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Theme: A much expanded version of the UK’s
counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST (based around the four CT
objectives of: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare), was published in March 2009.
Summary: After its first public version appeared in 2006 the
UK’s counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, CONTEST (based around the
four CT objectives of: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare), was
published in a much expanded version in March 2009. This paper
provides a critical overview of the 2009 version with particular
emphasis upon: outcomes measurement; the CONTEST ‘Prevent’
focus on countering violent extremism and CONTEST (2009)’s much heightened emphasis on the terrorist CBRN threat. The paper notes
that CONTEST (2009)’s expanded length is related to a belated
UK Government awareness of the need for better public understanding
of the Government’s perception of the international terrorism
threat facing the UK. Though the paper raises the issue of whether
the CONTEST focus on Islamist terrorism might inhibit a better
appreciation of current indicators of more overt right-wing violent
extremism in the UK.
Analysis: The UK has possessed a comprehensive, post-9/11,
counter-terrorism strategy since 2003 known as CONTEST. The strategy
is based around four counter-terrorism objectives, the four ‘Ps’:
Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Three of the four ‘Ps’
with the substitution of Respond for Prepare also form the key
objectives of the EU’s counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. CONTEST’s implementation, within the UK, rests upon the contributions of a range of government departments, led by the Home
Office (through its Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism or OSCT,
formed in 2007), the police and intelligence services and other
public bodies, eg, the Health Protection Agency, UK Border Agency and
regional and local government. CONTEST also requires and depends upon
the contributions of a myriad private sector bodies, eg, airport
operators, shopping-centre management and private security companies
as well a diverse collection of community and sectoral interest
groups.
The CONTEST strategy has evolved through three stages: (1) an
unpublished classified version from 2003-06 overseen by the Cabinet
Office; (2) a partly de-classified version, from 2006; and (3), since
March 2009, in a much revised version. Since 2006 responsibility for overseeing the strategy has moved to
the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office.
Some aspects of CONTEST obviously remain classified as is stated in
CONTEST (2009). For example, the details of the Government’s
2008 CBRNE threat review, and specific intelligence sources are, of
course, not cited in support of threat analyses, rather the reader is
referred to sources such as BBC News reports of terrorist
convictions.
The most striking difference between the two editions of CONTEST is
in the depth of explanatory material provided around the four ‘Ps’:
CONTEST (2006) is 36 pages in length, CONTEST (2009) is 176 pages
long. There is a two-part possible explanation for this four-fold
expansion in the depth of coverage. First, there is an
acknowledgement that the rather blinkered approach to recognising
causal factors and providing supporting material to justify
particular threat responses, characterised by the years of the
Blair-Bush partnership, was both wrong and unhelpful. Secondly, and
more importantly, there is the belated recognition that:
‘Communications are a vital part of our work on
counter-terrorism, CONTEST depends for its success on partnerships’. The partnerships, it is suggested in CONTEST (2009) depend on
openness and trust both of which ‘… depend upon accurate
communications about the threat and responses’. Or as the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, expressed it in the
introduction, the hope that better-informed equals more vigilant. Although it might be argued that the use of the acronym CONTEST (for
Counter-Terrorism Strategy) may suggest to some readers a struggle
between ‘them’ and ‘us’, which perhaps does
not really convey the aspiration for a sort of congruence between
public sector CT agencies and ‘resilient communities’ to
tackle those who are termed ‘violent extremists’.
Moreover, there still remains the question of who exactly the
Government anticipates is going to read CONTEST (2009) apart from
government spokesmen, analysts from academia and the ‘think-tanks’,
and the obvious ‘interested parties’ ranging from central
government officials posted to CONTEST-related appointments, local
authorities, representatives of Muslim groups, the security
industries and the newly formed counter-terrorism sub-committee of
the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs. There is some
evidence to support the view that CONTEST (2009) is particularly
aimed at such ‘interested parties’ as ‘… the
Home Office is planning a series of events across the country to
engage with and explain the strategy to groups, organisations and
agencies who will be involved in its delivery’. For a wider audience a shorter summary document on CONTEST (2009) is
available.
A linked rationale for an expanded CONTEST relates to the development
of CONTEST counter-terrorism PSA (public service agreement) targets
for the nine ‘key outcomes’ expected of the CONTEST
‘stakeholders’. It may be felt that the expanded CONTEST
narrative will help the ‘stakeholders’ develop their
outcomes as, for example, the Department for Health has recently said
it ‘… faces some significant challenges in delivering
against its CONTEST commitments…’. Though it will not help in instances where meeting the CONTEST
outcomes requires extra resources. Currently the Dafyd-Powys Police
are stating that, as presently funded and resourced, they ‘…
cannot meet the target times….’ for responding to a
threat alert at the LNG storage facility at Milford Haven. It should further be noted that the CONTEST ‘ends-means’
issue is a long standing problem. For example, in 2006 the Chief
Constable of North Wales described the national standards for
counter-terrorism as ‘… particularly demanding…’
and he suggested that the ‘... view of the Force is that as
drafted the standard will be forever unattainable…’.
As a partial framework for this policy analysis of CONTEST (2009) the
utility of the ambiguity-conflict model advanced by Matland (1995)
will be considered. This approach has been chosen because its
application can draw upon Bossong’s use of the model (2008) in
his study of the broadly analogous EU Action Plan on Combating
Terrorism.] As Bossong explains, the ‘… ambiguity-conflict model
postulates that there are two key factors that structure the policy
implementation process: the level of ambiguity in the formulation of
policy means and the degree of conflict the policy provokes.’ Though Bossong further notes, with reference to the model, that: ‘…
the impact of policy ambiguity is more contested’. Minimal ambiguity may aid a top-down hierarchical approach whilst
some ambiguity may facilitate adaptability to local conditions by
lower-level actors. An examination of CONTEST, especially in its 2009
format, suggests, prima facie, that two of Matland’s
four implementation paradigms are present to varying degrees across
the four ‘Ps’.
The first paradigm particularly identified in the response to CONTEST
is administrative implementation, where both conflict and
ambiguity are low ‘… so that implementation becomes
primarily a managerial or depoliticized process and therefore,
comparatively effective’. This paradigm, the analysis contends, is partly applicable to the
‘Protect’ part of CONTEST, for example, with reference to
policy areas such as airport security and the protection of crowded
places. Though here it must be noted that even if the ‘what’
and ‘how’ is relatively uncontested the issue of costs
may well be disputed because of what CONTEST (2009) calls ‘The
long established presumption that the “user pays”…’. This issue has recently surfaced over the proposals in Part 6 of the
Policing and Crime Bill (Bill 7 of 2008-09) to require all 63 UK
airports covered by the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP)
to cover all policing costs that may be required in their Aviation
Security Plan (ASP). Currently only nine airports are so designated
for the purposes of policing costs. Costs may be less of an issue if, as in the case of the water
industry, the ‘Protect’ requirements are both made a
legal obligation and receive some Government part-funding to
recognise the provision of a national security contribution.
The administrative implementation paradigm does not, however,
fit all aspects of ‘Protect’. The call for building
designs to reflect counter-terrorism security concerns have produced
divisions within the British architectural profession. As part of the
‘Protect’ strand the Government has been seeking to
promote the transferability of the existing ‘designing out
crime’ planning and construction requirements into ‘designing
out terrorism’. In 2008 the Royal Society of Arts (RSA),
together with the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the
Home Office and the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office
(NaCTSO) launched a competition for architecture students entitled
‘The Public Spaces. Safer Places: Designing in
Counter-Terrorism’. The brief related to a scenario where a
public space the size of Trafalgar Square had been subject to a
terrorist bomb attack which caused 500 deaths and left 1,500
injured. A more long-running exercise has been the NaCTSO-run ‘Project
Argus’ courses on designing out terrorism. These courses,
usually of one day duration, are primarily aimed at the business
community but the participants also include architects, planners and
designers. The RIBA President Sunand Prasad has been a high-profile supporter of
such initiatives and an advocate for the view that architects have a
role in designing out terrorism.
However, the architectural profession is somewhat divided over this
Government-backed initiative. For example, the architect Piers Gough
said, in a RIBA ‘Building Futures’ debate in June 2008,
‘Every special interest group in the country wants architects
on their side to carry out their paranoia! Don’t listen to
them’. At the London Festival of Architecture debate on the
motion ‘this house believes we should fortify our cities’
only seven votes were cast for the motion. Despite these reactions, the RIBA’s head of professional
development, Joni Tyler, argued that ‘People said the same
thing about sustainability: that it was too expensive, but there is a
genuine appetite for that now. We predict the same thing will happen
with counter-terrorism protection’. It might well be suggested that, in a deep recession period which has
particularly hit the building development and construction
industries, the potential extra costs of more secure designs could
produce quite a time lag before Tyler’s prediction is realised.
Although, the typically desirable building counter-terrorism
measures, such as higher spec glazing and associated fixings and more
robust building structures, are not thought likely to add more than
about 5% to initial new build costs. However, there would clearly
have to be a shift in attitude by a number of architects, designers
and spatial experts who see the Government’s aspirations as
just another attempt by the state to curtail freedoms. As John Adams,
UCL Emeritus Professor of Geography, said: ‘If you harden the
main targets, the bombers just make icons out of the buses in
Tavistock Square – you can’t harden the whole world’.
The second paradigm particularly identified in relation to CONTEST is experimental implementation, where ‘… conflict is
low, but where means and goals of policies are ambiguous’. This can be seen in respect of the counter-extremism/violent
extremists strand of ‘Prevent’ and issues relating to
CONTEST’s aim of building up other countries’
counter-terrorism capacity. Charles Farr, Director-General of the
Home Office’s Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, accepts
that OSCT has a challenge in explaining the threat and strategy
effectively to departments that may have quite different priorities.
For example, the Department for International Development focuses on
poverty reduction and not counter-terrorism and Farr also accepts
that the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) has
‘…. many, many other functions and counter-terrorism is
not the only one – or even the main one’. Rachel Briggs of RUSI suggests, with reference to the
counter-extremism ‘Prevent’ priority programme in which
the DCLG and its networks is supposed to be much engaged, that ‘…
some agencies and groups have had moral concerns – whether
focusing exclusively on Muslims is discriminatory – while
others have not felt that extremism is a priority in their areas and
have avoided getting involved’. These reservations when related to the inputs that may be required to
address CONTEST objectives may have some justification when even the
Security Minister, Lord West, accepts that it ‘… is
extremely difficult…’ to assess the effectiveness of
counter-terrorism measures and that the authorities were still trying
to ‘… work out what we can use as empirical evidence’.
Because of the breadth and depth of coverage of the issues associated
with the four ‘Ps’ in CONTEST (2009) this analysis can
only offer a selective engagement with the strategy and it will not
address the overseas aspects of the UK’s counter-terrorism
strategy. The analysis will commence with a brief presentation of key
differences between the two editions of CONTEST and critically
summarise the quantitative data relating to the UK counter-terrorism
strategy. This will be followed by more detailed analyses of the
following aspects of CONTEST (2009): (1) the prioritisation of the
counter-extremism aspect of ‘Prevent’; and (2) the
CONTEST (2009) ‘Prepare’ stress on the CBRNE threat.
Key Differences Between CONTEST 2006 and 2009
One of the most striking differences between the two editions relates
to the presentation of the nature of the terrorist threat. CONTEST
(2006) described the principal threat as coming ‘….from
radicalised individuals’. By contrast, CONTEST (2009) refers to four sources of threat: (1) the
al-Qaeda leadership and its inner associates; (2) the affiliated
groups in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Yemen; (3)
self-starting individuals (the London and Glasgow car bombers); and
(4) lone individuals (the Exeter café bomber). However, both versions of CONTEST refer to the presence of religious
justification from the primary sources of the terrorist threats.
CONTEST (2009) expands much more than CONTEST (2006) on the evolution
of the terrorist threat to the UK and highlights a possible move
towards more lethal operations. CONTEST (2009) also suggests that one
possible effect from changes to the al-Qaeda structure may be that ‘…
the terrorist threat in relation to the UK may diversify towards
smaller “self-starting” organisations”’. Though CONTEST (2009) also stresses the ‘Pakistan link’
with the comment that most ‘… significant terrorist
investigations in the UK have links to Pakistan and for this reason
cooperation with Pakistan is critical to our delivery of CONTEST’. In the view of the latest edition of the UK’s National
Security Strategy (NSS 2009): ‘… the threat from
international terrorism is the most significant immediate security
threat to the United Kingdom’. Though it should be noted that after the publication of the NSS the
UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) has recently, on 20
July, lowered its assessment of the level of threat to the UK from
international terrorism from the level one ‘Severe’
status to the level three ‘Substantial’ status. The problem of the continuing threat of Irish-related terrorism,
albeit at a lower level, has been well recognised. It is contended
that the ‘… key principles for tackling the threat from
Irish related terrorism are… (also)… drawn from…
the CONTEST approach to international terrorism but are applicable to
the specific circumstances of Northern Ireland’.
However, it may be suggested that the current UK practice of
labelling right-wing political violence as ‘extremism’
rather than terrorism represents something of a CONTEST (2009) ‘gap’.
In this context the West Yorkshire Chief Constable, Sir Norman
Bettison, has recently reported that right-wing extremism related
arrests and property searches in June and July 2009 led to 300
weapons and 80 bombs being recovered. This was the largest seizure of suspected terrorist weapons in
England since the IRA campaign of the early 1990s.
It should also be noted that NSS 2009 has a rather different way of
presenting a key aspect of PREVENT to the discussion in CONTEST
(2009). NSS 2009 suggests that the ‘… lines between
terrorism, subversion and legitimate dissent and protest may become
increasingly blurred’. Linking counter-terrorism to counter-subversion may prove
institutionally challenging to the UK security and intelligence
services as counter-subversion work rather harks back to the Cold War
era and would now require extra resources, given the current level of
resource allocation to counter-terrorism.
The second most obvious difference relates to the heightened
prominence given to the potential for a terrorist CBRN threat. In
CONTEST (2006) CBRN is just listed as one of the nine functional
‘Prepare’ work-streams. CONTEST (2009), by contrast, gives a much more explicit presentation,
under ‘Prepare’, of what is now called the CBRNE threat
(where ‘E’ refers to the threat from the varieties and
innovations in home-produced explosives and detonators now being used
in conventional IEDs). Contest (2009) suggests that ‘Contemporary
terrorist organisations aspire to use chemical, biological,
radiological and even nuclear weapons. Changing technology and the
theft and smuggling of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
and explosive (CBRNE) materials make this aspiration more realistic
than it may have been in the recent past’. Moreover, it is suggested that terrorists ‘… look to the
internet to assist them…’ to achieve this aspiration. In support of this latter contention CONTEST (2009) notes that,
whereas the CT agencies were aware of 12 terrorism-related websites
in 1998, in 2009 over 4,000+ such sites had been identified.
The various forms of national security related cyber-space threats
are given much greater attention in the 2009 version of the NSS and
CONTEST. Whereas in 2007 the national cyber-security body, the
National Information Security Coordination Centre (NISCC), was merged
with MI5’s National Security Advice Centre (NSAC) to form the
Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI), it
is now announced that two new bodies are to be set up: the Office of
Cyber Security (OCS) in the Cabinet Office and a multi-agency Cyber
Security Operations Centre (CSOC) hosted by GCHQ.
In the context of the foregoing presentation of the serious nature of
the terrorist threat facing the UK the quantitative data can be
examined to assess the degree of congruence between threat level and
threat response resources, for example, budget levels and the
relevant intelligence and police personnel levels. The latter two
resource categories are key components for delivery of the UK’s
aspirations for intelligence-led ‘Pursue’ and ‘Prevent’
responses. The UK has only recently, (2007) identified a ‘Single
Security Budget’ which is predicted to rise from £2.5bn
in 2008-09 to £3.5bn in 2010-11 but this does not include all
the relevant spending, parts of which are still scattered across
departmental budgets. Though this budget increase is still ‘… more than triple
pre-9/11 levels’.
Police numbers are presented in three ways. First, that since 2006
the number of personnel dedicated to counter-terrorism has risen
significantly, which suggests that, for the UK, the 2005 London
bombings had more of a resource impact than 9/11. Within that rise in
police CT personnel numbers there are some 300 ‘ring-fenced’
police ‘Prevent’ posts, spread over 24 forces and a
continuing rise in the number of police Counter Terrorism Security
Adviser posts from around 100 in 2004 to 250 in 2008-09. Overall in England and Wales there are more than 3,000 CT police
officers of which a total of around 1,500 are in the
Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC or SO15) of the Metropolitan Police,
which has a national remit. The Metropolitan Police CTC is the largest of the five English police
‘counter-terrorism units’ or ‘hubs’. The
others, comprising ‘brigaded’ specialists from provincial
police forces, are located in Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham and the
Thames Valley. Similar CT ‘hub’ structures are to be
found in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The CTUs are supported
by three provincial police ‘counter-terrorism intelligence
units’ (CTIUs –these also exist in Scotland, Northern
Ireland and Wales–). All the police CT specialists in England
and Wales are now being linked in the police National
Counter-Terrorism Network which was established in October 2008 and
an MPS Deputy Assistant Commissioner is the Senior National
Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism. ACPO rank officers also act as
police national co-ordinators for each of the four ‘Ps’
of CONTEST. Despite some evidence of increases in police CT resources
budgetary constraints are still evident and likely to increase as the
Government attempts to control public expenditure in the recession.
For example, the proposed ‘active enhancement’ of
policing at UK borders has to be achieved by ‘cost-neutral’
means.
Regarding intelligence resources, CONTEST (2009) refers to a 60% rise
in the multi-agency staff of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
(JTAC) since its foundation in 2003. NSS 2009 notes the doubling in size of MI5 since 2001 and refers,
more obliquely, to ‘significant’ growth at GCHQ and
‘enhanced’ overseas operations by MI6.
It is notoriously difficult to produce conclusive ‘outcomes’
in relation to a counter-terrorism strategy. In the case of the
long-running PIRA campaign, with its frequency of incidents,
statistics of arrests coupled with a decrease in the frequency of
incidents may be cited as evidence of success in a counter-terrorism
strategy. Since the July 2005 London bombings the UK has only
experienced three ‘near’ active incidents: the two
detected car-borne IEDs in Central London, the linked VBIED that was
crashed into Glasgow Airport terminal and the lone bomber who injured
himself in the wash-room of an Exeter café in 2007. These
represent, in comparative quantitative terms, a very small record of
terrorist incidents when placed in the context of the CONTEST (2009)
statistics which focus on the outcomes of ‘Prevent’ and
‘Pursue’. Although since 2006 there have also been some
particularly important disruption operations, for example, Operation
Overt in 2006 involving a plot to use liquid explosives to bring down
up to 10 aircraft (according to press reports) on the UK-US
transatlantic route and Operation Gamble in 2007 where there was
evidence of planning to kidnap and execute, in the UK, a Muslim
member of the armed forces.
Because the UK treats domestic counter-terrorism as primarily a
matter for an intelligence-led law enforcement response it is not
surprising that much of the CONTEST (2009) quantitative data focuses
on the statistical records related to this response. Though it is
also recognised that sub judice issues and protracted trials
processes have sometimes hindered the publication of fuller threat
related information.
Thus CONTEST (2009) reports that between 2001 and 31 March 2008 there
were 1,471 terrorism-related arrests. However, only around 480 of
these arrests led to charges being preferred and of this number only
around 360 were charged with terrorism offences and of these only 196
people were convicted. MI5 public statements tend to give a figure of
around 2,000 persons, at any one time, that they are actively
interested in as international terrorism suspects. Currently some of these suspects and others, as yet unidentified, are
thought to be involved in about ‘… 200 potential
terrorist networks’. So one might speculatively conclude that the ‘Pursue’
resources are succeeding in visibly disrupting around 25% of what, it
must be assumed, is a rolling cohort of persons who are suspected of
some form of terrorism-related activity. However, such disruption
evaluations have to be couched in rather tentative terms as MI5
statements never give much indication of how the composition of the
‘2000’ (suspects) and the ‘200’ (networks)
change over time. For example, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, as MI5
DG, gave the same ‘200’ figure for groupings and networks
in 2006 although she then gave the ‘suspects’ figure as
1,500. On that latter figure one can raise the question as to whether the
additional ‘500’ now identified are newly ‘radicalised’
persons, which would represent a 25% increase between the years 2006
and 2009. An alternative explanation might just be that there is more
active reporting upwards through the intelligence chain.
Other ‘Pursue’ measures involve various types of
person-controls: between July 2005 and December 2008, 153 non-EEA
nationals were excluded, ie, denied entry to the UK, on national
security grounds, eight Algerians have been deported and deportation
proceedings are underway for nationals of other states. In addition,
notice of deportation has been served on three persons with UK
citizenship by naturalisation, following notice of deprivation of
citizenship. Up to 10 March 2009 a total of 40 people had been subject to domestic
control orders, imposed without any trial procedures, restricting
their freedom. Fifteen control orders remain in place but the Court
of Appeal has just ruled that control orders ‘… cannot
be upheld if the hearing cannot be fair’. The Lords of Appeal ruled that if the Government does not wish to
provide adequate information for a fair hearing in appeals against
control orders then it must consider derogating from Article 6 of the
ECHR.
In the Government’s 20-year forward-looking horizon (NSS 2009)
an interesting cross-sector strategy problem is raised which, in
turn, will produce challenging implementation requirements. NSS 2009
suggests that there ‘… is some evidence to suggest an
overlap between terrorists and organized criminal groups, in
particular around how they fund their operations, for example through
drug trafficking and counterfeiting’. Indeed Clarke & Soria note that about 30% of the individuals of
interest to MI5 in relation to Islamist terrorism have a
non-terrorism-related criminal record. A linked issue relates to prison experience as source of
radicalisation and the fact that ‘… Muslims constitute a
disproportionate percentage of the total people in prison in this
country, somewhere between 12 and 13%…’. This in turn has led to the establishment of a special CONTEST
‘Prevent’ programme under the National Offender
Management Service (NOMS) which plays an important role in the
‘Prevent’ counter-extremism objective.
The Prioritisation of Countering Violent Extremism Under ‘Prevent’
After the July 2005 London bombings, the Home Office set up
‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups and these
formed the initial stage in a process that led to both the
prioritisation of ‘Prevent’ from Summer 2007 and the
promulgation, by the Government in 2008, of ‘The Prevent
Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England – Stopping
People Becoming or Supporting Terrorists and Violent Extremists’. It is contended that, following Bossong’s use of Matland on the
ambiguity-conflict model, the implementation response to the priority
in ‘Prevent’ (also re-emphasised in the National
Community Safety Plan 2008-11) on countering violent extremism is
likely to exhibit characteristics of the experimental
implementation paradigm. This is particularly so because the
Prevent strategy stresses that tackling violent extremism should be
by multi-agency partnerships where ‘… local authorities
and the police should take the lead…’ and the UK has seen many examples of problems with the multi-agency
problem response format. It has already been noted that local
authorities face a very diverse set of policy implementation
requirements from central government. Moreover, the current stage in
the development of performance indicators for this ‘Prevent’
work-stream is very much focussed on sort of generic ‘tick-boxes’
for the presence of local ‘Prevent’ structures and
processes. The problem of measuring effectiveness in tackling violent
extremism is, as yet, unresolved.
So there is likely to be rather varied level of input from local
authorities. This might also relate to the fact that the ‘Prevent’ strategy has very clear focus on what it calls ‘… Al
Qa’ida-influenced terrorism…’, which the
Government equates with the ‘new extremism’ and local
government areas will differ widely in the scale of presence of
Muslim communities within their boundaries. Moreover the Government’s
understanding of ‘violent extremism’ covers a very wide
range of conduct, ie, any conduct which promotes, justifies, supports
or carries out acts of or related to terrorism as defined in
anti-terrorism legislation. For the police there is an inevitable
tension between the community-orientated, multi-agency engagement
with Muslim communities, under ‘Prevent’ and the more
‘hard’ policing requirement of intelligence gathering,
under the lead of MI5 and investigations and arrests under ‘Pursue’
with its focus on stopping terrorist attacks. This matter also has a link with the use of intelligence as one of
the tools in the measurement of outcomes under the ‘Prevent’
programme. The OSCT Director-General, Charles Farr, said if ‘…
you create, as we are able to, an intelligence baseline to establish
how much radicalisation is going on in those places at the moment,
you then look at the programmes you are trying to introduce in those
areas to stop radicalisation, and then you check your intelligence
the following year, you can get an idea, albeit an imperfect one, of
whether the risk of radicalisation in those areas… has reduced
or increased’.
If the CT agencies are correct in assigning an increased priority to
the terrorist CBRNE threat, as discussed below, then the importance
of countering tendencies towards violent extremism will be
reinforced. Although some of the ‘Prevent’ partners may
continue to find the type of link with the intelligence process,
outlined by Farr, above, to be at odds with their ethos and practice.
However, the CT agencies are noting the contribution to intelligence
by the Muslim community in Bristol as a vital factor in the arrest
and later conviction of Isa Ibrahim, in July 2009, for making an
explosive with intent to endanger life and other acts preparatory to
terrorism. In this instance the explosive that Ibrahim had made was
HMTD and it was found that he made several purchases of hydrogen
peroxide at branches of Boots the Chemists in Bristol.
The Prioritisation of CBRNE in ‘Prepare’
It is understandable that in CONTEST (2009) that the ‘E’
should have been added to CBRN under ‘Prepare’, first,
because of the dynamics and frequency of IED use in Iraq and
Afghanistan against British forces and civilians; secondly, because of the 2006 arrests and subsequent convictions of a
group of Islamist extremists for plotting to bring down transatlantic
airliners by using liquid-based IEDs. Moreover, part of CONTEST (2009)’s focus on CBRNE is certainly
in the nature of a prudent ‘Prepare’ response. This
derives from the classified 2008 CBRN review of what could be done to
improve the ‘… security of legally held chemical,
biological, radiological and explosive substances, and the facilities
where they are stored…’ which gave the authorities new
objectives to attain. Similarly, there is a prudent ‘Prepare’ development
contained in the announcement that by around 2011 a CBRN preparedness
programme will have been completed that will ‘…. equip
18 centres nationwide with staff and facilities to improve
multi-agency response to CBRN attack…’.
However, the prominence given in CONTEST (2009) to the CBRN threat
part of CBRNE is less readily understandable. The explanation, in
CONTEST (2009), of the emphasis on that threat, which expert opinion agrees could be of high impact but is relatively low in probability,
is not fully convincing. First, reference is, partly, made to ‘old’ evidence: Arun
Shinrikyo 1993-95, Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 reference to a Muslim
duty to acquire nuclear weapons and the al-Qaeda CBR ‘laboratories’
found in Afghanistan in 2001. Though, a little more recent evidence
is also documented: UK trial reports gave information that in 2004 an
al-Qaeda cell in the UK considered trying to detonate radiological
devices and in 2006 al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq were trying to get Iraqi
nuclear scientists to work with them. Secondly, CONTEST (2009) argues
that ‘…. three other factors have increased the risk
that terrorists may acquire CBRN weapons…’. However, these are a very diverse set of risk indicators: references
to the post-1989 incidents of supposed and possible trafficking in
radiological materials, some of which have been recorded by the IAEA,
and the increase in CBRN information on the internet and risks of
either material leaks from legitimate sites or information leaks from
strategic programmes. None of these really represent ‘new’
evidence, acquired since CONTEST (2006), or evidence of a ‘clear
and present danger’ but rather a sort of re-packaging of
well-known information. The only ‘newish’ factor is that
pertaining to the increase in the availability of CBRN information on
the Internet. However, it is difficult to comprehend the rationale
behind the prioritisation of the CBRN threat in CONTEST (2009) on the
basis of the evidence in the strategy. Although it may be that the
Home Office was seeking to provide a UK ‘echo’ of the
concerns expressed by the US Commission on the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism which anticipates a terrorist use of WMD
materials before 2013. Finally, and more generally, comparing CONTEST (2006) with CONTEST
(2009), the increased coverage of CBRN can be seen more positively as
an explicit official recognition of the multi-faceted nature of
CBRN.
This paper will approach the issue by exploring Cornish’s
analysis (2007) which views the CBRN weaponisation spectrum as ‘…
a system, offering all that might be required for a range of
terrorist groups from the largest to the smallest, from the almost
casual to the most organized, and from the poorest to the best
funded’. This formulation of the terrorism-related CBRN threat identifies its
differentiation from the understanding of CBRN WMD in the Cold War
era and thus the wide varieties of CBRN IEDs that are conceivable.
Moreover this analysis recognises that these variable characteristics
need to be addressed by a CT response that that can encompass the
particular challenges of each component of CBRN. For example, Cornish
cites that the ‘… US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
estimated that one licensed US radioactive source is lost every
day…’ and draws attention to the fact that the ‘… global
BW-related research and development cycle could simply be moving too
fast for governments to keep pace’.
Following similar reasoning, the report of a Wilton Park Conference
(2007) contained a number of cogent arguments for raising the CBRN
profile suggesting that a terrorist CBRN attack might not be a
‘transformational event’, like 9/11, but rather ‘…
part of a process of habituation…’. This is explained as occurring where a CBRN modified IED causes
initial societal alarm but has low actual damage/casualties impact.
CONTEST 2, in this context, refers to the nine attempts in Iraq to
produce viable chlorine dispersing IEDs. There have also been
unconfirmed reports from Afghanistan which have suggested that, in
some incidents, the Taliban may have used a local agricultural
pesticide, Mallatin. This line of reasoning gives emphasis to both the psychological
effect characteristics of CBRN and the wide potential for IED
hybridisation with CBRN components through, in part, clandestine
proliferation channels.
In this context, it is perhaps surprising but maybe understandable,
that CONTEST (2009) made no reference to the June 2006
counter-terrorism raid on a house in Forest Gate in East London.
Although arrests were made no-one was charged with terrorism offences
and no terrorist materials were discovered. However, the raid had
been based on information passed to MI5 which suggested that a
cyanide-based IED was being developed at that location. Moreover there was then and continues to be a not insignificant
counter-terrorism concern around details of a cyanide dispersal
device (known as al-Mubtakkar meaning ‘the invention’
in Arabic or ‘the initiative’ in Farsi) which has
featured on al-Qaeda websites since 2005 and is similar to the device
planned for the aborted 2003 plot to attack the New York city
subway. Furthermore, computer files containing ‘… recipes for
creating cyanide gas using tablet capsules…’ were
discovered on the computer of Omar Altimimi, who was convicted in the
UK in July 2007 of possession of material for terrorism purposes.
On the N & R part of CONTEST (2009)’s CT CBRN concerns it
may well be argued that recent events in North Korea, the current
turmoil in Iran and continuing anxieties over nuclear facilities
security in countries like Pakistan and the former USSR, can all be
seen to contribute to a rationale for this aspect of CBRN issue
prioritisation in CONTEST (2009). Indeed, Mohamed El Baradei has recently said that the IAEA continues
to be ‘… worried because we still have 200 cases of
illicit trafficking of nuclear material a year reported to us…’.
The discussion, in the preceding paragraph, can therefore be further
understood by reference to the greater emphasis given in CONTEST
(2009) to counter-proliferation regimes and initiatives. As well as
long-established counter-proliferation initiatives –for
example, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group–, CONTEST (2009) lays emphasis on the UK role in the ‘Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’. This has its origins
in the June 2002 G8 Summit’s commitment to ‘six
principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them acquiring
or developing’ WMD. This is now linked to the programme of global CBRN materials security
enhancement, the ‘Global Threat Reduction Programme’
(GTRP). However, the presence of a very wide and diverse range of countries
in some of these counter-proliferation/counter-terrorism groupings
may prove inhibiting to some aspects of counter-proliferation
intelligence sharing.
Thus, whilst CONTEST (2009) does not advance any ‘new’
evidence to support its increased emphasis on the CBRN terrorism
threat, it does seem possible to conclude, on the basis of the
discussion above, that some of the ‘old’ evidence
relating to CBRN terrorism can be assigned more ‘weighting’
now than it would have merited at the time of CONTEST first
publication in 2006. Additional ‘weighting’ is also
provided by NSS 2009 where the UK Government expresses the belief
that there has been a regrettable lack of coherence between what it
calls the UK’s counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism
‘communities’. NSS 2009 now proposes that closer
coherence will be achieved by more formal linkages between them as
well as by a strengthening of the Cabinet Office led Counter
Proliferation Committee.
Conclusions: Internet searches, after the publication of
CONTEST (2009), have produced very few major reactions to the new
version of the strategy which rather reinforces the question, in this
paper’s introduction, about who the target audience is supposed
to be. Certainly CONTEST (2009), by volume, is more informative, at
first reading, than CONTEST (2006) but closer reading has found that
the detail in the important CBRNE area does not fully support its
‘Prepare’ prioritisation in CONTEST (2009). This can only
really be understood by reference to other, non-CONTEST (2009),
sources on CBRNE. Moreover despite the additional ‘Prevent’
related detail in CONTEST (2009) the head of the OSCT has noted that
further information and effort will be needed to gain the active
support of the public and private sector ‘partners’ that
the Government hopes to involve in its ‘Prevent’
prioritisation of countering violent extremism. In such CONTEST
policy areas this paper has found that Bossong’s use of
Matland’s ‘ambiguity-conflict’ model of policy
implementation provides a transferable analytical framework.
CONTEST’s historic preoccupation with Islamist extremism may
also not be sustainable for much longer if there are further reports
of what may be evidence relating to right-wing terrorism planning in
the UK. Perhaps CONTEST, in its next iteration, has to become more
overtly a generic counter-terrorism/counter-extremism strategy for
the UK.
Frank Gregory
Professor of European Security, School of Social Sciences,
University of Southampton
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