,
besides the G/C and T/C judges, the plan had imported three foreign judges.
(3) Most of the
economic burden of running the new state would necessarily fall on the G/Cs,
whose present per capita income is around three times that of the T/Cs.
(4) The fact that
pivotal property issues were handed to a Property Board was causing insecurity
and frustration: many 'very foggy' compensations could stretch over 35 years
while its unclear funding and obscure mechanism were unfathomable by most
calculated ambiguities, the plan had legitimated most of the illegal settlers.
Demonstrating utter insensitivity towards the G/Cs, the plan also ignored these
settlers' serious 'social, economic, psychological and political' conflict with
the indeginous T/Cs, as recognised by the 2003 Report on Cyprus of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Rapporteur Jaakko Laakso): 'The
settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed
regions of Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way
from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions
and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population who tend to
view them as a foreign element'.
Moreover, the plan contained two revealing legal and ethical sins: (1)
the annulment of the citizens' right to appeal to the ECHR for compensation;
and (2) the handing of the continental shelf to the British Sovereign Military
Bases, following the discovery of large hydrocarbon deposits south of Cyprus'
This sketch should justify the plan's
rejection by 76% of the Greek Cypriots. Now, once rejected, the plan was to be
rendered 'null and void'. And yet influential power-centres in Europe and beyond embarked immediately on 'punishing' the Republic for the Greek Cypriots'
rejection while attempting to 'reward the Turkish Cypriots' for the plan's
endorsement. Clearly, this made a mockery of the notion of referendum.
It was also blatantly unethical: for one just cannot 'punish' those who
rejected something unfair and unworkable or 'reward' those who endorsed what
was serving their interests and needs. All this demonstrates the Cypriots'
victimisation by crude Realpolitik instead of their protection by Moralpolitik.
Turkey and the T/C leadership are orchestrating the revival of the null and void Annan
Plan. They are persistently supported by Washington and Turkey's current 'EU lobby',
bent on whitewashing Turkey's illegal and unethical behaviour. Worse still,
this behaviour has recently been 'enriched': first, by the blatant violation by
Turkey of its obligation to open its ports and airports to the Republic of
Cyprus, and secondly, by the unceasing campaign to build homes and hotels in
the occupied territory, on Greek Cypriot properties abandoned during the bloody
Furthermore, the AKP government of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and its apologists have cultivated and spread a tripartite
mythology: first, that Turkey has 'fulfilled its Cyprus obligations' by
endorsing the Annan Plan; secondly, that the EU must keep its 'promises to the
Turkish Cypriots' before Turkey fulfils its contractual obligations; and
thirdly that 'the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots must
The first myth is palpably absurd. Since
the Annan Plan was concocted to exculpate Turkey and to serve the US, the UK
and the Turkish Cypriots, it is mind-boggling to claim that Turkey has
fulfilled the obligations that follow from the invasion, the 33-year-old
occupation and the gross violation of the human rights of all legitimate Cypriots.
The second myth also collapses by
recalling that, with Nicosia's consent, the EU adopted the Green Line
Regulation for the circulation of persons and goods. Moreover, the financial
aid of €259 million allotted by the EU for delivery to the 'Turkish Cypriots'
was approved by the legitimate Nicosia government. Therefore, this myth
represents another colossal lie.
Thirdly, by referring to the 'isolation' of the T/Cs, Turkish
propaganda hopes, first, to evade recognition of the generous assistance extended
to the T/Cs by the Cyprus Government and, secondly, to cover up the
international community's condemnation of the illicit and unrecognised regime
of occupied Cyprus ('Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' or 'TRNC'). This
condemnation resulted as follows: first, the 1974 invasion was universally
acknowledged as illegal and immoral, and, secondly, the November 1983 'unilateral
declaration of independence' (UDI) by the occupation regime was universally
declared null and void.
Condemnatory legal rulings, resolutions, and political declarations
were issued by the Court of the European Communities, by the European Community
and the UN Security Council. Thus, UNSC Resolution 541 (1983) stated that it
[the Security Council] "...1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot
authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus; 2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its
withdrawal;...7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other
than the Republic of Cyprus..."
The European Community immediately issued its explicit condemnation
of the UDI. Six months later, the Security Council, by Resolution 550,
reaffirmed the condemnation as per resolution 541 (1983) and demanded its
urgent implementation. None of these resolutions have been respected by Turkey.
But here is yet another myth, completely glossed over by most
Cyprus-watchers: any vague and unqualified talk of 'Turkish Cypriots' is
utterly misleading and unethical. The indigenous Turkish Cypriots have long
been a minority in occupied Cyprus. They are outnumbered dramatically by the
illegal Turkish settlers, methodically brought over in order to make unrecognisable
the Republic's pre-invasion demography. As noted by the aforementioned 2003
Council of Europe Report:
"Despite the lack
of consensus on the exact figures, all parties concerned admit that Turkish
nationals have been systematically arriving in the northern part of the island.
According to reliable estimates, their number currently amounts to 115 000... [The
Turkish Cypriots'] number decreased from 118,000 in 1974 to an estimated 87,600
in 2001. In consequence, the settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriot
population in the northern part of the island".
This illegality constitutes a war crime. However, the United Nations
allowed these Turkish nationals to vote in the Cypriot referendum as equals to the indigenous Turkish Cypriots.
All this helps explain why my recent book
was entitled, Unfair Play. London, Washington and Ankara emerged therein
as protagonistic in Realpolitik immorality; however, Greece and the EU were praiseworthy for supporting Cyprus's rightful claims. In particular,
the EU's ethical role emerged as follows: first, whenever the EC/EU
raised obstacles to Turkey's accession ambitions, the Cyprus occupation was present. Secondly, it immediately condemned the 1983 UDI by the
secessionist regime. Thirdly, it decoupled the Republic's EU accession from its
problem's resolution at the December 1999 Helsinki summit. Fourth, the December
2002 Copenhagen European Council decided that the (indivisible) Republic of Cyprus should sign the Treaty of Accession in April 2003. Finally, the
Republic joined the Union officially on 1 May 2004. By and large, therefore, EU institutions have kept recognising and defending for decades Cyprus's rightful case.
Some Post-Annan Plan Cypriot Vicissitudes
Aspiring to start accession negotiations on 3 October 2005, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to its Customs Union agreement on 29 July 2005. It added, however, a 'declaration', asserting that 'it does not recognise'
the Republic of Cyprus. But then, an EU 'Counter-declaration' was issued on 21 September 2005, demonstrating the Union's determination to assert its essential principles
The 'Counter-declaration' embodied legal, political and ethical
commitments. Paragraph 2 stressed that Turkey's declaration 'is unilateral,
does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol'. According to Paragraph 4, "The European
Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They underline that they recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law". Equally
explicit was the next paragraph: "Recognition of all Member States is a
necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU underlines
the importance it attaches to the normalization of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible". Finally, while reiterating support
for the UN's efforts for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, the Anti-declaration (par. 7) demanded that Cyprus's settlement should now
be "in line with the principles on which the Union is founded..." (emphases
During this period, Nicosia accumulated warm political and moral
support, in COREPER and the Council of General Affairs and External Relations,
by up to 19 other fellow Members. This support arose because Ankara's
provocative acts and omissions were increasingly frustrating EU Members and
institutions; the UK, then presiding, was frequently isolated due to its
excessive Turkophilia; and the Annan Plan's errors and sins were being revealed
Then, on 3 October 2005, the Council endorsed the 'Negotiating
Framework for Turkey', demanding inter alia: (b) its "continued support
for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within
the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is
founded..."; and (c) "progress in the normalisation of bilateral relations
between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus".
On 12 October 2005, 'The Committee for a European Solution in Cyprus',
presented in Brussels its Report entitled, A Principled Basis for a Just and
Lasting Cyprus Settlement in the Light of International and European Law. This Report, produced by an international panel of distinguished professors of
Political Science, International Law and Constitutional Law, contained a
devastating critique of the Annan Plan, followed by recommendations for the
achievement of 'a European solution' to the Cyprus problem. The Report was
praised by numerous MEPs tutored in the matter.
Another Commission document was welcomed by all those
who envisage the fair, viable and dignified resolution of the problem in
tandem with the authentic rapprochement and solid friendship between Greece and Turkey. The Proposal for a Council Decision on the
Principles, Priorities, and Conditions contained in the Accession Partnership
with Turkey reiterated that Turkey should "Continue to support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded". Thus, given Turkey's repeated faux pas and the Annan Plan's gradual
demystification, while Cyprus was becoming a less misunderstood and
increasingly respected EU Member, the Commission was re-asserting that the
Cyprus settlement must be co-determined by the Union's axiological principles
The Cyprus Government was pressed by an
angry public opinion to veto the start of EU-Turkey negotiations. It could have
done so on either 17 December 2004 or 3 October 2005 or on both occasions. Resisting this temptation demonstrated its decision to show respect for the Union's values of moderation and reconciliation. Simultaneously, Nicosia expected EU solidarity in the form of genuine pressure on Turkey to begin fulfilling 'at long last' its legal and moral obligations. Such pressure
did not materialise and the many Ankaras have not budged. By August 2007, Turkey refuses to 'recognise' the Republic. It follows that Turkey today keeps violating
its legal, political and moral obligations towards both Cyprus and the EU itself.
In 2006, Nicosia's case received further
moral and political support from many European capitals, the European
Parliament and some of its distinguished representatives. They have all been
shaping an 'ethical acquis' vis-à-vis Turkey concerning its
Cyprus-related tricks and antics. Quite telling was the September 2006 Report
on Turkey by the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs, written by the Dutch MEP
(EPP) Camiel Eurlings. Among the issues preoccupying MEPs were Turkey's non-fulfilment of its obligations towards Cyprus. For instance, in paragraph 52,
the Report expressed the Committee's disappointment over the fact that, in
spite of its contractual obligations, Turkey continues to maintain restrictions
on vessels flying the Cypriot flag...; reminds Turkey that this practice
constitutes a breach by Turkey of the Association Agreement, the related
Customs Union and the Additional Protocol, as the restrictions infringe the
principle of the free movement of goods;... regrets that Turkey maintains its
veto against the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international
organisations and in multilateral agreements. Moral support to Cyprus was also extended by leading MEPs, responding to the publication of the Regular
Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession. Observing the Commission's
emerging passivity towards Turkey's non-fulfilment of its contractual
obligations, Elmar Brok (EPP) -at the time Chairman of the EP's Foreign Affairs
Committee- lamented a 'shift of responsibility' by the Commission to the
December 2006 summit: "The Commission evades a final evaluation of Turkey, in particular with respect to the unresolved Cyprus question. This means not
only lack of credibility towards the European public, but also continues to
weaken the EU negotiation position vis-à-vis Turkey". Similarly, the Socialist
Group's Vice-President, Jan Marinus Wiersma, said: "... [The] Ankara protocol is an
important question of law: it is not up for negotiation and it must be
implemented fully" (ibid.).
In Cyprus, political elites academics, and
public opinion were dismayed by Commisioner Olli Rhen's sudden backsliding on
the aforementioned issues. Throughout 2006, Rehn was warning of an EU-Turkey 'train
crash' unless Turkey fulfilled its legal obligations and ethical duties. But
then, yielding to widely reported pressures by the usual suspects, instead of
endorsing the long-threatened substantive sanctions against the guilty
country -such as proposing the suspension of Turkey's accession negotiations-
he was actively engaged in a European Commission 'compromise'. Turkey was 'punished' by the 'freezing' of only eight (accession negotiation) 'chapters'
out of 35. Elmar Brok now advocated that "no new negotiation chapters should be
opened as long as Turkey does not meet its legal obligations".
In December 2006 Turkey was handed a 'toleration period' of up to three years to meet its violated
obligations towards Cyprus and the EU. The implicit rationalisations "in terms
of helping Turkey transcend its domestic travails and political malaise" are
deplorable. Turkey's own problems cannot excuse either the transparent
victimisation of an EU Member State or the crude violation of the Union's norms, principles and values.
Does Cyprus Deserve the EU's 'Ethical
accumulated guilt towards Cyprus results, inter alia, from the continued
use of military force in the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus, the gross
violation of elementary human rights and fundamental freedoms of Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, the refusal to recognise the Republic -in contrast to the
entire world and the EU itself-, the implied threats to use again military
force in Cyprus, the persistence of hypocrisy and deception, the intentional
distortion of legal, political and ethical facts, the incessant use of
political and military blackmail and the violation of the cardinal norm of pacta
Such behaviour is ethically intolerable.
It demonstrates Turkey's attempt to disregard the EU's normative (ie, legal
and ethical) acquis expecting to serve narcissistic interests and
geopolitical ambitions. Equally painful is that certain EU Members and
(recently) the European Commission stand idly by at Turkey's illegal and
immoral provocations. Therefore, once the record of victimisation is recalled,
any further delay to satisfy the Republic's rightful claim to liberation
amounts to an ethical scandal: legal paradoxes, ethical sins and political
anomalies are being tolerated in favour of a problematic 'and deeply unpopular'
This ethical scandal contains profound
implications for the EU's credibility and prestige. A grand contradiction
emerges in the rhetorical celebration of the Union?s essential principles,
norms and values while failing to honour what is being celebrated. Liberty, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rule of Law,
Dignity, Equality, Solidarity and Justice are not metaphysical abstractions,
but the Union's constitutive legal, political and ethical commitments. If their
enunciation and celebration are to be taken seriously, especially when globally
pursued, it should follow -ethically and politically- that they have to be
applied a fortiori to Cyprus and Turkey.
According to Immanuel Kant, "ought implies can". Is the EU capable of satisfying Cyprus's rightful claims so that we can establish what it ought
First, we saw how the EU has demonstrated repeatedly the will and
the ability to protect Cyprus's rights and frequently to 'punish' Turkey for its Cyprus policies.
Secondly, an ethical acquis regarding Cyprus has been crystallised by resolutions, declarations, statements and actions, issued
by most EU institutions, by the United Nations with EC participation and by
distinguished EU personalities. This acquis entails the EU's proved capability to protest the unethical victimisation of the Republic.
Thirdly, if the EU can threaten Third Parties with substantial
sanctions should they violate their citizens' human rights, it is incomprehensible
that no substantial sanctions are imposed on a candidate state that
keeps victimising the citizens of an EU Member State. To be sure,
traditionally, the EC/EU has relied on the UN to handle the Cyprus problem. Today, however, the picture has changed dramatically: the Republic is an EU
Member State, the UN's role in the Annan Plan is seriously discredited and Turkey's arrogance, unreliability and bad faith are demonstrated. Therefore, the EU ought
now to assert its essential principles and values in tandem with
assisting a fair UN role: to protect the human rights of the (legitimate)
Cypriots and the Union's credibility, prestige, and self-respect.
Fourth, regarding the measures of an effective EU modus operandi,
they should start with the speedy withdrawal of Turkey's occupation troops; with
radical changes in the Turkish Penal Code (TPC), which prevents debate and
self-criticism; and with respect by Turkey of pacta sunt servanda, giving
priority to the normalisation of Turkey-Cyprus relations, beginning with
recognition. To be sure, the Republic's recognition will entail de-recognition of the secessionist regime. But this, like the normalisation of Turkey-Cyprus
relations, will not be an act of generosity. It is merely what Turkey ought to do, given the countless UN and EC/EU Resolutions and decisions and the
explicit obligations attached to its EU candidacy.
Fifth, the above do not imply that the EU is expected
to resolve the Cyprus problem. Turkey does not desire it, worried about
enforcing ?the principles on which the Union was founded?. And Nicosia does not demand it, expecting implimentation of the UN Charter's norms and values in
tandem with application of the EU's principles and norms.
Therefore, here is a preliminary catalogue of what the Union can, and therefore morally ought to, do:
(1) To emphasise
consistently -in statements, declarations, actions and decisions- that one of
its Members is being victimised by a candidate eager for accession.
(2) Turkey should be forced to speed up the withdrawal
of its troops from Cyprus.
(3) Turkey should recognise the Republic following
its 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections.
(4) Because Turkey has engineered the evasion of the UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations -agreed
upon on 8 July 2006- it should be forced to commit the T/C leadership to these
(5) The Union should demand the immediate abolition of Art. 301 and all analogous articles of the
(6) The proverbial 'moral
conscience' of the Union, the European Parliament, should take further bold
initiatives to defend Cyprus.
(7) A 'Committee of
Wise Persons' could well be formed to play the role of 'honest broker' between
Nicosia and Turkey, and between the two main Cypriot communities, and to liaise
with the appropriate UN officials and the Permanent Members of the Security
newly-envisaged -after the June 2007 European Council- EU Foreign Affairs High
Representative should include among his/her priorities the coordination and
implementation of the above.
If, however, the proposed measures do not suffice to mobilise the Union as required by its moral obligations to Cyprus, the Cyprus Government, supported by
the like-minded fellow-Members, should definitely change its strategy and
resort ?at last? to the use of its right to veto.
Conclusions: This author is fully aware
of the manifold support extended to Turkey on account of its geopolitical
value, its growth potential, its possible role as a 'bridge' between the EU and
the Muslim world, etc. In fact, these reasons and the likelihood of
establishing a zone of peace and friendship between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece -once Turkey should become 'Europeanised'- explain my warm, earlier
support for Turkey's EU accession ambitions. But the assumption of Turkey's 'Europeanisation'
is being progressively falsified: by rising nationalist passions generated by
the 'perception' that the EU is being 'unfair' to Turkey, by a misplaced
eagerness to influence its membership's terms, by an elite and popular reaction
to the negative perceptions of many Europeans (for whom "Turkey is too large,
too poor and too Muslim") and by a contradictory and confused political culture
where narcissism, arrogance and aggressiveness co-habit with pessimism,
insecurity and confusion. This very picture explains both the animosity towards
and support for Turkey's EU trajectory. It might also account for the notion
that, since Turkey's accession road looks increasingly bumpy, one need not
expect it to conform to EU principles, values and norms. This notion, however,
represents a serious fallacy, for it entails either that the EU must alter its
axiological character to accommodate Turkey or that accession must preceed
conformity to EU values and norms. Both these readings imply that the Union should yield to Turkey's blackmail, something politically and morally intolerable.
There is, however, a third way suggested by this essay: first, whatever the
EU-Turkey future holds (including 'strategic partnership'), Turkey should be
helped to fulfill its legal-political-moral obligations without affirmative
action or negative discrimination; secondly, the Union's moral obligations to
Cyprus must be fulfilled, for they now constitute a test-case of the EU's
axiological authenticity and ethical identity on which its internal credibility
and international prestige largely depend.
University of Cyprus
 The accession covers the entire Republic of Cyprus as an integrated
international actor. According to Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession
(2003), the acquis communautaire will be applied to the occupied
territory after the resolution of Cyprus's (political/legal/moral) problem.
 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", Journal
of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, nr 2, 2002, p 235-58.
 Costas Melakopides, Achilles Emilianides and Giorgos Kentas, The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2007, KIMEDE and Power
Publishing, Nicosia, 2007 (forthcoming).
 See Costas Melakopides, Unfair Play: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the EU, Martello Papers 29, Centre for International
Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, 2006.
 The invasion's human cost on the Greek Cypriot side included 6,000
dead, 180,000 refugees and displaced persons and 3,000 missing persons. As
regards material losses, the invasion resulted in the appropriation by Turkey
of 70% of Cyprus's 'productive resources', according to Strategic Survey
1974, IISS, London, 1974, p. 82n.
 See Unfair Play for details on this crucial matter.
 European Commission, Brussels, COM (2005) 559, 9 November 2005, p. 10, emphasis added.
 See Costas Melakopides, "On the Mediterranean 'Fuzzy Edge' of the
EU: The Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey", Journal of European
Integration, vol. 22, 2000, p. 299-34.